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ABSTRACT 
 
This research is a practitioner inquiry into change in concepts in contexts of 
task based discourse in teacher education classrooms. The particular concepts 
selected for study are epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history. A hypothesis 
that there is a relationship between a perception of agency in task based discourse 
and change in concepts is proposed for research on the basis of a review of Kuhn's 
arguments for paradigm change and those of others on the problems of 
convergence of meaning between paradigms.1 Four of five quasi experimental 
studies conducted find tentative support for the alternative hypothesis and 
demonstrate how the relationship could be tested in the field. 
Change in epistemic beliefs from pre-test to post-test is significant in both 
groups, Control and Experimental, and consistently more and better change with 
moderate effect sizes is seen in the Experimental groups. A matched pedagogical 
method, experience of a range of suitable examples, Skemp (1971) was provided 
to both Control and Experimental groups and this is found to be effective in 
developing beliefs. The experimental construct, a perception of agency in task 
based discourse was enhanced in Experimental groups alone, which is used to 
explain the difference in change.  
A rubric, the Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History, CBKH, is 
developed and employed to examine responses to open ended questions. Likert 
Scales are also used and conclusions are drawn with a final quantitative analysis 
of data. Excerpts from a focus group discussion illustrate the process.  
 
                                            
1 Among others, Schön (2002), Newman (1999) and Russell (1996). 
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Glossary 
 
 The meanings of key terms are discussed in depth in the pages that follow 
while a simple definition or reference is provided below.  
 A Perception of Agency: An enhanced perception of agency to reflect upon 
one's prior knowledge, to question, argue, agree or disagree with group 
views, progress at one’s pace, is facilitated within the task-based group 
discourse in the quasi experiments conducted for this research. The manner 
in which a perception of agency is operationalised as an intervention is 
described in the research methodology. The experience is provided to 
experimental groups exclusively and not to control groups. 
 Task Based Group Discourse: This is a term coined for a group discussion 
in the context of an active learning task. The term encompasses the 
contexts, actions and words required for concept development. 
 Change in Concepts: What are concepts and change within these is not 
open for simple definition as is argued in Section 2.2.2. The concepts under 
consideration in this research are epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history. Change is considered as a move on a scale from naive to 
sophisticated beliefs. 
 Experience of a Range of Suitable Examples: This term is derived from 
Skemp (1971, p.32). A Psychology of Learning Mathematics. There is a 
small amendment from Skemp’s term ‘collection’ to ‘range’. The meaning 
here is near literal with each word of consequence. See Section 2.2.11. 
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List of Acronyms 
 
 BM: Boscolo & Mason 
 BLTHQ: Beliefs about Learning and Teaching History Questionnaire 
 EBI: Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
 CBKH: Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History 
 CIE: Cambridge International Examinations 
 O' Level: Ordinary Level Examination 
 C: Control 
 E: Experimental 
 
 
 
Citation and Referencing in the Dissertation 
 
 Harvard Referencing is used throughout with Endnote 7 software. 
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and Kuhn’s theory is referred to multiple times in this document a reference 
is added the first time and in places where a particular item is quoted but 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The problem provides the occasion and enduring focus of experimental inquiry.’ 
 
Scheffler (1999)  
 
This introductory Chapter begins by outlining the problem of interest that 
provides the focus of this research in teacher education. Key ideas and 
perspectives that shaped my thinking and the development of the theoretical 
framework for this research are briefly discussed. The relationship of a perception 
of agency and change of concepts that is the focus of this research is introduced 
in the context of the evolution of ideas about conceptual change beginning with 
Kuhn's theory of paradigm change. The research focus is situated in theoretical 
frameworks on conceptual change, specifically, epistemic belief change and this 
is discussed, explaining decisions for the methodology of research. The argument 
is introduced contextually, elaborated and key issues are highlighted. The purpose, 
benefits, importance and scope of the research is explained, highlighting what 
could be seen as contribution to knowledge. A conclusion sums up important 
themes and outlines the direction that is taken in the methods used in the study. 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem 
 
Expectations of teacher education include helping teachers review and 
revise deeply held concepts and beliefs such as concepts about how people learn 
or the role of the classroom environment in affecting pupil behaviour. Valuable time 
is spent in in-service professional development of teachers to change and develop 
such key educational ideas. I, Lubna Kidwai, the practitioner researcher, teacher 
educator, have observed that the dynamics of whole group, teacher led discussion 
creates a seemingly shared social-construction that is not always a reliable 
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indicator of change in individual views or concepts. A year spent in interaction with 
a classroom group in discussions builds hope that change has indeed taken place 
but a visit to schools reveals traditional classrooms with desks in rows and beliefs 
in received knowledge as the dominant philosophy. 
Perhaps, I wondered, if it was the discourse in our teacher education 
classrooms that was misleading. Perhaps, we the tutors, were reading more into 
the discourse than what lay underneath. Student teachers may be expressing a 
socially constructed stance that was merely surface learning and did not really 
reflect a deep belief change. Or, it could be, that the product of group learning did 
not reflect individual belief change. What is needed I recognized, is research that 
yields theory to better explain classroom learning of concepts in contexts of task 
based discourse in teacher education classrooms. Task based discourse is a term 
I have coined to refer to discussion that takes place in groups in the context of a 
learning task. My objective is to make these vital occasions more fruitful for change 
in concepts. 
In order to understand the phenomenon, I turned to the literature for an 
analysis of the history and processes of thinking in conceptual change. An in-depth 
review highlighted interesting aspects of Kuhn’s structure of paradigm change4 that 
I could see were incompatible with contexts of learning as prevalent in classrooms. 
Apart from insight from theory, reflection on my experience of teaching raised 
questions that required answers. A chance observation of a small group of early 
years children occupied in learning seemed to illuminate constraints in the task 
based group discourse that may have hindered learning for some. These were 
children working in groups but I could see constraints and opportunities that might 
be found in teacher learning groups.5  
This study problematises classroom interaction as unequal in its 
affordances of agency for individuals to reflect on prior beliefs and the new ideas 
on offer. A question is raised if concepts change more easily where there is an 
enhanced perception of agency in task based group discourse. The task based 
                                            
4 Thomas Kuhn (1962) 
5 See Appendix A for the Case Study. 
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discourse provides the necessary contexts, actions and words, but is reflection on 
own prior ideas possible within this scenario? I base my argument for agency on 
a review of Kuhn’s analysis of paradigm change, and look for answers in Schön’s 
work followed by Newman’s, on ways to resolve the problems of convergence in 
meaning. Sinatra and Pintrich (2003) give importance to intentionality and 
motivation as a factor in learning and this too informs the development of the 
argument. The construct, a perception of agency and its relationship to conceptual 
change in contexts of task based group discourse is thus developed as a focus for 
my research. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background in Teacher Education  
 
Teacher education as conducted in large private school systems in Pakistan 
includes formal courses of study in education conducted in collaboration with UK 
universities. As a teacher educator involved in such programmes, I chose to focus 
on a major issue of the development of teacher concepts. Conceptual change, 
while being an aim of teacher education, is often difficult to achieve. 
Mayer-Smith and Mitchell (1997, p.129) find mixed results in promoting 
change in pre-service teachers’ beliefs and practices. They discuss the failure of 
teacher education programmes to impact on the prior knowledge pre-service 
teacher candidates possess. They conclude that even robust efforts of those 
involved in carefully crafted programs aimed to promote conceptual change have 
minimal effect. In our own practice of teaching university based courses to 
teachers in Pakistan, we find that teaching and encouraging reflection has 
remained problematic. Zeichner and Liston (1987) discuss the goals of reflective 
teaching to argue for the importance of greater teacher autonomy and democratic 
participation. 
Richardson (1997, p.6), discusses Schifter and Simon (1992), to suggest 
that the negotiation of meaning within social interaction often provides a source of 
cognitive dissonance that allows individual students to restructure their concepts. 
Loughran and Russell (1997, p.180), in describing their pre-service teacher 
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development programmes, say they strive to use a pedagogy that challenges new 
teachers to better articulate and understand their beliefs and practices which are 
rooted in prior experiences. This ‘better articulation and understanding of personal 
beliefs and practices’, I have come to realize, is key, especially in the contexts of 
social interaction in educational programmes. There is a need for more research 
in order to understand the phenomenon of the individual's agency in task based 
group discourse to articulate ideas and make connections with prior beliefs and 
concepts. Procedures that provide opportunity for more democratic and agentic 
discourse need to be understood and practiced to improve the possibilities of 
change.  
 
1.3 Competing Explanations of Conceptual Change  
 
Study of concepts and conceptual change, including individual beliefs about 
knowledge and knowing, is an area of interest in education and psychology, which 
is traced to the work of Piaget in genetic epistemology and Vygotsky on social 
constructivism. Change in concepts is studied with reference, among others, to the 
theories of Kuhn (1962) on paradigm change, Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog 
(1982b) and a range of literature in cognitive psychology including the work of 
Sinatra and Pintrich (2003) and Vosniadou (2003). Change in epistemic beliefs is 
a focus of research in the cognitive sciences. 
Change is seen as occurring in the individual mind in the Piagetian 
perspective, as assimilation or accommodation of new ideas with prior knowledge. 
The key finding of ‘How People Learn’ research is the importance of student’s 
preconceptions, say Ashby et al. (2005, p.79). This, I argue, is imperative. We 
teachers need to recognise that prior conceptions of each individual may be 
different and not necessarily common with and homogenous to those in the group. 
There may be varying levels of conflict and difficulties in accommodation. Social 
and cultural factors play a role in the process. Posner et al. (1982, p.212) argue 
learning as a rational activity. They refer to Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1970) to 
support patterns of change in concepts as comparable to descriptions of paradigm 
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change in science. Based on Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change, conceptual 
change even at an individual level, is construed as arising out of conflict with 
existing beliefs. 
There are two main approaches to the study of conceptual change. One is 
that of cognitive development and meaning construction, as in Piaget, the other of 
knowledge as socially constructed in discourse communities, O’Loughlin (1992), 
Hofer (2002, p.25). Vosniadou (2007a, p.1) describes a reframed, constructivist 
approach to conceptual change. Vosniadou (2007b) considers knowledge to be 
organized in domain specific, theory-like structures, and knowledge acquisition to 
be characterized by theory like changes as in Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change. 
Pintrich (2002, p.403), in a review of research, proposes that 
epistemological development is a function of both, internal psychological 
mechanisms as well as contextual facilitators and constraints. This is discussed in 
the review of literature and informs the development of the focus on a perception 
of agency in task based discourse. Change in concepts is considered a 
psychological process and contextual factors are seen to have meaningful effects. 
Pintrich et al. (1993, p.167) highlight a need to focus beyond cold cognition, on 
motivation and the roles of individuals in a classroom learning community. Change 
as intentional is also discussed with reference to the key voices in the domain. 
Vosniadou gives importance to prior learning. While accepting the 
importance of socio-cultural factors, she suggests that ‘radical socio-cultural or 
situative perspectives ‘consider only the internalization or appropriation of existing 
cultural practices, tools and artifacts, and do not give adequate attention to the 
active role of the individual in understanding or constructing new knowledge’. 
Vosniadou (2007a, p.3). She believes that the conceptual approach could be 
reframed to account for both. 
Such ideas challenge an uncritical paradigmatic belief in social constructive 
learning situations benefiting learning. There is faith that the individual who has to 
construct knowledge with reflection on prior concepts will best be able to do so in 
social interaction. I too share the faith but have learnt in the years of my practice 
that there are factors at play in group work and interaction that need to be explored 
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with more research in order to improve the possibility of change in concepts, each 
individual at a time. Scaffolding learning in task-based discourse may require more 
awareness of difference in individual prior concepts and efforts to encourage 
individual agency to reflect upon these within the social contexts of learning. 
It is useful here to note developments in research and practice in the 
‘Learning Sciences’, which is a move away from ‘Instructionism’ (Sawyer, 2006, p. 
1-16). Importance is given to deeper understanding of complex concepts and 
creating effective learning environments. Importantly, these are argued as 
constructivist approaches that emphasise prior knowledge, scaffolding, 
externalization, articulation and promote reflection for better learning.6 
 
1.4 The Theoretical Framework: An Argument for Agency  
 
There is a large and diverse body of research and theory that informs the 
work in conceptual change in learning. Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change is 
influential in building theory in the classical approach to conceptual change. 
Posner et al. (1982); Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.7); Ferrari and Elik (2003, p.33); 
Vosniadou (2007b); Thagard and Zhu (2003, p.79); are among those who argue 
change from a Kuhnian perspective. 
While Kuhn’s theory is often cited in beginning discussions on conceptual 
change, in my understanding, Kuhn’s theory of change in paradigms could be 
incommensurate with change through instruction. Instruction in classrooms has a 
change agent and planned change is assumed first and then brought into 
production. Therefore, to import Kuhn’s theory to explain and predict conceptual 
change in classrooms one must recognize and accommodate the difference. The 
autonomous, cognitive/socio cultural processes that make existing ideas obsolete 
and generate consensus and enthusiasm for the new, creating a new paradigm, 
are not part of planned classroom process. Change through instruction is 
                                            
6 See 
1. Sawyer (2006, p.1-16) in The Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences (2006)  
2. How People Learn; Brain, Mind, Experience and School (2000)   
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generated deliberately by others in artificial situations and on possibly 
unsuspecting actors. Classrooms are places for more ‘mediated action’ as 
opposed to the autonomous, naturally evolving action that is taken as examples of 
paradigm change. 
It is in this context of complex learning that Kuhn’s analysis of changing 
paradigms can be revisited to account for change even at small scale and 
individual level. The change in paradigms as social-cultural events, have been, as 
I have highlighted earlier, autonomous, often hotly debated, emotionally charged. 
Issues are real and the change is often radical and especially in the domain of 
science, the change has been effective over large groups and over time. In 
classrooms, issues may be of transient, cursory interest. Participants may not see 
the need to invest energy in what they may see as an interest of the group rather 
than a personal concern. 
Machamer (2007, p.39) discusses Kuhn’s philosophical claims to agree that 
Kuhn was right to tie knowing with acting and doing. He argues that knowledge 
use is in the public domain which entails that criteria for knowledge always has a 
social component. Machamer (2007, p.39) refers to Piaget’s accommodation and 
assimilation to argue that knowing and doing involve recall of prior schemata with 
feedback received in the environment leading to ‘knowing well’. This, as a long 
practicing teacher, I can argue, is where the problem arises. Knowing is 
simultaneously an individual, psychological action, with the individual expected to 
make connections with prior schemata but in social situations which are necessary 
yet at times possibly obstructive, in allowing this process to take place. My 
argument is that a perception of agency may be present or missing in the social 
situation which may impact conceptual change. The video record of an early years’ 
classroom that is provided, illustrates just such a situation.7 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7 See Appendix A1. 
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1.5 Pedagogical Method for the Experiments 
 
In order to research a perception of agency in practical classroom teaching 
experiments it is necessary that all other variables are controlled. The pedagogical 
method needs to be common in all experiments and clearly defined and described. 
The method also needs to be effective for learning in order for the teacher to be 
able to focus on the environment of a perception of agency to change concepts. 
For this research, Skemp (1971) principles of change in concepts in the domain of 
mathematics were selected. This method is described and is itself examined for 
effectiveness in change of epistemic beliefs in history. 
The theoretical framework developed on the basis of these arguments is 
illustrated below in a Venn diagram set in a context (See Figure 1.1). Conceptual 
change is hypothesized as emerging from an experience of a range of suitable 
examples supported with a perception of agency to question, reflect on own prior 
knowledge, agree or disagree with group views and freedom to circulate to a more 
compatible group. The context is task-based group discourse in teacher education 
classrooms. 
 
Figure 1.1: The Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task Based Group Discourse 
A Perception of Agency Conceptual Change Experience of a Range  Of Suitable Examples 
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1.6 Research Aim 
 
To enquire into a problem of teacher learning as change of concepts that I 
and my colleagues encounter as practitioners in teacher education. 
 
1.7 Study Question 
 
The main research question is, if there is a relationship between a 
perception of agency and change in participants’ epistemic beliefs in learning 
contexts of task based discourse. 
 
1.8 The Research Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis states that there is a relationship between a perception of 
agency and change in concepts in task based group discourse. 
 
1.9 Key Objectives of Research 
 
 To investigate an alternative hypothesis of a relationship between a 
perception of agency and conceptual change in task-based 
discourse in 5 quasi-experimental studies conducted in teacher 
education contexts. 
 To employ and examine Skemp (1971) principle of a range of 
suitable examples as a pedagogical method to change concepts. 
 To demonstrate if the relationship of a perception of agency and 
conceptual change in task-based group discourse can be 
researched. 
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1.10 Purpose of Study 
  
This research is planned and conducted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of research for the award of a Doctor of Philosophy from the 
University of Bradford. As I am an extra mural candidate, this independent, self-
funded, research has been conducted in my own country, Pakistan, in the field of 
private schools providing teacher education facilities. Distance learning has its 
challenges but the constant support from the University and of academics in the 
field as well as provision of resources, makes the task possible to accomplish as 
this study demonstrates. 
The purpose of the study is to enquire into a problem of teacher learning 
and change that I and my colleagues encounter as practitioners in teacher 
education. Most teachers in Pakistan come from a background of traditional 
schooling. Traditional schools have teacher led, whole class teaching, one correct 
answer to questions that are rote learnt and reproduced in examination. Behaviour 
and learning is conceived as a consequence of upbringing and societal influence. 
Concepts that teachers bring to the teaching encounter are notoriously hard to 
change and develop, as I and my colleagues have found. This background of 
concerns about practice has informed the development of my hypothesis and 
research project, and is of personal interest to me. Conceptual change is a growing 
field of study in educational psychology and a new relationship with change may 
be of general interest in the community of teacher education as well as in other 
domains. A personal, intentional interest to research my practice and its problems 
of conceptual change was the initial impetus for the choice of  
a research degree. 
Practitioner research has its common practices including action research, 
case studies and qualitative methods. This research conducted in my practice of 
teacher education demonstrates the use of quasi-experiments and mixed 
methods. As a teacher educator, one of my objectives is to model other ways of 
conducting practitioner research for my teacher students in Pakistan. 
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1.11 Benefits of the Study  
 
Research in the field of conceptual change should benefit from the proposal 
of a new relationship for study. Change is researched from psychological 
perspectives of cognitive development, from a focus on cognitive dissonance as 
creating conditions for change, as well as from social and situational perspectives 
and there is a range of literature8 that inform this field. The review of literature, 
especially that of paradigm change in scientific communities, introduces a critical 
analysis of the process of paradigm change as interpreted by theorists in the field 
of conceptual change following Kuhn. As an outcome of this analysis, I introduce 
a perception of agency as a possible factor in change and my research looks for 
support for this relationship. An alternative hypothesis is proposed and found to be 
supported in the research. This could be followed by other research to reject a null 
hypothesis. 
Conceptual change is considered the most central area in the learning 
sciences as diSessa (2006, p.265) points out. Supporting change through task 
based group discourse in classrooms in a range of concepts in domains such as 
science, history, mathematics, and geography can be explored with a perception 
of agency as a factor in change. A relationship of change and a perception of 
agency can also be studied in contexts of organizational change. 
Epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history are an important area of 
research. Measures are still in the process of being developed. The CBKH, 
(Categories of Belief about Knowledge in History) rubric for assessment of 
epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history was modified and developed in this 
study and employed in the assessment of 166 responses. The rubric is trialed and 
found useful and can benefit from development in more research in the field.9 
                                            
8 See Sinatra and Pintrich (eds) (2003) Intentional Conceptual Change; Sawyer K. (ed.) (2006) The 
Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences; Donovan and Bransford (eds) (2005) How Students Learn 
History Mathematics and Science in the Classroom. 
9 The rubric was developed with reference to Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) Levels and Maggioni et al model 
of the Copier, Borrower, Criterialist categories of belief. 
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The pedagogical method of using a range of suitable examples finds strong 
support with significant conceptual change observed in 10 groups. This is adapted 
from Skemp (1971, p.25, 32) to experience a collection of suitable examples as 
necessary to learn mathematical concepts. Further trials in primary school learning 
of science, social studies and mathematics concepts could draw attention to this 
useful pedagogical tool. I have found that the three specific conditions of 
experience, range, and suitability of examples are all necessary for making a 
difference in change. This is another benefit of the study pointing towards more 
areas of research.  
The word collection may be taken to imply a group of collected objects or 
examples. Range implies the amount, number or type between an upper or lower 
limit. Skemp (1971) discusses examples and non-examples of concepts which is 
a useful distinction. I provided types of sources of evidence in the workshops and 
these were discussed with reference to questions. Details are provided in the 
Chapter on Research Methodology. 
One interesting aspect of this research is that the particular concepts 
identified for study are epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history. These 
concepts and change within these are the source of requirements of teacher 
development in line with change in Syllabus of the Cambridge O’ Level 
Examination (CIE) of History in Pakistan. I have identified this requirement of 
teacher education from a reference to targets of teacher development in the UK 
and elsewhere, these not being stated as such in academic manuals of the private 
schools, where Cambridge examinations are conducted in Pakistan, as yet, to my 
knowledge.  
History teaching and learning is a politically dictated activity in most parts of 
the world although curriculum improvements show a trend towards development.10 
History teaching content in Pakistan usually follows changing patterns with each 
changing government and provincial body. Local examinations require a limited 
syllabus definition and the scope of development is not large. Cambridge 
                                            
10 A quick Google search, with Pakistan Studies or Pakistan History as search terms, will reveal the intense 
interest in the subject on an international level as well as within Pakistan. 
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International Examinations are set to international standards, therefore change 
and development can be expected for the better. My research should be useful to 
inform CIE that teachers can develop epistemic concepts and that change of the 
syllabus can lead the way. To play a positive role in developing critical thinking is 
an important aim of education.  
Quasi experiments may appear to be somewhat technical and bound by 
theory in practice; however, all teachers try out new ideas and methods in their 
practice and indeed many have their bag of tricks developed in much the same 
experimental ways. Interestingly, mixed methods for all their paradigm challenging 
theory are, again, something teachers and tutors use all the time whilst assessing 
and reporting on pupil achievement. It would benefit teachers to learn the 
limitations of inference from less than reliable methods and different types of 
methods, measures, and analysis, to draw useful conclusions. The problem of 
conceptual change that is identified is one I and my colleagues in teacher 
education are familiar with, as indeed would be teachers in schools. My own role 
as a teacher practitioner researching my own practice allows me access to unravel 
in fine grain the many layered complexities that make up educational situations. 
Reflexivity allows the kind of insight that supports a reasoned inference that is 
necessary in quasi experimental research. 
The development of the rubric, the CBKH, Categories of Beliefs about 
Knowledge in history may be of benefit to future researchers interested in the 
critical analysis and development of such instruments. This is further elaborated in 
the Section that follows. 
What I learn from the conduct of this research will support reflection on my 
own learning, as indeed it has immensely, as well as I hope, be of interest to inform 
the domain of teacher education generally. Conceptual change is a complex 
phenomenon that has much potential for study as discussed in the review of 
literature. What I have learnt about epistemic beliefs in the years of this research 
is indeed a life changing experience and I would like, Quixote like, to run out in the 
field and warn people rather than just sit back and assess their claims to knowing. 
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Truth is a fascinating subject and the years of this study have been a most 
personally rewarding learning experience. 
 
1.12 Importance and Scope of the Study  
 
A key contribution of this study is the proposal of an interesting relationship 
of a perception of agency and conceptual change in task-based group discourse. 
The argument is novel, emerging as it does from Kuhn's description of the change 
of paradigms and concepts within these. Kuhn's theory of paradigm change has 
long been considered the basis for the development of theories of conceptual 
change through educational experiences. Differences in a perception of agency 
are highlighted in the context of change in scientific communities and in task based 
group discourse in teacher education classrooms. This is an important factor that 
needs recognition in planning for change through instruction in both child and adult 
education as my study suggests. 
Conceptual change is a major concern in the field of education and in its 
various domains. Emerging from Kuhn’s claim of incommensurability between 
paradigms, much theoretical argument and research tries to address the problem 
of convergence in meaning. Schön’s work to resolve the problem of meaning by 
emphasizing contexts, actions, words and reflection in action is influential while 
being disputed by others such as Newman (1999). A perception of agency as 
making a difference within the context of task based discourse fits in this space. 
Change in concepts is studied in Science, e.g. Driver (1983, p.180), in 
Mathematics, Skemp (1971), History, Lee et al. (1993), Shemilt (1980), 
VanSledright (2002), Lee (2005), Maggioni et al. (2009a), VanSledright (2014) and 
in a range of other fields and publications by the authors.11 Measures of epistemic 
beliefs are several as Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001) analyse. 
                                            
11 See Donavan and Bransford (eds) (2005) How Students Learn; Myint Swe Khine (ed) (2008) Knowing 
Knowledge and Beliefs; Hofer and Pintrich (eds) (2002) Personal Epistemology; Vosniadou, Baltas and 
Vamvakoussi (eds) (2007) Re-framing the Conceptual Change Approach in Learning and Instruction. 
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My arguments fit in this theoretical domain and introduce the factor of a 
perception of agency in the social context of task based discourse as playing a 
role in the process of an individual's surfacing of own prior concepts, recognising 
conflict and finding new ideas acceptable or useful. This should be a fruitful new 
avenue of research in conceptual change. The advantage is that it is logical and 
fits in well with arguments such as those for other psychological constructs 
including intention and motivation as relating to change. The theoretical 
background of agency and mental development of infants and young children goes 
back to Piaget (1928) and Russell (1996). It may be worth exploring if a perception 
of agency is a factor in adult learning of new concepts. Qualitative research could 
shed more insight on this relationship. 
There is scope in this argument for research into change of all kinds of 
concepts not just epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history. Epistemic beliefs 
and change within these are studied in a range of domains by researchers around 
the world. Conceptual change is of interest generally in management of change in 
organizational cultures as well as cultural change in societies. Change in concepts 
in society is produced intentionally as well as unintentionally through a range of 
processes and media and for a wide variety of purposes. Perceptions of agency in 
processes of change especially where this is orchestrated by agents on 
unsuspecting subjects may be usefully taken into account. It would be interesting 
to see if a perception of agency could be a common denominator in societal 
change as well as change in the contexts of interaction in classrooms. 
Somekh (2006) discusses agency and change to generate actionable 
knowledge and action research for agency in organizational change. Somekh 
considers the constraints in institutional structures and the affordances that either 
enable or constrain the action of individuals to bring change. In this research I 
focus on a perception of agency that bridges a psychological accommodation of 
new ideas to change existing schema within the context of task based discourse. 
My focus is on a change of concepts and not on action or bringing about change 
in organisations, however I see scope for research within organisational change 
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frameworks of a perception of agency bringing about measurable difference by 
simply helping to change the way people think. 
Demonstrating that the relationship of agency with change can be 
researched in practical terms is particularly useful. This is practitioner research 
using a quasi-experimental methodology. The trial is not a randomized control trial; 
however, it has its value in validity for similar contexts and samples. Conducting 5 
studies with 10 Groups, Control and Experimental, based on this relationship 
provides reasonable evidence that the study can be replicated by other 
practitioners in classrooms. Operationalising the perception of agency is a useful 
model for future use.  
The design of the research is reported with transparent detail and should 
be useful for teacher educators and researchers to follow. Conducting 5 matched 
quasi experiments and carrying out independent as well as meta-analysis of all 5 
studies was a useful if time consuming methodology and this is described in detail. 
This would have benefits for others who carry out research in education, where 
there are debates about how valid knowledge can be generated by practitioners. 
The constraints and opportunities of the context described forewarn researchers 
about the limitations of research in the field as well as its value for practice. 
Epistemic beliefs of teachers about knowledge in history are explored 
through a qualitative analysis of responses to open ended questions. These 
responses are assessed with reference to a scale of epistemic beliefs developed 
for this purpose. Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) as well as Maggioni et al. (2004).  
Maggioni et al. (2004) models of epistemic beliefs (2004) are used to build a 
revised set of categories to order responses. This rubric called the CBKH or 
Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in history is trialed, amended and improved 
with repeated readings of the 166 responses sheets. Exemplars are added to 
illustrate the categories. This instrument might be seen as useful by others 
researching epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history. As this is a new 
development, there is scope for critical analysis and more research. 
This research finds that concepts are learnt well with experience of a range 
of suitable examples. In the 5 studies, all 10 groups showed significant change 
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from pre-test to post-test. This is another good theory to examine in conceptual 
change research. Skemp’s theory for the use of a collection of suitable examples 
for change in concepts is well argued, Skemp (1971, p.32). His idea always made 
sense to me and employing the method formally for research with careful planning 
and implementation proved effective. Making sure all three examples were used 
in the workshops was not hard. The qualifying adjective ‘suitable’ turned out to be 
key, as the range of examples I used were meaningful, had good explanatory 
value, and caught the imagination of the participants. Therefore, the words, 
experience of a range of suitable examples are all of importance. Experience is 
also an important element here. The teacher participants were provided concrete 
experience of the source materials, examined these carefully and drew 
conclusions that were meaningful to them. Significant change, as seen in both 
Groups, Control and Experimental, bears testimony that the method did work. The 
examples and heuristics used are employed as argued by VanSledright (2002); 
VanSledright and Afflerbach (2005); Lee and Shemilt (2003). 
Teaching to change concepts is intentional, where teachers are clearly 
aware of the scope of the goals they plan. How such teaching can be made 
effective, whilst still humane, moral, not manipulative and not coercive, is a 
complex issue. Agency in intellectual activity is not counter intuitive. This research 
suggests that there could possibly be a relationship between a perception of 
agency and change in concepts in task based group discourse. Purely logically, it 
would have been strange indeed if the inquiry had suggested otherwise. 
Finally, this quasi experimental research using mixed methods, is 
conducted taking a generally pragmatic stance. I question ‘what works’, however 
and suggest that ‘what is known to work’ is of value only if it is known how it is 
known and to what parameters it can be held to apply. The research is conducted 
as 5 independent studies and detailed transparent and open reporting is provided 
for other researchers in the field to try out. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
‘Even whatever is written in the book may be totally wrong like aa Bahadur Shah 
Zafar was the last emperor and...’ 
‘It’s true, that is the thing I am telling.’ 
 (Loud buzz from group)  
‘Ma’am was asking that aa are you sure about that?’ (giggles, laughter) ‘we said 
yes we are sure about that. And she is asking, how do you know and we 
said....’(participants joining in) 
‘it is written in the book.’ (laughter) 
- Participants in a focus group session reflecting upon change in their 
epistemic concepts in the history workshops. The ‘Ma’am’ they refer to is 
myself, the tutor.           
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is composed of essays that critically review relevant literature 
that has led to the development of the theoretical framework, informed my 
understanding of philosophical and practical aspects of the design, issues in 
conceptual change particularly epistemic beliefs, and importantly, the development 
of the CBKH rubric, the Categories of Belief about Knowledge in History. The 
development of the research design required much reading and reflection on 
issues of paradigms in mixed methods, reliability in quasi experimental research, 
and indeed the drawing of conclusions from the mixed data. All of these are 
important reading and have shaped my understanding as well as helped me 
identify gaps in knowledge and thought that research efforts could serve to 
illuminate. I would like to draw special attention to Sections 2.2.6 to 2.2.8 that argue 
and present the key relationship of agency with change in concepts in the context 
of Kuhn’s ideas of how paradigms change. 
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The focus being complex and the literature vast, it requires far more 
coverage than is possible in this literature review and word limit. I have been 
selective and focused on key issues and arguments relevant to my research. I 
explore knowledge in these areas and proceed to critically select, review and add 
my voice to the debate. The first section traces the development of understanding 
of learning as conceptual change with its basis in Piaget’s genetic epistemology, 
the history of science approach, and Kuhnian paradigm change. Conceptual 
change, specifically epistemic concepts and change within these, concepts of 
knowledge in history, agency as a factor in change and the history of research 
within this domain, is critically reviewed. The relationship within these is explored 
to find relevance and meaning and indeed to gain insight into the complex 
phenomenon of conceptual change in teacher learning. 
The research focus, a relationship between conceptual change and a 
perception of agency in task-based group discourse is at a nexus of knowledge in 
domains of cognitive psychology, philosophy, sociology and education. That 
sounds more grand than it is. In everyday classroom practice in schools around 
the world all of these areas interact and are the focus of concern of learners, 
teachers, schools, parents and the society at large. 
 
2.2 Concepts, Epistemic Beliefs? 
 
The focus of interest in this research are concepts, specifically, epistemic 
beliefs about knowledge in history, and change within these. In this section of the 
literature review and those that follow, what are epistemic beliefs, how change in 
such concepts can take place, and aspects of the social context that may make a 
difference in change are explored in depth. I raise a key weakness in existing 
understanding about the relevance of Kuhn’s description of paradigm change and 
the process of change of concepts in classroom situations to identify a possibility 
that a perception of agency may be an underpinning difference in the change 
processes that take place in scientific communities and the orchestrated change 
in concepts in classrooms. 
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diSessa (2002, p.32-33, 58) is critical of research that is built on vaguely defined 
terms such as ‘concept’, ‘belief’, ‘theory’ and ‘ontology’. diSessa argues in 
picturesque ways, that the lenses to inspect conceptual change are ‘fuzzy’ and 
what we have in theoretical terms is a ‘mushy soup’. In place of coherence and 
broad terms such as concepts, she takes the position that concepts be seen as 
fragments, as parts of coordination classes and recommends a “conceptual 
ecology approach”, which is a complex organisation or reorganisation of different 
kinds of knowledge. I discuss this further below. 
Hewson (1992, p.8) sees epistemological beliefs as part of a person’s 
“conceptual ecology”. Chi and Roscoe (2002, p.6-7), suggest that one can 
represent knowledge as a set of interconnected ideas as a ‘mental model’. This 
adds a structure in which these propositions are embedded. They say there can 
be fragmented or coherent models. Schema, mental model, theory, theory-like, are 
more terms employed in the literature. 
Pintrich (2002, p.390) discusses the nature of the construct of personal 
epistemology expressing concern that diverse models discussed in the literature 
‘might not be concerned with the same construct or at a minimum might not define 
the boundaries of the construct in the same way’. A review of literature finds that 
the terms 'personal epistemology or epistemic beliefs' are complex with a broad 
range of contextual and domain related meanings. Hofer (2002, p.4) frames 
epistemology from a philosophical perspective, as being concerned with the origin, 
nature, limits, methods, and justification of human knowledge. This I consider a 
particularly useful definition in the context of knowledge in history. Hofer (2002, 
p.4) differentiates the term ‘epistemic’ as relating to knowledge more generally, 
and to the conditions for acquiring it. Kuhn and Weinstock (2002, p.123) argue that 
well developed epistemological understanding would demonstrate a coordination 
or balance between the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing. This is 
good insight as I have seen responses demonstrate development with a growing 
awareness of the constructed nature of knowledge followed by understanding that 
the use of heuristics can help find the better explanation in history. 
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I explore what are epistemological beliefs about knowledge in history, and 
a ‘perception of agency’ in this Chapter in depth. In the description of the research 
I will spell out the frame of reference for ‘a perception of agency’. 
 
2.2.1 Perspectives on Conceptual Change 
 
Learning as change of concepts is a concern in education. A Report on 
‘How Students Learn’, in texts produced by the National Research Council of 
National Academies in America, begins with the statement that students come to 
the classroom with preconceptions about how the world works and, if their initial 
understanding is not engaged, they may fail to grasp the new concepts and 
information, or they may learn them for the purpose of a test but revert to their 
preconceptions outside the classroom. Donovan and Bransford (2005b, p.20) raise 
the concern that revealing prior ideas and changing these in the course of 
instruction is essential to effective learning and receptive teaching. They find that 
a focus on student thinking would as a norm encourage expressive behaviour as 
well as risk taking. Donovan and Bransford (2005a) also suggest that mistakes 
should not be judged as evidence of poor learning but rather as demonstrating 
understanding. I draw in part on these ideas to operationalize the construct of a 
perception of agency as an intervention. 
The effectiveness of teacher education programmes in changing teacher 
beliefs and expectations such as that all children are capable of learning and that 
teachers hold and communicate their expectations regarding children's learning 
are questioned by McDiarmid (1993, p.113). In my own experience, I know that 
while teachers enjoy listening to accounts of Rosenthal's research, the thought that 
their own expectations could be making a difference seldom sinks in. A four year 
longitudinal study in eleven programs found that teachers’ ideas about ethnic 
stereotypes being valid knowledge on which to make classroom teaching decisions 
did not change in most of the sample. However, they did find statistically significant 
differences on a number of items, McDiarmid (1993, p.137). 
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These are daunting statistics but research must go on if concepts are 
required to change. In this research as well, I find that while there is good change 
of a degree or from low to higher stance, change of a complete stance is infrequent 
in the sample. 
A view of conceptual change as a process of equilibration through 
accommodation owes its clarity to Piaget. There are two main approaches to the 
study of conceptual change. One is that of cognitive development and meaning 
construction as in Piaget, the other of knowledge as socially constructed in 
discourse communities. O’Loughlin (1992), Hofer (2002) and Scott et al. (1997) 
review strategies to promote conceptual change. They identify two approaches; 
cognitive conflict-resolution of conflicting perspectives; building and extending 
learners existing ideas. Roth sees an integration of psychology and anthropology 
in Vygotsky’s approach. He terms this a socio-cultural and socio-historic approach 
which integrates both cultural and individualistic ways of knowing. Roth (1999, 
p.13). 
Pintrich (2002, p.403), in a review of research, finds that both internal 
psychological mechanisms as well as contextual facilitators and constraints have 
a role in epistemological development. According to Pintrich (2002, p.403) ‘strong 
cognitive developmental claims about internal cognitive processes (e.g., 
equilibration) or strong contextualist claims about socialization processes (e.g., 
scaffolding) as the sole or main mechanisms of change are not warranted.’ Pintrich 
(2002, p.404) concludes that there is no need for research that compares internal 
psychological mechanisms with contextual factors as facilitators of epistemological 
development. 
From the perspective of psychology diSessa (2006, p.266) argues that 
‘there are, in fact, no widely accepted, well-articulated, and tested theories of 
conceptual change’. diSessa (2006), analyses what she calls threads and fault 
lines in the history of theorizing and research in conceptual change. Concepts are 
seen according to diSessa (2006), as coherent and strongly integrated or as 
fragmented, quasi-independent elements. Vosniadou (2007a, p.1) considers 
knowledge to be organized in domain specific, theory-like structures, and 
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knowledge acquisition to be characterized by theory like changes as in Kuhn’s 
theory of paradigm change. 
diSessa, argues that the term “concept” is ‘hopelessly vague’ and urges 
more precise definition. She promotes a move towards a study of conceptual 
change in finer grain size, multiple and, according to her, therefore, more 
accountable concepts.  She recommends studying concepts as a greater number 
of small scale, diverse elements. In place of the broad term concept, diSessa 
advocates the use of ‘phenomenological primitives’ or ‘p-prims’ organised in 
‘coordination classes’ but recognises that if concepts are seen to exist in the 
thousands within conceptual ecologies there would be an issue to know which are 
‘activated’ in particular contexts. diSessa considers that context dependence 
should be expected, diSessa (2002, p.29-51). 
In my initial understanding, if a researcher were to employ diSessa's idea, 
what would necessarily be needed in a review of research is to find sound empirical 
verification for such constructs. One would need to look for existing verified models 
that make specific links between each mental entity and the processes that are 
said to promote its development. As a reader of theory doing a literature review, I 
saw practical problems in researching smaller grain. I reasoned that given the 
range of possible cognitive/affective and socio-cultural factors and mechanisms in 
change, smaller grain in concepts may just as easily make causal relations difficult 
to establish and alternative explanations difficult to counter. 
As my analysis of data progressed however, I learnt the usefulness of finer 
grain. I realized that indicators of belief required expansion, and elements that 
compose concepts of epistemological beliefs could be usefully unraveled for 
analysis. In the statistical analysis, exploring the change in concepts in finer grain 
as change between low and high stance, and no change, degree change, category 
change as well as a fine grained analysis of the neutral, revealed the underlying 
nature of the change as well as significant differences. This is described further in 
the Results and Analysis Sections. 
Vosniadou (2007a) reinforces the view that conceptual change should not 
be seen only as individual, cognitive process but that the role of socio-cultural 
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factors be considered as well. Placing learners in circumstances where they 
experience cognitive conflict is seen as insufficient for change by Sinatra and 
Pintrich (2003, p.3). Motivation, affective resistance, and learner’s beliefs are 
characteristics that they consider necessary while others take a socio-cultural 
approach or a balanced approach. Vosniadou (2007a, p.1) compares theory that 
conceives of learning as adding to knowledge where concepts are seen as 
enriched rather than changed with the constructivist approach that considers 
knowledge to be organized in theory like structures and knowledge acquisition to 
be characterized by theory-like changes.  
While accepting the importance of socio-cultural factors, Vosniadou (2007a, 
p.3) reinforces the criticism of Hatano (1994), that radical socio-cultural or situative 
perspectives, e.g. Lave (1996), Rogoff (1998), ‘consider only the internalization or 
appropriation of existing cultural practices, tools, and artifacts, and do not pay 
adequate attention to the active role of the individual in understanding or 
constructing new knowledge’. They believe that the conceptual change approach 
could be reframed to account for both. This stance is in keeping with the 
perspective I take in my study when I examine a perception of agency to reflect 
within the social context of task based discourse. 
Ferrari and Elik (2003, p.24-25), discuss what concepts are from a range of 
perspectives. They identify meanings from standard experimental psychology, 
probabilistic theories, theory based models of concepts, relational theories and 
actional/situated perspectives. From actional/situated perspectives, they find that 
concepts are not localised in individual minds. Concepts in these perspectives, 
according to Ferrari and Elik, are abstractions that apply to people acting in social 
settings. I argue an either or approach as inadequate.  
Vosniadou (2007) supports Baltas (2007) to argue that understanding a new 
concept should not require the replacement of a ‘correct’ theory with one that is 
‘incorrect’ but ‘rather the ability to move on to a new, wider, broader perspective’. 
This is in keeping with arguments in the history of science approach that see the 
new paradigm as a wider perspective informed by knowledge of the old.  
Vosniadou (2007, p.11) argues ‘change should be seen as requiring the ability to 
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take multiple perspectives, examine different points of view and understand how 
they relate to different contexts of applicability’. There is, however, a concern in my 
understanding for instances where there is conflict between prior ideas and those 
being introduced. From a stance, for example, that history is isomorphic with the 
past to one that acknowledges history as a construction, beliefs are distinct and 
change from one set of beliefs to another is not easily accomplished. 
Vosniadou (2007a, p.7) argues that the use of bottom–up additive 
mechanisms may not be useful in producing change through instruction. She 
concludes that conceptual change through instruction requires restructuring of 
children’s naive theories, their models of learning, and the creation of meta-
conceptual awareness and intentionality Vosniadou (2003). She concludes that in 
order to avoid misconceptions the use of appropriate tools, artifacts and situational 
contexts can be facilitated. 
From the background of Kuhn's arguments about paradigm change, Posner 
et al. (1982) propose conditions necessary for conceptual change: there must be 
dissatisfaction with existing conceptions; a new conception must be intelligible; the 
new conception must appear plausible; and should be fruitful. Posner et al.’s model 
is widely used in conceptual change theorizing; Sinatra and Pintrich (2003) are, 
however, critical of 'cold conceptual change' models. 
Bendixen (2002, p.191) confirms the role of epistemic doubt as a factor in 
change and considers that doubt and the struggle to resolve epistemic doubt is not 
an easy experience. Bendixen queries the role of the instructor in the process and 
recommends more educational research to better understand how to deal with the 
‘tumultuous experience’. In this research I examine the role of the teacher in 
developing and maintaining a perception of agency within task based discourse 
finding that to be a possible factor in change. 
 
2.2.2 Conceptual Change in Various Domains 
 
Apart from the subject of history, epistemic beliefs are studied in domains 
of science, mathematics, and in general, as well as at different age and educational 
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levels. Stages of development and relationships with culture, age, gender, 
education among other aspects are of interest to researchers.12 Kagan (1992, 
p.73) discusses a sample of studies on teacher beliefs to conclude that teacher 
beliefs usually reflect the actual nature of instruction that teachers provide to 
students. My case study, provided in Appendix A-1, illustrates such an event. 
Whilst framing conceptual change as domain general, Vosniadou suggests 
that conceptual change approaches make a larger claim about learning that 
transcend many domains Vosniadou (2007a, p.1). Domain specificity and 
generality of epistemic beliefs is debated in the literature with several studies 
located in particular disciplines such as mathematics, science and history. In one 
example, Clinchy considers that students may ‘move from subjectivist to 
procedural knowing in the humanities but move from received knowledge directly 
to procedural knowing in science’ Clinchy (2002, p.85). From the perspective of 
learning in science, Viennot (1979) and Driver and Easley (1978) support the ideas 
of Posner et al. (1982, p.212) of students changing their prior frameworks and 
replacing these with scientific concepts in which they receive instruction at school 
(italics mine) as related to the theory change approach of Kuhn. I see problems 
with this as I argue later in this Chapter. 
Limon characterizes concepts in history as being different from those in 
science and history. In Limon’s words, history concepts are abstract, implicit in 
narrative, have to be inferred; they change over time; consensus is difficult; 
categories are ill-defined; and it is difficult to construct reliable or global 
representations of concepts. According to Limon, there are important 
epistemological differences and science constructs are not applicable to 
conceptual change in history, Limon (2002, p.277-285).  
For the purpose of my research I take the various points of view to draw a 
workable frame of reference as well as to critically analyse my findings. I am 
researching change in concepts of knowledge in history and Limon's argument has 
weight in this. In my experience in this research, a combination of narrative 
responses to open ended questions, along with Likert Scale questionnaires, is 
                                            
12 See De Corte et al, Bell and Linn, Elder, Qian and Pan, Hofer and Pintrich, 2002 
 27 
 
useful to study epistemic beliefs in a population. Inferring a stance from a narrative 
over large numbers of responses is not an easy task but the use of a framework 
such as the one devised for this study, the CBKH, was most helpful.  
 
2.2.3 The Use of Kuhn's Theory (1970) and Posner et al’s Model (1982) in 
Conceptual Change Theory Building 
 
Kuhn explored the history of science over periods of change to compare 
what he termed normal science and extraordinary science. According to him 
change in paradigms came about as a process of revolution rather than as an 
incremental, additive growth. Kuhn argued that science functions, as a rule 
governed practice with its peculiar concepts, methods and language in particular 
paradigms. Normal science is thus conceived according to Kuhn as a puzzle 
solving activity with additive growth. When anomalies are found that cannot be 
explained, crisis is said to ensue and the process of resolution of the crisis brings 
about change in ways of thinking and doing science.  Puzzlement, awareness of 
anomaly, crisis, perception of novelty, resistance, large-scale paradigm 
destruction, major shifts in the problems and techniques of normal science, 
incommensurability, are states of affairs argued by Kuhn in the process of change 
in paradigms. As a potent example, Kuhn unravels in depth, the process of the 
discovery and recognition of oxygen in a comparison of Priestly and Lavosier's 
efforts to solve the puzzle where Lavosier was able to overcome the constraints of 
the existing paradigm to think in new ways whilst Priestly resisted change till the 
end of his life Kuhn (1962). 
Kuhn’s work has had a large impact on the development of theory in 
conceptual change. Ferrari and Elik (2003, p.33) consider that Kuhn’s analysis of 
the history of science has been the inspiration behind the standard model of 
conceptual change in cognitive science. Relating Kuhn's theory of paradigm 
change to conceptual change work, diSessa (2006, p.268-271), cites a range of 
theorists including Karmiloff–Smith (1988), Nersessian (1992), Vosniadou (2002) 
in applying the history of science approach, seeing it’s importance in the context 
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or process of conceptual change. diSessa (2006, p.266) discusses the ideas of 
Kuhn as seeing concepts as coherent and Toulmin arguing for fragmentation but 
supports the fragmented view as allowing disassembling, refining and 
reassembling. While I find a stance on fragmentation difficult, in my analysis I did 
find fine grain as diSessa argues but coherence overall.  
Hoddeson (2007, p.26), Vosniadou (2007a, p.2) describe Kuhn in similar 
terms as seeing normal science functioning in a set of shared assumptions, beliefs, 
commitments and practices which he termed paradigms and change taking place 
as a theory replacement, a gestalt shift making old ideas incommensurable with 
the new. Science educators have found this framework fruitful to conceptualize 
learning of science concepts. 
There are arguments in other fields about the extended use of Kuhn's 
structure where he may not have intended it. Kuhn’s framework is socio-cultural, 
and diSessa (2006) questions its use to explain change at an individual level. 
London (1996) cites Capra to argue that paradigms imply change at the level of 
society and not at the level of the individual. London uses the term 'nevertheless' 
to say that the concept provides a useful metaphor for understanding the nature of 
change. I have found that while the rhetoric does demonstrate awareness of this 
contradiction yet a more constructivist approach to applying Kuhn’s ideas 
according to fitness and purpose prevails.  
Hoddeson (2007) discusses criticism of Kuhn to argue ‘at the level of theory, 
there really are revolutionary changes and incommensurable differences between 
earlier ways of making sense and the ways that eventually replace them..’ 
Hoddeson (2007) finds that Kuhn’s theory of revolutionary paradigm shift has been 
used to describe changes lesser than those he analysed. She says however, that 
it has proved to be a useful model for researchers in the fields such as psychology 
and education. She discusses the influence of Kuhn in change towards thinking 
about science as a social activity that occurs in a particular period, expanding it to 
include other factors, Hoddeson (2007, p.26). 
Cognitive psychology approaches are criticized by proponents of socio-
cultural approaches. Vosniadou (2007a, p.2) sees the socio-cultural approach to 
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be actually in line with Kuhn. Vosniadou refers to Machamer (2007, p.3) that the 
‘introduction of the notion of paradigm, shifts the emphasis from individuals’ minds 
to the role that the scientific community and their group commitments, shared 
examples, and tacit knowledge play in scientific discovery and change’. I find that 
while Kuhn expanded the notion of science from beliefs and practices of individual 
scientists to those of a community, he did consistently provide examples of change 
at the level of individual minds.  He expounded the notion of meanings themselves 
being internal to paradigms and raised the problem of incommensurability as a 
problem of communication between paradigms.  
In a development from understanding of concepts as coherent, theory-like 
and Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change as well as Piaget’s ideas of knowledge 
construction, Posner et al. (1982), describe conditions for conceptual change 
where according to them, there is dissatisfaction with existing ideas, conflict 
between ideas is perceived, and new ideas appear fruitful and plausible.  
The Posner et al. (1982) model has had a profound influence on subsequent 
theorizing. Scott et al. (1997) describe a range of literature that belongs to this 
perspective. Others, including Bendixen (2002, p.191-212), Ferrari and Elik (2003, 
p.21-54), for example, describe the process of intentional conceptual change as 
‘perturbations’ to an individual’s concepts that causes the individual to question 
current understanding. This is said to be followed by deliberate efforts to account 
for those perturbations. Posner et al. (1982, p.223) conclude that teaching science 
involves a rational basis for conceptual change. They further argue that conceptual 
change will be rational if students have the commitments or the standards for 
judgement required at their disposal.  
Gill et al. (2004) argue that conceptual change theory offers a model to 
understand change in conceptions. They too cite Posner et al. (1982) to suggest, 
after a consideration of research, that the model is effective in inducing conceptual 
change in other academic domains including teacher education. Here my 
argument is with words such as ‘induce’ considering that change in concepts is 
more likely to be a volitional and thoughtful act.  
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My research explores learning as conceptual change as a both 
psychological and social process. The proposition of a perception of agency as 
relating to change in task based discourse defines a link between the social context 
and the perception of agency within it. Learning as individually constructed in social 
contexts is problematised and the effect of the tension of structure and agency as 
inherent in social constructivist learning situations is argued. A possible 
relationship of conceptual change with a learner’s perception of agency is 
hypothesized to contribute to the process of theory building. The review of 
literature on conceptual change is thus an important part of the study and informs 
the empirical research. 
 
2.2.4 Understanding Conceptual Change 
 
In keeping with the dual perspectives that co-exist in the domain, my 
understanding is that concepts and change of concepts are complex phenomenon 
and processes. Psychological, social and philosophical aspects need to be 
integrated in analysis. From the viewpoint of psychology, Pintrich (2002) goes so 
far as to argue that there is no need for research on whether individual factors or 
social contexts are mechanisms of conceptual change, considering this to be a 
given. I find that an either or stance on the process of knowledge construction as 
a function of cognition with its associated role of reflection, or, as a social 
construction is not useful. This study argues concept development as a product of 
individual cognition within social contexts.  
My thesis is built on the premise that a perception of agency within task 
based discourse provides an individual with space to reflect upon own prior 
concepts and the new ideas being introduced. The data tentatively supports the 
hypothesis. As I have noted above and in the conclusion of the research, 
individuals within the sample changed differently. There is tentative evidence to 
suggest that more and better change in epistemic beliefs took place in groups 
where a perception of agency was enhanced. My efforts to urge participants to 
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agree or disagree, to think and reflect upon their own ideas and experience and 
those of others could possibly have made a difference. 
It may be possible to argue that a perception of agency was naturally at 
work for some, to a lesser extent, in both groups, Control and Experimental. In the 
Experimental group the perception of agency to reflect upon prior ideas was 
deliberately enhanced bringing about more and better change. Change did take 
place in the Control group as well but to a lesser extent. 
It is important to remember here that the second aspect under study is the 
effectiveness of Skemp’s proposition that experience of a range of suitable 
examples can support the development of concepts. This experience was provided 
to both groups. The data in both groups, Control and Experimental, shows that 
significant change took place which supports the effectiveness of this strategy. 
Thus the active experience of a range of suitable examples of conflicting accounts 
on key historical events did serve to bring about change.  
Schön, Newman, give importance to contexts, actions and words in 
developing convergence of meaning. Newman (1999, p.81) disagrees with 
Schön’s claim to have developed an epistemology to account for change and the 
emergence of novelty. He revisits and analyses Schön’s case studies to argue that 
reflection in action or reciprocal reflection in action are redundant for convergence 
of meaning. Newman (1999, p.157) claims that convergence of meaning comes 
about through participation in language games and a reinterpreted reflection may 
take place afterwards.  
I have concerns about Newman’s arguments. Convergence of meaning is 
a problem when there is incommensurability between paradigms as argued by 
Kuhn. There is commitment to existing paradigms. Conflict is perceived followed 
by attempts at conflict resolution. Such situations would necessarily provoke 
thought, reflection and deliberation. An unquestioning assimilation or infusion of 
incommensurable ideas is difficult to imagine.  
Newman discusses a tension in Schön’s notion of frames, family 
resemblances and incommensurability with his positing of sense data ‘as a referent 
giving incorrigibility’ Newman (1999, p.35). He describes Schön’s proposal for a 
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dialogue that has three essential features; it takes place in context, it makes use 
of actions as well as words and reflection in action. Newman disagrees with the 
need for reflection. He finds Schön’s case study ‘unremarkable’ and his analysis 
flawed Newman (1999, p.69, 73). He further argues that Schön fails to account for 
the means by which convergence of meaning is achieved between novice and 
expert practitioner Newman (1999, p.82, 111).  
From a psychological perspective, Piaget, followed by Russell, give 
importance to agency in mental development. I examine a perception of agency 
within the social contexts of task based discourse to question, agree, disagree and 
reflect as making a difference in change. My data finds tentative support for this. 
Certainly, reflection and reciprocal reflection in action did take place in my 
workshops. Participants did reflect upon and surface their prior epistemic ideas as 
both responses to questionnaires and excerpts from the focus group discussion 
illustrate. That they did become aware of their own stance on knowledge in history 
and did change is evident in the data taken at pre-test and post-test. That they did 
come to learn, if weakly, the processes of enquiry and knowledge development in 
history with the use of the examples and the contexts of task based discourse, has 
empirical support.13 This may be described by Newman as an initiation into the 
language games of historians.  
Evidence in this research however suggests that participants did reflect in 
action as they participated in the task based discourse. Without noticing, 
recognizing conflict with their prior concepts, struggling to see the implications of 
the evidence, accommodating to the idea that evidence can be questioned in 
reference to the question posited, change in their epistemic beliefs could not have 
taken place. The nature of the change, that of epistemic beliefs, is a recognition 
that knowledge in history is constructed from fragile, discontinuous evidence and 
the presence of the historian in the account is complex and must necessarily 
require questioning, requires awareness of conflict and reflection in action. The 
data reveals individual differences in the degree and quality of change suggesting 
                                            
13 See excerpts from the Focus Group discussion on pages 18 and 203.  
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that prior concepts, experiences, mental capacity did play a role. The evidence 
also suggests that a perception of agency to reflect and question within task based 
discourse made a difference in change. 
Baltas (2007, p.63) discusses the problem of relativism as inherent in the 
assumption that there is no extra-paradigmatic neutral ground as Kuhn argues. All 
meaning residing within paradigms makes paradigm comparison impossible 
therefore all knowledge can be questioned as relative. Arguing for the possibility 
for reason to counter the threat to relativism, Baltas (2007) proposes that after the 
Eureka moment the new paradigm affords a broader, wider perspective. Thus 
providing space for reason and avoiding the notion that any paradigm is as good 
as the other. Several participants in my studies demonstrate change from naïve 
objectivist positions towards an awareness of knowledge as constructed. This 
raises questions if this is to be called a paradigm change, or a move to a newer, 
wider perspective. 
I digress from here to remind readers that while Kuhn takes a broad 
perspective on change he too discusses change at the level of the individual with 
sensitivity and detail. See Section 2.2.10. 
 
2.2.5 Intentional Conceptual Change  
 
Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.6) describe intentional conceptual change as 
‘goal-directed and conscious initiation and regulation of cognitive, meta-cognitive 
and motivational processes to bring about a change in knowledge’. They further 
argue that intentional conceptual change involves some internal agency, volitional 
control, or self-regulation in the process of learning new concepts. Sinatra and 
Pintrich (2003). 
Bandura’s theory of social cognition and self-regulated learning has taken 
on many meanings in psychology and education according to Reeve et al. (2008). 
Reeve et al. (2008), refer to Deci and Ryan, (1985) to explain autonomy as ‘the 
sense that one's actions emanate from one's self and are one's own’. They cite 
studies that show that when learning tasks were introduced in ‘autonomy 
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supportive’ as opposed to ‘controlling’ ways, students showed more positive 
learning outcomes. 
Pintrich et al. (1993), Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.ix) famously criticised 
the Posner et al. (1982) model as ‘cold conceptual change’ raising awareness of 
intention and motivation as factors involved in the process of change. There are 
even examples in the literature of ‘hotter’, ‘warm’ or ‘warmer’, conceptual change 
models. Motivation and intention are variously considered either external or 
internal factors. 
Vosniadou gives importance to prior learning. In a criticism of radical socio-
cultural or situative perspectives, Vosniadou notes that the focus is upon the 
acquiring of cultural tools, practices, artifacts and argues that the active role of the 
individual in understanding or constructing new knowledge must be taken into 
account. She believes that the conceptual change approach could be reframed to 
include both. Vosniadou (2007a, p.3). 
Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.380), find that there is agreement that 
conceptual change does not just take place in individual minds but socio-cultural 
factors and educational settings also play a role. Inspired by Bereiter and 
Scardamalia’s (1989) idea, of the ‘intentional learner’, Sinatra and Pintrich 
introduce their construct of intentional conceptual change to argue that the 
learner’s intentions can determine the likelihood of conceptual change, Sinatra and 
Pintrich (2003, p.ix). Conceptual change, say Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.2), does 
not just depend on cognitive factors such as recognition of conflict, but on factors 
of affect, motivation, metacognition, which a learner may control thus governing 
the possibility of change. They focus on the role of the learner rather than teaching 
process and aspects such as epistemological stance, self-regulation, meta-
cognition, and motivation that would support change. It is important to recall here 
that Pintrich et al. (1993), earlier suggested four general motivational constructs, 
goals, values, self-efficacy and control beliefs, as potential mediators of the 
process of conceptual change.  
Vosniadou (2003, p.404) discusses whether intentional learning is indeed 
needed to promote conceptual change and suggests that more complex change 
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mechanisms eg model making, would need intention. She considers it is possible 
that conceptual change can take place without intention but such change may be 
less stable or inconsistent. Hatano and Inagaki (2003) consider that intentional 
conceptual change is not necessarily a frequent occurrence. Hatano and Inagaki 
(2003, p.407). They give importance to instruction including teacher/peer support, 
activity, internal rewards, the socio-cultural context as well as individual motivation. 
They argue that a large scale revision is produced only when there is no other 
choice. This again coheres with Kuhn’s descriptions of change in my 
understanding.  
A comparison of intentional and unintentional levels of cognition is made by 
Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.431) as they explain intentional level processing as 
goal directed, involving some metacognitive or meta conceptual awareness and 
under the learner's conscious control. This argue Sinatra and Pintrich (2003, p.4) 
is initiated by the learner. They also refer to some internal agency in the process.  
Ferrari and Elik (2003, p.22-49) suggest that any comprehensive account 
of conceptual change must necessarily integrate both individual agency and 
culture in its analytic framework. By ‘culture’ they refer to cultural symbol systems 
developed over generations. They suggest that persons engage radical 
conceptual change for concepts where it has personal critical importance. Further 
that, through the provision of material and educational conditions that nurture 
intentional conceptual change, we involve students in learning. My research looks 
beyond material and educational conditions to the social context of groups involved 
in task based discourse and the agency that individuals perceive within these 
contexts to develop their own understandings.  
 
2.2.6 Adult Learning in Groups 
 
Adult learning has its own extensive literature. Cognitive control that has 
been most researched, according to Knowles et al. (2005), is that of field 
dependence/independence. They urge a distinction between behaviours of self-
teaching and the internal cognitive process of feeling and acting with autonomy. 
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Rogers (2002, p.175-178), analyses the advantages and disadvantages of groups 
for adult learning. He thinks that ‘the pressure to conformity, the suggestibility that 
the group exerts can promote imitation not the free exercise of experiment’. 
Members may find it difficult to express a divergent point of view and revert to old 
ideas when away from the group. This I consider a valuable insight in 
understanding adult learning in groups and as relating to our observations of 
learning in teacher education classrooms. 
The differences of prior experiences of individuals in learning groups is often 
taken into account by the teacher in the process of a brain storm to draw out prior 
knowledge at the beginning of a lesson or within a group activity. How individuals 
themselves address conflict with prior ideas and the new concepts within the group 
discourse, and what factors of context can make a difference to change, requires 
more research. This gap in knowledge is the focus of my study. 
 
2.2.7 The Argument for Agency 
 
 Kuhn's (1962) theory of paradigm change is often cited in beginning 
discussions on conceptual change. Here I repeat for readers what I have stated in 
the introduction in order to revise and emphasise this. I have argued that the 
processes of change in paradigms in scientific communities as described by Kuhn 
could be incommensurable with change through instruction. Instruction has a 
change agent and planned change is assumed first and then brought into 
production. Therefore, to import Kuhn’s theory to explain and predict conceptual 
change in classrooms one must recognize and accommodate the difference. The 
autonomous, cognitive, socio-cultural processes that make existing ideas obsolete 
and generate consensus and enthusiasm for the new, creating a new paradigm, 
are not part of planned classroom process. Change through instruction is 
generated deliberately by others in artificial situations and on possibly 
unsuspecting actors. Classrooms are places for more ‘mediated action’ as 
opposed to the autonomous, naturally evolving action that is taken as examples of 
paradigm change. 
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The process of paradigm change, according to Kuhn, involves discovery, 
the awareness of anomaly, followed by exploration. Crisis, tension, resistance, 
polarization, mass persuasion, displacement, are words in the text that pertain to 
the process. Kuhn argues that ‘The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to 
paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced’, Kuhn (1962, p.151). 
After Kuhn and following on from Posner et al. (1982), the structure of 
dissatisfaction, conflict, plausible and useful alternatives, is often imported into 
possible classroom experiences it is hoped will mediate change. This is perhaps a 
reasonable approach but incomplete. Other factors need to be considered as well. 
It is in this context of complex learning that Kuhn’s analysis of changing 
paradigms can be revisited to account for change even at small scale and 
individual levels. The change in paradigms as social-cultural events have been as 
I highlight, autonomous, often hotly debated, emotionally charged. Issues are real 
and the change is often radical and especially as described by Kuhn in the domain 
of science, the change has ultimately been effective over large groups and over 
time. In classrooms, issues may be of transient, of cursory interest. Participants 
may not see the need to invest energy in what they may see as an interest of the 
group rather than a personal concern. 
In the Asian - Pakistan context, discourse is more polite, and constrained. 
There are socially desirable positions and often a lack of understanding is masked 
by silence. What may also be lacking is agency or perceptions of agency to raise 
alternative views. The concept discussed in class even most energetically, in the 
context of active tasks will be constructed in different ways by the same 
participants outside of group pressure. 
Changing concepts is not a straightforward additive process of inserting 
new knowledge bytes into old frameworks. Change of concepts needs experience 
of conflict and plausibility of new ideas as framed by Posner et al. (1982). Space 
is also needed to reflect upon meaning and to accommodate, at will, the ideas on 
offer. 
While the change I observe is in a concept, from a sociological perspective, 
questions to understand are these. How do teachers-as-learners perceive the 
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newly introduced ideas? How does the discourse alienate or include participants? 
Does the dynamic of whole and small group discussion and seeming consensus 
for new ideas actually mediate against change for some? How does the teacher’s 
role as bearer of new ideas effect change? Elements such as pace, sequence, 
language, differences in prior experience or prior cognition, could frustrate the 
adult in a group discussion or task. The learner may want more control and may 
feel group pressure to conform to the new ideas as coercive. 
Change as intentional, assumes that individuals know and clearly 
understand their existing concepts, the new concepts on offer, and change 
consciously and intentionally. This also assumes that individuals do not feel 
constrained by group pressure or discourse to accept or reject the proposed 
concept or theory. An underlying assumption of social construction is that the 
social context is, universally, a positive influence on individual conceptual change. 
That universally, individuals construct own understanding in synchrony with the 
knowledge constructed by the group. Real life experience, indeed paradigm 
change as described by Kuhn, does not fit this assumption. 
If Kuhn’s structure is to be taken to build theory of the mechanism of change, 
then account needs to be taken of the social conditions that pertain at such a time 
of change. The tension between agency and structure needs to be seen as part of 
the equation in individual conceptual change. What this implies is a perception of 
agency as a variable in group discourse, and agency to be seen as a variable in 
successful construction. 
Group discussions are often set to produce objects reflective of a group 
view, group knowledge. This is different from situated cognition or actional 
perspectives which are task or situation related. Legitimate peripheral 
participation14 describes the initiation and participation in communities of 
professional practice. Discourse in classrooms has been endlessly researched. I 
do not know yet of a term that adequately describes the distributed abstraction that 
is the product of group discussion, a socially constructed knowledge that may end 
just there, in the atmosphere, leaving tutors in the false impression that good 
                                            
14 Lave and Wenger (1982) 
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learning has taken place. How does this group viewpoint differ from the knowledge 
that individuals may have constructed in the same time and space may be worth 
knowing. 
Teachers, as students in workshops, may over a period of time, assimilate 
the learned ideas within their own cognitive framework. They may embrace the 
idea wholeheartedly, engage partially or disregard it. This again, however speaks 
for the space outside of group pressure where a perception of agency brings 
reflection and conversion to the new idea. If this is indeed the case, then 
adjustments need to be made to the way the social processes of knowledge 
construction are conceived towards an awareness of the need of the individual’s 
agency to construct own concepts within the social context. 
More so for adults, instruction to change concepts and possibly beliefs, 
raises issues of consciousness, of empowerment, intention and motivation. 
Research on conceptual change now focuses on intentionality being a factor.15 
Ethical issues also arise when a possible change cannot be known or understood 
in advance. Participants, for example, are not competent to judge if they wish to 
attain greater maturity and 'sophistication' in epistemic cognition. Were they 
competent to do so they would not need instruction.16 
Teaching to change concepts is intentional, where teachers are clearly 
aware of the scope of the goals they plan. How such teaching can be made 
effective, whilst still humane, moral, not manipulative and not coercive, is a 
complex issue. 
 
2.2.8 Schön’s Epistemology 
 
Conceptual change is, as argued above, a complex phenomenon which is 
studied from various perspectives. From the perspective of philosophy and teacher 
education, the work of Schön is a large influence as the common use of terms, 
                                            
15 See Ferrari and Elik,  Mason, and Vosniadou in Sinatra and Pintrich  eds.(2003)  
16 The problem perceived in changing concepts in adult education is illustrated in the account that is 
presented as a Case Study. (See Appendix A1) An event in which this researcher was a participant is 
described. 
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reflection on action and the reflective practitioner, bear witness. I will not go into 
this in detail here just refer to a small but key aspect that is especially relevant to 
the objective of conceptual change and the contexts of task-based group discourse 
that are the focus of this research. 
Newman (1999, p.38) is critical of Schön’s attempts to answer the crucial 
epistemological question of convergence of meaning if meanings are internal to 
paradigms. He raises Schön’s17 argument for context, actions, and words as well 
as reciprocal reflection-in-action as important conditions for convergence of 
meaning. Newman (1999, p.81) examines Schön’s case studies to contest his 
empirical observation of convergence of meaning between expert practitioner and 
novice through a process of reflection in action and reciprocal reflection in action. 
 Newman (1999, p.149) reinterprets reflection in terms of Wittgenstein as 
describing certain behaviours within a language game, arguing ‘that it is within a 
language game that it makes sense to doubt, to give reasons, and to make what 
is ordinarily implicit, explicit’. In a critique of Schön’s arguments Newman (1999, 
p.158) contends that reflective practice may have more than one meaning and 
that, ‘in accounting for convergence of meaning, there is no need to posit as an 
‘essential feature’, reciprocal reflection-in-action’. Schön has however been a large 
influence on the development of ideas and practices for reflection in action as a 
means to develop concepts in contexts of professional practice.   
From the background of psychology and conceptual change learning, I do 
consider reflection on our prior concepts as part of the process of assimilation and 
accommodation of new ideas along with the importance of contexts, actions and 
words in the learning process. This research is an inquiry into this process. 
In this particular research I am interested in better understanding the 
contexts of task based group discourse and the knowledge that is constructed 
within these situations. As described earlier, our experience as teacher educators 
has been that assessment of the products of group learning often does not 
correspond with the learning of individuals within these groups. Exploring how such 
                                            
17 Schön (1987a, pp.100-101)  referred to in Newman (1999, p.157) 
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group learning situations can be made effective in the change and development of 
concepts of individual members within these groups is useful for my practice. 
In my experience of mentoring, I have often found that teachers ascribe the 
difference between what the group had conveyed in discussion or in group 
presentations, and pupils’ individual concepts in written responses to questions as 
a problem of conveying ideas in writing. The effectiveness of the task based 
discourse as a context for individual learning is seldom questioned. These are 
practical, everyday problems in classroom learning and require research as well 
as theoretical consideration to resolve. 
In response to such problems of practice, I focus my research upon a 
perception of agency of individuals participating in ‘task-based discourse’. This 
includes contexts, actions and words  and reflection as important conditions for 
convergence of meaning.  I consider Newman’s arguments against reflection or 
reciprocal reflection in action being necessary for convergence of meaning in the 
light of the description of, and empirical evidence of, the change in concepts that I 
observed in my studies, to draw tentative conclusions as I proceed. Recognizing 
reflection as part of the broader context of language games raises interesting 
questions about the nature of such knowledge. 
The gap in knowledge about conceptual change in task based discourse is 
illuminated in my research. The study explores the relationship of an enhanced 
perception of agency making a difference in task based discourse to persuade 
more participants to change epistemic concepts. Evidence is seen to tentatively 
support the relationship. Contexts, actions and words in the use of a range of 
suitable examples are also seen as effective in developing learning. See Section 
2.2.10 for more on reflection. 
 
2.2.9 Agency and Mental Development from a Perspective of Cognitive 
Psychology  
 
Russell (1996) discusses the psychological and philosophical nature of the 
arguments raised in understanding the processes of cognitive development with 
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reference to Piaget (1928). Importantly, Russell (1996) explores the strength of a 
theory of agency driving cognitive development from infancy to maturation. 
Piaget's theorizing, although based upon research on cognitive development of 
children, is however, a large influence in the understanding of the development of 
cognition in general. It is important to note here that the nature of development 
under consideration is the development of ‘ the process of establishing a division 
between two kinds of reality: an objective reality grasped as independent of 
ourselves and a subjective reality constituted by our volitions and representational 
states’ Russell (1995, p.127). Russell explains agency as the capacity for first-
person experience, Russell (1996, p.2). 
A claim by Piaget that agency is the engine of mental development is 
recognized by Russell to be untenable. (italics mine) He finds that there is too 
much evidence of innate capacity to accept such a claim. One example Russell 
(1995, p.129) employs for innate capacity is of research by O’Keefe and Nadel18 
that finds animals possess innate, within the hippocampus, capacity for spatial 
cognition. While accepting the criticism against Piaget, Russell argues for a 
watered down version for the role of agency in mental development. It is better to 
cite his own words here. 
‘My principal claim here will be that it is only by experiencing agency that a 
subject can experience the world as resistant to her will, something which is 
necessary for any distinction to be drawn between subjective and objective. I argue 
here that an essential feature of agency is a capacity for willfully determining the 
sequence of one’s perceptual inputs’, Russell (1995, p.127). (Italics mine) He also 
argues that the contextualist option cum gradual dawning is open, even preferable 
for us, Russell (1996, p.205). 
There is a fine difference between the proposition that a perception of 
agency relates to change in concepts in task based group discourse, which is the 
hypothesis I propose for my research, and Russell’s arguments for the central role 
of agency in mental development. My hypothesis relates a perception of agency 
to change in concepts within the social context of task based group discourse. This 
                                            
18 Russell refers to O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) 
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throws light on the function of individual agency within group discourse involved in 
a learning task. Context, action, and words are present but the social context 
needs attention. 
This argument does not challenge the widely accepted notion of knowledge 
as socially constructed or of learning as a development of shared meanings in 
social interaction. Theories of learning in social interaction such as Legitimate 
Peripheral Participation in Communities of Practice, Lave and Wenger (1999) or 
the Community of Inquiry framework, Garrison et al. (2000) give importance to 
context and participation in learning in activity. Within this approach issues are 
raised of power relations and conditions for legitimacy as defining possibilities of 
learning, Lave and Wenger (1999). Garrison et al. (2000) focus on collaborative 
learning and consider a ‘cognitive presence’ as 'the extent to which learners are 
able to construct and confirm meaning through sustained reflection and discourse' 
Garrison et al. (2001). 
These theories do not directly concern themselves with the process of 
learning new concepts or psychological aspects such as assimilation or 
accommodation of new ideas at an individual level. Knowledge is in participation. 
Prior concepts are individual properties and change within these must take 
place at the level of the individual even when in contexts of participation in active 
tasks, discussion and reasoning in social groups. Products of group learning 
activity in terms of responses may not always reflect the concepts of all individuals 
within groups as teachers often observe. Alternative ideas held by individual 
learners are seen to surface when teachers inquire.  
A perception of agency as a condition in task-based group discourse that 
can relate to individual conceptual change is the focus of this study. The 
hypothesis that agency relates to change in task based group discourse does not 
imply either that learning best takes place in isolation. What is argued is only that 
there are constraints within task based group discourse for individuals to construct 
their own concepts, making connections with personal prior knowledge and 
experiences. If change in concepts needs to overcome the tension between 
assimilation and accommodation at the level of the individual, the task based 
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discourse needs to be supportive of agency to question, to reflect, to agree or 
disagree, to argue, to speak one's word. The constraints in group discourse are of 
a practical nature as well as at a level of process of cognition. The space to reflect 
and make meaning at an individual level, where after all, concepts have to develop, 
is restricted in social situations and may contribute to resistance to change. A 
perception of agency is explored in my research experiments as making a 
difference to learning within task based group discourse. 
The understanding that knowledge is not simply constructed, it is  
co-constructed has its basis in the theories of Vygotsky and extended in work such 
as that of Lave and Wenger (2002)19 on knowledge as situated in communities of 
practice. This is not challenged in my study. I do consider that there is a tension in 
the function of the construction of an individual reality in the presence of multiple 
realities making the role of a perception agency all the more crucial. By enhancing 
a perception of agency in the social situations of group learning as a pedagogical 
device, I suggest change in concepts may be better supported. 
The meaning I give to agency acquires a fine nuance. Agency as perceived 
by individuals in social contexts of group discourse adds the dimension of 
perceived freedom to alter one’s perceptual inputs to what may be own prior 
knowledge without the necessity to uncritically assimilate the conceptions of 
others. The tension between assimilation and accommodation arises in contexts 
of new experience, and agency being a necessary condition, is necessary due to 
the particular prior conceptions of the agent. As an agent, at the level of the 
individual level, agency is a necessary condition as I can assimilate or 
accommodate only to the conceptions I already possess in my own mind and not 
to those of others. 
 
2.2.10 Reflection in the Process of Conceptual Change 
 
My arguments for a perception of agency in task based discourse emerge 
from an analysis of Kuhn’s illustrations of paradigm change in communities of 
                                            
19 Lave and Wenger in Harrison et al. (eds) 2002. 
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scientists. I do very briefly raise Schön, Newman here as questions may be asked 
regarding the relevance of Schön to my own arguments or the learning that took 
place. 
Newman (1999) discusses Schön and Wittgenstein’s work and finds 
support for Schön's argument for the importance of contexts, actions as well as 
words, in developing a convergence of meaning. Newman (1999, p.113) however, 
points out that while Wittgenstein considers actions and contexts are important for 
the convergence of meaning, reflection in action has already been explored by him 
(Wittgenstein) and found ‘incoherent’20. Newman is critical of Schön's claim of 
‘reflection on reflection-in-action, reflection-in-action and knowing-in-action21’ 
considering these notions to be ‘redundant’22 for convergence of meaning. 
The pedagogy employed in the development of concepts in my research 
workshops uses aspects of context, action and words to good effect. Here I draw 
attention to the fact that the situation in my workshops was not the one studied by 
Schön of apprentice and expert in an exploratory dialogue within a practice 
context. Teachers as learners participated on tasks in small groups in the 
workshops. They took part in actions of examining historical sources, identifying 
conflicting accounts and used heuristics to argue a claim. There was task-based 
discussion amongst participants themselves, and with me the expert, as they 
considered their prior concepts and as the evidence suggests, they did in small 
individual ways, review and change their epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history. From paradigmatic beliefs in knowledge in history as objectively known, to 
not possible to know, or to a more criterialist stance, change did take place to 
various degrees at the time. 
If meanings are internal to paradigms, how can convergence of meaning 
take place is the essential epistemic question. I do draw attention to the 
observation that change, or convergence of meaning took place within the learning 
experience of the workshops in my study. There were no other experiences as 
                                            
20 Newman (1999, p.113) 
21 Newman (1999, p.113) 
22 Newman (1999, p.113) 
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possible causes of development of epistemic beliefs operating within that time and 
space. Apart from myself, none of the participants in the small groups were 
experts. Evidence suggests that participants’ epistemic beliefs changed, which is 
qualitatively different from simple knowledge accretion. The experience itself was 
novel for participants as they explored historical evidence and attempted to 
construct accounts. They tried to argue and justify these on the basis of the 
strength of the evidence. The discourse required an exploratory use of epistemic 
ideas, the language of source and evidence, certainty and justification with which 
they were not familiar as the excerpts at the beginning of this Chapter and others, 
illustrate. At no time did I or the students consciously and overtly raise or discuss 
philosophy or epistemic beliefs as phenomenon underpinning the tasks they 
carried out but we discussed truth claims, evidence and heuristics whereby 
accounts could be examined. To discuss philosophical theories would have been 
difficult to say the least as the participants did not know the words or were familiar 
with, the same language game. 
Did reflection support the change in beliefs or was it the broad context of 
the language games exploring the concepts of knowledge in history that they 
experienced that made the difference? This is a question that could be raised here. 
As I describe in this study, there was modeling, discussion, questioning and the 
tentative use of words and methods of analysis of evidence that historians use. 
The questions, as I point out, were of an epistemic nature and ones the participants 
were not familiar with. Certainly individuals must have reflected at the time to be 
aware of the anomalies between their own prior concepts and the new ideas. The 
new ideas did appear plausible as the small excerpt at the beginning of the Chapter 
illustrates. 
It is important to note here that change in participants’ beliefs was not even 
or consistent within groups. It took place in various ways and to varying degrees. 
The evidence suggests that participants’ beliefs changed from those they came 
with, in generally the direction of more sophistication according to the CBKH scale. 
The differences in their prior understanding as well as their personal capacities 
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that I discuss with reference to Vosniadou and Hatano23 possibly affected the 
degree and quality of change amongst them. The responses to the questions show 
a range of meanings in the use of words, upon the interpretation of which, I draw 
conclusions as I assess the change that took place from pre-test to post-test.24 
Kuhn’s description of the processes of change from one paradigm to 
another are broad in scope, discussing change at the level of the society of 
scientists within relevant time frames. It is useful to note that Kuhn focuses upon, 
explores and describes, often in detail, difficulties in change at the level of 
individuals such as Priestly, Lavosier, within the larger complex of change in the 
community as instances of change. Reisch (2012, p.324) refers to these as case 
studies. One such small reference25 to Lord Kelvin’s reaction to the discovery of 
X-rays to be an elaborate hoax illustrates the possibly intense and painful, personal 
reaction to the challenge. When Kuhn (1970, p.83-84) further describes the 
response to crises, he refers to Wolfgang Pauli, who, when faced with what was 
to be a new quantum theory, said he wished he had been a movie comedian and 
had never heard of physics. In my sample of teachers from different school 
systems across the country I can see that, broadly, change did take place within 
the community as they participated in the language games of knowledge in history. 
Yet it is not homogenous or equal at the level of individuals. Interestingly, as the 
change is in epistemic beliefs and within the direction and language of the change 
in the group it does demonstrate coherence.  
In reference to my central claim, I find meaningful where Newman (1999, 
p.45) refers to Schön….‘advocates of conflicting frames (to) enter into one 
another’s worlds, attempting under a willing suspension of disbelief, to learn the 
things, the coherence, the other has created there.’26 A close reading of the above 
highlights the aspect of ‘willingness’. For the purpose of argument, I wonder if 
                                            
23 See page 34 (in this Dissertation) 
24 See 3.36-3.38 for an understanding of the beliefs and quality of  change 
25 Kuhn (1962,1970, p.59), ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science 
26  Newman (1999, p.189) has provided a comprehensive list of the work of Schön which is useful to find 
references.  
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‘willing suspension of belief’, is a condition that would support an enhanced 
perception of agency? 
From Newman’s point of view it could be questioned if participation and 
development within a language game brought convergence of meaning if, as he 
argues, reflection is redundant and “it is within a language game that it makes 
sense to doubt, to give reasons, and to make what is ordinarily implicit, explicit’ 
Newman (1999). In my study I provide a role and time for reason and reflection 
within discourse and activity  My research focus is upon a relationship of a 
perception of agency within task based discourse to reflect upon own prior 
concepts in order to develop these concepts. For this I find tentative support. 
 
2.2.11 Reflection on My Own Learning and Epistemic Belief Change 
 
Prior to the beginning of this research, I was a teacher, educator and an 
editor of a small school teacher research journal. I organised much of the research 
myself. Looking back at my own work, I can see that I did not at that time 
understand in depth what I read and even taught, about the nature of knowledge 
as constructed. My own beliefs were naive and my awareness of the meaning of 
interpretation and construction of meaning was instrumental rather than 
philosophical. Newman (1999) quotes Schön, ‘once practitioners notice that they 
actively construct the reality of their practice and become aware of the variety of 
frames available to them...’ This noticing is a giant step and it is in essence the 
one necessary in epistemic belief change. I have argued a beginning ‘awareness’ 
as in a sense a loss of innocence in the development of epistemic concepts. This 
‘noticing’ or ‘awareness’ can lead to a change in paradigm and, as research into 
epistemic beliefs documents as well as my own developing understanding tells me, 
it does sometimes take place. In Section 2.6.7, I discuss awareness of knowledge 
as constructed as the defining difference between an objectivist and subjectivist 
stance on the CBKH scale. I argue that finding participants had not as yet 
developed expert skill in the use of words and heuristics but were aware that 
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knowledge claims were constructed needed to be unraveled to place them on a 
scale of epistemic development. 
 
2.2.12 Skemp’s Principles for the Formation of Concepts 
 
Conceptual change in mathematical concepts is argued by Skemp (1971) 
in detail in his text The Psychology of Learning Mathematics. Skemp considers 
that concepts are not learnt by definition but by encountering, experiencing, a 
suitable collection of examples. This I have amended to an ‘experience of a range 
of suitable examples’ and used it as a pedagogical method in my studies. The 
examples are described in the Chapter on Research Methodology. The use of a 
single pedagogical method in all 10 groups helped to reduce the threat of 
alternative inference of cause. As change was significant from pre-test to post-test 
in both Control and Experimental groups, the data supports the effectiveness of 
Skemp’s principle in bringing about conceptual change even in this case in 
epistemic beliefs. 
Skemp (1971, p.32) suggests that it is the communicator who must know 
the principles and indeed, I as teacher, communicator, endorse his view. From the 
perspective of psychology, Skemp (1971, p.29) includes, abstracting, classifying, 
naming, communicating as part of the process of developing concepts and argues 
that, ‘The actual construction of a conceptual system is something which each 
individual has to do for himself’.  
 
2.2.13 Reasons for a Focus on Epistemic Beliefs and Beliefs About 
Knowledge in History 
 
Upon embarking on a study of change in concepts, I required a concept to 
change within the teacher education sphere I was involved in and I found this in 
the domain of history where a change was in process. The history syllabus that 
students in Pakistan study for CIE, Cambridge International Examinations, is 
undergoing development apparently to bring it in line with international standards.  
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History teaching and learning has moved away from an exclusive focus on first 
order concepts to include development of epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history. The teacher education project that is the context of my research could thus 
centre on developing teachers’ concepts about knowledge in history in keeping 
with the requirements of syllabus change. 
History education in the developed world includes aspects of 
historiography. Ashby et al. (2005) state that if history education is to include an 
understanding of history as a discipline, then central to that understanding is a 
concept of evidence. Ashby et al. (2005, p.24), Maggioni et al. (2009b) also see 
important connections between historical thinking and the development of 
historical beliefs. 
VanSledright (2011, p.1) addresses the ‘knowledge teachers need to 
possess in order to significantly deepen their students’ historical understandings…’ 
locating this in epistemological underpinnings as well as other second order 
concepts. This is a very real concern as changes in syllabi can be met in superficial 
terms as well as active resistance when teachers recognize their own inability to 
understand and deal with the new ideas. Thus, the rationale for my research and 
the workshops that were the context is reinforced. Anecdotal evidence gathered 
during the pilot and in the experimental workshops found that most teachers 
understood that the sources provided in the test papers were merely meant to be 
hints for students to help form the answers to questions of history. 
VanSledright and Afflerbach (2005, p.1) argue that knowing something 
about the nature of a source helps situate it within an array of different types of 
historical evidence that can be used to build an interpretation of the events under 
consideration. They argue that assessing the status of sources is the sine qua non 
of historical understanding because access to the past is ‘largely, perhaps, solely, 
mediated by evidentiary accounts and artifacts’. Evaluating source and evidence, 
criticising and developing accounts are part of the process skills of history and 
have been a part of progressive curricula over the last 20 years. CIE has now 
begun to introduce the change in the Syllabus of Pakistan Studies. How this 
develops and its impact could be the subject of research studies. 
 51 
 
 
2.2.14 The Importance of Research into the Development of Concepts About 
Knowledge in History 
 
History teaching and learning more than any other subject area, is a matter 
of concern from a range of perspectives. Apart from mainly political debates about 
the content of history, arguments about the purpose that history education serves 
are raised. VanSledright (2002, p.4) expresses concern that importance placed on 
literal comprehension of text during reading activities develops a belief that the 
‘meaning is in the text, that the text contains what really is’. He describes how 
children use text books where the historian author is not apparent thus producing 
a belief in the ‘reality effect’, that all the words in the text map directly onto what is 
real. Teachers and tests that require verbatim recall also reinforce such ideas he 
argues. If this is the finding in America, history text books in Pakistan are no better. 
The textbooks produced and used in Pakistan are often geared to reduce, 
summarize and focus content to set questions and most national examination of 
history require tightly circumscribed responses rather than argument as a critical 
review of questions repeated over the years in textbooks and papers can show. 
Needless to say this has a backwash effect on concepts of knowledge as well as 
learning and teaching practices. The planned change in the CIE Syllabus towards 
a focus on history skills is much needed to encourage development of concepts of 
knowledge. My research into teacher’s epistemic beliefs and change within these 
is an effort in this direction. 
Learner’s epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history are a source of 
concern. Bain27 is often cited in the literature for describing history as 
fundamentally an ‘epistemic act’. Referring to Barthes (1968, 1986), VanSledright 
(2002) discusses ‘the referential illusion’ explaining this as the belief amongst 
readers that interpretations of historians  literally mirror a past reality. Barton (2008) 
cite Ashby and Lee (1991) writing that ‘children, adolescents and adults often 
approach sources as decontextualised, disembodied, authorless forms of neutral 
                                            
27 Bain (2000: 3-4). See for example, VanSledright et al. (2006: 560) 
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information that appear to fall out of the sky ready-made’. I agree with Bain and 
consider the content of text books that teach history as facts for rote learning and 
repetition as harmful in developing critical thinking. Ashby et al. (2005, p.80) find 
that students have critical misconceptions that have an impact on the way they 
read and imagine the past. Making history accounts problematic by raising 
epistemic questions is at the very purpose of study in the discipline, argues Bain 
(2005, p.179-211). 
Barton (2008) reviews research on students’ ideas about history and the 
topics they study at school to find that most students do not recognise history 
accounts to be developed from evidence. Barton (2008, p.240) finds that even if 
students learn about sources they may not be critical. Wineburg (1991) observed 
that adults when asked to write their story starting from available evidence, tended 
to reaffirm the objectivity of the text by seeking to be absent from their own 
narrative. Maggioni et al. (2004, p.176) argue that an attitude recognizing 
positionality will seldom be cultivated if the role of the historian is not recognized 
since ‘unchecked present standards are often used as a default to interpret the 
historical evidence’. 
While difficulties in change are described in the literature there are some 
encouraging findings. A study conducted by VanSledright (2002) drew attention to 
the role of instruction in challenging students’ epistemological stances and to the 
difficulties inherent in this endeavour Maggioni et al. (2004, p.177). VanSledright 
(2002) did find, what he calls, conditional success in helping fifth graders engage 
in efforts to think about history although Maggioni et al. (2004, p.176) in a review 
of studies on historical thinking found that adults did changed little  when presented 
with a new understanding of what history might be. 
My research into conceptual change targets teachers’ epistemic beliefs in 
the domain of history. I believe I made a difference in developing the epistemic 
beliefs of the teachers who participated in my study. The study has also helped me 
personally, in developing my own understanding and beliefs about knowledge. Can 
we, as teacher educators, bring about this change needed for teachers and 
through them their students? My research may help in answering this question.  
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Barton and Levstik (2004, p.191-260) argue for inquiry teaching considering 
that inquiry makes the process of knowledge construction transparent although 
they recognize problems in the method. 
 
2.2.15 Concerns and Purposes of Teaching History 
 
There is a concern to be recognized in teaching history as constructed. As 
Maggioni et al. (2004, p.186, 191) discuss, novice students exposed to conflicting 
evidence without being provided the tools to deal with the tension may jump to 
‘resigned naive relativism’ or ‘cynical skepticism’, concluding that history is just a 
matter of opinion. I, too have concerns that when development from an objectivist 
stance to awareness of the nature of knowledge in history as constructed takes 
place, there may be possibilities that learners may be left at that stage without 
progress towards a more criterialist stance. The danger of relativism, that all 
accounts are true accounts or that there is no way to judge between them, requires 
that educators leading learners on this journey see it to its more informed and 
educated end. My efforts did change teacher’s beliefs from pre-test to post-test. It 
would be interesting to see what epistemic beliefs teachers continue to hold or 
develop after a passage of time.  
 
2.3 Review of Literature for Research Methodology 
 
2.3.1 Arguments on Paradigms and Mixed Methods 
 
The design of my research based on quasi-experiments with the integrated 
use of both qualitative and quantitative measures as well as methods of analysis, 
was formulated after much study and thought to frame reasonable answers to 
study questions. These questions arose naturally in the peculiar context of interest 
in the relationship of conceptual change with perceptions of agency amongst adult 
learners. Contextual opportunities and constraints also influenced the type of 
design and means of data collection.  
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            Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, p.38) suggest that mixed methods 
researchers should not only be aware of their philosophical assumptions but also 
clearly articulate these. Articulating ones assumptions is easier said than done as 
these are slippery things and often context related in my experience. However, as 
this research is situated in a delicate balance between critical realism that is the 
philosophy of quasi experimentation as claimed by Cook and Campbell (1979), 
and the process of interpretation of epistemic beliefs from tentative statements to 
open ended questions about knowledge in history, there is a requirement to 
explore theoretical perspectives and a possible stance in order to build some kind 
of order to the exercise.  
In this Chapter, I explore philosophical perspectives that are said to 
underpin mixed methods research in general and my own developing ideas in 
particular. Pragmatism is the philosophical perspective that is often used in 
arguments for mixed methods. Many of the decisions I have made in my research 
are pragmatic and practical. While I can support aspects of pragmatism that allow 
space for researchers to address complex research issues and questions, I find 
employing personal values as a basis of choice between explanations of cause 
interesting but requiring some thought. I question the possibility of using personal 
values to choose between competing explanations as needing definition and 
instead of ‘what works’ I also consider ‘what is known to work’ as support for design 
choices as there is a connotation in the latter of what is known to work in the 
academic community. ‘What is known to work’, as an evolving concept, would be 
more responsive to knowledge growth, the dynamics of the concept, and the 
diverse and tentative nature of knowledge in history. The research itself could 
demonstrate how mixed methods work in practice. Upon reflection upon the 
conduct of this research, I reframe my stance. This is discussed further.  
The use of mixed methods in research has its critics as well as supporters. 
Arguments on philosophical perspectives underlying mixed methods research 
have been daunting to say the least. It became important to study the various 
points of view in this domain, develop insight, and make an informed choice. The 
research design is experimental although set in the field, therefore arguments for 
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mixed methods need thought. What follows is a review of some important 
perspectives in the debate and how these informed a choice of mixed methods for 
this quasi experimental research. 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.77) firmly state that researchers working 
within the mixed methods tradition may find certain aspects of ‘strong’ 
postmodernism difficult to reconcile with the very act of performing research. They 
cite Gorard and Taylor (2004) that by denying the possibility that there is any 
means of judging knowledge claims to be more or less true, postmodernism makes 
research a completely pointless activity. To quote Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, 
p.77), ‘Among strong postmodernists the gap between the collapse of objectivity 
and science is taken as beyond serious debate, and inquiry is judged by 
humanistic…..standards of aesthetics, poetics, morals, and interpretive insight, 
rather than by objective standards of truth’. This strong criticism can become an 
argument for a critical realist or pragmatist stance.  
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p.109), who describe themselves as 
transcendental realists, argue that differences in paradigm assumptions cannot be 
dismissed, implicitly or explicitly. These positions they say, have important 
consequences for the practical conduct of inquiry as well as for the interpretation 
of findings and policy choices Guba and Lincoln (1994, p.107-112). Guba and 
Lincoln define paradigms as basic beliefs, worldviews that have to be accepted on 
faith. They argue that paradigms are human constructions and advocates of any 
particular construction must rely on persuasiveness and utility rather than proof in 
argument. Bazeley (2002, p.3) considers that one can’t research or prove 
paradigms, and paradigmatic debates can never be resolved.  
Howe (1988, p.15) considers that theories of truth as correspondence or 
truth as coherence are a forced choice as do Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009). Howe 
is critical of the two positions, positivism, championed as truly ‘scientific‘ and 
interpretivism, embracing multiple realities with researchers free to speak their own 
languages, investigate their own questions, and come up with their own standards 
of truth. Howe (1988) argues that the two paradigms, positivist and interpretivist, 
do not exhaust the possibilities and reminds readers of pragmatism as a possible 
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alternative. Howe and Eisenhart (1990, p.2) argue that the problem of standards 
for inquiry is best framed in the ‘logics in use’, which I tentatively apply in practical 
terms. When examining 166 responses to 6 open ended questions, it was logical 
to develop a rubric that made a common standard of assessment possible and 
transforming the descriptors into numerical scores for analysis.  
Smith and Heshusius (1986, p.6), in an often cited article in the qualitative–
quantitative debate, criticise attempts by Guba and Lincoln to develop criteria to 
judge quality in naturalistic research. Smith and Heshusius (1986) argue that Guba 
and Lincoln’s view together assumptions underpinning naturalistic inquiry 
alongside criteria and procedures that characterize rationalist inquiry. They 
criticise LeCompte and Goetz (1982) as well, who, they say, describe procedures 
for the practice of naturalistic inquiry in ways that are comparable to rationalistic 
inquiry, making their approach as systematic and rigorous as the other. Miles and 
Huberman (1994), argue Smith and Heshusius, ignore paradigmatic differences in 
order to pay attention to developing a body of clearly defined methods for drawing 
valid meaning from qualitative data.  
Smith and Heshusius are critical of Miles and Huberman who according to 
them do seem to accept that concepts such as valid, real, dependable, trustworthy 
can be defined in the same way for both sides. The principal concern now is, 
complain Smith and Heshusius, to find methods for qualitative inquiry that will 
provide the same objectivity and certitude presumably available to quantitative 
inquiry. They argue that as reality is mind-dependent, a description can only be 
matched to other descriptions and not to an ‘unconceptualised reality’ Smith and 
Heshusius (1986, p.7). 
For qualitative inquiry, Smith and Heshusius (1986, p.8) argue, a valid 
interpretation is among interpretations one with which ‘one agrees’. They elaborate 
‘the ultimate basis for such agreement is that the interpreters share, or come to 
share after an open dialogue and justification, similar values and interests.’ 
Qualitative inquiry, insist Smith and Heshusius, does not require that certain things 
must be done or that validity is a matter of appropriately implemented techniques. 
All that can be done, they say, is to match descriptions to other descriptions, 
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choosing to honour some as valid, given one’s interests and purposes. The last 
adds a radical pragmatic explication in Smith & Heshusius’s argument. The 
founding arguments are epistemological and ontological but do not resolve on this 
basis an epistemologically grounded answer to the dilemma posed. The choice 
between alternative interpretations, choosing to honour one, given one’s interests, 
is therefore, pragmatic and personal. 
From my perspective as an educational practitioner and end user of 
knowledge, one whose responsibility is to change practice, this is problematic. In 
education, the responsibility of children’s learning and indeed their life chances, 
makes educational decisions a matter not so much as one of personal choice as 
responsible choice. It is questionable if the stance of Smith and Heshusius is 
coherent with the stance on knowledge in normal educational practice. Schools 
are places where assessment and evaluation of learning and teaching are 
everyday activities that have consequences for pupils, teachers and schools. 
Personal values as a basis for choice between knowledge claims are not the norm. 
The alternative to personal choice however, of claim of knowledge corresponding 
to reality can be, and has been, successfully challenged on many fronts. Problems 
of learning and teaching need knowledge that works to resolve problems and build 
content for the development of practice. It is reasonable to assume that truth would 
work in practice while that which suits personal or group interest may or may not.  
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.90-91) explain their pragmatic stance 
distancing themselves from post-positivists on axiological considerations. They 
say pragmatists decide what they want to study, and include units of analysis and 
variables based on what is important within their personal value system. Thus far, 
pragmatism is a practical and useful philosophy. 
Discussing paradigm issues in mixed methods research Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2009, p.87-89) argue that pragmatism and transformative 
perspectives reject forced choices between positivism/post-positivism and 
constructivism with regards to methods, logic, and epistemology, and embrace 
features associated with both. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.87-89) believe that 
pragmatists and transformative scholars can choose both inductive and deductive 
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logic in the research cycle to address questions. This theoretical support helped in 
planning my research including both confirmatory and exploratory questions as 
well as both pre-set categories and grounded development of categories in 
analyzing data. 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.90) discuss the relationship between 
knower and known on a continuum rather than on two poles. They suggest the 
researcher and participants may require a highly interactive relationship at times 
and distance at others. They address ontological considerations, pragmatically 
suggesting that they agree with an external reality but deny that truth regarding 
reality can actually be determined. Pragmatists, they say, are unsure if any 
explanation of reality is better than another. They cite Howe (1988) that for 
pragmatists, truth is a normative concept. Howe explains that for pragmatists ‘truth 
is what works’, is best seen not as a theory or definition, but as the pragmatists 
attempt to say something interesting about the nature of truth and to suggest, in 
particular, that knowledge claims cannot be completely abstracted from contingent 
beliefs, interests, and projects (italics theirs). Transformative scholars suggest 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.93) believe there are diverse viewpoints and 
choose between alternative explanations that best promote social justice for 
oppressed groups. The last is a choice based on personal morals which again sets 
aside arguments for truth. 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) say they believe that research conducted in 
the tradition of pragmatism is carried out within the value system of researchers 
and is focused upon answering questions in the researchers interest. There is a 
crucial difference between the two statements. The first refers to choice between 
explanations on the basis of personal values, the second to design elements which 
is probably the norm for most research. If values are to be taken to refer to 
philosophical, disciplinary or cultural viewpoints or positions, my question is: would 
these then be the values of the individual or the community of scholars and reflect 
a democratic aspect? Individual or small group values in the global community are 
hard to defend as what may be political and ethical values for one community may 
not be so for another. Pragmatism, as the philosophy avowed by historians, 
 59 
 
especially those of American History, can thus be challenged by marginalized 
groups in ways that are similar to the History of the Sub-Continent written by those 
from other dominant groups. Kloppenburg (1996, p.101) express a concern that 
present day pragmatists differ from early pragmatists who believed their 
philosophical ideas had particular ethical and political consequences. They find 
that contemporary pragmatists consider it merely a method of analysis.  
This is where I part ways with core pragmatism. To dwell at length on 
philosophy, while fascinating, is outside the scope of this research. Suffice to say 
that to choose pragmatism alone as an expedient alternative conceptual 
framework, for me, would be unwise. I, as teacher educator, Pakistani, female, 
Muslim, student researcher, inferring cause on the basis of personal values, would 
be opening myself to argument quite distinct from that of research quality. 
Symonds and Gorard (2008, p.1) argue that labels can be restrictive in enforcing 
categorical differences. They suggest as a  practical alternative, to focus on the 
quality of research techniques, data, and how that data is used instead of trying to 
construct overarching categories and researcher identity Symonds and Gorard 
(2008, p.17). This stance is more pragmatic, less controversial, and more in line 
with my personal values. One last rationale is the practical choice in a given 
situation such as the many I have taken in the quasi experimental design. 
Howe and Eisenhart (1990, p.3) argue that abandoning positivism does not 
lead to abandoning standards. Howe, as a pragmatist’s argument, is that as there 
is no way to know truth, truth is what works. Howe (1988, p.15) argues that 
knowledge claims cannot be completely abstracted from underpinning contingent 
beliefs, interests and projects. Pragmatists, he argues, giving the examples of 
Kuhn (1977), Quinne (1970), supplant coherence and correspondence with criteria 
such as accuracy, scope, simplicity, consistency, and comprehensiveness Howe 
(1988, p.15). I will need to explore what this means in practical terms.  
Shadish et al. (2002, p.35) explain pragmatism in a different light. They 
suggest that pragmatism says a claim is true if it is useful to believe the claim which 
is somewhat different and more practical from a claim that suits personal values. 
They cite Latour (1987) that what comes to be accepted as true in science is what 
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scientists can convince others to use, what they say is implied in Mishler’s (1990) 
assertion that qualitative methods are validated by a ‘a functional criterion - 
whether findings are relied upon for further work’. Shadish et al. (2002) reason that 
as all theories of truth, correspondence, coherence, pragmatism are compromised, 
practicing scientists should not have to choose between them in justifying a viable 
approach to the validity of inferences about causation and its generalization. This 
is a position I consider useful in the conduct of this research in teacher education 
using a quasi-experimental and mixed methods design. I have arguments 
however, with core pragmatism which I discuss at various points in this 
dissertation.  
Pragmatism’s choice of ‘what works’ may not be enough justification for 
some. But pragmatism as what is known to work could be based on experience 
and expertise. Smith and Heshusius (1986, p.9) make even this problematic by 
arguing that the problem with what works, no matter how it is expressed, tells us 
nothing about the process of inquiry and the interpretation of results. 
Shadish and Cook (2009) who are proponents of quasi-experimental 
research discuss theories of truth and suggest that as all roads to truth are 
compromised, their theory of validity employs all three, correspondence, 
coherence, and pragmatism. They argue that scientists should not have to choose 
between them. Perhaps so, however, to be unaware of such concerns especially 
using mixed methods would be a recipe for trouble.  
Where I select a set of open ended questions as a data gathering 
instrument, I do so because this affords respondents space to construct a broader, 
personal, reflective response. I select Likert Scales where I require more tightly 
circumscribed responses taking a stance. When I transform qualitative descriptors 
to quantitative scores it is a practical choice to facilitate analysis of a large number 
of responses. I am pragmatic as a practical choice in context but I resist labeling 
the decision as a personal value.  
As far as drawing conclusions using both qualitative and quantitative data 
and methods of analysis, I am content to be careful in applying method and 
principles prescribed for each methodology in its place such as those of internal 
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validity, being transparent and providing rich description, drawing tentative 
conclusions within the limitations that are found, and being open to argument. I do 
not expect that a stance identified on the Likert Scale would be the self-same 
stance expressed in the open ended responses or one a more true isomorphic, 
reflection of the reality of the respondents’ beliefs than the other. I do however 
expect to see some coherence or what is referred to as an ‘overall fit’.  
In the absence of consensus on paradigms for research, mixed methods 
properly applied, and carefully conducted are at present the best choice. Method 
can gain ascendancy of careful rule following, taking context into consideration, 
and being open to criticism. What is known is of value then, only if it is known how 
it is known, and to what parameters it can be held to apply. In the real world, 
knowledge is needed and used for real purposes to address urgent real world 
problems. Just as products carry labels of contents and ingredients, etcetera, 
research too should have openness, detail, including if any, a statement of the 
personal value that has given rise to the choice. Apart from this, a critical, reflective 
awareness of background assumptions at every stage could make knowledge 
claims more credible. A way forward for future research could be to see if 
assumptions constructed to personal values do indeed work to solve real world 
problems. 
Being a mixed methodologist, I have found, is being beset by self-doubt and 
indeed, doubts about theorists that seek to light the way. It took courage to realize 
that pragmatism is the way forward especially in complex areas. Like all theories 
however, it is better to take pragmatism itself, critically, as a work in progress, that 
practical research activities can help to direct and define. 
Here I am reminded of a phrase in the Quran which I shall take the liberty 
to quote, ‘Reality! What is the Reality? Ah, what will convey unto thee what the 
reality is!’28 Indeed it is difficult to take a stance to answer this question especially 
if one is a social scientist. The vagaries of fortune of theories even in the hard 
sciences make this challenge applicable to all knowledge claims. 
                                            
28 (Chapter 69: Verses 1,2,3)  Translation by Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall 
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This quasi-experimental and mixed methods design straddles the spheres 
of experimental science with interpretive approaches and finds this comfortable 
and practical in achieving the research purposes. Theoretical arguments are 
necessary in academic work. This research demonstrates in its own way, how 
ideas and actions can be made coherent to achieve a real life educational goal to 
find out, to make what we teachers do, better.  
 
2.3.2 Effect Sizes 
 
The results are tantalizing and interesting but not conclusive in the sense of 
statistical significance in most tests of the relationship. This not being a 
randomized control trial but a practitioner research using mixed methods, results 
are interpreted with care. Numbers being small in the complete population (83), 
and within single studies, and selection being non-random, limits the number of 
tests that can be conducted as well as the strength of the interpretation. There are 
no easy references of effect on adult learning therefore the references for 
children's learning are used. It is important to remember that epistemic beliefs and 
change within these, as well as a perception of agency are psychological 
constructs unlike self-report grades, homework or feedback which can be expected 
to have a larger impact on children's learning as Hattie's Rankings lists show29. 
Effectiveness of the intervention is seen with a test of percentage change on all 
items of the BLTHQ. Cohen d effect size is 0.511.  
There is no effect size quoted in Hattie Rankings (September 2014, May 
2015) on a perception of agency as this may be the first time that this relationship 
has been suggested, researched, or reported, to my knowledge. The sizes quoted 
for related psychological constructs such as 0.48 for motivation, 0.24 affective 
attributes, are taken as a rough reference. Thus, effect sizes ranging between 0.51 
and 0.60 in tests, as seen in data in this research, can be interpreted from good to 
moderate. Some tests show significant difference. 
                                            
29 Self-Report Grades 1.44; Feedback: 0.73. Hattie Rankings May 2015 
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Hatties Rankings of effect size fall in the genre of ‘what works’ research in 
school-based learning therefore these are not easily generalised to teacher 
education. Hattie (2009, p.7-8) quotes Cohen (1988) that an effect size of 1.0 is 
‘large, blatantly obvious’. It is useful however to know that an effect size of over 
0.40 is considered 'hinge point’.30 
 
2.4 Arguments for the Design of the Quasi Experiment and Validity of 
Findings in Quasi-experimentation with Reference to this Research 
 
As stated, my research design is based on a Quasi Experiment in the 
context of in-service teacher education in schools where I have been a practitioner. 
I have relied mainly upon the texts of Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell, influential theorists in the field, to design the Quasi 
Experiment. Campbell and Stanley (1963) introduced the terms Quasi 
Experimentation, and Internal and External Validity. Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(2008), and many of their arguments focus on these aspects. This Section of the 
Chapter discusses theoretical aspects relating to internal validity while its practical 
implementation is discussed in Research Methodology.  
In this Section, I review and discuss the theoretical assumptions that 
underpin my own project. I have found that ground realities often reflected much 
of what was described by the authors. In a sense, generalising theory to the 
particular contexts of research in schools in Pakistan did become possible. I see a 
pragmatic perspective, a leaning towards 'what works' underpinning the reasoning 
of Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish et al. (2002) as they describe quasi 
experimentation. The authors also say they are ambivalent about their role in 
promoting quasi experimentation and there are increased efforts on their part to 
emphasise better control in selection to make causal inference more reliable. In 
more recent work, Shadish and Cook (2009) say that Randomised Control Trials 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for well-warranted causal inference.  
                                            
30 Grant Wiggins as read on 7th May 2015: grantwiggins.wordpress.com/2012/01/07/what-works-in-
education-hatties-list-of-the-greatest-effects-and-why-it-matters/ 
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Cook et al. (2010) find that the theory and practice of field experimentation is 
increasingly being used for answering causal questions. The term 'quasi' is 
described in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as meaning seemingly, apparently, but 
not really, and that is how I have found quasi experiments to be in reference to true 
experiments. 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.35), Shadish et al. (2002), outline that in quasi-
experiments, the cause is manipulable and occurs before the effect is measured 
and that the paradigmatic assertion in causal relationships is that manipulation of 
a cause will result in manipulation of an effect. The experiments in my research 
were designed carefully to keep the cause manipulable and occurring before I 
measured the effect. 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.6-8) describe quasi experiments as 
experiments that have treatments, outcome measures and experimental units but 
do not use random assignment. Thus Experimental and Control Groups may be 
non-equivalent where field conditions constrain possibilities of randomisation. 
These non-equivalent Groups, warn Cook and Campbell, may differ from each 
other in many ways other than treatment effects which could be alternative 
explanations for the observed effect. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.6-8) however, 
argue that random assignment makes most of the alternatives less likely as causes 
of observed effects. Importantly, Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish et al. 
(2002, p.xvi) emphasise a focus on better design rather than dependence on 
statistics to test causal propositions. Their descriptions of various types of 
experimental designs as well as design elements that help to counter threats to 
generalised inference were valuable in planning. Threats to validity are referred to 
as heuristic devices in examining the research design. No list is exhaustive and I 
have found that I need to be alert to threats that may be peculiar to my research 
context.  
 
2.5 Truth Claims in Quasi Experimental Research 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979), as self-described ‘critical realists’, tread the 
ground with care as they develop their logic of experimentation. They are careful 
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to state that ‘outside variables will always impinge on a dependent variable making 
results sensitive to forces outside the theoretical system’ and, that they expect the 
relationships to be fallible and probable at best. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.15-
34) use the term validity to refer to ‘the approximate truth of an inference’ and lay 
out procedures that they suggest can support assumptions of internal construct, 
and external validity in making claims regarding causal relationships between 
variables. Cook and Campbell (1979), Shadish et al. (2002, p.34) recommend 
modesty and use of the terms ‘tentative’ and ‘approximate’ in making truth claims 
as ‘one can never know what is true’. Taking from Popper, Cook and Campbell say 
that at best one can only know what has not yet been ruled out as false (Cook and 
Campbell (1979). 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.34) say their theory of validity makes use of each of 
these approaches to truth; correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, but 
recognise that each is compromised. 
 
2.5.1 The Assignment Process 
 
In my programme of research, I chose what Cook and Campbell (1979) 
recommend as generally interpretable, Control and Experimental Groups with pre-
tests and post-tests design. The programme had five separate studies in three 
different school systems over three cities of Pakistan. Each study had a Control 
and an Experimental group. In all studies, selection of participants or assignment 
of participants to Control or Experimental groups was not mine as the researcher, 
as described above. Groups were formed naturally, based on geographical 
location. My own decision was arbitrary and across the board; the second of two 
groups in a study, would be the Experimental Group as described above.  
Can this process be seen as having the probability value of a chance 
assignment? As the assignment process was unrelated to the outcome, on 
average, could this be seen to function like a randomised experiment? That is a 
matter of judgment. What appears to me to be more meaningful is that the groups 
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were typical of those found in teacher educational classrooms with their multiple 
similarities and differences. 
Steiner et al. (2009) find that within study comparisons have shown that 
quasi-experiments regularly fail to reproduce experimental results unless the 
assignment mechanism into treatment is completely known or extensively and 
reliably measured. Meaning thereby that with knowledge of the assignment 
mechanism, the study could be replicated. I can only guess the assignment 
mechanism and certainly not measure it in reliable terms, but I assume that it would 
on average be in a similar range in all groups with individual differences. I consider, 
knowing schools well, that on average in a group, there would be a similar range 
of reasons why participants chose to attend or chose the Control or Experimental 
Group, especially as they did not have knowledge of the difference in the treatment 
in the groups. 
Those designs that meet the standard for inference include non-equivalent 
control group designs with plausible theories of selection into treatment versus 
control states and extensive and reliable measurements of this selection process 
Steiner et al. (2009). The last clause would necessarily preclude most quasi-
experimental designs including this one. As described in the last Section, it was 
found to be difficult to obtain reliable data regarding the selection or assignment 
process therefore ‘extensive and reliable’ measurements of the process were not 
attempted. Many key questions such as prior qualifications in history appeared 
threatening to the participants and responses were either withheld or not reliably 
answered. 
Insisting on responses would have been a threat in itself and conflict with 
the perception of agency I wished to create in the experimental groups. These are 
the field conditions that make true experiments impossible and even restrict 
possibilities of inference in quasi experiments. By making this shortcoming plain 
and avoiding interpretation that is more than tentative, I hope to make this research 
useful and credible. Other practitioners trying out a perception of agency in their 
classrooms would however, benefit from knowing that conditions were similar to 
those in their own contexts. 
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Steiner et al. (2009) write from the context of research in psychology, 
especially university based research, where randomised trials may be feasible. 
Students in psychology departments would be more likely to cooperate in providing 
information regarding selection, and in random selection. Administrators and 
managers in busy, children's schools would be unlikely to cooperate in random 
selection and assigning staff to groups. These are the realities of the field. There 
is relevant information regarding participants that would remain hard to obtain or 
unreliable if volunteered in many cases. 
 
2.5.2 Validity 
 
Validity, argue Shadish et al. (2002, p.34), is a property of inference not a 
property of design or method. Campbell (1957) explained internal validity as the 
question ‘did in fact the experimental stimulus make some difference in this specific 
instance?’ The data appears to show that in 4 out of 5 studies the experimental 
stimulus could have made a difference. How valid or reliable is this inference 
depends upon what is construed as valid or reliable in such quasi experimental 
conditions. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.38) list four types of validity; statistical, internal, 
construct, and external. Cook and Campbell (1979) describe a range of threats to 
internal validity and encourage the use of design to control these threats where 
possible. Cook and Campbell (1979) point out however, that this is a deductive 
process and fallible.  
Shadish et al. (2002, p.63) see a close relationship between internal and 
statistical conclusion validity. Both, they say, are concerned with study operations 
and with the relationship between treatment and outcome. Shadish et al. (2002) 
discuss construct validity and raise the question, ‘how can we generalise from a 
sample of instances and the data patterns associated with them to the target 
constructs they represent?’ This is a hard question to answer but their suggestions 
are reasonable. 
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A perception of agency, the treatment, is a construct that may be interpreted 
in various ways. Therefore, I chose to limit the definition to specific actions and 
statements which I could follow. The outcome, change in epistemic beliefs, 
especially as observed in responses to the open ended questions, again required 
clear explication to make assessment consistent. The effort to develop the rubric, 
CBKH, and repeated assessment, as well as Inter Rater and Internal Evaluations 
was useful in keeping a careful eye on the process. Using the same three different 
instruments to measure change and carefully following classroom procedures and 
content kept all studies as similar as possible and supported the level of inference 
that could be made. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.69) extend the usage of construct validity from 
outcomes and treatments to include persons and settings. They argue that 
construct validity involves making inferences from any of the sampling particulars 
in a study to the higher order constructs they represent (emphasis theirs). 
Understandably, they warn against construct mislabeling. This is a concern of mine 
as the measures I use, imply a sophisticated or naive set of epistemic beliefs, 
which can be open to challenge. Critics, respondents, can challenge the validity of 
a conclusion. I have used these existing measures as a matter of convenience as 
any measure of such concepts would be an approximation. Sampling treatments, 
say Shadish et al. (2002), is rarely done in field research for good practical reasons 
and I did not as well. I piloted four instruments and did not use one, The Four 
Quadrant Scale, Schraw and Olafson (2008, p.25), as it appeared to have social 
desirability effects in my sample. 
 
2.5.3 Fuzzy Plausibility 
 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.484) argue that quasi experiments rely on 
researcher judgments about assumptions, especially on the fuzzy but 
indispensable concept of plausibility. While both texts describe the possibility of 
quasi-experiments, a concern for improving inference through careful design is 
emphasised. Shadish et al. (2002, p.484), suggest that in the best of quasi 
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experiments, internal validity is not much worse than with the randomised 
experiment and argue that fuzzy plausibility is central to ruling out threats in quasi 
experimentation. After following arguments to overcome threats to validity in the 
research, I found I could counter several threats but not all. Key among these of 
course is random selection and assignment; nor was I able to measure and 
account for threats as key information was simply not available. These I have 
raised and described giving reasons. This begs the question that with these 
reservations, why are quasi-experiments considered at all? The answer, as I have 
found, lies in both the constraints of field conditions where random selection is near 
impossible as well as the poor relevance of true experimental conditions to the real 
life world of schools.  
 
2.5.4 Types of Designs 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979) discuss two classes of designs; those they 
consider generally non-interpretable, that generally do not permit causal inference, 
and non-equivalent, control group designs that, they say, are generally 
interpretable. Among the latter, the untreated control group with pre-test and post-
test is most often used and often interpretable. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.103). 
This is the design I have used in all 5 studies. Groups were not matched in 
particulars. Broadly, all belonged to the category of O’ Level teachers of history in 
high school. They are therefore classed as nonequivalent. 
Shadish et al. (2002) recommend Regression Discontinuity designs where 
the decision to assign participants to Control or Experimental Groups is based on 
a measure prior to treatment. Assignment to treatment is on the basis of a cutoff 
score on an assignment variable not by coin toss or lottery. Interestingly, Shadish 
et al. (2002, p.216) say that the assignment variable can even be one that is totally 
unrelated to outcome and have no particular substantive meaning. They cite the 
example of Cain (1975), where the order of application to a program was used as 
a basis for assignment. The first 20 applicants were assigned to treatment, the 
remainder were controls. Such a rule did not remain constant in my study as 
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participants self-selected to groups according to location. The two groups formed 
for each study were assigned a location at a distance and participants actually 
came to the group nearer to home or school.  
Another example discussed is that of Deluse (1999) where couples were 
assigned to treatment based on the day they filed for divorce. This, argue Shadish 
et al. (2002), would function like a randomised experiment in which the assignment 
process is unrelated to the outcome on average. I find this an interesting argument 
as it can be extended to apply in a wider range where assignment is to criteria that 
do not impact the outcome. In my 5 Studies I kept an arbitrary rule to decide which 
group would be the Control and which would be Experimental. The first of two 
groups in each study was the Control Group and I kept this practice throughout the 
5 studies. Thus this is an assignment variable that is totally unrelated to outcome. 
For me this has to suffice.  
 
2.5.5 Selection Bias 
 
Steiner et al. (2009) refer to research (in carefully circumscribed contexts 
and with regression discontinuity designs) that suggests bias reduction has been 
achieved with full knowledge or extensive measurement of the selection process 
and, when intact, local but nonequivalent comparison groups are selected that 
heavily overlap with the treatment group. In other contexts, they argue, the degree 
of bias reduction has been disappointing. 
The groups in this research are not intact but formed in all cases at random 
in the sense that no particular selection process was employed. I as researcher, 
was presented the groups as found by schools. Participants could have either been 
self-selected or assigned by school managers. I am known as a teacher educator 
of long standing, and there is some awareness of the value of training for CIE 
programmes amongst high school teachers and schools, therefore the workshops 
could have attracted interest and those available could have elected to come. 
These are conjectures however. In many ways the groups were representative of 
such a group formed in normal teacher training workshops. Some information was 
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volunteered on the forms but it was not adequate in developing sound knowledge 
of participants’ qualifications and experience. Probing questions were seen as 
unwelcome, therefore I gave up asking. My focus on a perception of agency made 
me nervous of creating undue tension or awareness that could possibly create 
differences in treatment. 
Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish et al. (2002) warn against what 
they call mono operation bias and mono method bias. Using several measures can 
address the former as I have done by using both quantitative and qualitative 
measures. I have also used a measure of general epistemic beliefs as well as two 
of particular history related beliefs about knowledge to extend the description as 
well as for possibilities of triangulation. I have, however, used the same set of 
measures throughout the five studies in order to facilitate comparison. I have 
conducted the experiment in different locations what Shadish et al. (2002) call 
multi-site studies. Different persons from a range of schools and cities were used 
in experiments. While broadly falling into similar categories, finer differences such 
as age, years of experience, etcetera are the norm. 
 
2.5.6 Generalized Causal Inference 
 
While discussing generalised causal inference, Shadish et al. (2002, p.385), 
mention that researchers are often interested in the level of treatment 
implementation that would be anticipated as modal if the intervention were 
routinely adopted. Indeed, in this case, building a perception of agency would have 
become ineffective if it had become noticed as a peculiar action, a research 
treatment, or a comical aberration in the trainer's behaviour. The need to make the 
actions less obtrusive did however clash with the problem that participants may 
simply miss seeing the message if it was too lightly presented. This is another kind 
of threat. In any follow up research, I would still recommend that sincerity in the 
perception of agency would be more effective than one where it was seen merely 
as a gimmick. 
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Shadish et al. (2002, p.96) cite Cronbach (1982) that timely, representative 
but less rigorous studies can lead to reasonable causal inference while Campbell 
and Boruch (1975) are said to maintain that causal inference outside of 
experiments is problematic because many threats to internal validity remain 
unexamined and have to be ruled out by fiat rather than through design and 
measurement. 
 
2.5.7 Possibilities of Randomization and Standardization 
 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.23) recognise that random sampling is always 
desirable but only rarely and contingently feasible. They suggest that purposive 
sampling is sometimes useful and more commonly used. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.50) cite Boruch & Gomez, 1977; Cook, Habib, 
Settersten, Shagle, & Degirmencioglu, (1999), Lipsey, (1990), to argue that 
conclusions about co-variation will be affected if treatment is implemented 
inconsistently from site to site or from person to person within sites. This threat 
they say is pervasive in field experiments, however they add that a lack of 
standardization is intrinsic to some real world interventions. While mechanical 
aspects were easy to deliver consistently, I cannot claim that all my actions were 
entirely consistent or were consistently perceived by all. The perception of agency 
was provided as planned, however in any classroom it would be difficult to claim 
that all heard, observed, registered, and constructed the same message. This not 
being a medicinal pill taken at set time times and quantities, there are bound to be 
variations in the perception amongst participants. 
I do not have adequate evidence to make a claim but generally I consider 
that a difference in experience of the perception-as-operationalized was surely 
provided between control and experimental groups. I tried to make an audio record 
of all sessions but the quality of the record varies, being incomplete and inaudible 
at times, makes it problematic for use. I have used my records and the audio record 
in order to describe the experiments and to illustrate the process. For a replication 
of the experiment, in depth qualitative data would be needed as well as more 
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thorough observation. These are difficult to manage in self-funded research as well 
as being impractical in terms of all participants. 
The treatment was not complex and did not involve actions on the part of 
others which made it easier to monitor. It did, however, involve care in delivery so 
that all introductions and statements were made and the follow up approach was 
persisted with throughout the three day course. The treatment was novel. In such 
a case Shadish et al. (2002) recommend that levels of treatment should be 
included; one as high as possible and one equivalent to a no treatment group. This 
I will need to recommend to others who wish to conduct this research. 
It must be kept in mind that field research has dynamics that can change 
with the imposition of greater demands. More measures can cause boredom and 
attrition. My most pressing concern at all times was that of participant attrition due 
to the content being perceived as less than relevant. Such fears dominated the list 
of influences on the design and conduct of the research. Therefore, while the ideal 
design of an experiment may be desirable for interpretation, what one can actually 
do in school is quite another matter. 
 
2.5.8 Cause in Quasi Experimentation 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.10-15) want to base causal inference on 
procedures that reduce uncertainty about causal connections. Steiner et al. (2009) 
understand that full explanation of any causal relationship is necessarily context 
dependent and, further, that many factors are required for a given cause-effect 
relationship to occur. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.9) argue that while experiments are useful for causal 
description they do less well in causal explanation, which is clarifying the 
mechanisms through which, and the conditions under which, that causal 
relationship holds (Italics added here). 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.10) argue that causal explanation is an important 
route to the generalization of causal descriptions because it tells us which features 
of the causal relationship are essential to transfer to other situations. I recognize 
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the modest possibilities of generalization but have added descriptions supported 
with contextual data from field notes, records, photographs, and random 
observations by participants. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.27) understand that the impossibility of theory 
neutral observation…..implies the results of any single test (and so any single 
experiment) are inevitably ambiguous. They further suggest that such critique is 
true of single studies and less true of programs of research, Shadish et al. (2002, 
p.28). I took great pains to repeat the experiment in 5 studies in order to add to 
numbers in a meta-analysis as well as to study the relationship in broadly similar 
yet different in particularities of persons/settings/times, to see how well the 
relationship between agency and conceptual change holds. This is an aspect 
which will be reviewed in analysis. 
 
2.5.9 Alternative Explanations in Causal Inference 
 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.14) explain that in quasi-experiments, the researcher 
has to enumerate alternative explanations one by one, decide which are plausible, 
and then use logic, design, and measurement to assess whether each one is 
operating in a way that might explain any observed effect, Shadish et al. (2002). 
This is a process I have followed although it may be hard for readers who do not 
know quasi-experimentations theories of internal validity to understand why each 
threat must be considered and described. I have realised that writing up a quasi-
experiment in accordance with the theory of internal validity as argued by Cook 
and Campbell (1979) requires a very context related, explanatory and descriptive 
mode which I can assume is different from the writing of true experiments. These 
transparent details and acknowledgements however, must help teachers and 
educators recognise familiar territory and the possibility of research within it. 
On the other hand, Shadish et al. (2002, p.16) argue that it is neither feasible 
nor desirable to rule out all possible alternative interpretations of a causal 
relationship and suggest that plausible alternatives be the major focus. Shadish et 
al. (2002, p.15-16) argue that falsification depends on two assumptions that can 
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never be fully tested; the claim needs to be fully specified and require measures 
that are perfectly valid reflections of the theory being tested. These are indeed 
difficult claims to maintain in most social science. 
In case threats to validity cannot be ruled out by design controls, either 
because the logic of design control does not apply or because practical constraints 
prevent available controls from being used, Shadish et al. (2002, p.40) suggest 
three critical questions. 1) How would the threat apply in this case? 2) Is there 
evidence that the threat is plausible rather than just possible? 3) Does the threat 
operate in the same direction? I have made attempts to identify possible threats 
and counter these in the design. These could be identified and described in my 
study context but could not be quantitatively assessed due to a lack of information. 
This is described in detail in the Chapter on Research Methodology. 
 
2.5.10 Thoughts on the Review of Literature on Quasi-Experimentation 
 
The processes of science as well as theories of science, having been 
developed over time and systematic reasoning, the importance of existing 
knowledge in the field cannot be overlooked or undervalued. The literature review 
was an invaluable exercise in both design and its analysis. Carrying out research 
itself tests such knowledge and advances it with reason and reflection if only in 
miniscule ways at times. The elegance of quasi-experimental theory was 
experienced in the design and conduct of this research as many described 
situations and relationships came to life. 
The theory is easy to criticize and cynical reviewers may see many 
weaknesses in the perseverance that it takes to continue with the experiment in 
the face of threats to valid inference that are really apparent and obvious. What 
makes the quasi-experiment worth doing, in my understanding, is the possibility it 
affords of researching the practice of schools within real life school contexts. 
Where internal validity becomes a cause of concern, careful design can to a large 
extent help to sidestep and may avoid threats. One learns how manipulating 
design features can actually help improve the quality of inference. There is a 
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degree of challenge as well as pure excitement in conducting such studies which 
may not be the purpose but it certainly makes science well worth doing. 
Cook and Campbell's work has been criticized for its emphasis on internal 
validity, and their text for its long and often tiresome detail. This in fact is its very 
strength. The often arduous reading pays off with better design and more arguable 
inference. Both texts have been my companions throughout my research and I 
owe the authors much gratitude. The texts are liberating in a sense, because they 
legitimize research in field contexts. Quasi experimentation in the field makes real 
life situations valid experimental contexts and procedures within it assume 
meaningful value. 
I have set the quasi experiment in a mixed methods research design and 
have found that it works well. Both quantitative and qualitative data and its analysis 
have a logical place within an experiment as I am able to demonstrate. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.18) find that the strength of experimentation is its 
ability to illuminate causal inference. There are others such as Chomsky who are 
critical. I pondered Chomsky’s (1959) criticism cited in Cohen et al. (2007) that a 
singular problem of behaviourism is our inability to infer causes from behavior to 
identify the stimulus that has brought about the response. I interpreted the criticism 
as a need for a more expanded approach, providing rich description, using both 
evidence and argument. On the whole, I consider that teachers and teacher 
educators can and should try strategies and approaches in quasi-experimental 
fashion in order to better inform their practice. 
 
2.6 Theoretical Background of Measures and the CBKH Rubric 
 
 This Chapter discusses key aspects in the development of the theoretical 
model and instruments used in this study. Change in concepts and a perception of 
agency are discussed in Sections 2.1 to 2.2.10. Epistemic beliefs are argued next, 
followed by a review of literature on research methodology including quasi 
experimentation. What follows in the next Section is a focus on the measures used 
and the development of the CBKH rubric. 
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Apart from the three measures, the BM questions, the BLTHQ and EBI 
Likert Scales, the CBKH rubric is discussed in this section. The Categories of 
Beliefs about Knowledge in History are developed and used in this study based 
upon two previous models, Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) and Maggioni et al. 
(2009a). This set of categories is used to examine and order epistemic beliefs 
about knowledge in history on a scale of 1 to 7 from naive to sophisticated beliefs.  
The background of the development of the CBKH is first described briefly. 
This is followed by arguments specific to the development of the CBKH on the 
basis of theoretical perspectives studied as well as some reflection in action during 
the assessment of responses to the BM questions. Concerns expressed by the 
sample of teachers about the problems of history texts and how their pupils debate 
these in classrooms, is another basis for argument.  
A category scale such as the CBKH needs to be recognized as a tool in 
progress of development, used only to make ends meet until a better one comes 
along. The CBKH is not a prescription of how epistemic beliefs need to be, nor 
even a complete description of how they are. The complexity of the phenomenon 
defies complete description. The literature has been read critically, the various 
options available studied, and a rubric worked out to fit as best as possible with 
the nuances of the beliefs I could read in the data. Thus theorizing in the literature, 
my own concepts and skills, discussions with Maggioni, and the concerns raised 
by the teachers both inform and limit the development of the categories. 
 
2.6.1 Theoretical Models of Epistemic Beliefs that Inform the Development 
of the BLTHQ, Beliefs about Learning and Teaching History Questionnaire 
and the CBKH, Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History 
 
Maggioni et al. (2009a), Maggioni et al. (2004) argue the development of 
the Beliefs about Learning and Teaching History Questionnaire, the BLTHQ, and 
the model of epistemic cognition, the Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist categories, 
based on theoretical, methodological and pedagogical reasons. They explain that 
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they tested if their hypothesis was reflective of various philosophical perspectives 
but also compatible with data obtained of different groups of individuals. 
Maggioni et al. (2004) describe epistemological beliefs in the context of 
cognitive development in History and argue that their research findings parallel 
changes observed by King and Kitchener (1994), Kuhn and Weinstock (2002); 
Schraw et al. (2002). The work of Kuhn and Weinstock, King and Kitchener, Lee 
and Shemilt, is the main reference for the work on the original categories designed 
and argued by Maggioni et al. (2004); Maggioni et al. (2009a). These frameworks 
are discussed briefly below as they are pertinent to arguments for the CBKH as 
well. 
Kuhn and Weinstock (2002, p.125) conceptualize the development of 
epistemological understanding as the coordination of the subjective and objective 
dimensions of knowing. Their ‘Levels of Epistemological Understanding’ order 
development from what the authors term, realist, absolutist, multiplist, and 
evaluativist levels. This is described as on a developmental trajectory from children 
as young as three years old to a final level which is ‘most likely never to be 
achieved’. Interestingly, Kuhn and Weinstock introduce a ‘constructivist theory of 
mind’ by middle to late childhood. It is important to note here that stage related 
development of beliefs is argued in the literature. Chandler et al. (2002, p.146) find 
competing claims at ‘wildly different ages’. Kuhn and Weinstock consider that the 
transition from a multiplist to an evaluativist level as difficult describing this as the 
move from a belief in all claims being equally valid reflections of their owners 
subjectivist perspectives, to the evaluativist's reintegration of objectivity into 
knowing on the basis of criteria to judge between claims to have more merit than 
others. Kuhn and Weinstock (2002, p.126). The reintegration of objectivity at an 
evaluativist level in the domain of history requires a careful and reflective approach 
as I have found and argue in these pages.  
King and Kitchener (2002) describe epistemic cognition as the cognitive 
process enabling individuals to consider the criteria, limits, and certainty of 
knowing. The empirically developed Reflective Judgment model of King and 
Kitchener, suggests that individuals engage in three levels of cognitive processing. 
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At the first level called 'cognition' individuals engage in processes like computing, 
memorizing, reading and perceiving. At the second level, they engage in meta-
cognitive processing to monitor their progress and on the third level they operate 
in what is called epistemic cognition where individuals engage in considering the 
limits of knowing, the certainty of knowing and the criteria for knowing. Hofer (2002, 
p.6) finds the model encompasses the skills of critical thinking and personal 
epistemology. I can see an interesting order in the development described by King 
and Kitchener (2002) reminiscent of early levels of understanding in Bloom’s 
taxonomy at the first level and Schön’s reflective thinking at the second level. 
Epistemic cognition appears to be at a sequentially higher level of thinking in this 
model which is reasonable. 
 
King and Kitchener (2002, p.38) describe Reflective Judgment as based on 
Dewey's observation that reflective thinking is called for when people recognize 
that some problems cannot be solved with certainty. Their development of 
reflective thinking is described as seven distinct but developmentally related sets 
of assumptions about the process of knowing which they further reduce to three. 
These are termed the pre-reflective, quasi-reflective and reflective stages. King 
and Kitchener (2002, p.39) argue that at the pre-reflective stage, knowledge is 
gained through the word of an authority figure or through first-hand information 
rather than through evaluation of evidence. Such people are said to see knowledge 
as certain and absolutely correct. King and Kitchener describe quasi-reflective 
thinking as a stage when people recognize that knowledge claims contain 
elements of uncertainty, which they attribute to missing information or to methods 
of obtaining the evidence. People at the stage of reflective thinking are described 
as accepting that knowledge claims are not made with certainty but are ‘not 
immobilized by it’ but make judgments of which they are ‘reasonably certain’, that 
are ‘most reasonable’ on the grounds of their evaluation of available data.  
 
It is worthwhile here to discuss an older model of epistemic beliefs in the 
history domain. Seixas (1996, p.770) explains Shemilt (1987) four stage hierarchy 
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for analyzing adolescents’ ideas about historical evidence. The initial level accepts 
accounts with no questions about the authenticity or reliability of the source and 
no question about ‘using’ evidence other than as information. At the next level, 
questions about reliability or of sources are asked though still failing to use a 
source in the revision of an account. The third level is an understanding of evidence 
as a basis for inference about the past and finally, understanding the historicity of 
all historical accounts. The last is an argument for more sophistication, 
necessitating the revision and discounting of all accounts. This hierarchy is clearly 
ordered according to ideas or concepts about evidence at the same time relating 
to what one does with evidence to make inferences about the past. The importance 
of the last point cannot be ignored. I have argued in the development of the CBKH 
Categories that to be a criterialist, the awareness of the knower must not be lost 
even when the historical method is used with expertise.  
 
I have highlighted the word ‘failing’ to compare this with Maggioni et al. 
(2004) use of the word ‘deemed’ in the same context. There is a difference in 
reasoning and volition between the two words which is interesting and either may 
be representative of a respondent’s level of epistemic belief or merely a level of 
performance in a given case. Where Maggioni et al. (2004, p.188) write for a 
Borrower, ‘In this case, the constructed nature of history is acknowledged but the 
historical method is not deemed to be an effective tool to deal with problems of 
conflicting evidence’, a considered judgment is indicated. There is a difference 
between a person simply not knowing how to evaluate evidence or not believing 
that evidence can within reason resolve problems of choosing between 
explanations in history. The complexity of epistemic development makes for no 
easy answers.  
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2.6.2 The Model of Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist Categories of 
Epistemic Beliefs of Knowledge in History 
 
Authors Maggioni, VanSledright and Alexander, describe the development 
of the model, the Copier, Borrower, Criterialist, with reference to the Reflective 
Judgment Model (RJM) of King and Kitchener (2002) and Kuhn and Weinstock 
(2002) conceptualization of mature epistemological understanding as the 
‘coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing’, Maggioni et 
al. (2004, p.173). They say the project draws on three main frameworks used in 
the study of epistemic cognition; King and Kitchener (2002), Kuhn and Weinstock 
(2002) and Schommer (1990), Maggioni et al. (2009b, p.191)  
Maggioni et al. (2009b, p.194-195) discuss the 6 levels of progression of 
pupils’ ideas of evidence identified by Lee and Shemilt (2003), and find interesting 
similarities with domain general paths of epistemic cognition. They describe the 
Copier stance as parallel with the pre-reflective thinking in the RJM and the realist 
or absolutist level in Lee and Shemilt (2003) progression. Describing the Naive 
Realist position they argue that it is characterized by a belief in a perfect 
correspondence between the past and history. Maggioni et al. (2004, p.188) cite 
Alexander (2003) to suggest that Naive Realist beliefs tend to be typical of novices 
who still do not possess well developed knowledge of the principles and methods 
that characterize a specific domain. VanSledright refers to reader’s beliefs that 
history accounts fall from the sky readymade. For those who are not familiar with 
epistemic issues in the history domain, this sometimes seems strange as names 
of authors are recognized on book covers. Someone did ask me this question. 
However, there is consistent evidence even in my data that adult respondents can 
be seen as equating the past with history, for example, in response to the question, 
‘what is history?’ several responses were, ‘the past’ or ‘reflections of the past’. 
Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.209) argue, in the case of the Copier, evidence fogs the 
awareness of the interpretive process at work. Here, Shemilt (1987)’s definition of 
the highest level retaining understanding of ‘ the historicity of all historical accounts’ 
is again to be emphasised. 
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Maggioni et al. (2009a) liken the Borrower stance to the 3rd and 4th stages 
of Lee and Shemilt's progression, the multiplist level of the LEU or quasi-reflective 
thinking of the RJM. They name it the Borrower in order to ‘highlight that individuals 
tend to borrow their stories from accounts...on the basis of instinctive preferences 
or casual selections and do not yet fully know the disciplinary tools used by 
historians’. 
The third level of Maggioni et al. (2009a) is the Criterialist which they 
associate to reflective thinking in the LEU and the evaluativist model of Kuhn. The 
authors are specific in the association of greater sophistication with the 
understanding of heuristics. The Criterialist, as they describe, can ask questions 
that sources of evidence were not specifically designed to answer. They refer to 
other heuristics such as considering the perspective of the source and 
corroborating evidence across different sources to overcome the problem of bias 
in testimony considering that this makes history possible again. To this point they 
add reasoning about the past in its historical context to make the approach 
powerful. There are implications in this for history education of teachers as well as 
students. In explaining the CBKH categories I argue for the continued awareness 
of the knower and known at the level of the Criterialist beyond the development of 
knowledge and skill in the use of heuristics. A focus on heuristics alone may 
obscure the interpretive process at work and the role of the historian in the text. 
  
2.6.3 Are Epistemic Beliefs Domain General or Domain Specific Beliefs? 
 
Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001, p.420) argue that measures draw 
heavily upon the theory upon which they rest and therefore, measure different 
aspects of epistemic beliefs. There are arguments for domain generality as well as 
specificity. Paulsen and Wells (1998) report differences in beliefs in students from 
hard-soft-pure-applied sciences. Pintrich (2002) states that substantial differences 
persisting in epistemic beliefs across domains were unlikely. The EBI measures 
domain general beliefs whilst the BLTHQ is used to measure epistemic beliefs in 
history set in aspects of pedagogical practice. Apart from pedagogical practice, the 
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BLTHQ is also underpinned by theoretical considerations of what is knowledge in 
history as opposed to more domain general beliefs. The BM is a qualitative 
measure of epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history set in more abstract, 
theoretical terms. The theory underpinning the BLTHQ and the BM with reference 
to beliefs in history is compatible. Using the BLTHQ and the BM as well as the EBI 
in both pre-test and post-test to assess change provided measurements of change 
in beliefs in different aspects of epistemic beliefs and both qualitative and 
quantitative data. The BLTHQ additionally incorporates aspects of pedagogical 
practice of teaching history. 
Hofer (2002, p.11) refers to much work done that holds to epistemic beliefs 
being domain general and wonders if these can be seen as related in disciplines. 
An overview of instruments generally suggests a focus on epistemic aspects of 
what can or cannot be known, how people can come to know including source of 
knowledge such as authority, and how certain can the knowing be. A measure of 
general epistemic beliefs, the EBI and Maggioni et al’s BLTHQ are used in this 
research to measure change in concepts post intervention. A key difference 
between the two is the integration of the concepts and methods of historiography 
as defining progression in beliefs in the BLTHQ. Concepts of the nature of 
knowledge in history and the justification of this knowledge with the pragmatic use 
of evidence and argument are expected to grow with greater sophistication in 
epistemic beliefs in history. 
Some authors such as Schraw et al. (2002, p.261) include an examination 
of theory of learning aspects such as speed of learning and the ability to acquire 
knowledge. Belenky et al. (1986) Ways of Knowing refers to silence, received 
knowledge, subjective knowledge as well as procedural and constructivist 
knowing. Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001). This differs from my use of the term 
in the CBKH as I use ‘Ways of Knowing’ more in the procedural or strategic sense. 
This I took as a practical step to unravel the epistemic belief in the responses from 
the weak knowledge and skill in use of heuristics. This became necessary in the 
context of the numbers of responses and making a reliable assessment of beliefs 
within my sample.  
 84 
 
Hofer and Bendixen (2012, p.233) consider that while early models have 
suggested domain generality of epistemic beliefs there are studies that suggest 
that there is evidence that beliefs may be domain specific as well. 
 
2.6.4 Does Culture Have an Effect on Epistemic Beliefs? 
 
Effects of cultural backgrounds on epistemic beliefs are a focus of research 
as are perspectives in history. Epstein (1998) is cited by Barton (2008, p.247)31 to 
have found contradictory perspectives amongst students of European American 
and African American backgrounds. Alexander and Dochy (1995) inspected 
implicit theories of adults from the United States and Europe about knowing and 
believing and found repeated evidence that cultural background and educational 
experience shade the way that adults conceive knowing and believing. The authors 
argue that we cannot assume that those who speak of knowing and believing are 
communicating from a shared semantic base. Interestingly, Alexander and Dochy 
(1995) observed that with less educational training or with less expertise 
respondents were more likely to relay their views on knowing and believing with 
less tentativeness and greater conviction. A study of epistemic beliefs amongst 
secular Jews, religious Jews and Bedouins in Israel reported by Tabak and 
Weinstock (2008, p.177) found Bedouins had higher percentages of absolutist 
beliefs in all domains particularly values. 
I have used the BLTHQ in a very different cultural context albeit similar in 
terms of a school and teaching and learning history background for reasons that I 
have explained in the Chapter on Research Methodology. 
My study does not make comparisons of stance as seen in the BLTHQ of 
teachers in Pakistan and those described by Maggioni, VanSledright and 
Alexander, or explore these on the basis of cultural differences. That would be 
outside the scope of my research besides having epistemic issues regarding 
different paradigms and convergence of meaning in my view. I do describe specific 
features of curriculum experience that could impact beliefs but these are contextual 
                                            
31  In Levstik and Tyson (Eds) (2008) Handbook of Research in Social Studies Education. 
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aspects and not analyzed in the research. I conducted a Factor Analysis to test the 
performance of the BLTHQ in my sample and if there were differences in pre-test 
and post-test in the factors that emerged. The Factor Analysis conducted of data 
from the BLTHQ in my research has interesting differences as well as similarities 
with data described by Maggioni, et al. I provide the Factor Analysis but it is outside 
the scope of my research to compare differences and argue this on the basis of 
culture as stated above. Word limits also restrain such discussion. 
 
2.6.5 Epistemic Beliefs in the Domain of Knowledge in History and How 
These Differ from Domain General Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Epistemological beliefs about knowledge in history are considered to have 
an essential domain related relationship of epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history with the principles and practices of history as these have been employed 
by historians over time. A brief review of literature is necessary to understand the 
rationale for this. 
Ashby (2004) refers to what (Rogers, 1978, p.7) calls the symbiotic 
relationship between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ in history. Ashby (2004) 
explains that history asks different questions about the past, and it is the individual 
and specific nature of these questions that determine what counts as evidence in 
validating a claim to knowledge. This key principle is raised repeatedly in the 
literature.32 Seixas (1996, p.766) argues that all problems, including the question 
which account should we believe, addressed by historical thinkers both novices 
and experts, are rooted ultimately in pervasive historical traces or in historical 
accounts. VanSledright (2002, p.6) emphasises that historical thinking requires a 
complex regimen of investigative techniques. VanSledright (2009) uses the terms 
‘procedural or strategic knowledge’ when referring to methods. VanSledright and 
Afflerbach (2005, p.16) explain the requirements to move students to greater 
cognitive sophistication. They emphasize the importance of criteria investigators 
                                            
32 VanSledright (2002), Maggioni, VanSledright, Alexander (2009), Maggioni, Alexander and 
VanSledright (2004), Lee & Shemilt (2003), Ashby (2004). 
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use to assess the reliability of sources. They elaborate these as a move from binary 
distinctions, towards an awareness of the author’s historicized positions. Reading 
subtext, corroborating testimony, analyzing coherence in accounts, and resolving 
conflict with interpretations that make the most sense after a careful assessment 
of evidence are some things students would be expected to learn. 
Background knowledge of the historian is seen as a key element. Seixas 
(1996, p.770) relates the historical thinker’s background knowledge of the situation 
and about the perspectives of the author of the account or record, leads to the 
revision of the account and to new interpretations. This is what teachers often 
describe as taking place in classrooms. 
It is interesting to read the difference in the use of the heuristic as 
underpinned by the concept of its purpose by novice and expert. Finding the 
students and experts not just performing but reasoning differently, Wineburg 
(1991) attempts to explain the reasons behind the difference. He discounts the 
idea that historians possessed and activated an appropriate principle-oriented 
knowledge structure suggesting that they did not use existing schema but carefully 
and thoughtfully constructed these tailored to the event under study. Differences 
amongst the two groups reflected different conceptions not of what a text says but 
what a text is. The key difference pointed out between the students and historians 
was the use of attribution as the question from which all else emanated rather than 
as an add-on as students appeared to do. For historians using the sourcing 
heuristic did not appear to be a rule or problem solving strategy but demonstrated 
a belief that texts are defined by their authors’ Wineburg (1991, p.83). Maggioni et 
al. (2004) found teachers or pupils using methods in the absence of understanding 
the role or purpose of evidence.  
The emphasis in Wineburg (1991, p.83-84) argument is thus the 
underpinning epistemic concept without which the procedures of the historian 
could not be applied meaningfully. The concept of what the text is was seen as the 
defining difference between novice and expert. This is an important distinction and 
can be said to support my argument that weak knowledge and skill in the use of 
heuristics alone may sometimes blur the underpinning awareness of the 
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importance, in principle, of evidence and argument in constructing an account. 
Student teachers, I found, did not develop the expert level of skill and knowledge 
in my workshops as indeed would have been difficult in the short interventions of 
three four-hour sessions. Many did, however, become aware of the use of 
evidence and argument as providing a means to judge between explanations. 
They quoted some heuristics and phrased responses in ways that indicated that a 
change had taken place from a Naive Subjectivist stance to one where use of 
method and heuristic was seen as a way out of relativistic helplessness. 
Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.206) describe their examination of the stance of 
history professors expecting them to take a Criterialist epistemic stance. They 
found that historians acknowledged the need for criteria in the interpretation of the 
past but they rejected the view of history that equated interpretation with subjective 
opinion. Comparing novices to Maggioni et al. (2009b) historians in my data, I see 
that novices were more likely to be aware of bias and perspective at pre-test, more 
often not able to make this distinction between interpretation and subjective 
opinion.  
 
 
2.6.6 Development and Validation of the CBKH, the Categories of Beliefs 
about Knowledge in History 
 
2.6.6.1 Background for the Development of the CBKH 
 
A set of open-ended questions described by Mason (2002, p.315) and used 
in early research by Bombi and Ajello (1988), as well as Boscolo and Mason 
(2001), were selected as measures of epistemic belief. These are 6 open-ended 
questions that are general, not specific context related, and relate well to a critical 
reader's experience of history. The questions are: What is history? How do people 
who write history know about the past they write about? What problems can 
historians have when they try to understand what happened in the past? Is it 
possible to explain what happened in different ways? Why? If there are two 
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different explanations, how is it possible to understand which is better? These 
questions require a qualitative analysis and can also yield scores on a continuum. 
A rubric to differentiate between responses to the Boscolo & Mason 
questions was required. As the number of participants after all data cleaning was 
83 and the sum of response sheets pre-test to post-test was 166, it was necessary 
that a format that could be used as consistently as possible be developed. The 
questions are open-ended and employed in a context of teachers and school 
history teaching, the indicators for categories needed to be specific where 
possible. 
In order to assess responses, I had originally planned to use the framework 
devised by Kuhn and Weinstock (2002, p.121). Later, I studied Maggioni et al. 
(2004), and Maggioni et al. (2009a) model along with the possibility of transitions 
between stages as suggested by them. Based on this work and especially the 
study of Maggioni for her PhD as well as online discussions with her, I adapted 
their three categories and transitional stages to seven with definitions for the 
transitional stages. This development is described in detail in the Chapter and 
online discussions are cited. 
 
2.6.6.2 Whose Beliefs? 
 
A question raised by Maggioni33 in discussion was on the CBKH: is this 
scale underpinned by the beliefs of the historian writer or the reader of history? 
Technically, this scale is created to access the beliefs of teachers as readers or 
users of history accounts in this research. The Boscolo & Mason questions the 
teachers respond to in the instrument, refer to a historian's problems in writing 
history accounts in Questions 2, 3 and the judgment between different 
explanations in history in Questions 4, 5, and 6. The reader’s awareness of the 
historian in the text and indirectly, the historian’s awareness of audience and 
purpose are discussed as required in the context of the argument. 
                                            
33 Maggioni, L. (2013). CBKH (personal communication) 
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The subjects of assessment could be teachers of history as are the 
participants of this research or their students or other readers of history. In practical 
terms, as I understand it, the historian writer of history texts, or even the pupil 
constructing an account in class using evidence and source would need to hold 
sophisticated beliefs in order to produce sophisticated accounts that may be 
considered credible by sophisticated readers of history. Without the relevant 
beliefs and skill in the production of accounts underpinning the practice, the 
accounts produced would have many underlying weaknesses. In judging a history 
account too, a naive reader would differ from one who was a sophisticated reader 
in making an informed judgment.  
The purpose the CBKH serves is to access the stance in the given sample, 
the state of this sample and not a hypothetical sample. This compares the various 
responses within the sample to judge between them. Having said that, as a rubric 
to assess epistemic beliefs, it is structured in a rationale and logical progression 
from a state of naive to sophisticated beliefs that can be argued to be in keeping 
with the theoretical positions found in the literature and described in research 
studies as prevailing in the world. 
The words naive and sophisticated are used per force for want of a better 
alternative. Sophisticated is an antonym of naive and therefore, these can 
represent the two ends of a scale. I recognise the judgmental connotations but 
numbers or letters alone would be inadequate. 
 
2.6.6.3 Developments from Maggioni et al Model to the CBKH 
 
The original model developed by Maggioni et al has three categories: the 
Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist. This is described and discussed in the earlier 
Section of this Chapter. Maggioni et al. (2009a) had expanded these categories to 
include transitions in their research. These transitions made sense after my early 
attempts at data analysis. I first expanded the three categories to the following 
seven. 
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Copier; More Copier than Borrower; More Borrower than Copier; Borrower; 
More Borrower than Criterialist; More Criterialist than Borrower; Criterialist. 
This expanded model was used to assess the data but as I read and reread, 
recalled the sessions with field notes and the snippets of audio record, it became 
apparent that the model required more adjustment that could better differentiate 
between the responses. There were small adjustments required in the definition of 
the stages and in the spread from one level to the next. The transitions were there 
but the transition stage required more elaboration and definition. The following 
modifications were made to the original model. 
First, I changed the titles of the categories. From Copier, Borrower and 
Criterialist Maggioni et al. (2009b), I changed to the straightforward: Objectivist, 
Subjectivist, and Criterialist in keeping with terms also used by Maggioni et al. 
(2009b, p.6-7). My readers in Pakistan may have difficulty in associating the same 
meanings to the terms Copier and Borrower that are intended by the authors as 
one needs to be familiar with the rather complex literature behind them. I reverted 
to more generally understood labels, Objectivist and Subjectivist, even though 
these do not capture the fine nuance of meaning the authors describe. The term 
Criterialist was retained being more self-explanatory and easier to defend. The 
terms Naive and Sophisticated are used, for want of better terms, to serve as easy 
access to two ends of a scale of development of epistemic beliefs. 
Next, I considered what appeared to be the transition stage as more of a 
zig-zag between a naive and critical awareness rather than a smooth, linear, 
forward movement of development in belief. Maggioni and I discussed in mail34 if 
the Borrower was more sophisticated than the Copier. In this sense the order and 
linear movement is problematized. This is discussed below and the zig-zag 
movement from naive to critical then naive again in the CBKH categories reflects 
this developing idea. In this order, an objectivist could be seen as naive to begin 
with but with the introduction to doubt in the naive realist stance could be called a 
critical objectivist as the individual has begun to doubt naive objectivist belief but 
                                            
34 Maggioni, L. (2013). CBKH (personal communication) 
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has not yet acquired the complete awareness of the constructed nature of 
knowledge that defines the subjectivist stance.  
To reason the order, I argue that when the individual becomes aware of the 
mediation of the historian in the construction of knowledge in history, aware of 
perspective or position, or standpoint in the evaluation of evidence, the use of the 
methods of the historian acquire meaning and purpose. At the top end of the scale, 
the Criterialist is not just a more expert Objectivist but one who integrates aspects 
of the knower, known, with way of knowing as is argued by Kuhn and Weinstock 
(2002). It is with this reasoning, I retained the development as proceeding from an 
Objectivist to Subjectivist to Criterialist stance as a proposition that the interim 
phase of awareness of the knower is necessary for the individual to recognize the 
purpose of evidence and argument in the construction of history. It is not necessary 
to see the Objectivist or Subjectivist as more sophisticated than the other; they can 
be conceived as different but necessary, interim phases in a development of 
epistemic beliefs. Both the Objectivist and Subjectivist can be seen as naive, as 
Maggioni points out, but moving towards sophistication with integration of the 
knower and known.  
The unraveling of the ‘way of knowing’ from concepts of the ‘known’ and the 
‘knower’ in the assessment of development of epistemic beliefs about knowledge 
in history is a key change argued in the CBKH. This is discussed in detail in the 
response to Question One, ‘Why is it necessary to unravel elements of belief in 
knowledge in history?’ 
Spread in the stages of development in the Criterialist stance became 
necessary as it became apparent that participants who had moved on from an 
Objectivist, Subjectivist stance could not yet be called Criterialists in the full 
definition of the term as they had not yet achieved knowledge and skill in the 
methods of history and the heuristics that are employed to evaluate evidence and 
accounts in history. This is discussed in Question Two, ‘Is the Criterialist just a 
more expert Objectivist?’  
Conversely, I was unsure if a set of response that displayed good 
knowledge and skill in the use of heuristics was necessarily a Criterialist if the 
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responses contained no reference to the constructed/interpreted nature of the 
account. Was it possible that the respondent, having learnt good use of method, 
had reverted to a belief in an objective account where the mediation of the author 
was completely overcome? Maggioni et al. (2009b, p.11) point out that the 
Criterialist would recognize the interpretive role of the historian. Awareness of the 
need of the acknowledged presence of the historian in the text is again argued 
below as higher level of sophistication that needs to be reflected in the category 
scale. 
 
2.6.7 Question 1: Why is it Necessary to Unravel Elements of Belief in 
Knowledge in History? 
 
Maggioni et al. (2009a) conceptualise development in epistemic beliefs as 
integration of the objective and subjective dimensions of knowing. This they 
express as the integration of the knower and the known in their model, the Copier, 
Borrower and Criterialist. Maggioni et al. (2004). Awareness of the presence of the 
knower in the construction of the history account and the constructed nature of the 
account are the two key elements mentioned by the authors. There is, however, 
an underpinning element of how the account is constructed with understanding 
and skill that is considered key in this process. This process is described at length 
in their writings. I have felt it necessary to unravel the process of integration by 
examining beliefs about the knower, the known, and ways of knowing in history as 
separate and not necessarily congruent developments in concepts, knowledge, 
and skill. 
Suggesting that levels of knowledge and skill can be temporarily unraveled 
from concepts of the knower and the known is not to suggest that the ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship does not exist between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ as it is 
conceived in the domain. What I have done at a practical level for one, is to call 
‘ways of knowing’ a separate element and place it in a separate row after the 
known, knower for closer examination. What I argue is, that ways of knowing differ 
in levels of knowledge and skill amongst novices and experts and this difference 
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can be assessed relative to the data in a wider spread that recognizes the 
epistemic development but gives concessions to the incongruent weak knowledge 
and skill. I consider that a weak level of knowledge and skill should not be seen as 
precluding a move from a Borrower to Criterialist stance. In examining a 
respondent’s beliefs about knowledge in history, when there is seen evidence of 
the presence of the epistemic belief that knowledge in history becomes possible 
by or through the use of evidence and argument this makes it difficult to rate the 
examinee as not Criterialist as the specific use of heuristics is only weakly known. 
I refer once more to Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) conceptualization of 
epistemological thinking as the coordination of the objective and subjective 
dimensions of knowing. The use of the words ‘by’ and ‘through’ suggests a 
possibility that such coordination, albeit tentative, has taken place. If the words are 
followed by a reference to authority as arbitrator, ‘ask the teacher’ as suggested 
by one respondent, that could be seen as naive in its antecedents. Seixas (1996) 
points out that the second basis for historical epistemology other than traces lies 
in expert historical authorities. But where the reference is to evidence or argument 
or to an adequate heuristic as a means to select between different explanations, 
the move from naive to a level of sophistication has been achieved. What should 
follow is growing expertise and with it confidence in a sound account.  
It is important to remind readers here that the CBKH orders the criterialist 
category at three levels, Naive Criterialist, Critical Criterialist and Sophisticated 
Integrator. This, I argue, as necessary for development of several aspects of belief. 
I realised upon reading responses of participants that practical knowledge 
about the way of knowing was weighing heavily in assessment of epistemic beliefs 
in the responses using a category definition that required sound knowledge and 
skill.  There appeared to be conceptual awareness of the good use of evidence 
and argument, of the search for reliable evidence, in the construction of history 
accounts. What VanSledright (2002, p.111) refers to as procedures or strategies 
were however weak in my respondents. The heuristics themselves were not well 
known even at post-test. This was a dilemma as clearly many respondents had 
moved out of a purely subjectivist stance with relativistic perceptions of knowledge 
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to a sense that evidence and argument could make history accounts possible. 
Many used the words, reliable, authentic, in reference to source or evidence as a 
way of judging an explanation as better than another. They could not therefore, be 
placed at Level 3 of a Naive Subjectivist stance or even at the beginning of doubt 
at Level 4 where a person begins to recognize a way out of the bind. 
Therefore, I altered the description of the category of the Criterialist to the 
purely epistemic awareness of the use of heuristics to use sources to find reliable 
evidence even though expert knowledge or skill in the use of the key heuristics 
involved was not yet observed. I assigned expertise in skill to a last category, the 
Sophisticated Integrator. 
I set a criteria that if a response to the question, ‘is it possible to decide 
which explanation is better’, the response is yes and the following words are by, 
or through, and then suggests, use primary or secondary sources, the respondent 
has crossed the epistemic barrier of relativism into the next level of belief where a 
criterion is seen as useful to resolve the problem of subjective knowing. This 
becomes easier to understand when the definitions of stance are examined. A 
Copier is one who is not aware of the knower, of the constructed nature of historical 
knowledge, not aware that conflicting accounts could conflict not necessarily due 
to ‘false evidence’ but due to a different reading of the evidence from the standpoint 
of the historian. The Borrower at the next level is aware that history is an authored 
account and the positionality, perspective, act as filters in the construction of the 
account. This in a sense is a loss of innocence and can lead to infinite regress 
where no account can be trusted. The Criterialist at the third level is one who has 
come to recognize the use of evidence and argument to construct a useful account. 
If in response to the question, ‘how is it possible to tell which explanation is 
better,’ the respondent says, ‘by using evidence, primary and secondary sources’, 
lowering this response to the level of the Borrower or Subjectivist is not appropriate 
as the person is now aware that some process can be used to differentiate 
between accounts and can suggest some heuristics. Lowering him or her further 
to an Objectivist level is again inappropriate as the person is aware of the 
interpreted nature of knowledge, and has passed over from naive belief in objective 
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knowledge in history. The person is now aware of criteria making it possible to 
choose between conflicting accounts but does not yet possess expertise in this 
action. Epistemically, the person has moved on from a naive helplessness to some 
confidence in the possibility of historical accounts but may yet not know or 
understand the process of doing so at the level of an expert historian. Therefore, 
what I suggest and have done in assessing responses is to lower the bar slightly 
to include such weak responses into the Naive Criterialist category and spread the 
levels of Criterialist belief from Naive Criterialist, Critical Criterialist to Sophisticated 
Integrator. Thus, the expert has a higher bar and teachers, not being experts, can 
occupy a lower level whilst still being included in the Criterialist category. 
An interesting point here is related to Maggioni et al. (2004, p.188) analysis 
of a relativist position. They write, ‘In this case, the constructed nature of history is 
acknowledged, but the historical method is not deemed an effective tool to deal 
with problems of conflicting or missing evidence’. I extend this use of the word 
‘deem’ to my argument. Where respondents use the words ‘by’ and ‘through’ 
referring to some heuristic, they do in fact imply that they deem this to be an 
effective tool to use to find a better explanation. Evidence in the responses may 
show that this judgment is based on limited knowledge and skill but the person has 
moved on from a complete relativistic hopelessness to consider criteria as a basis 
for deciding between accounts. Here then, the purely epistemic value is 
differentiated from the procedural. This is complex however, and it would need to 
be seen if the judgment by the respondent was a considered judgment. 
VanSledright et al. (2006, p.216-217) argue that epistemological 
standpoints must be studied with respect to the community contexts in which they 
are employed. They describe the BLTHQ as a tool to measure the standpoints of 
history teachers. They say that the 21 Items of the measure are about evenly 
divided on a rules-criteria-warrants structure of the disciplinary community of 
history and a knowledge-acquisition criterion of the school history community. 
They hoped to see which criteria the teachers’ positions cohere with.  
I see this comparison as purpose based. Where novices are to be compared 
with experts, procedural and strategic knowledge may need to conform to the level 
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of the expert whereas when novice teachers are compared amongst other 
members of their community, arguably, standards of skill and knowledge would be 
adjusted accordingly. 
In my sample, teachers are not experts. I want to make the distinction that 
while they appeared to indicate, post-intervention, that they have moved beyond a 
helpless relativism to recognize the use of evidence and argument to judge 
between accounts they may not be able to do so at an expert level. Wineburg 
(1991) argues that this is complex work and not easily accomplished by novices. I 
have found that there are differences amongst novices at Levels 4, 5, 6 in growing 
concepts as well as skills and these differences can be mapped by spreading 
definitions of the categories in ways that are more responsive to the data. I have 
constructed the CBKH on this assumption and the assessment of responses is 
described in these pages. I leave it to the reader and possible user of the category 
scale to see if it works for them. 
Finally, there is a practical reason for my interest in expanding the scale. 
My research is experimental, focused on supporting a hypothesis on the basis of 
observations of change. I need to differentiate in the sample at a finer grain. If I 
were to set the bar on expert level of epistemic beliefs to assess my sample of 
teachers, I may be reducing nearly all participants to a single row at the low end of 
the scale. By expanding levels with transitions of finer difference, I can differentiate 
in ways that is theoretically arguable as well as being practically more useful. 
Besides, as a teacher, I can visualize my students standing by my table to argue 
with me that the assessment is not fair were I not able to differentiate between 
them. 
 
2.6.8 Question 2: Is the Criterialist Just a More Efficient Objectivist? 
 
If the focus in assessment of an individual’s epistemic beliefs with the CBKH 
category scale emphasizes one element only, ‘ways of knowing’ (e.g. the use of 
heuristics and method, the importance of the question in evaluating sources) as 
the key element to assign the individual to the Criterialist stance, there is a danger 
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that the Criterialist may begin to be seen by developing learners to be, just a more 
efficient Objectivist. It is therefore, important to retain awareness of integration of 
all three elements, knower, known, way of knowing, to award a level of 
sophistication. The definition of sophistication needs to be based on an emphasis 
on integration of the objective and subjective dimensions as suggested by Kuhn 
and Weinstock (2002, p.123) rather than on any single element. Maggioni 
questions (in mail35) that, ‘If a participant is aware of a method, isn’t this an 
indication of integration?’ ‘What could be missing here though’, she argues, ‘is 
awareness of the limits of knowledge and, probably, there is a misuse, reduction 
of the historical methods, too’. I agree that when a method is referred to, a knower 
is indicated as a user of the process; however, the constructed nature of this 
knowledge may not always before grounded in this awareness nor taken into 
consideration when the account is evaluated. It would be useful to add this 
cautionary note and look for evidence in the responses to the continued 
consciousness of the interpretation and epistemological underpinning in a 
Criterialist stance even if expert use of method is seen. 
Giving importance to the tools of the historian, VanSledright (2011, p.66) 
argues that ‘historical accounts will vary but can still be legitimate if they measure 
up to judgments about what people agree to believe (criteria) constitute good 
accounts’. Within this criterion, I would like to stress the importance of the 
acknowledged presence of the historian in the text and the tentative, propositional 
nature of the account. This argument is in the context of novice teachers, as 
readers and users of history, developing epistemic beliefs; however, on the level 
of expert historians, who are expected to be sophisticated Criterialists, the 
question, ‘is a Criterialist just a more efficient Objectivist’, can also be asked. 
Amongst histories produced by expert historians there will be differences in the 
degree of accounts that appear to be objective, true, factual, continuous, 
untouched by human hands, and those that are tentative, propositional, open to 
criticism and change. As VanSledright et al. (2006, p.225) explains, history is an 
                                            
35 Maggioni, L. (2013). CBKH (personal communication) 
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interpretive reduction. ‘It is necessarily tentative, unstable, and less than the past.’ 
A Criterialist would, by definition, be aware of the nature of history accounts as 
tentative judgments constructed with knowledge and skill being the best possible 
in the circumstances of fragmentary, discontinuous evidence.  
History texts used in schools expect a naive, uncritical reading. 
VanSledright (2002, p.4) cites Scott and Barthes (1968,1986) to argue that the 
accounts historians create often give the impression that there was no interpretive 
process used at all and that their words directly capture the reality they depict. This 
is a constantly occurring concern in the literature. As I assess responses that 
appear to show that teachers have moved towards Criterialism with references to 
method as a means to choose between explanations, I can see some responses 
no longer refer to interpretation or subjectivity and most do not mention the 
tentative nature of historical knowledge. I see these responses as less 
sophisticated than those that do retain a reference to the perspective or 
positionality of the author. I realize that the Criterialist stance can be spread into 
degrees of sophistication, taking into account a continued awareness of the 
interpreted, constructed, nature of the history account. 
VanSledright and Afflerbach (2005, p.16) argue in the context of children’s 
learning that to move students to greater sophistication involves shifting them from 
binary distinctions towards observations that historical accounts embody 
perspectives and subtexts that reflect the authors historicized positions. This 
awareness may get lost in the process of development if the focus remains on 
procedure as indeed has been found to happen. Maggioni et al. (2007) refer to a 
professional development program that required teachers to write a historical 
narrative. Teachers were taught to include detailed references to sources so that 
‘it may force teachers to explicitly acknowledge the role played by evidence in the 
construction of historical arguments and thus foster epistemic awareness.’ 
Maggioni et al. (2007, p.6, 9) report that reading historical narratives written by 
teachers, they found, conveyed an authorless view of history typical of a Copier 
stance. 
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2.6.9 Question 3: Is Awareness of the Acknowledged Presence of the 
Historian in the Text a Necessary Aspect of Sophistication for the Reader of 
History? 
 
The experience of meeting teachers of history and listening to their 
discussions and stories of classroom experience of teaching history in the 
interventional workshops was enlightening. Teachers described the perceptions of 
pupils and the sometimes emotional response to perspectives read in the 
textbooks. I realized that what is referred to as the effect of the ‘referential illusion’ 
on pupil learning needed to take its place as a principle in the overt and 
acknowledged presence of the historian in school history texts. 
Concerns about the effect of the referential illusion have long been argued 
in the literature. VanSledright (2002, p.4) notes that ‘the accounts historians create 
often give the impression that there was no interpretive process used at all, that 
their words directly capture the reality they depict, as though they were there 
chronicling every word’. In a current article, VanSledright (2014) restates the 
importance of recognising the role of the historian. He argues here for supporting 
knowledge claims by making evidence transparent via citation and subsequent 
checking by peer review. This is an important clarification. Maggioni (in mail)36 
argues that an attitude of recognizing our own positionality will seldom be 
cultivated if the role of the historian is not recognized. My participants do not know 
these words but spent much time in my workshops discussing pupils’ concerns 
about the history accounts they read as a part of their curriculum and assessment 
requirements. Pakistan’s past in relation to Britain colours the expectations of 
readers when they encounter history texts written and published by writers from 
the UK. Whereas there may be a ratio of pupils from European and African 
backgrounds in most classrooms in the US, the classroom in Pakistan is largely 
from one cultural background, Pakistani, and the text is from the UK. This 
enhances awareness of the positionality of the historian amongst pupils and 
teachers. Their concerns and indeed those of numerous writers in the subject area 
                                            
36 Maggioni, L. (2013). CBKH. (personal communication) 
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were used to redesign the last level of the CBKH to include awareness of the 
acknowledged presence of the historian in history accounts. 
Those who could recognize and be critical of the referential illusion, should 
be recognized as more sophisticated I considered. This aspect of requiring the 
acknowledged presence of the historian and the tentative nature of the history 
account is arguably a higher level of epistemic sophistication. This is a 
sophisticated argument, and readers may be made aware of this shortcoming in 
history texts through the use of the CBKH scale. Assessment serves a 
developmental purpose. 
Unfortunately, as most history texts read by students in school are 
evidence, the historian or the evidence-based, propositional, tentative nature of 
the account is seldom plain to view. Indeed it is this concern that has led me to 
include an enhanced emphasis on the need for transparency, of the constructed 
and tentative nature of history accounts within the CBKH. 
The CBKH as a development from the models discussed and used by 
Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.196) in their research has several differences of 
emphasis, additional criteria, some unraveling, and argument. I owe the authors 
my heartfelt thanks and especially to Liliana Maggioni. With this I conclude my 
thoughts on the development of the CBKH category scale. 
The literature review for this research required a study of a range of 
domains. Conceptual change literature was studied and a possible gap in 
knowledge was identified. Kuhn's description of the process of change of 
paradigms in scientific communities was seen to be different from the orchestrated 
change processes that are expected to lead to change in concepts in everyday 
classrooms. An examination of the difference in conditions in the two social 
situations illuminated the lack of a perception of agency amongst participants that 
could be a factor in change. A hypothesis was drawn from this and the research 
was designed to explore how this factor could work in teacher education practice. 
The review of literature also necessarily covers epistemic beliefs and 
research within this as the particular concepts selected for study. Issues of theory 
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in mixed methods research and quasi experimental design lay the groundwork for 
design decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
To recall briefly, this research examines a relationship between a perception 
of agency and change in concepts in contexts of task based discourse in teacher 
education classrooms. Problems of learning as change in concepts are a source 
of concern in my practice and indeed in education generally. This research focuses 
on change in epistemic concepts of knowledge in history in contexts of activity and 
talk to explore a gap of a perception of agency to question, agree, disagree, to 
reflect upon own prior concepts within the process. 
Task based discourse in classrooms provides the necessary contexts, 
actions, and words needed for concepts to change. Schön argues for reflection in 
action for convergence in meaning within contexts, actions and words. I base my 
argument for agency in task based discourse on a review of Kuhn’s description of 
paradigm change. 
A hypothesis is developed from the critical reading of the literature, and a 
quasi-experimental research to test the hypothesis is conducted and reported in 
this study. The practitioner research is designed to use real life situations for 
change in epistemic concepts. Workshops for teachers to prepare for syllabus 
change in history are the contexts. The research is designed as 5 quasi 
experimental studies which supports the drawing of conclusions and demonstrates 
how the relationship can be researched. 
This Chapter on The Research Methodology describes and, where 
required, argues features of research design, the methods used, contexts of study 
including constraints and opportunities, measures and ways of data collection, 
sample and control, and aspects of reliability. Tables, a Map of Research, and Lists 
of features are provided for ready reference. The interventions and standardization 
is an important feature in the research and detail is provided in this Chapter. The 
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quasi experiments conducted are described in considerable detail as is necessary 
in this type of experimental design to aid in interpretation. Threats to interpretation 
in quasi experiments are necessarily discussed under headings as raised in the 
literature. The contexts are detailed with transparent descriptions of strengths and 
limitations. In the end, reflective conclusions are drawn with reference to the 
research methodology. Additionally, this Chapter presents diagrams of design 
features and tables to outline and display key features of the design, (see Figures 
3.1, 3.2) the objectives, the interventions, and the validation exercises for 
assessment of reliability of qualitative assessment. This was seen as necessary 
as the research has a complicated design with five experimental studies with 5 
Control and 5 Experimental groups, two interventions and a range of analysis. The 
data and analysis is both quantitative and qualitative. I request readers to first 
study the graphic representations for ease in understanding. 
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Figure 3.1: Features of the Research Design 
 
Teacher Education Event in School 
Workshop for teachers of 
O’Level History with reference to 
change in Cambridge 
International Education’s 
Syllabus + Assessment 
Context 
5 Quasi Experimental Studies 
1 Focus Group 
Mixed Methods 
Mixed Measures 
Qualitative & Quantitative Analysis 
Results & Discussion 
Analysis Types of Data 
The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
BLTHQ, Beliefs in Knowledge about 
History Questionnaire 
Boscolo and Mason Questions 
Likert Scales 
Open ended questions 
Audio record of sessions  
Audio record of focus group 
Qualitative analysis of responses 
to open ended BM questions 
using CBKH Category scale. 
Quantitative analysis of Likert 
Scale’s data. 
Qualitative descriptors are 
awarded, which are transformed 
to a single holistic score. 
Scores are then analysed in 
quantitative methods 
Exploratory and inferential 
statistics 
Implicit in the change in syllabus 
is a requirement for development 
of epistemic beliefs about 
knowledge in history. 
Field Experiment in Natural Conditions  
Control and Experimental group with pre and post-test in each study 
Self-selection or school organised selection to non-equivalent groups  
Practitioner Role of Researcher 
Varied but similar settings/persons/timings/ matching outcomes 
Study repeated in 5 iterations in 3 cities of Pakistan 
The Quasi Experiment 
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3.2 Aim of Research  
 
To enquire into a problem of teacher learning as change of concepts that I 
and my colleagues encounter as practitioners in teacher education. 
 
3.3 Study Question 
 
The main research question is if there is a relationship between a perception 
of agency and change in participants’ epistemic beliefs in learning contexts of task 
based discourse. 
 
3.4 The Research Hypothesis 
 
The research hypothesis is stated as an alternative hypothesis in place of 
a null hypothesis. The hypothesis states that there is a relationship between a 
perception of agency and change in concepts in task based discourse. 
 
3.5 Key Objectives of Research 
 
 To investigate an alternative hypothesis of a relationship between a 
perception of agency and conceptual change in task-based 
discourse in 5 quasi-experimental studies conducted in teacher 
education contexts. 
 To employ and examine Skemp (1971) principle of a range of 
suitable examples as a pedagogical method to change concepts. 
 To demonstrate if the relationship of a perception of agency and 
conceptual change in task-based group discourse can be 
researched. 
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3.6 Specific Objectives for Conduct of Research and Analysis 
 
 To conduct multiple (5) independent quasi experiments each with a 
Control and Experimental group, pre-test and post-tests and collect 
data.  
 Use Skemp’s proposal of ‘experience of a range of suitable 
examples’ Skemp (1971) as a common, pedagogical method to 
change concepts of knowledge in history as Intervention 1 in all 10 
groups, Control and Experimental, in all 5 studies.  
 Provide Intervention 2, an enhanced perception of agency, in 5 
Experimental groups to test the hypothesis.  
 Use Likert Scales EBI, BLTHQ, and Boscolo and Mason open 
ended questions as measures of epistemic beliefs and change 
within these at pre-test and post-test to collect data.  
 Attempt an audio record of sessions and focus group to collect oral 
data to describe the process and participants’ perceptions. 
 
3.7 Objectives of Data Collection 
 
 Obtain data to assess and describe the participants’ epistemic 
beliefs and concepts of knowledge in history at pre-test and post-test 
and change within these. 
 Obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. 
 Obtain oral data of sessions and post study Focus Group to illustrate, 
if possible, awareness of a perception of agency from participants’ 
perspective. 
3.8 Objectives of Analysis 
 
 Modify, develop, and employ a model of epistemological beliefs in 
history to analyse epistemic beliefs. 
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 Develop the model (CBKH) to assess and order epistemic beliefs as 
expressed in responses to open-ended BM questions. 
 Qualitative analysis of responses to open ended Boscolo & Mason 
questions using the CBKH rubric. 
 Assign quantitative scores to qualitative descriptors of epistemic 
beliefs as assessed using the CBKH scale.  
 Carry out Inter-Rater agreement exercise and Internal Evaluation of 
assessment of responses to the CBKH scale.  
 Analyse numerical scores through a range of statistical analysis to 
assess epistemic beliefs at outset and change within these, post 
intervention.  
 Analyse data from responses to Likert Scales using quantitative 
analysis. 
 Analyse data of all three instruments separately using a range of 
statistics for description and inference. 
 Compare changes in epistemic beliefs from pre-test to post-test, in 
all 10 Control and Experimental groups due to Intervention 1. 
 Compare differences in change in concepts between Control and 
Experimental Groups to study the effects of Intervention 2 and 
support the hypothesis. 
 Compare differences in change between Control and Experimental 
Groups in 5 independent studies. 
 Analyse change in general epistemic beliefs with the EBI data and 
epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history using the BM questions 
and BLTHQ from pre-test to post-test. 
3.9 Features and Steps for Analysis 
 
 Meta-analysis of overall combined data and independent analysis of 
all 5 studies. 
 Comparison of change in stance independently in each measure. 
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 Quantitative analysis of Likert Scale data. 
 Qualitative analysis of written responses to BM open ended 
questions to assess change in epistemic beliefs 
 Transformation of qualitative descriptors into numerical scores for 
quantitative analysis. 
 In-depth analysis of quantitative data through a range of numerical 
and statistical tests according to constraints of data. 
 Summarize support for a possible relationship of a perception of 
agency on change of concepts using both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of all data of change in epistemic concepts from pre-test to 
post-test.  
 Explore attributions of change by participants as evident in audio 
record and focus group record in order to illustrate change. 
 Analysis of responses to BM questions using the CBKH category 
scale. Descriptors awarded to each of 166 responses and 
transformed to quantitative scores for statistical analysis. 
Note: 
(1) The main question is drafted as sub-questions for analysis of data in order 
to draw conclusions. These sub-questions are provided in Section 4.3.2 in 
the Chapter on Results and Discussion. 
(2) The audio record of the sessions is unfortunately not complete or 
continuous and often inaudible. Excerpts are taken and added. 
3.10 Objectives for Discussion and Conclusion Based upon Qualitative and 
Quantitative Data and its Analysis 
 
 Discuss difference in change in epistemic beliefs and concepts of 
knowledge in history as a consequence of a difference in a 
perception of agency in Control and Experimental Groups. 
 Discuss change in concepts and relationship of change with a 
perception of agency. 
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 Discuss change using a range of suitable examples as a pedagogical 
method for change of concepts. 
 Critically discuss the validity of measures and methods used in the 
study and the reliability of statistical conclusions.  
 Discuss a perception of agency in task based group discourse as an 
educational intervention. 
 Discuss the difficulties and possibilities of research into epistemic 
concepts and a relationship with perceptions of agency. 
3.11 Research Facts  
 
3.11.1 Design of Quasi Experiment 
 
A quasi experimental, pre-test-post-test non-equivalent group design 
conducted in a series of 5 studies with both Control and Experimental groups in 
each study Cohen et al. (2007). 
Within the educational context, which is a workshop, X marks the 
intervention, an enhanced perception of agency. This can be represented as 
follows for the 5 studies as in Cohen et al. (2007). 
 
Experimental  O1 X   O2  O1 X   O2   O1 X   O2  
   ------------   ------------   ------------  
Control  O3 O4  O3  O4   O3  O4 
Experimental  O1 X  O2  O1 X O2  
   ------------  ------------  
Control  O3 O4  O3  O4 
 
3.11.2 Sample Size 
 
83 after data cleaning, missing data is described. 
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3.11.3 Dependent Variable 
 
Change in concepts about knowledge in history: Concept of knowledge in 
history as isomorphic with ‘the past’ known and certain or a relativistic view of 
history as ‘not possible to know’ to an awareness of criteria and use of heuristics 
to examine claims and decide upon a better explanation. 
 
3.11.4 Independent Variable 
 
An enhanced perception of agency introduced in the Experimental groups 
only. 
 
Figure 3.2: Map of Research 
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3.12 Features of Mixing of Methods Used in this Research 
 
Mixed methods within each single study (repeated in a programme of 5 
iterations of the same study with independent, different but similar groups of 
participants). Concurrent mixing at stages of design, measures, analysis, and 
drawing of conclusions. As a quasi-experimental study using mixed methods, there 
was a mixing of theoretical frameworks by design followed by the use of 
quantitative and qualitative measures for data collection and types of analysis.  
The purpose of mixing methods was to measure the complex phenomenon 
of epistemic beliefs and obtain data that may emerge on a perception of agency. 
Triangulation and expansion of findings was made possible in discussion. 
Level of mixing: At level of design, measures, analysis and at level of 
discussion. To begin, quantitative and qualitative data are analysed to their own 
logic and methods. Data is mixed first in transformation from qualitative descriptors 
to quantitative scores, which are analysed with statistical tests. Finally, mixing is 
essentially at the level of conclusion and discussion, where evidence from both 
types of data is used to support the hypothesis. 
 
3.12.1 Quantitative Data 
 
 Demographic data: Gender, age, years in service, educational 
qualifications. 
 Responses to items on a Likert Scale on instrument, the Epistemic 
Beliefs Inventory, EBI. Authors: Schraw et al. (2002). (General 
epistemic beliefs). 
 Responses to items on a Likert Scale in the instrument, the BLTHQ 
Maggioni et al. (2009a). (Epistemic beliefs specific to the domain of 
history incorporating aspects of pedagogical practice). 
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3.12.2 Qualitative Data 
 
 Responses to open ended BM questions in a written framework as 
data to support the hypothesis Boscolo and Mason (2001) in Mason 
(2002, p.328). 
 Transcript of Audio record of a Focus Group/feedback session with 
5 respondents from an Experimental Group.  
 Transcript of sections of audio record of sessions for first 3 sets. 
 Field notes. 
 Observation by a colleague for one day both groups only. The written 
data was unfortunately not submitted by the observer. 
 
Note: Demographic data and the audio record of sessions and focus group are 
used to inform the write up and add quotations to illustrate the perception of agency 
and participants’ learning. 
 
3.13 Description of Research Methods 
 
Research methods used in this study are described in this Chapter with 
particular reference to the constraints and opportunities that played a role in the 
evolution of the design and key features of method. The context of the research is 
described followed by a description of constraints and opportunities. The design is 
explained and the means of data collection are described in some detail. The 
intervention is described next with a summary of procedures to standardize this 
over the groups. Materials used in the workshops are listed and finally the key 
features of the sample and control are explained with affordances provided by field 
conditions as a rationale. Analysis will be described in the next Chapter but a brief 
summary of research facts does lay out the plan. 
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3.14 Answering Research Questions Using Mixed Methods 
 
The responses to open ended questions about epistemic beliefs are vital 
data and very time consuming to interpret. The descriptors awarded to each of the 
166 responses are transformed into scores and therefore, lost to view and 
qualitative methods appear to have less of a role to play in this research. However, 
in interpreting results, all evidence is employed. In this research, data from both 
measures corroborates findings and expands what can be said about the quality 
of change. Triangulation of findings is interesting. The instruments differ in that the 
BM questions are theoretical and abstract whilst the BLTHQ Likert Scale is set in 
contexts of pedagogical practice in history teaching. The EBI examines general 
epistemic beliefs. Therefore, change in responses are analysed independently in 
each instrument and then findings are compared with reference to change. 
Greene (2007) argues that the decision that is most important is the level of 
interaction between the strands. Transforming qualitative descriptors to 
quantitative scores for analysis is one level of interaction, the other is in the 
conclusions drawn from the wealth of data in my research. Status or priority of 
different methods in weighting different results to answer study questions is 
important as suggested by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). In the last stage of 
drawing conclusions from both types of instruments, the dual nature of the 
research exercise becomes apparent as interpretation takes over. 
Here data of the two types of instruments and the different types of analysis 
are considered in tandem. The measures play a key role as they assess related 
but different aspects of the phenomenon as well as what could broadly come under 
the umbrella of general epistemic beliefs. In one sense, priority is given to the 
qualitative data as the responses were elaborated to some extent and appear 
considered and coherent. The data from the BLTHQ Likert Scale is related to the 
context of history teaching, but recognised as a forced choice response, with some 
social desirability issues in its pedagogical context perhaps causing dual positions 
to be taken by respondents. Thus, the status, if any, accorded is more on the basis 
of practical issues rather than a paradigmatic stance. It is a matter of belief in the 
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validity of a finding from qualitative or quantitative data that is a complex question 
to answer. A pragmatic stance is taken to interpret and draw conclusions from both 
sets of data. 
 
3.15 Background 
 
I, Lubna Kidwai, am the researcher. I am a teacher educator, and this 
practitioner research was designed in response to an often observed problem in 
the field. Over the years of our practice, my colleagues and I had noted that 
concepts are difficult to change and there was a need to make teacher education 
classroom experience more effective in change management. This problem of 
conceptual change was, in fact, the basis of my original proposal to the University 
of Bradford and admission for an MPhil leading to a PhD. Research into 
mechanisms that drive development in epistemic cognition is recommended by 
Pintrich (2002). 
My prior experiences of the problems of conceptual change as well as 
extensive reviews of literature in the course of my study, led me to understand and 
formulate a relationship that could be studied for this research. I had observed, as 
the video37 I present exemplifies, that social constructivist learning situations have 
dynamics that may negatively impact learning. Could a perception of agency relate 
to conceptual change? This was the question that came to mind. Reading in my 
years of teacher education and working on a Social Studies Curriculum had honed 
my understanding of difficulties of changing concepts that underpinned much 
learning in the domain. Kuhn’s arguments for paradigm change, although not 
focused on change at an individual level, and certainly not on classroom learning 
or teacher learning, did help identify a relationship that could explain the difficulties 
in change in concepts through classroom learning. The problem was: Could this 
relationship be studied in empirical terms? I decided to try to test the relationship 
for my research. 
                                            
37 http://tinyurl.com/mdrpjvd 
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An important challenge was to find a concept that needed to be changed in 
the ambit of teacher education and to research this in ways that could facilitate the 
observation of a relationship of a perception of agency in the process. Concepts 
are hard to define and conceptual change is hard to put into a petri dish to observe. 
Essentially, schools are places for change and development of concepts but to 
observe a change relating to intangible phenomenon and control other influences 
is difficult. It was my good fortune to come upon a change in the history syllabus 
that was underpinned by an expected change in beliefs. How I managed to 
research this is described in this Chapter. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 can assist in 
understanding features of the design and the provision of the two interventions. 
In the design phase, I considered a choice of identifying a context where 
change was expected and doing an observational case study. There were 
possibilities however, that change may or may not take place and factors other 
than a perception of agency play a larger role in the change process. The 
underpinning epistemic quality of the change in the syllabus being unknown to the 
teachers and schools, the chances were that it may not happen unsupported. 
Another key factor in this decision was that I was researching conceptual 
change in my own practice, which is implemented in teacher education classrooms 
and not freely occurring social change. This led to the selection of practitioner 
research in a classroom setting.  
An exploratory, quasi-experimental research into the issue was developed 
and mixed methods for data gathering and analysis were selected. This had 
necessarily to be in my own practice as it was difficult to find teacher education 
programmes and educators willing to permit access for research. Teacher 
education in Pakistan takes place either through government run colleges or 
through private non-governmental bodies. Unfortunately, most of these private 
organisations are either not run with professionally trained teacher educators, or 
run extended courses that could be the context for research.  
The design itself was constructed to use a precious, small window of 
opportunity that arose with a change in syllabus and the resulting need for teacher 
development to meet the challenge of changing concepts. This provided a point in 
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time when a key, definable, conceptual change was needed in an accessible 
population; interventions to facilitate the change were possible and desirable; no 
other interventions that could possibly be threats to inference were on the horizon; 
instruments validated in previous research in the field were available; I, the 
researcher, had some access and ability to provide the intervention. Therefore, the 
opportunity was grasped and the research designed accordingly. As this is a 
completely self-funded PhD, a longitudinal, observational study of change in 
concepts as they unfold was also not feasible.  
I chose a mixed methods research using methods and measures with which 
I was comfortable. Practitioner research is a tradition in schools and something 
that I had practiced and taught for a long time, therefore it was the best choice in 
the circumstances. 
 
3.16 Locating the Study 
 
‘…………the sources are there, and we make questions out of them and 
sometimes we asked (pupils) what do you see in them and they make their own 
bank of questions from there.’ 
- Participant in focus group describing what they do with the 
extracts from sources that are now added to history text books in 
line with syllabus change. 
In order to research conceptual change, I had to plan a training programme, 
and interest schools and teachers in it as I was refused access to research an 
existing course. For teachers and schools to be interested in a course offered by 
an independent researcher, a strong rationale would be needed and that is exactly 
what the change in syllabus offered. It is necessary here to explain why this was a 
time and space bound window of opportunity as many decisions were taken such 
as the selection of ready measures, a practitioner researcher role for myself in 
order to use the opportune moment.  
Cambridge International Examinations (CIE) conduct O’ and A’ Level 
Examinations, for which private schools in Pakistan prepare pupils. The Pakistan 
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History and Culture Syllabus is being revised gradually to introduce understanding 
of multiple perspectives and interpretation and the use of source and evidence in 
learning history. This requires a shift from a traditional perspective of knowledge 
in history as isomorphic with the past to one of knowledge in history as constructed. 
Change in syllabus is not at present reflected in change in examination and 
assessment in significant ways giving teachers and schools time to prepare. This 
change in syllabus necessitates teacher learning of new concepts i.e. perspectives 
on historical knowledge. While the CIE had carried out some introductory training, 
currently there were no other programmes on offer in Pakistan in this particular 
focus. With time, schools and CIE would possibly be arranging workshops to meet 
the need for preparing teachers.  
I recognized that training events such as those organized by examining 
bodies would have effects on the population that could be difficult to isolate. With 
more alternative courses on offer in this area, threats to valid inference would 
increase. There was no time to waste and the opportunity was taken but at some 
cost to the design. Written instruments to measure epistemic beliefs have been 
used in the world for some time and there was no published reference of their use 
in Pakistan. As this changing situation of teacher development in historical thinking 
did not allow the luxury of developing and validating new instruments in time, those 
available were put to use after initial piloting. 
 
3.17 Procedures 
 
The sample was approached through the offices of the school system. A 
poster (Appendix-A2) was sent for display to invite history teachers to attend 
History Workshops and schools were requested to make arrangements in their 
training rooms on the dates agreed upon. The poster informed participants of the 
research, explained cost and benefit, and gave details of dates, etcetera. The 
schools mailed lists of participants, who were divided into two groups by them more 
as a matter of convenience based on location. The history workshops were 
conducted over a three day period over three weeks for the first three sets; then 
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over three consecutive days in the last two sets. These were for 4 hours each. The 
workshops were held in the school’s staff development centres, which are located 
in the cities of Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore. Teachers from school branches in 
the systems travel regularly to attend training from small towns in the periphery. 
As is the practice, travel costs were paid by schools and a meal depending on time, 
and tea was served. A total of 5 sets with two groups each, one Control and one 
Experimental, were held. Thus, there were 10 groups in all with 83 participants 
(after data cleaning). The second term of school, from January to May 2011, was 
the time frame to complete all 10 workshops, as these were called, for the 5 
studies. 
The pre-test was conducted as explained below on the first day and the 
post-test at the end of proceedings on the last day. The instruments were 
distributed in the training room itself and participants of the workshops were 
requested to fill these. As the facilitator, I remained present during the test, 
answered any question that was asked but generally stayed quiet. It took about 25 
minutes to fill all three instruments, which were collected on the table. The post-
test was recognized as being the same and participants often commented and 
sometimes asked outright why they needed to do this again with knowing smiles 
and occasional laughter. 
In the Experimental Group, the Intervention, a perception of agency, 
described below was enhanced and sustained over the three days. 
 
3.18 Research Constraints and Opportunities 
 
The number of teacher educators accredited to deliver educational 
programmes in the private schools, to which I have access, is small and there were 
none with experience of history learning and teaching apart from myself. To be 
able to prepare other teacher educators was not seen as possible in a short time 
scale especially as the persons would need to hold the relevant beliefs, knowledge 
and skills of history. This was therefore, a forced choice. It was also seen as useful 
that the intervention could be carefully conducted with the researcher as 
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practitioner, maintaining the standardization of instructions, as well as, as much 
constancy in the teaching procedures and environment as possible. 
Ready to use instruments, non-random, non-equivalent groups as found, 
varying field conditions, small sample size, make this less than a ‘true experiment’ 
limiting the kind of inferences that can be made. At the same time this has its 
advantages in the representative nature of the sample and the value in normal field 
conditions. Another advantage is the comparability of obtained data with that 
emerging from other research around the world. Valuable findings on existing 
beliefs and possible change in action can be found in published literature. 
 
3.19 The Design and Data Collection (Appendix-A6) 
 
The research was conducted as a quasi-experiment with a pre-test-post-
test Control and Experimental group design Cohen et al. (2007, p.276) in a series 
of 5 studies with 2 groups i.e. a Control Group and an Experimental Group in each 
study carried out as a series of five small studies. The experiment measured a 
change in concepts in the setting of a learning experience, which was based on 
experiencing a range of suitable examples of different explanations of events in 
history with the use of sources. A perception of agency is the independent variable 
provided to the Experimental Groups alone. This learning workshop was provided 
to all participants in both groups, Experimental and Control. The Control Groups 
however, did not receive the intervention of an enhanced perception of agency. 
The design was developed with constant reference to Cohen et al. (2007), Cook 
and Campbell (1979) as well as Shadish et al. (2002). See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 to 
understand key features. 
The pre-test and post-test was set for both Control and Experimental 
Groups. The test measured concepts of knowledge in history and the items could 
raise awareness of this concept even in the process of measurement. Therefore, 
it was necessary for both groups to experience this at the outset. It was not 
necessary to hold back the pre-test from the Experimental Group as the test’s 
content made no reference to the independent variable, the ‘perception of agency’. 
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The test could not affect the group’s perception of agency, which was the 
independent variable apart from a possibly perceived lack of choice in actually 
doing the questionnaires or completing all items that may be challenging. It is for 
this reason, the pre-test questionnaires were mentioned in the initial poster and 
handed out at the beginning before the intervention procedures began. The 
procedures (detailed below) to enhance perception (for the Experimental Group 
only) were conducted after a relaxed 5 minute session of talk and humour to 
change the subject.  
Educational research to study the value of interventions is a common 
enough practice as is assessment of learning. Therefore, the choice of pen and 
paper measures, and their pre-test and post-test use, did seem very much in 
character in the world of schools. Teachers looked quizzical at first, made a few 
jokes but filled them in with some interest, occasionally with some comments 
amongst themselves. The pre-test was conducted as soon as participants settled 
down and the workshop was begun and the post-test was held on the third day at 
the end of the day. I am happy to report that all participants filled the questionnaires 
and many responses showed careful reading and were quite reflective. The neutral 
option was not overused and no more than one or two response sheets had a 
single option marked on items of the Likert Scale. Nowhere in the responses did it 
appear that the question or statement had not been understood although words 
such as facts could possibly be analysed as to the meaning made of them.  
To measure concepts about history, ‘The Beliefs in History Teaching and 
Learning Questionnaire’, (BLTHQ) Maggioni et al. (2009a), was used. 
Triangulation was achieved with the addition of an instrument to test general 
epistemic beliefs, ‘The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory’ Schraw et al. (2002), as well 
as a most useful set of open ended questions for a more deliberative though 
structured response. These questions have been used as part of research and are 
referred to by Mason (2002, p.328).  
It was also a stated intention to use performance assessment in tasks to 
enhance the data. This is a common data gathering device in the domain and 
provides a useful comparison of reported belief with in-task application. This could 
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not, however, prove useful when conducted and was dropped as three day 
workshops did not provide enough time for participants to learn the use of the 
heuristics involved in the task competently. I would, however, recommend these 
to other researchers. 
The workshops were constrained to be attractive to teachers and schools, 
not just for them to sign up but to continue to attend all three days. To develop 
concepts in depth and skill in the use of heuristics, however needed an exclusive 
focus on source work. Courses that VanSledright and others describe to prepare 
teachers for history teaching are university based and longer term. The focus on 
source and evidence in history was interesting for teachers but not a key part of 
their curriculum, therefore it was necessary to add tasks related to examiner 
reports, etcetera, which is time consuming. To resolve the quandary, I kept the 
content and objectives ostensibly focused on the kind of history teaching and 
learning concerns that make sense to teachers rather than a wholesale focus on 
source work that they did not seem to think important enough. The poster sent to 
schools inviting participation reflected this concern. Source work occupied a third 
of workshop time. In the remaining time, activities such as moderation of marking 
and assessment issues, were included to keep the workshop meaningful. At all 
times, a worry was ‘will they return on the next two days of the workshop to be 
present for the post-test?’ Luckily, after the first study, nearly all those who began 
did see it through, finding the content interesting and challenging. The concepts 
did develop as is evident in all measures, but the shortage of time limited the 
development in knowledge and skill in evaluating sources with appropriate 
heuristics. 
 
3.20 The Intervention and Standardization (Appendix-A6) 
 
The main intervention under study was a carefully enhanced perception of 
agency for the Experimental Group only. It is necessary to emphasise that a 
perception of agency was limited to an enhanced ‘perception’ in reference to an 
opportunity acceptable and useful, freedom in questioning and making sense, 
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opportunity to reflect upon own prior ideas and the new ideas discussed. It did not 
specifically imply for this study, physical arrangements, grouping, task 
differentiation, talk time, or other social aspects of classrooms. Participants were 
only made more aware of the condition of their intellectual agency in relation to the 
ideas being introduced.  
In spite of much searching, I could not find existing instruments that could 
be used to measure a perception of agency during classroom learning in adults. 
Therefore, it was decided to measure the change in concepts in pre and post- test 
with the enhanced perception, an artifact embedded in the change intervention. 
This is described below. 
A perception of agency is a psychological construct and intangible, 
therefore, it needed to be operationalised for the research. After introductions and 
the reading of objectives, and crucially, filling the instruments at the outset of the 
workshop, a statement was made that this is a workshop not a training session. 
This was explained as follows:  
A workshop is a place where people collaborate and work together in order 
to learn and construct meaning. Opportunities for talk are provided to better 
articulate and understand personal beliefs and practices. These workshops 
are contexts for meaningful tasks in collaboration and discussion. This is 
not a training session or lecture where knowledge is delivered.  
 
3.20.1 During the Session the Following Steps were Taken 
 
i. Participants were encouraged to ask questions, to agree or disagree with 
group views. 
ii. Participants were reminded during group discussions to think and reflect 
how an idea related to their own prior knowledge, and try to make links with 
it.  
iii. Participants were encouraged to raise their own examples.  
iv. Participants were encouraged to consider if particular content was 
personally useful and meaningful to them.  
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v. Participants were reminded that they could slow down and pace their work 
to understand what was discussed. 
vi. Seating was in freely formed groups and my own role remained that of a 
facilitator. Tasks were carried out in small groups to examine sources and 
conflict in history accounts. I led whole group discussion but I avoided 
developing a single whole class account of an event.  
vii. As the facilitator, I deliberately paused at important points and waited to 
allow participants to decide rather than impose a point of view.  
viii. Participants were reminded in tasks that they can change groups and work 
with people of their own choice. At the beginning of each of three workshop 
days, I kept circle time and then encouraged them to form groups of 4 or 5 
people and move around. The seating was in small groups though different 
grouping arrangements were encouraged according to tasks. I observed 
that not many changed groups, perhaps not to offend others or because 
they were comfortable but the concept had been introduced.  
ix. Participants, who were in whole group discussions and small group tasks, 
were repeatedly encouraged to disagree/agree with the facilitator and other 
members of the group rather than passively accepting what was said. A 
wonderful snippet from my field notes illustrates how I could see this 
working. One small sized young female teacher, raised her hand high in the 
middle of a whole group discussion and announced to the whole class, ‘I 
disagree!’ When I focused on her and asked her to elaborate, she went 
ahead and made her point.  
Note:  
An important point to note here is that I as researcher had a very limited 
access to schools and was dependent on school administration to contact 
teachers and make arrangements. While schools were sent the poster and 
told in writing that the workshops needed to be voluntary, it was difficult to 
know how voluntary this was in real terms. It can be suspected that schools 
arrangements differed in, informing/inviting/persuading/even charging 
teachers to attend the offered workshops. On the other hand, as the word 
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got around regarding the workshops, there were in most cases more 
attendees on the second and third days than the first making a case for 
personal motivation. As there is a dearth of professional courses for 
teachers of senior schools, it is possible that the workshops were generally 
welcomed. A record of the last feedback session provides useful data in this 
area. 
 
The first study, however, was an exception where several participants from 
the Control, and some from the Experimental group, did not return after the first 
day. The reason could possibly be that these were members from a large school 
branch with high rates of success in CIE examinations and they did not perceive 
the 4 mark change in Syllabus to include questions on evaluation of source in 
history as consequential. This was a point that had come out in the pilot I had 
conducted earlier. Importantly, the percentage of drop in members in the Control 
group (21.42 %) was lower than in the Experimental group (50%) in the first study. 
In the third study, the Control group lost 4 of 15 while the Experimental group lost 
only 1. In the remaining 4 studies attrition after workshops began was no more 
than 1 or 2 members of a group.  
I consider that it was perceived that the workshops were less closely tied to 
examination content than earlier thought, which is why more participants dropped 
out in the first study. In this city and school system, performance in examination is 
high and teachers are highly prized, being paid large salaries. Those who dropped 
out in the first study are among the more successful and have a voice. I consider 
it a part of my success that so many attended at all. It must be noted however, that 
from the original estimate of possible attendees, only a third came. Security and 
cost implications apart from school constraints are also a reason people did not 
come from out-station schools. 
I did not consciously change the content, pedagogical method, or 
intervention in any way from the first to last study. It is possible that I grew in 
confidence after the first round of two workshops. I think I was nervous in the first 
session, which I was not later. I have a long experience of teaching and teacher 
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education as well as the development of social studies curricula. I am generally a 
popular teacher, well known, which must have been a factor in the learning but 
common to all groups. 
 
3.20.2 Experience in the Control Groups with Reference to the Experimental 
Treatment  
 
The first Intervention, experience of a range of suitable examples was 
provided to all 10 Control and Experimental groups. Apart from this, workshop 
format, task-based group discourse, materials used, activities, content of talk, 
number of days of the workshop, myself as tutor researcher, bilingual language, 
were features maintained as common in all groups. The numbers of participants, 
building environment and comfort levels, pace of lesson, incidents, food quality, 
distance travelled, cultural, language background and personal characteristics, 
etcetera, had multiple random differences that did not have a pattern and were not 
possible to control or measure. Both Control and Experimental groups of each 
study were conducted in the same city. Islamabad-Rawalpindi are taken as one, 
being twin cities, sharing many cultural and geographic features. The first three 
studies were conducted over three weeks with one day a week. The last two were 
conducted on three consecutive days due to school constraints. 
 
3.20.3 How was the Experience Different in the Control Group?  
 
How the experience was different in the Control group is an important 
question. First of all, I kept my focus on whole and small groups without giving 
particular attention to encourage individuals to think or question prior concepts. I 
did not consciously announce, encourage, or persuade individual participants to 
consider their own prior concepts in reference to group ideas. I did not ask 
questions of individuals as ‘what do you think?’ ‘What has been your experience?’ 
as I did in the Experimental groups. I did not deliberately encourage individual 
participants to reflect upon their own prior concepts about the epistemic value of 
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the content in the history books although that was the focus in the whole group 
discussion and tasks. I did circulate and provide input to groups without focusing 
on individual participation in talk. 
I avoided focus on seating, movement, participation in talk, or pace for 
individuals to comprehend. I avoided noticing where in small groups, individuals 
were left out of the conversation or tasks or where a member or two appeared to 
be quiet or dominating the activity or conversation. My effort was to not develop a 
perception of agency to consider and reflect upon their own meanings, to differ, to 
question, agree or disagree at will, amongst participants as I did in the 
Experimental group. I kept the video I have mentioned of a group task in an early 
years classroom as a model in my mind. In this video, I interpret learners missing 
a perception of agency and this was the scenario I avoided in the Experimental 
groups. To be honest, there must have been occasions when I forgot which group 
I was in but that was not a common feature as the pressure of research kept me 
generally focused. That model video has been placed online and can be seen at 
http://tinyurl.com/mdrpjvd. The video is not edited and blurred at onset. The 
important section is the activity taking place in the last group. The camera focuses 
on this. 
 
3.21 Materials Used for Learning and Teaching 
 
The first intervention was a pedagogical device used in all 10 groups, 
Control and Experimental. Using  Skemp’s argument for experience to change 
concepts, it was decided to use ‘a range of suitable examples’ to facilitate 
conceptual change, Skemp (1971). Task-based group discourse was the context 
for learning. Three topics were selected from the CIE syllabus and well researched; 
rich source material from a range of perspectives was found and employed. Types 
of sources were varied and criteria to analyse sources as evidence was used. The 
same content and method was used in all workshops. 
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3.22 Topics and Examples of Multiple Perspectives and Source Material 
Used in Workshops:  
 
 The Bengal famine/holocaust of 1943-1944 with two perspectives, 
one laying responsibility on the Bengal Muslim League Ministry, the 
other on the British Government. Sources: O'Grada (2008), Mukerjee 
(2010), Wikipedia. 
 The secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan, 1971, with two 
perspectives on the causes of secession. Sources: Bose (2005).  
 The annexation/accession of Kashmir to India, 1947 and the role of 
the British Government. Sources: Jinnah Papers with source 
documents Lamb (1992). 
It is important to emphasize here the importance of the material selected. 
The examples were particularly focused and sharply indicative of conflict in 
sources and different explanations. The examples demonstrated how Pakistan 
History particularly, has been represented and interpreted in various ways, and 
how sources can be evaluated and used to construct and analyze an explanation. 
All participants read the material, evaluated the sources and drew conclusions 
which were discussed. The discussions took place first in small groups and then 
with the whole class pitching in. VanSledright (2002, p.140) suggests that to 
pursue learning by investigation involves choosing topics and events that hone 
powerful investigative, domain-specific strategies and then use these to build 
thought and critical reading capacities. I selected topics for the presence of 
conflicting accounts, availability of evidence, and relevance to the curriculum. 
These examples also have some emotive value as they relate to particularly painful 
events in the Sub-Continent’s History. 
 
3.23 The Sample and Control 
 
In implementing the design, it was found that the construction of groups was 
not in my control. School concerns and commitments dictated the when, where 
 128 
 
and with whom the research could be conducted. A range of common and varying 
features were found in the sample.  
To study the influence of an educational intervention on conceptual change, 
the aim was to target as many members as could possibly be available for the 
three day courses. As Cohen et al. (2007), cite Gorard (2003), one can start from 
a minimum number of cases per cell to calculate the size of the sample. As this is 
an entirely new area of research in Pakistan, it was difficult to predict the size of 
difference in relationships. I feared that there will of course be non-response, 
attrition and respondent mortality and this did happen as is described. Some 
participants did fail to attend, or return questionnaires.  
At the time of research planning, I did have access to the entire population 
of over 200 in-service teachers of O’ Level History, in a single large school system 
with branches spread over three geographical regions in Pakistan. I was a tutor for 
University teacher education courses in the large Pakistan School System but a 
sudden rise in costs brought these to an end. Therefore, I lost direct access to the 
teachers in the school. The worsening security situation in the country also 
reduced the number of the teachers in the originally identified sample of 200 that 
could travel from out station schools to attend the planned intervention workshops 
in three main cities. This caused a setback to the research making the numbers 
low for statistics. The smallness of the sample made it necessary to reach out to 
two other similar O’ Level teaching school systems and re-run the workshops to 
add numbers. In the end, 83 attended all three days and filled pre-test and post-
test instruments. 
There were broad features common to all groups. All in the sample were in-
service teachers of history for senior school ranging from Classes 9 to 10 in the 
first 3 sets, and some from Classes 8 to 10 in the last two sets. These were from 
3 large schools where the CIE Syllabus is taught and learnt by both boys and girls 
in English. Nearly all taught a section of Pakistan History although some who were 
found to be teaching to Class 8 taught a lower level. All were from School A in the 
first three sets and used mainly the same 2 history texts by two authors and had 
become used to seeing sources referred to in the texts. Some members in the last 
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two sets (Schools B & C, Class 8) used a different text but which also contained 
reference to sources. All schools were preparing pupils for the CIE examination. 
Some teachers in one group were seen to be teaching to Matriculation and not O’ 
Level. All three schools had a commitment to professional development and some 
form of collaboration with universities in the UK thus an ethos of professional action 
could be assumed. IELTS scores tested for teachers, as seen on Courses, is an 
average of 6 although there would be a range. 
Stated workshop objectives/broad sequence/group seating/tasks/task 
materials/arrangements of distribution of materials/presentation materials/ 
facilitator were common for all groups. There were differences in settings as all 10 
workshops were held in different locations as organized by schools. These were 
located in three cities of Pakistan and therefore, there were cultural differences as 
well as first language differences. Educational qualifications differed within a band 
of history, Pakistan Studies, within a component of history or International 
Relations with a component of history. There were more female than male 
teachers.  
Random allocation to groups was not possible nor was it possible to match 
groups. Most came with a Graduate or Masters in Pakistan Studies, International 
Relations, or Political Science and volunteered that there had been components 
of history in their courses. Two had studied Philosophy as a component and this 
is evident in the analysis. This information was not available from schools in 
advance and was obtained upon inquiry in the introduction sessions. Generally, 
participants did not appear to like volunteering this information except for those 
with relevant backgrounds. As the data spoken out loud, was a source of potential 
anxiety, I kept questions off hand and at low key, and written recording of findings 
could not be made. This could be a serious threat but for the knowledge that 
historiography is possibly not more than a part of the knowledge content and 
seldom taught as a skill or a development in epistemic cognition in University 
history courses for Masters degrees anyway. No teacher appeared to have a 
moderate or high level of skill or understanding of heuristics at entry. Some had 
theoretical understanding. One who had studied history as a subject referred to 
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Durkhiem, and another wrote a phrase in the post-test that suggested he/she had 
been reflecting and reading up on epistemic aspects of historiography. 
There was a range of differences in Universities or Colleges attended but 
this was not questioned. There was a range of differences in the cities and towns 
they came from and the distance travelled to attend. I insisted that workshops for 
the two groups (Control and Experimental) in each set were either on the following 
day or close in time and the time sequence of workshop sessions were the same 
between two groups in each set. Schools were requested to form a set of two 
groups in each city and the decision was made that the first of the two in a set 
would be the Experimental group. This was adhered to in all sets.  
This was very much an experiment in the field and all kinds of unforeseen 
occurrences created a range of different situations. In the first set, a teacher, who 
was a part time employee with long experience and a pedantic style, focused on 
precise marks schemes, kept interrupting the session with arguments and 
demonstrating her boredom with the source work. Two attended the first sessions 
of the two groups in the first set saying they were not teachers of history but wanted 
to learn. They did not return on subsequent days and data from them is not added 
to the data set. 
There were also two other participants travelling for nearly three hours who 
came all three days to attend the workshop who had also never taught history but 
wanted to learn to do so having taken Pakistan Studies at college. There was a 
girl from an out station school who drove over bad roads and a poor security 
situation to attend all days even though she had an accident one day. Their 
motivation was awe inspiring but their knowledge of the history content was limited. 
All three were from a Control group. 
It is important to note that both groups, the Control and Experimental, 
attended the workshops. Both were given pre-test and post-tests. The content of 
the workshops, the sequence of presentation, the tasks carried out, the examples 
of historical source and evidence used, were kept as carefully matched as 
possible. I, as the facilitator, was common in all. No members of the administration 
were part of the participants or present in the class. 
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As the saying goes, one can never cross the same river twice. It is 
recognized that no two sessions could ever be the same. No two people could be 
said to have had the same experience. In many significant ways however, the 
facilitator being the same, keeping course content and material matched, it could 
be said as far as educational experiences go, they did all attend the same course.  
How far participants perceived themselves to be agentic was not measured 
nor indeed how far the message of agency had been registered by each individual. 
With real life field conditions reducing the degree of control, the smallness of the 
samples and the multiplicity of variables making strong inference difficult, it was 
understood that a good quality description using both statistics and qualitative 
analysis may be the best that could be attained. A focus group session was 
organized and held with the last Experimental group.  
The variables being multiple, I have not tried to adjust these differences in 
statistical analysis as suggested by Steiner et al. (2009). These are described in 
open detail and interpretation is left to readers. Pilot studies are useful in 
developing the research design and ensuring reliability, therefore a pilot was 
conducted. Some information was obtained on the measures and the concepts of 
participants regarding the potential importance of the change in syllabus that the 
workshops were ostensibly targeting. 
Details of the Sample and Missing Data are included in Appendix A2b. 
 
3.24 Instrument Effects 
 
The pre-post-test instruments contain no reference to, or content, that could 
inform a perception of agency, the independent variable. Instruments measured 
the change in concept only, the dependent variable. The pre-post instruments 
could have an effect on enhancing awareness of epistemic issues. Therefore, 
these were submitted to all in both groups, at the outset of the workshop and as 
the last task, in the same class room circumstances. Thus, the possible focusing, 
interest building, enhancing effect of the instruments was available to all members 
of both groups at the same time in the beginning of the workshops. 
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3.25 Focus Group as a ‘A Feedback Session’ 
 
At the stage of planning the research, it was discussed by my supervisor 
and myself that an effort to obtain participants’ thoughts on the process would be 
useful. In the conduct of the experiment, it became difficult to hold the participants 
back after they had completed the questionnaires of the post-test on the third day 
of the workshops to arrange a discussion or focus group. Busy teachers have a 
practice of rushing out after training sessions are over. As the experiment was 
being conducted multiple times in three cities and I had limited help, I could not 
allocate this task to others to do at a later time. 
An opportunity arose after the last experiment was over to return to school 
after about a week and hold what is commonly referred to in teacher parlance as 
a ‘feedback session’. I took permission from the Head of school to visit and talk to 
the teachers. As it seemed that they were curious and interested, they agreed and 
a time was set. This could be called a focus group but it had characteristics that 
set it apart.  
Briefly, the teachers who had attended the Experimental Group sessions 
collected in an empty classroom. I arranged a circle time seating arrangement and 
had audio recording facilities at hand. I asked the teachers if they would be 
comfortable with the mikes and did not mind the recording and happily they agreed. 
The time was immediately after school but nearing afternoon as school had let off 
early. There was some hustle and bustle outside as some children and staff were 
still busy. It was a summer afternoon and warm. The fan was working but made a 
noise which interfered with the recording. I tried to put it off at one time but it 
became too warm. The teachers were busy when I arrived but agreed to attend. 
They were in the process of marking scripts as examinations were in progress in 
this senior school. We spent about an hour together. 
I had copies of their pre-test and post-test questionnaires, which I handed 
out for them to study for a while to help them recall the session as well as to 
consider the change in their responses. After they had studied the responses and 
seemed to have done, I asked them if we could talk about it in turns. They took the 
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mike from each other and gave a few points each on what difference they could 
perceive in the responses and tried giving reasons. After this the discussion 
became general. I kept to the rules of circle time, keeping my own input to a 
minimum but edging them towards my main interest, which was, ‘what was it in the 
classroom environment, if anything, which could have helped them to change?’ I 
kept the question tentative and exploratory. The audio record, though somewhat 
fuzzy, was of a reasonable quality. The purpose of the Focus Group was to inquire 
how participants recognized change and to what did they attribute this. A few 
excerpts from the transcript are placed in the text. 
Audio records were planned and made of complete sessions but 
unfortunately, the recordings tend to range between ‘good’ for the facilitators voice, 
but ‘often inaudible’ of participants’ speech. The recording of 3 sets of Control and 
Experimental Groups were made but are not a useful record, being fragmented 
and incomplete. There is, however, enough material in the records and field notes 
to have assisted me in this detailed write up. 
 
3.26 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Data in both numbers and words was collected in stages of the research 
cycle. This is data regarding epistemic beliefs at pre-test and post-test. Nominal 
data on characteristics of the population was collected with some reliability, 
however, it is not used as variables in the quantitative analysis. Significant patterns 
in the data could have been used to analyse and interpret test results, however the 
variables are found to be far too many and many are unknown or unreliable such 
as the nature of prior study. Illustration of a perception of agency and change in 
concepts is sought in qualitative data obtained through recording of the 
introduction and parts of sessions where possible. The Focus Group, as feedback 
session, is a most useful source for description. Participants’ oral evaluation of own 
learning and the process of learning with reference to perceptions of agency in 
group tasks and discourse was expected to enhance the descriptions of the 
process and change.  
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3.27 Reliability 
 
This is practitioner research and issues of reliability can be argued due to 
the researcher conducting research on her own students as subjects, Cohen et al. 
(2007). This was, however, unavoidable as epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history is a new area of study for Pakistan and tutors are simply not available. I 
planned to off-set this by developing a team of tutors of education, a university 
teacher of history as expert to co-teach the session with the researcher; however 
this did not work out. I could not find an expert in historiography available to teach 
neither could I afford to take such a person on the extended round of cities to be 
present for all sessions. One teacher educator as observer was invited, who did 
attend the sessions in the first round but she did not continue or give me a record 
of her observations. Another observer was most appreciative but not very well 
informed. I had therefore, to decide to conduct the training myself. In order to 
address issues of reliability, a framework, the CBKH, was developed to make 
assessment of 166 response sheets as reliable as possible. Inter Rater and 
Internal Evaluation was conducted.  
 
3.28 Inter Rater Reliability and Internal Evaluation 
 
Inter-rater reliability was tried for the BM data assessment. This was 
followed by internal evaluation conducted in three iterations improving the scale till 
an acceptable reliability of assessment was achieved (Appendix-A7). Reliability is 
also tested through statistical analysis and described in the Chapter on Analysis. 
This is described in Section 3.37. 
 
3.29 Ethical Issues 
 
I, the researcher, was at the beginning of the research, a member of teacher 
education staff of the organization where the sample was to be obtained but I had 
no administrative role other than the course I taught. (Teachers currently enrolled 
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were not to be invited). Before the interventional workshops, I left the organization; 
however, they were kind enough to allow me to proceed with the research. I also 
expanded the sample to include teachers from other school systems teaching to 
O’ Level. These organizations have an interest in staff development but the focus 
of this research, abstract concepts and perceptions, play no part in appraisal of 
staff at present or in the foreseeable future. The certificate awarded was one of 
participation and did not indicate success or failure or other information regarding 
an assessment of beliefs. 
Obtaining personal information about age, prior study, nature of study, 
schooling, was important but I found that teachers hesitated to provide such 
information and this created some tension so I dropped the idea. 
A video I had made on a school visit to an early years classroom is included. 
This is not used for data but as an illustration of situations we see in classrooms 
where children are involved in group tasks. Permission has been taken from the 
School and teacher. As this video was made at least 6 years ago, the children 
have grown up and moved out of school therefore, it is not possible to take 
permission from them. 
Providing complete information to participants about the research focus 
(perceptions of agency and epistemic beliefs) could have affected reliability. 
Reasonably informed consent was therefore, obtained at all levels including each 
and every individual participant. Informed omission rather than deception Kimmel 
(1988, p.75) was the strategy. After the research, explanation and individual results 
will be made available to participants in confidence. 
 
3.30 Some Steps That Were Taken Are 
 
 An intermediary teacher to explain and ask for participation.  
In the culture of schools, outsiders are not allowed in or allowed to 
roam freely, especially in current security concerns in Pakistan. 
Someone who has access to teachers would have to fit the 
acceptability criteria anyway and there would be 
'gatekeepers' controlling that. A teacher from another school branch 
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or a teacher of another subject area or year group was requested. 
Opportunity was provided during informal tea time or lunch sessions 
to answer queries as far as possible. 
 Complete security was provided when data on characteristics was 
gathered. Sealed envelopes, collection boxes were placed for the 
submission of completed questionnaires. In place of names, code 
numbers were written and the codes secured on my personal 
computer. An added measure was to codify names of cities where 
the research was conducted as well as the names of school systems. 
 The pilot had revealed issues in collection where some respondents 
handed over filled questionnaires to heads in outstation schools. In 
the actual research, the questionnaires were collected by myself on 
site to preserve security. 
 Guidelines to assist respondents in understanding confidentiality 
were included in the introduction. 
 Teachers need to be well aware of their right not to participate. Cost 
and benefit need to be explained in the covering note as well as by 
the intermediary. This practice may not be reliable at all times and 
contexts, as teachers may feel constrained by their school 
administration to attend training.  
 Efforts were made to negotiate time and venue to be comfortable and 
non-threatening. 
 Participants were free to leave the research at any time. It was 
explained that no personal or professional consequences for 
declining an invitation to participate were anticipated. The research 
was a private project, not funded and no reporting was to be carried 
out to the organisation. To obtain a formal Certificate of Participation 
on the workshop, however required participation (Appendix A2a). 
 Strict procedures were to be followed in storage of data at all times 
as well as in the process of analysis. 
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 Permission to audio-record was taken each time after explanation of 
the process.  
 All records were kept under security. Writing references to the record 
was done carefully to maintain confidentiality. 
 
3.31 Development of Knowledge and Skills 
 
An interesting phenomenon, change in my own epistemic cognition over the 
time it has taken for the research plan to evolve and the processes that have 
fostered the change, is worthy of mention. I have reflected upon this in various 
sections of the dissertation. 
 
3.32 Description of the Quasi Experiments 
 
Analysis of the Elements in the Design and Threats to Internal/Construct 
and External Validity in the Contexts of My Research. 
 
3.32.1 Introduction 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.6-8) describe quasi experiments as 
experiments that have treatments, outcome measures and experimental units but 
do not use random assignment. Thus, Experimental and Control Groups may be 
non-equivalent where field conditions constrain possibilities of randomisation. 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.15-34) use the term validity to refer to ‘the 
approximate truth of an inference’ and lay out procedures that they suggest can 
support assumptions of internal, construct, and external validity in making claims 
regarding causal relationships between variables. Cook and Campbell (1979), 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.34) recommend modesty and use of the terms ‘tentative’ 
and ‘approximate’ in making truth claims as ‘one can never know what is true’. 
Steiner et al. (2009) assert that no current quasi-experimental method...provides 
as convincing a causal counterfactual as a randomised experiment. Where this 
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cannot be conducted, they recommend a non-equivalent control design with close 
matching or sophisticated pattern matching. I used the theory to design, conduct 
the experiments and analyse data, therefore, it is important to take each principle 
and describe the steps taken in the light of constraints and opportunities. 
 
3.32.2 Truth Claims in Quasi Experimental Research 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979), as self-described ‘critical realists’, tread the 
ground with care as they develop their logic of experimentation. They are careful 
to state that ‘outside variables will always impinge on a dependent variable making 
results sensitive to forces outside the theoretical system’ and that they expect the 
relationships to be fallible and probable at best.  
The design of my inquiry is quasi experimental and mixed methods are 
employed in various ways to collect and analyse data. In this Section of the 
Chapter on Research Methodology, I discuss particular features of the quasi 
experiment as conducted in my study in the light of theoretical arguments. Practical 
problems that arise in research in the field were thus considered in advance and 
ways to adapt to, and resolve these, were sought. In this Section, I systematically 
raise threats that can arise in the experimental studies and consider the limitations 
to interpretation that are suggested in the literature. A balance between reliability 
and validity is sought through careful design as far as the contexts allow. Rich 
descriptions are provided with reference to threats to validity and reliability to help 
readers to interpret the findings of the research as it was conducted. For myself, I 
draw conclusions on the basis not of despair but pragmatic understanding that field 
research is not laboratory science but it is the best there is in the circumstances. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.24) quote Cronbach that most challenges to the 
causal generalisation of an experiment typically emerge after a study is done. That 
is probably true; however, using the copious material in Cook and Campbell 
(1979), Shadish et al. (2002) many threats to various types of validity were avoided 
by design in my study. Steiner et al. (2009) suggest that it is better to anticipate a 
threat before the study where that can be done but if design controls cannot be put 
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in place, the best alternative is to measure the threat directly to see if it actually 
operates and if so, conduct statistical analysis to examine if it can plausibly account 
for the obtained cause and effect relationship. They endorse the direct assessment 
of possible threats, whether done using qualitative or quantitative observations.  
In the studies conducted for this research, the variables, despite planning, 
turned out to be numerous. By careful reasoning, I was able to plan to counter 
some threats. Others that could not be countered are described as well. 
Assessment of each variable would require reliable evidence, and adjustment to 
the numerous variables is difficult, and there are areas where evidence is not 
available. My effort is to describe conditions with transparent detail in order for 
interpretation to be well informed. 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.40) recommend the primary method of ruling out 
threats is to use design controls that minimize the number and plausibility of these 
threats that remain by the end of the study. As Shadish et al. (2002, p.484) term it, 
fuzzy probability is central to ruling out threats in quasi experimentation.  
Cook and Campbell (1979) discuss two classes of designs; those they 
consider generally non-interpretable, that generally do not permit causal inference, 
and non-equivalent, control group designs that, they say, are generally 
interpretable. Among the latter, the untreated control group with pre-test and post-
test is most often used and often interpretable. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.103), 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.136) This is the design I have used in my studies. Groups 
were not matched in particular. Broadly, all belonged to the category of O' Level 
teachers of teaching history in high school. They are therefore, classed as 
nonequivalent. 
What follows in this Chapter is a description of ways in which threats to 
internal validity were countered during my research. This is structured like a list 
with separate headings for easy reference. The theory is raised in the preceding 
Section. 
 
 
 
 140 
 
3.32.3 Ambiguous Temporal Precedence 
 
Shadish et al. (2002, p.55) reiterate that cause must precede effect but 
consider this may be unclear. In my experimental research the causal treatment 
was provided between pre-test and post-test in all 5 studies. Measures were 
carefully conducted at outset and in the last hour of the final day. There were no 
other training sessions being held to develop epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history in schools or at CIE or the British Council in Pakistan at the time. The 
chances of this being a valid threat for the sample are few. 
 
3.32.4 Selection and Assignment for Control 
 
Research participants for this study were found in three large private school 
systems in Pakistan spread in three large cities Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. 
These school systems prepare students for Cambridge O' and A' Level 
examinations. The target population was the entire population of teachers of O' 
Level History in all these school systems. An estimate given by System One, which 
is the largest, of the number of history teachers was 200. However, at the end, 
only 83 were accounted for after data cleaning. The other schools did not give me 
an estimate and only offered vague responses over the telephone. 
Potentially, the complete population of adult O' Level history teachers 
between Classes 9-11 in all 3 school systems was invited and therefore, could 
have attended. In that sense I can claim that there was no bias as there was no 
limitation and no selection on my part. No one was disqualified due to any reason 
by me, the researcher, or anyone on my team. Most did not attend however, 
upsetting my original calculations. This attrition took place at the outset of the 
programme and there was some attrition during the programme. This is 
documented and will be accounted for in the analysis. Reasons for not attending 
are probably random. Discussions in the pilot prior to conducting the research had 
disclosed that teachers did not consider that the prospective change that I was 
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targeting in the curriculum was of much consequence. Cambridge had indicated 
this in writing on the website. 
The largeness of the school systems and the lack of access made it difficult 
to judge if self-selection, administrator's assignment or other reasons were behind 
the reduced attendance. Crucially, as self-selection itself could be considered as 
contributing to the outcome of interest, bias would be an issue. A perception of 
agency would be compromised if someone had been ordered to attend. There is, 
however, one argument which is important. As these are Senior School O’ Level 
teachers, the school culture is not authoritarian for them. O’ Level teachers are 
greatly in demand in the city and often work part time moving from school to school. 
School administration would be more likely to persuade than try to force 
attendance in a three day workshop. There is very little professional development 
offered to senior school teachers. Even CIE has about one session a year, which 
is expensive, therefore, schools select some teachers to attend. There would be 
some value seen by teachers and schools to develop their practice and add 
training to their CV.  
Groups were in one sense given, as school managements made the 
arrangements to their own convenience. These were not intact groups such as a 
complete university class but yes, in the sense that these were, as history 
teachers, a subset of all the teachers in the school system. I had distributed posters 
to schools to encourage volunteers but knowing schools, I can conceive of a range 
of ways in which teachers were either told to attend or heard about it and requested 
to go. A scenario of random selection of teachers in busy functioning schools is 
hard to imagine.  
As in some cases, out station teachers attended, there were variables that 
were not known such as travel issues, weather, time pressures, etcetera. These 
are necessarily the kind of differences that would underlie the makeup of groups 
and social situations. Homogeneity in matched groups would still have hidden 
differences. A sick child at home, transport problems, copies to correct piling up, 
could not possibly be matched or accounted for. 
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3.32.5 Assignment to Control and Experimental Groups 
 
Assignment to Control and Experimental Groups was also due to 
circumstance and not design. Teachers’ presence in the geographic area, a matter 
of chance, made it convenient for them to attend either one of the two groups 
formed in each study. To explain this further, either their home or their workplace 
was in the location of the workshop. In three cases, there was switching from 
control to treatment group on the second day. These respondents are not included 
in the analysis. 
One other way of control was that I determined in advance that all Group 
A’s (the first in the set of Group A and Group B) would be Control Groups, therefore 
removing any possibility of choice on my part as to which group should receive the 
treatment. The groups were constructed by the school to my broad specifications. 
I could not influence who would attend or in which group. That this meant that the 
experience would be different between groups in any way was not known to 
anyone except myself and my supervisors and the ethics committee as earlier 
stated. Being part of an experimental research is not commonly experienced here 
nor do teachers know that an experiment would mean different experiences within 
groups. Therefore, it is safe to assume that only practical, personal reasons were 
behind the assignment of teachers to either group. 
 
3.32.6 Differential Attrition 
 
Differential attrition is hard to judge as members of groups attended, or did 
not attend, due to random, unknown, administrative or personal reasons. Steiner 
et al. (2009), in the context of experiments, suggest that if the pattern of attrition 
differs by group then a selection confound is introduced. There is some clear 
pattern for differential attrition that can be identified in one of my studies. In the first 
Control Group, 16 participants were reduced to 10 on the second day, and went 
up to 11 on the third day i.e. 5 did not submit a post-test. In the Experimental Group 
of the study, there were only 6 on the last day from a total of 12 on the first day. 
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Thus both groups showed attrition. In this city study there was a concern 
expressed by participants that the change in the syllabus was of not more than 4 
marks, therefore learning about assessment of source did not seem of much value. 
This could be a reason. Another Control Group of Jasmine lost 4 participants at 
post-test while the Experimental lost only 1. In this group there were several 
travelling from out station. An important point is that the first three studies had 
participants of one school system. The other studies had participants of two 
systems. The remaining studies did not show attrition in the same way with only 
one or two not attending either pre-test or post-test in the Control or Experimental 
Groups. Pansy, the last study, has attrition of only 1 participant; however, change 
is seen as more in the Control Group rather than the Experimental Group in this 
study. Such participants were counted out of the analysis. Travel from distant 
towns should not be discounted as a reason for attrition. Missing data does not 
include these participants. 
Regarding the aspect of threats to the interpretation due to differences in 
voluntary or involuntary participation, I can make some clarification here. I, as 
researcher, had a very limited access to schools and was dependent on school 
administration to contact teachers and make arrangements. While schools were 
sent the poster and told in writing that the workshops needed to be voluntary, it 
was difficult to know how voluntary this was in real terms. It can be suspected that 
schools’ arrangements differed in, informing/inviting/persuading/even charging 
teachers to attend the offered workshops. As there is a dearth of professional 
courses for teachers of senior schools, it is possible that the workshops were 
welcomed. A record of the last feedback session provides useful data in this area. 
It might be better if this study is repeated to obtain data about motivation and 
intention at the outset of the course.  
 
3.32.7 Access and Social Situation 
 
I did not have free access to schools and was only permitted to visit when 
conducting the workshop. This limited possibilities of randomisation, selection, 
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assignment, location, and even the kind of observation that could be conducted. 
Most researchers would face such problems of limited access to sites in my 
opinion. 
As Shadish et al. (2002) describe, each experiment is also a social situation, 
full of social roles and social expectations but with a uniqueness that can lead to 
problems when social cues are misread or thwarted by either party Shadish et al. 
(2002, p.30). I experienced this in the very first group which happened to be a 
Control Group. I found a trio of members that were considered on the top of the 
field in history teaching in the flagship branch of the School. Good results of the 
School and long term experience made them feel any further training to be a waste 
of time. They had come along as I was a known trainer in the field and they 
probably did not want to miss anything but they were looking for specific 
examination related content. The focus on the change in history papers did not 
appear useful to them as they were not convinced that this would mean a larger 
change in examination content. I was told by one participant that it meant a mere 
4 marks difference in the examinations. (Early data gathering had established this 
perception existed among experienced O' Level teachers of history. This was the 
mark difference that could be worked out from CIE guidelines) 
One participant, especially, was a part time teacher in the School and a 
visiting teacher in other schools with little time to spare for flighty ideas about 
history content. She was a constant source of trouble in classroom proceedings, 
challenging me on each mark awarded when we did some paper moderation. Such 
conditions, neither desirable nor replicable, are albeit, part of the complexity of field 
settings. It is difficult to quantify such an experience to add to statistical analysis 
because of its unique and complex nature. 
Another example that is important is of a young teacher who drove down 
from a neighbouring town to attend classes in the city in spite of bad roads, 
insecurity, and a distance of over 120 kilometers. Most teachers that come long 
distance do so in school transport and do not drive alone. She persisted in coming 
even when she had an accident. Such examples within a group question the level 
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of homogeneity even with all other things being the same. Interestingly, she was 
in the Control Group and grew in degrees of sophistication as assessment shows.  
 
3.33 Alternative Explanations  
 
3.33.1 Prior Study  
 
In this experiment, one alternative explanation for an initial score in a pre-
test could have been background of study of history as a discipline in a degree 
programme as opposed to a degree in other subject areas such as Pakistan 
Studies, where processes of history e.g. source assessment are not taught. 
Information regarding earlier qualifications was asked and, when it became 
apparent that the domain of the degree was not forthcoming on the questionnaire, 
I requested teachers at the start of the session to please add it. This was 
unfortunately a source of some tension as it affected their credibility in the eyes of 
their colleagues and I could see that they considered it confidential. I therefore, 
gave up the attempt. This is one of the limitations that make causal inference 
difficult from weaker quasi experiments. 
A difference between study in history and the subject Pakistan Studies has 
implications for epistemic beliefs but obtaining this information reliably was difficult 
and seen to be embarrassing, therefore I discontinued it. I felt that I may be 
crossing limits of ethics in trying to obtain data they were loath to give. I should in 
principle work out the effect of such variance and account for it in analysis. This 
variable could make a difference but information regarding the variable is not 
available and would be a contravention of ethical concerns to extract. 
 
3.33.2 Knowledge of the Treatment 
 
There are no guarantors of valid inference argue Shadish et al. (2002, 
p.483). In my research, knowledge of the treatment would have had an effect, 
therefore deception was used to control the threat. Deception is difficult in practice 
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as well as to justify especially in a research where agency is being critically 
explored. It was necessary, however, as explained in the Section on ethics, due to 
the importance of studying the relationship and the unusual circumstances that 
made this research design possible. 
All groups, Experimental and Control, received one level of the treatment, 
which was instruction to change concepts of knowledge in history. The method of 
instruction was Intervention 1, which was an experience of a range of suitable 
examples. No one was aware of the existence of or the nature of the underlying 
concurrent treatment to create a perception of agency except for myself the 
researcher/teacher and my supervisors. This treatment was administered to 
Experimental Groups alone as was expected to effect the change of concepts 
making new ideas more acceptable. 
 
3.33.3 History and Maturation 
 
An issue in such experimental studies is the threat of change emerging from 
learning conducted elsewhere. In-service learning tends to filter down in schools 
with small workshops and collaboration. It was, therefore, necessary to frame the 
research to short courses and complete the experiments before some other 
training event took place. As this was not an award bearing course, assignments, 
and long duration study would not be acceptable to a large sample anyway. 
 This was a one in a million opportunity to study a planned and necessary 
change in concepts within a bounded population and I did not want to let it go to 
waste. The threat that history could possibly explain findings of change, both 
possible and plausible, drove the pace of my research programme as well as 
choice of instruments. The History O’ Level Curriculum of Cambridge International 
Examinations (CIE) was in the process of change and it was appropriate to expect 
schools in Pakistan and CIE to institute teacher education programmes to address 
it. I feared that CIE could be conducting workshops, or even, that teaching practice 
to the newly developing curriculum itself could affect teachers’ concepts given 
time, thus becoming a threat. I chose therefore, to use existing, validated, 
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instruments rather than wait to develop and test new ones for Pakistan’s context. 
I planned the workshops to take place within a short space of a few months in 
order to pre-empt other training programmes making a difference. These were both 
possible and plausible threats that I was able to successfully counter. 
An alternative explanation for change in concepts could be earlier or 
simultaneous attendance by the participants at a teacher training programme with 
similar content. As such programmes on this change in curriculum or related 
subjects were not being offered in schools, CIE training could be the only other 
possibility (I did enquire). Before beginning the workshops, I had attended one 
such training by CIE to find that the training sessions did not target teachers’ 
concepts about knowledge in history. I held the workshops before training was 
conducted by CIE again that year, and gathered information regarding those who 
had attended the training earlier. I held meetings with a group of teachers who had 
attended training sessions and was able to conclude that the concept of source in 
history was assumed to be only a ‘hint or link’ to assist in answering questions in 
examination. A key way to reduce the threat was to take pre-test and post-tests 
and time sessions in such a way that no other training session was held or attended 
between these. This I was able to ensure, in the sense that I kept a track of any 
such training on offer within the time scale. Luckily these did not take place. 
 
3.33.4 Threat of Testing 
 
The population of O’ Level teachers of history being specific and small, 
made the threat of testing real and thus limited the extent of the pilot that could be 
conducted. Those who had studied the test in advance could not be assumed to 
respond in comparable ways as those who had not. I tested the instrument EBI on 
random family and friends, colleagues who were not from the target population, 
and the history instruments on some teachers who were then not included in the 
experiment. As numbers mattered, this was a difficult decision. 
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As far as the pre-test was concerned, it was not a threat because it was 
administered to both groups, Control and Experimental, at the start of the 
workshops and at the end. 
 
3.33.5 Resentful Demoralization 
 
An issue with withholding treatment did not occur as both groups received 
a matching content in instruction targeting the stated goal of curriculum revision. 
The difference of treatment between Control and Experimental Groups was 
qualitative as an enhanced perception of agency. Thus practical issues of groups 
learning different content were avoided and there was also reduced risk of 
resentful demoralisation. 
One issue which Cook and Campbell (1979) refer to is ‘Resentful 
demoralization of respondents receiving less desirable treatments’. Steiner et al. 
(2009) similarly refer to the Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value-Assumption (SUTVA) 
where it is advised that the experiment is conducted in such a way that students 
and teachers do not become aware of the specific treatment or control condition 
to which they were not assigned. The treatment was at two levels. Both Control 
and Experimental Groups received Level 1, which was the course itself, to address 
changes in the O’ Level History Curriculum. The experimental treatment, the 
perception of agency, was given only to the Experimental Groups. 
All participants knew that I was carrying out research and had signed 
consent forms, but most had never taken part in an experimental research before 
and did not know that different treatments were to be given or expected. The 
statements I made regarding agency, my efforts to encourage disagreement and 
challenge, may have appeared my mood of the day. This threat was therefore, 
assumed not to apply within the short time frame of three weeks within which each 
study took place. 
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3.33.6 Threat of Difference in Experience with Different Tutors 
 
Another threat, of difference in experience with different tutors, did not apply 
as I conducted all sessions myself. There were many teacher educators available 
who teach education. Tutors were required with matching knowledge, skills, and 
understanding and critically, perspectives at a philosophical level, as was needed 
for this course to be taught. Such tutors were not available. Course objectives were 
to change teachers’ concepts about knowledge in history. A tutor for this course 
needed to possess a working, practical sense of epistemological issues, and of 
status of sources in knowledge in history. As this was described as practitioner 
research in the original brief, I could decide to keep the role to myself. Though 
extremely taxing on my time and energy, this threat did not become, as it could 
have, an intervening variable across all six studies. 
The researcher being the one delivering the treatment was, however, a 
threat to inference as being the researcher and knowing the Experimental group. I 
could have unconsciously or consciously made a difference. What difference could 
that have been, to obtain a change in epistemic beliefs take place amongst more 
participants, in the appropriate direction and degree, and match it in all 5 studies 
might then well be the factor of interest! There is a clear difference of more change 
in 4 out of 5 Experimental groups and a perception of agency is the difference I 
consciously maintained. If there was any other common factor, I do not know of it. 
 
3.33.7 Size of Sample 
 
Initial questioning in schools indicated that the sample could be large 
enough for inference but unfortunately, a smaller than planned sample was 
obtained. The reasons could be many. Concerns of safety and security in the 
country affected all equally and made a large difference in reducing the numbers 
that could attend. Those for example in the north could not attend.  
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3.33.8 When Treatment is Non-Obtrusive or Comparison Becomes Difficult 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.348-349) discuss obtrusive and unobtrusive 
treatments where respondents may possibly not notice the treatment at all or pay 
scant attention to it reducing the effect of the treatment. This could certainly be an 
alternative cause in my research studies. Cook and Campbell consider such 
treatments could be mundane, or not stand out. In the case of this treatment, I can 
tell from experience of conducting this experiment that the treatment does catch 
attention. It is palpable in the classroom atmosphere and the qualitative data does 
provide evidence of this. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.348-349) do suggest 
multiple research programs to counter this threat and that is good advice. I carried 
out the experiment 5 times, which helped to make my observation, as stated 
above, somewhat more dependable. 
 
3.33.9 Non Availability of Baseline Assessment 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.348-349) point out problems where a no-
cause baseline is not available for comparison as some level of treatment was 
given to all. Cook and Campbell refer to this making it difficult to test hypotheses 
about 'absolute cause' as opposed to hypotheses about differential impact. 
Campbell and Cook suggest a no-treatment Control group would solve the 
problem. In this study, that would not help, as to create a workshop situation and 
not target the curriculum revision, would not make sense to schools or teachers 
and neither would any other training correspond to the domain of the measures. 
Tests to obtain no-change data from those who did not attend any training would 
still not help in differentiating between Control and Experimental Groups. The best 
option in this case is the one employed, that of Control Groups as well as pre-test 
and post-test measures. In order to add to reliability, I designed each study with a 
Control and Experimental Group. Another important factor was taking entry pre-
tests for all groups. This has been a most useful element as a comparison could 
be made with some control over variables. Both groups had participants from the 
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same geographical area and the same school system. The pre and post- test for 
each study is a useful device for comparing change. Out of 5 studies, 4 showed 
more change in the Experimental Group. One group differed with more change in 
the Control Group. 
 
3.33.10 Confounding Factors 
 
My greatest concern was, if the design of the intervention was too strong, 
as it appeared to be in the pilot, it would explain the change making the perception 
of agency of little effect. Both groups would perform in similar ways. To explain, 
the content of the workshop, History of the Sub-Continent, as part of the teachers’ 
taught curriculum in schools is an emotive subject on the whole for the general 
population. A choice of the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh used in the pilot surfaced 
personal feelings that underpin the colonial experience. I feared that this would 
make agency of little consequence. As it turns out, there is good change in both 
groups, Control and Experimental but more change is evident in the Experimental 
Groups. 
I structured the experiment to ensure that both groups experienced the 
same content, topics, and questions. The perception of agency was a treatment 
reserved for Experimental Groups alone. I figured that if the difference was seen 
over all iterations of the experiment, it could be plausible that agency had indeed 
had effect over and above the effect of the content which was common to both. 
 
3.33.11 Construct Validity 
 
3.33.11.1 Inadequate Pre-Operational Explication of Constructs 
 
Concepts, conceptual change, epistemological beliefs, beliefs about 
concepts in history, beliefs about history, are discussed in depth in the literature 
and reviewed in this study. Cook and Campbell (1979, p.65) suggest that a precise 
explication of constructs is vital for high construct validity as it permits tailoring the 
manipulations and measures to whichever definitions emerge from the explication. 
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Concepts and conceptual change are defined in various ways by scholars. 
Precision or even consensus in definition is not to be found in the literature. Formal 
definitions are therefore, those that pertain to the measures. I was fortunately able 
to contact the developers of two of the measures to obtain permission as well as 
understand ways in which these were used. The measures being common to both 
groups did not have differential impact. 
The manipulation, as mentioned, was at two levels. Instead of no explicit 
treatment to the Control Group, the treatment given was 'qualitatively different' 
(term used by Steiner et al. (2009). At one level, all groups attended workshops in 
education to change concepts of history. The content and process was designed 
carefully following VanSledright (2002), VanSledright (2011). Three different 
examples from history, as written in relevant course texts, were selected and 
materials were organized to help participating teachers experience examples of 
how history is represented. A range of sources was examined to provide 
experience of evaluating source. This was a careful match and arguably met 
standards of validity. 
Shadish et al. (2002) argue that since single operations both under 
represent constructs and contain irrelevancies, construct validity will be lower in 
single exemplar research where each construct is operationalised in multiple ways 
in order to triangulate on the referent. They suggest that there is no substitute for 
deliberately varying two or three exemplars of a treatment, where possible. This I 
could not do. 
Definition of the construct of agency was not as large an issue as agency 
itself was not being measured. The perception of agency could be described with 
the use of qualitative data from the sessions. The audio record of the sessions 
helped to flesh out my own notes to build an account. 
 
3.33.11.2 Explication of Treatment 
 
Careful explication of the treatment can be possible. The independent 
variable, a perception of agency, was explicated in the Experimental Group and 
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this same explication used each time. Thus the treatment could be planned and 
maintained over iterations. How this perception was perceived, could also be 
examined with the use of qualitative data from the sessions. The audio record of 
the sessions, my field notes, photographs, helped to build a description. It is my 
intention to suggest ways this can be researched in the future with different 
exemplars of the treatment. There are, however, differences in degree of 
explication or perception that must reasonably have taken place and these are not 
measured or indeed even known.  
As Shadish et al. (2002) note that construct validity is fostered by, one, 
starting with a clear explication of the person, setting, treatment, and outcome 
construct of interest, and two, carefully selecting instances that match those 
constructs. While efforts were made by me to maintain the pattern, curriculum, 
school settings, sample similarities between iterations, there were differences. 
These are enumerated. The balance between educational qualifications, age, sex, 
experience in the units studied was different in each study making exact replication 
impossible to claim. As I have mentioned in the Section on measures, I did try to 
look for a ready instrument to measure a perception of agency; however, the 
construct being new, ready measures were not available. There were none that 
precisely targeted a perception of agency in task based group discourse. There 
was not enough time to develop and validate new ones as explained. A measure 
such as this could have helped to address this threat with more reliability. 
 
3.33.11.3 Variables in the Sample and Settings and Tutor 
 
The letter promoting the course described the target audience thus the 
target population of teachers of O’ Level history was defined and met. In one 
school, several teachers of a lower class and age group (8 rather than 9 onwards) 
and teaching a different text book, attended, who had sadly to be counted out in 
the analysis. Some attended in a group who were teaching Matriculation rather 
than O’ Level history. They were also not counted in the final total of 83 
respondents. The measures remained the same in all studies but it could be 
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argued that participants would respond in individual ways to the language, content, 
perspective, task demand. Settings were schools or their teacher education 
centers. These are described. All settings were similar in the sense that attending 
teachers were familiar with both location and routine of teacher education. 
The settings were as similar as field experiments can have. There were 
differences that are described. One was noisier, another had an idyllic setting but 
was in the school group office training room. All sessions were conducted in school 
training rooms, I was the tutor for all, one group was smaller as members did not 
turn up. The training was conducted in three cities, thus there were cultural and 
language differences. However, these differences were between iterations or 
studies. In each case, Control and Experimental Groups had similar settings and 
broad person characteristics. In each case, the group was from one homogenous 
background of school with ‘surface similarities’, Shadish et al. (2002, p.67). 
The quasi experiment was constructed in a sensitive and careful manner, 
recognizing constraints and opportunities of the context. Participants were not 
treated like laboratory animals and an ethos of shared endeavour, everyday work 
place activities and camaraderie was maintained. The process was organized to 
create Control and Experimental Groups, pre-test and post-tests were taken, the 
treatment was limited to the Experimental Group and the whole process was 
repeated over six iterations of studies in three different cities of Pakistan. Both 
qualitative and quantitative measures were deliberately selected to triangulate and 
expand findings. As the measures were taken from studies conducted outside 
Pakistan, and the questions covered an unfamiliar domain, it was seen as 
necessary to use both closed and open ended structured and semi structured 
questions. 
Was the measure a perfectly valid reflection of the theory being tested? It 
was hard to say as the instruments were piloted on a small scale. The data from 
the pilot was inadequate for statistical inference. For one, a large scale pilot was 
not practical because of the smallness of the population of history teachers, 
making history a threat if the instruments were experienced repeatedly. Time 
constraints were an issue as earlier described in the Chapter on Research 
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Methodology. A careful review of the responses demonstrated no problems and 
so it was decided to go ahead. A post-doctoral professor in Psychology, who is an 
authority on research in Pakistan, was asked for her opinion and she found it 
suitable for use. Small notes were added to explain the meaning of a few terms on 
the questionnaire itself.  
 In my study, I carried out pre-tests in both Control and Experimental Groups 
as I was sure that a prior experience of the questionnaire would give an advantage 
to the respondents and become a possible alternative explanation. Besides this, 
in each study, I maintained both Control and Experimental Groups because there 
would be differences such as language skill, familiarity with training, school ethos, 
etcetera, that could account for the effect. 
 The teachers participating in the studies had not received any treatment to 
change their concepts about knowledge in history previously. The treatment was 
thus at two levels. On the one level, observations could be made about being better 
prepared to teach the developments in history curricula. A form of knowledge and 
skill addition was the intervention at this level. The manipulation was the steps 
taken to enhance a perception of agency in the Experimental Group alone. This 
was in terms of words spoken and steps taken to encourage disagreement, 
challenge to the teacher’s perspective as well as that of the group. Encouragement 
to explore one's own prior understanding within group talk was less well 
understood as teachers were not used to the idea and would require a different 
kind of training. This is further explained in the analysis. 
In my experiment, as explained earlier, I was the tutor for both Experimental 
and Control Groups in all cases. I was the one who implemented the treatment 
and withheld it in Control Groups. This had advantages in the sense that I knew 
the treatment and the centrality of the approach in classroom practice. I could carry 
out the steps designed by me and follow the procedure as planned as well as vary 
my approach. There were disadvantages. The obvious issue of bias is one that 
can only be dealt with statistically, if at all. This was unavoidable as described 
earlier; however, the threat of bias is real and has to be accounted for. 
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3.34 Variables in the Treatment 
 
3.34.1 Slip Between Intention and Action in Classroom Practice 
 
A slip between intention and action in classroom practice is possible as 
years of teacher education and classroom observation as well as much theory has 
taught me the difference between teacher intention and action, and teacher 
intention and student perception. How often teacher instructions fail to be heard, 
understood and followed, is known by all those who spend time in teacher 
observation. Perception games are part of teacher education's bag of tricks. I do 
not assume that the group of 20 or so adult teacher participants perceived the 
same message equally and it made the same impact on them in every one of the 
six groups. However, having said that, research in the social sciences has to be 
conducted in the conditions that exist. That is also the only way research can have 
validity. If I were to tell my teachers I had conducted this experiment rigorously, in 
a laboratory, and these were my findings, they would say alright now do it here in 
a class of 15 year old boys and a curriculum for examination. 
Unlike medical research, where implementation requires unobserved 
actions by recipients, who are out of the researcher’s control, this was in a sense, 
easier because I was myself the person implementing the treatment. In a follow up 
research, I would recommend that student logs be instituted to observe if the 
treatment has been similarly perceived. I would also suggest a video of a 
presentation be added for Experimental Groups to ensure that main features are 
communicated and this can be better defended. I would also suggest that there 
should be checkup points for the person implementing the treatment to self-monitor 
the process as it unfolds. 
My experience of years of teaching and teacher education, and my own 
observations during the programme of research tells me that they did perceive the 
agency. What they thought was this was my style. The way I challenged them to 
think on their own and contradict or differ with me or their group, did on the whole, 
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make an impact. The feedback session is good data on this. Snippets of the audio 
record of the sessions also points in this direction. 
I tried to institute observation for the sessions but the observer I had asked 
did not show up on the second day of the workshops. I had other occasional 
observers from the schools who attended some random sessions but they could 
not be told what the treatment was as this was a planned deception. Observers 
normally take notes on school observation formats they are familiar with and a 
perception of agency not being one of the items on these formats, one observer I 
had requested, did not record or communicate anything. The random observers 
did not sit through complete sessions and certainly did not sit in both Control and 
Experimental Groups. 
I had no one but myself to monitor my actions and record anything. The 
audio records were not continuous as electricity is not continuous in Pakistan. 
Technical hitches, sound variance affected the record but in spite of this, I can say 
I did make the required statements, and did persist in the planned approach. How 
many student teachers heard, recorded, and developed the perception, was not 
recorded or measured. 
Having said this, I can say that there was a perceptible difference in the 
classroom environment between Control and Experimental Groups and I have data 
that pointed to this. The feedback session was the most useful source for such a 
claim. The transcript of the audio record can support this. 
Shadish et al. (2002) cite a well-known maxim, co-relation does not prove 
causation. They explain that this is so because we may not know which variable 
came first nor whether alternative explanations for the cause exist. They add that 
co-relations also do little to rule out alternative explanations for a relationship 
between two variables, Shadish et al. (2002, p.7) 
Quasi Experiments are Quasi Scientific conducted in field settings and not 
laboratories. In educational experiments, the field setting can have a classroom 
with students, teaching practice and normal testing conditions that has little to 
distinguish it from normal practice. Indeed, as many concessions are made to 
human subjects and environments, causal inference is tentative. I did explicate all 
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possible threats to inference and design ways to deal with them but it was difficult 
to know if this was an exhaustive list. Collecting data to rule out effects is 
problematic at best. I have made efforts to counter threats in design as described. 
I have also used mixed methods. I thought that a good description 
supported by evidence could be built with both quantitative and qualitative data 
complementing or even arguing with each other. Thus the need to use both 
approaches seemed both natural and necessary. 
The classroom experiment, or rather the series of experiments, provided 
valuable contexts to study the miracle of changing concepts. The tests themselves 
have descriptive potential and the field data provides rich description to talk about 
the change and how it took place. At the outset I wondered if, as Meehl (1990) 
argues, this is one example of an interesting and important idea that is really 
untestable. I decided that I would reduce it to practical situations and processes in 
order to test it in my own practice. I have not tried to prove or falsify the theory, just 
learn enough to build a hypothesis for future research into conceptual change. I 
may not succeed in this instance but it would be worth doing anyway. By quoting 
Meehl, I demonstrate my awareness of the problems of testing theories in the 
social sciences. As a teacher researching my own practice with quasi experimental 
methods, I hope to claim I have enough evidence to argue that this interesting 
intervention may have made a difference to the learning and can possibly be 
researched. 
This Section of the Chapter on Research Methodology discusses the quasi 
experiments in the light of theoretical arguments. Transparency in description is 
vital as the alternative hypothesis is seen as being supported with the findings in 
this research. The findings are otherwise reasonably reliable and effect sizes 
suggest a moderate support to the hypothesis. More detailed knowledge of how 
the research was conducted in the field will enhance the interpretation. An 
organizational feature is used in this essay for easy reading. References are made 
to theoretical arguments and each is discussed according to how this threat was 
addressed in the limitations of the context. By focusing on an explication of threats 
and describing how threats were dealt with in my research context is useful to 
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interpret findings. As a practitioner in the field, I can thus demonstrate how far 
threats to reliability can be countered in real terms.  
 
3.35 The Measures 
 
This educational research is planned as a series of experiments in the field 
with the use of mixed methods in data collection and analysis. I needed to select 
appropriate instruments that could measure the same construct in different but 
compatible ways to obtain as reliable and valid an assessment as possible. This 
Section discusses the Measures with some reference to theory as well as practical 
constraints and opportunities. The qualitative measure is a set of open ended 
questions called the Boscolo and Mason (2001) questions (Appendix-A3). Two, 
Likert Scales are used. One is the BLTHQ, Beliefs about Learning and Teaching 
history questionnaire (Appendix-A4) Maggioni et al. (2009a), and the EBI, 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (Appendix-A5), Schraw et al. (2002). Apart from these, 
data from a feedback session was audio recorded and field notes were made 
which are used to describe and discuss the proceedings as well as to illustrate the 
findings. 
 
3.35.1 A Measure of a Perception of Agency? 
 
In order to decide the measures to use, my first consideration was if a 
perception of agency, the independent variable, could be measured. It would have 
been convenient to measure the perception and co-relate the data with a measure 
of belief change. There are validated instruments available for self-esteem, self-
regulation, and locus of control. Psychological tests, e.g. Levenson’s Locus of 
control scale; Sherwood’s Self Concept, were studied for this purpose. An 
instrument called the CAMI38 measures agency, control and means-ends beliefs 
of children and adolescents in school settings. These are however, instruments to 
                                            
38 CAMI Control Agency and Means-ends Interview (Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes (1988)) 
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study individual qualities rather than the effect of environment or social context. 
My research does not focus on stable traits, beliefs or attitudes. 
I saw that an appropriate instrument to measure a perception of agency in 
a social context was not available readymade and developing a new one would 
have been time consuming. As time was a key factor in the change process, the 
research was designed to measure the change of concepts and not a perception 
of agency. 
For the ‘perception of agency’ as an intervention, I assume that the process 
of information-communication regarding individual agency has been effective to 
enhance the perception amongst participants in the Experimental Group. In the 
light of this deliberation, I considered that a pre-test, post-test, non-equivalent 
group design Cohen et al. (2007, p.283) was most suitable. Change in concepts 
would be measured and the perception of agency would remain the treatment and 
would not be measured. Qualitative data would be collected, if possible in a focus 
group session, seeking respondents’ views on the treatment. Field notes and audio 
records would enhance a qualitative description. 
 
3.35.2 Questions to Consider in Instrument Selection 
 
Recognising that there are numerous instruments on offer to study 
epistemic beliefs, Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001, p.421) suggest 4 questions 
to consider in selecting an instrument. These are: consideration of theory, (e.g. do 
instruments measure beliefs as multi or unidimensional); relevant epistemological 
dimensions, (e.g. justification); format, validity, and reliability. These questions 
were among those used to make a decision on measures to use. The 
questionnaire for qualitative data collection is called the Boscolo and Mason or BM 
Questions. The questions are adapted from those used by Boscolo and Mason 
(2001) Bozo, Morra and Pierimarchi, described by Mason in Mason (2002, p.328). 
Responses to these questions were assessed using the CBKH rubric.  
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3.35.2.1 The Open Ended Boscolo and Mason Questions: 
1. What is history? 
2. How do people who write history know about the past they write 
about? 
3. What problems can historians have when they try to understand what 
happened in the past? 
4. Is it possible to explain what happened in different ways?  
5. Why? 
6. If there are two different explanations, how is it possible to 
understand which is better? 
 
3.35.3 Some Considerations 
A pilot was conducted with the addition of historical context to the questions. 
The addition of historical context was found unsuitable and the instrument was 
returned to its original form. It was understood that the questions had possibilities 
of yielding rich data, cause respondents to think and provide information that could 
help to interpret the data from the Likert Scales.  
 
3.35.4 Measure of Beliefs about Knowledge in History 
 
The BLTHQ was planned as a measure of beliefs about knowledge in 
history. The EBI was suitable for triangulation with this as the BLTHQ also explores 
beliefs about learning and teaching and has a Likert Scale format. The BLTHQ 
tests domain specific beliefs about history and has been through a validation study 
by Maggioni et al. (2009a) with mixed results. Maggioni et al interpreted the results 
of the confirmatory factor analysis as supportive of the BLTHQ with the theoretical 
framework and thus an initial indication of its validity (Maggioni et al. (2009a, 
p.205). They also report however, that a low number of items and relatively low 
reliability of the scale indicate that it is still a rough measure. A second version of 
the scale, the Beliefs about History Questionnaire, BAQ, is described in another 
study by Maggioni et al. (2009b). The BLTHQ was considered suitable. 
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3.35.5 The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
 
Two direct, self-report measures of epistemic beliefs were selected. One of 
these is the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory, EBI (Schraw et al. (2002, p.261). The EBI 
measures domain general epistemic beliefs from a multi-dimensional beliefs 
perspective. These are stated as beliefs about Certain Knowledge, Simple 
Knowledge, Quick Learning, Omniscient Authority, and Innate Ability by Schraw et 
al. (2002, p.263). The EBI is a development from the CLEV, and the EQ. The CLEV 
formed the basis of the development by Schommer-Aikens (1990), of the 
Epistemological Questionnaire, the EQ. In a comparison study of the EQ and EBI, 
(Schraw et al. (2002, p.271) conclude that the EBI had better predictive validity 
when co-related with a test of reading reliability as well as test-retest reliability than 
the EQ even though criterion validity remained poor (Schraw et al. (2002, p.272). 
Findings indicated that the EBI yielded 5 hypothesized factors described earlier. 
Compared to the EQ, the EBI explained substantially more sample variation than 
the 5 primary factors on the EQ although neither instrument produced factors that 
were highly reliable. 
Hofer (2002) developed an instrument called the ‘Epistemological Beliefs 
Questionnaire’, EBQ, finding a 4 factor frame work: Certainty of Knowledge, 
Source of Knowledge, Justification, and Attainment of Truth. Schraw and Olafson 
(2008, p.28) find that the EQ, EBI and EBQ explained approximately 45% of the 
sample variance, a mixed success. Schraw and Olafson (2008, p.29) express 
concern regarding current instruments. They find that existing self-report 
instruments have not agreed upon what should be and can be measured, show 
low predictive validity between epistemological factors and various outcome 
variables. They say the instruments measure narrow epistemic beliefs rather than 
holistic world views, the focus is exclusively on epistemological worldviews without 
considering ontological world views. They propose a new instrument ‘The Four 
Quadrant Scale’ (Schraw and Olafson (2008). I piloted this instrument in a sample 
of teachers and again it was seen to have for teachers, a strong indication of 
socially desirable positions. Teachers of O’ Level Science, who had never 
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experienced questions of philosophy, were seen to choose the epistemological, 
ontological relativist positions. This could be due to the questions being similar in 
tone and content to the school’s classroom teaching manual instructions with items 
such as ‘students need to be involved in learning through discussions, projects 
and presentations’ and ‘students work together in small groups to complete 
assignments as a team’. It is a very good instrument but adaptation would enhance 
the questionnaires predictive potential. 
As pen and pencil measures are still developing, generally, 45% validity is 
cited Schraw and Olafson (2008). The choice of the EBI was made as it is among 
the most used instruments. There was reasonable evidence of reliability and 
validity found in the study by Schraw et al. (2002). The Likert Scale, although of a 
5 point, did provide continuous data. The instrument was easy to score and 
administer and did not require certified people to score it. More importantly, as 
there is knowledge of its use in various studies around the world, this can be useful 
in assessing the quality of the data that emerges in Pakistan. There are 32 items 
as compared to 63 items in the EQ making it more manageable and less tiresome 
to participants unused to doing questionnaires especially ones that ask odd 
questions about truth. A pilot was conducted; however, the smallness of the 
sample, 35 respondents, did not yield conclusive data against the EBI in the Factor 
Analysis. Therefore, it was decided to go ahead. 
 
3.36  The CBKH Category Scale 
 
3.36.1 Introduction to the Proposed Scoring Rubric: Categories of Beliefs 
about Knowledge in History the CBKH 
 
This Section briefly outlines developments and arguments that are 
discussed in the Chapter and presents the rubric, the CBKH i.e. Categories of 
Beliefs about Knowledge in history. The two main versions are produced here to 
describe the development and are useful alternatives in their own right. One is a 
weighted scale and the other is without weights. The 7 Categories are listed and 
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the elements that make up each Category are defined. Excerpts from the 
responses to the Boscolo and Mason questions are also arranged in a table to 
serve as exemplars for use of the scale. These exemplars are useful for a 
consistent assessment and to understand the differences in responses according 
to the Categories.  
The rubric developed in stages of trial and error. Repeated assessments of 
the data were made with each developed version and reliability of marking was 
assessed in several attempts. This process informed the modification and 
development of the Category Scale. Reviewing the literature and discussions with 
Liliana Maggioni raised the level of the analysis and reflection on the model. The 
CBKH was finalized after Inter Rater and Internal Evaluations, provided a 
reasonably consistent, therefore satisfactory assessment of responses to the BM 
questions using the Scale.39 
This Section of the Chapter on measures is followed by a Section with a 
discussion on the literature in the domain of epistemic beliefs to provide a 
background and rationale for the development of the model. The Section also 
contains arguments with the current definitions of the categories and rationale to 
unravel and simplify the levels for use in a less than expert population of history 
teachers. It is important to note here that the CBKH is a model, one of many, and 
there is not enough known or agreed upon about epistemic concepts to conclude 
that this is the most appropriate order or definition of categories. Maggioni reflects 
(in mail)40 that there can be questions if a Subjectivist is more sophisticated than 
an Objectivist. This is an interesting argument and may have people aligned with 
either position especially when raised in the light of the paradigmatic debates. For 
the purpose of order in the scale, I argue in practical terms that the Subjectivist 
must come after the Objectivist on the scale because it is only after the epistemic 
                                            
39 It is important to consider the problem of convergence of meaning that may exist in a review of 
epistemic concepts. The activity involves interaction between the reviewers own concepts about 
knowledge, the range of concepts evidenced in the data, and the particular construct of epistemic 
beliefs that underpin the scale in use. Suffice to say that this is complex and requires more words 
than my document permits. 
40 Maggioni, L. (2013), CBKH (personal communication) 
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awareness of the knower can one appreciate the use of the methods of history to 
resolve the problem of subjective knowing. I have described a naive and 
sophisticated position for each category depending upon the integration of the 
elements. Thus, there is an element of zigzag seen in development of 
sophisticated beliefs. 
A key development in the CBKH is the unraveling of elements of belief about 
knowledge in history as the Known, the Knower, and Ways of Knowing. This was 
seen as necessary as there is incongruence seen in the development of 
awareness of the known and the knower with the development of knowledge and 
skill in the use of heuristics used to evaluate sources and accounts in history. 
 
3.36.2 Selecting the Instrument of Data Collection 
 
In selecting an instrument, Duell & Schomer-Aiken further suggest that 
apart from issues of validity, reliability, etcetera it is important to consider the 
underlying theory. Questions to ask are: do I believe the theory, does the 
instrument truly assess the theory, how does this relate to my research questions 
Duell and Schommer-Aikins (2001). The instruments I selected were suitable as 
described as they assess epistemic beliefs, can be used for a pre-test and post-
test measurement of change, and there is some variance in the construct 
measured to provide a broader picture. I do consider that the measures are sound 
theoretically and do assess the theory largely. Epistemic beliefs are difficult to 
conceptualise and more research will help to develop these. As pre-test and post-
test measures of belief change, they have been useful. Patterns have emerged 
that could be interpreted although the BLTHQ and EBI would benefit by 
development. 
While truth claims about epistemic beliefs are necessarily tentative, there is 
enough data in 3 measures over 166 response sheets equaling 498 
measurements to give confidence in the measurement. 
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3.36.3 Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History (CBKH) 
 
Progression Models of beliefs about history require careful planning to 
develop as Lee (2005, p.164) points out. The CBKH rubric was born from necessity 
to reliably assess a large number of responses. It is built upon arguments and 
insight in the literature, online discussions with Maggioni, patterns seen in the data, 
as well as what I learnt from teachers as they discussed their own and their pupils 
concerns in the course of teaching and learning history. The online discussions 
with Maggioni on epistemic issues were a significant resource and are cited in 
these pages. The CBKH is a modification and development from the original model 
of epistemic beliefs in history, the Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist developed by 
Maggioni et al. (2009a). The CBKH, Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in 
History, is a set of 7 categories of epistemic beliefs pertaining to the domain of 
history used as a rubric to assess epistemic beliefs as read in responses. The 
CBKH was developed for the purpose of assessing responses to the Boscolo and 
Mason questions in my study. The development was an unplanned project that 
became necessary due to the difficulty of consistent assessment of 166 response 
sheets with complex epistemic statements. Developing descriptions and bringing 
order to layers of complexity is not an easy task neither can it ever be said to be 
entirely satisfactory. Necessity is the mother of invention and therefore, this scale 
was developed for use in this research. The support of Liliana Maggioni at this time 
was invaluable. 
Epistemic beliefs have a complex nature and as Pintrich (2002) argues, 
there are diverse views about the nature of personal epistemologies and the role 
they play in learning and development. Epistemic beliefs are believed to be either 
domain general or domain specific (Hofer (2002, p.11). In the case of history, 
beliefs about knowledge in history are seen as specifically relating to or having 
what Rogers (1978, p.7) calls ‘a symbiotic relationship’ with, or underpinned by, 
practices of knowledge development by professional historians and the evaluation 
of history accounts by readers or users of history. Ashby cites Rogers (1978) to 
argue that only ‘knowing how’ ‘can give the right to be sure’ because it is the only 
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valid base for claims to ‘know that’. There is a requirement to differentiate between 
responses from pre-test to post-test according to the general level of standards of 
epistemic beliefs observable within that sample. This particular rubric has been 
developed for the specific purpose of assessment of history related epistemic 
beliefs of teachers as users of history. The context of this research is Pakistan and 
the sample is of O' Level history teachers in Pakistan. The Category definitions are 
here adjusted to the sample of teachers of history rather than to professional 
historians or expert users of history. The examples included for the Categories are 
therefore, from this sample. 
I must point out that in most studies, the level of this expertise and the 
attendant concepts about knowledge are seen as low in novices although 
interventions are seen as making a difference. Wineburg (1991), VanSledright 
(2002), Maggioni et al. (2004), Maggioni et al. (2009a) Educational research 
focuses on the development of beliefs amongst children and teachers and these 
groups do not generally belong to the level of experts in historiography. Unraveling 
slightly, as I have done, the levels of expertise and their relationship to a theoretical 
standard of naive or sophisticated belief may help differentiate between such 
samples with more relevance. 
The research uses a quasi-experimental methodology. The data and the 
scale were required to reliably assess epistemic stances of participants at pre-test 
and post-test in order to identify and describe change as a result of the 
interventions. Assessment of responses to the set of open ended BM Questions is 
focused on sorting and ordering epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history that 
may underpin the responses of participants. The 6 BM questions were open 
ended, therefore responses varied in content, structure and form. A holistic reading 
across questions appeared to help recognise underpinning concepts to sort and 
order these. I carried out reading in repeated iterations in order to recognize 
familiar words and phrases and identify a possible stance but found that 
assessment was not easy or consistent. I realized that a category scale was 
essential for reliable assessment due to the large number of response sheets 
(166). 
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The CBKH is developed for specific purposes from the original model of the 
Copier, Borrower, Criterialist categories. These were first employed with 
suggested transitions designed by Maggioni et al. (2004) but changed and 
modified according to the differences in responses as observed in the data. A study 
of the literature and online discussions with Liliana Maggioni with reference to the 
original categories has informed the development and this is described in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
Grounding the categories was necessary to find a better fit. The sample was 
one of regular history teachers of O’ Level History in Pakistan. It was felt that the 
set of categories, while closely following theoretical perspectives, needed to 
differentiate between samples of non-expert users of history. Unraveling of the 
various elements of belief was also seen as necessary in order to make it possible 
to assess responses as consistently as possible. If there is incongruence in 
development of concept and skill, it can be identified with this unraveled rubric and 
a score awarded. Finally, and importantly, the concerns expressed by the sample 
of teachers of history regarding the history accounts they taught and that were 
experienced in the classroom by pupils, needed to be reflected in the Categories. 
These concerns also have some support in the literature and are relevant to school 
contexts of learning and teaching history.  
 
3.36.4 Qualitative Analysis of Responses 
 
Assessment of responses is qualitative. 6 Open ended questions in the BM 
questionnaire require repeated reading and holistic assessment to assign each 
respondent to a single category amongst the 7 categories of beliefs about 
knowledge in history. The sample fits into 6 Categories, therefore the 7th is seen 
as hypothetical and not included in the assessment. Each respondent is assigned 
one descriptor Category according to best fit of the descriptions in the Categories, 
CBKH. Scores are also assigned with the descriptor. These scores are assigned 
to describe fine differences between performances, to infer possible change in 
beliefs due to the intervention. The scores are used for a quantitative analysis of 
stance and change in stance from pre-test to post-test. 
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Pre-post-test Questionnaires are assessed separately. The complete 
sample after cleaning of data is a total of 83 respondents. Both Control and 
Experimental Group members are assessed and descriptors and scores assigned 
in the same manner. Thus, a Qualitative Descriptor plus Quantitative Score is 
assigned. Each response is placed in a descriptive category and a single 
summative numerical score is assigned after calculation. Weightage was originally 
seen as necessary as often the change is more a matter of degree of emphasis, 
numbers of references. This is a finer difference than a change in Category. The 
weighting was meant to help differentiate between responses. 
 
Note:  
The Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History, CBKH, are listed in 
Table 3.1 below. Tables 3.5-3.8 provide an initial version of the CBKH with 
weighted scores to show development; the final version of the CBKH; 
explain the categories with evidence and elements of the known, knower, 
way of knowing as these are unraveled for the rubric; provide a range in 
responses; and finally some exemplars from responses to the Boscolo and 
Mason questions.  
 
Table 3.1: The Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History –CBKH 
 
Categories Score 
Naive Objectivist 1 
Critical Objectivist 2 
Naive Subjectivist 3 
Critical Subjectivist 4 
Naive Criterialist 5 
Critical Criterialist 6 
Sophisticated Integrator 7 
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3.36.5 Category Scale Options with Weightage 
 
I planned and assessed responses to the weighted scale given below. 
However, Inter Rater Assessment suggested that weight increased the numbers 
of subjective decisions. This was then dropped to a single score on the basis of 
holistic assessment to the categories. This option is provided here. 
 
Table 3.2: Degrees of Pre- Post Change 
 
 Reduction 
No 
Change 
Weak 
Change 
Within 
Category 
Weak 
Change 
From 
Category 
Strong 
Change 
From 
Category 
Score -0.5 0 +0.5 1 1.5 
 
 
Table 3.3: Degree of Consistency in Responses 
 
 Conflicting Statements Some Consistency Consistency 
Score 0 1 2 
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Table 3.4: First Category Scale with Weighted Scores 
 
Serial 
no 
Categories Score Weightage 
Sum 
Score 
Degree of 
Change 
-
0.5;0;+0.5+1;+1.5 
Consistency 
Score 
0-1-2 
Final Score: Summation of 
Sum Score + Degree + 
Consistency 
1S Naive Objectivist 1 -0.5 0.5    
2S Critical Objectivist 1 +1 2    
3S Naive Subjectivist 2 -0.5 1.5    
4S Critical Subjectivist 2 +1 3    
5S Naive Criterialist 3 -0.5 2.5    
6S Critical Criterialist 3 +1 4    
7S 
Sophisticated 
Integrator 
4 +1 5 
   
 
Note:  
These were various options explored in the development of the Category Scale. These were discarded for the 
assessment as they tended to increase the numbers of subjective judgments making assessment less than consistent. 
They are presented for discussion only. 
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Table 3.5: The CBKH Categories and their Elements with Reference to Evidence in the Responses  
Elements of Belief Explanation Range in Responses 
Known 
 
The word 'known' refers to an 
awareness of what is it that is 
known. 
Belief in history may range 
between history as a true 
reflection of the past, or a 
construction of the historian, 
or an academic judgment 
developed on the basis of 
evidence and reason. 
 
The response demonstrates awareness of what is known.  
Responses range between: 
Considers what is known as objective knowledge of the past; 
continuous and complete knowledge; knowledge of the past as 
subjectively acquired; or an account developed from 
perspective to answer historical questions with the critical use 
of evidence employing key principles and heuristics.  
Responses to the Question, ‘what is history’ range from the 
isomorphic ‘the past’ and ‘reflections of the past’ to 
‘interpretation of the past’ or ‘study or investigation of the past‘. 
Focus on facts as knowledge of past to be organised/ 
memorized/presented. 
Maggioni et al. (2004, p.188). ‘perfect correspondence with the 
past and history’. References to history as ‘isomorphic with 
past’. 
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Elements of Belief Explanation Range in Responses 
Knower 
 
 
The knower refers to an 
awareness of the mediation 
of the writer historian in the 
interpretation/construction of 
the historical narrative. 
 
The range is relative to a 
belief in true knowledge in 
history as objectively 
acquired; to a sense that 
mediation makes all 
knowledge in history suspect; 
to awareness that knowledge 
in history is possible as a 
construction of the writer 
historian using disciplinary 
methods based on evidence 
and reason. 
 
The Response demonstrates awareness of the historian as 
mediating knowledge of the past; as user of methods of history 
to build an account or explanation.  
The Responses can range from: 
 The response shows a belief in history as 'falling from the 
sky' where the awareness of the historian is missing from 
the evaluation of the account. 
 A completely relativistic helplessness that knowledge in 
history is difficult or not possible; with complaints of bias 
and opinion. 
 An understanding of how history accounts are constructed 
by historians with careful, persistent inquiry, use of 
evidence and reason. 
The Knower implies: 
 Awareness of the knower in the construction of an account 
as a person with cultural, other, identity, perspective. 
 Reference to perspective, opinion, bias, position, 
interpretation, standpoint in responses. 
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Elements of Belief Explanation Range in Responses 
Ways of Knowing  'Ways of knowing' refers to an 
awareness/knowledge/skill in 
the methods or procedures of 
the historian such as 
investigation, the use of 
heuristics, in the 
development of a historical 
narrative.  
The Response demonstrates knowledge and skill of the 
processes of knowing history. 
Responses range from weak to growing, to expert knowledge 
of method. From one who considers truth to be a property of 
the source thus refers to true sources/false evidence; to 
reference to research, inquiry, vague/broad use of evidence 
and source to choose between explanations. At a higher level, 
responses show a range of knowledge and skill in the historical 
method along with an awareness of the constructed ‘tentative’, 
nature of knowledge in history. 
Reference to the following words will be looked for in the 
responses: 
Study, investigation, research, analysis, and particular 
heuristics used in the evaluation of sources in history. 
The respondent understands that the historian uses available 
sources to answer questions. This is a sophisticated 
awareness that source was not necessarily created to answer 
the historians questions in the future but can be used by the 
historian in a critical method to inquire into the past.  
At a higher level, awareness of using a pragmatic 
hermeneutics. VanSledright and Reddy (2014)  
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Elements of Belief Explanation Range in Responses 
Integration 
 
Integration of the objective 
and subjective components 
of knowing with way of 
knowing. 
Integration is seen to be an 
aspect of sophistication in 
belief where the three 
elements of knower, known, 
and ways of knowing, are 
integrated in the evaluation of 
an account. 
Knowledge in history is 
specific in laying down 
methods of acquiring 
knowledge in keeping with 
‘guild honed’ principles of 
historiography. 
Responses demonstrate no integration, some integration and 
integration of what is known with the mediating presence of the 
knower and the range of knowledge and skill. 
Refers to history as interpreted and the heuristics used to 
obtain more reliable accounts or to select between 
explanations. Refers to the nature of historical knowledge as 
based on the examination of evidence and argument. 
Attribution is seen as key by Wineburg (1991, p.83). 
The historian’s presence is acknowledged in the construction 
of an account with the use of available resources and the 
historical process. 
The evidence is recognized as discontinuous, fragmentary, 
and not made-for-historical judgment but for a purpose of the 
time. 
As VanSledright et al. (2006, p.225) explains, history is an 
interpretive reduction. ‘It is necessarily tentative, unstable, and 
less than the past.’ 
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Table 3.6: The CBKH Categories and their Elements with Reference to Evidence in the Responses 
 
Categories Evidence in Responses 
Naive Objectivist 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
Refers to history as ‘the past’ ‘reflection of the past’, referential illusion not recognized 
as such. 
What is known is either true/untrue on the basis of facts. An objectivist position that 
does not question how an account is developed and the role of the knower. 
Focus on facts as knowledge of the past to be organized/memorized/presented. 
 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
No reference to historian as conduit to the past. 
History as ‘authorless’. 
No reference to history as constructed from standpoint or perspective. 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
None or weak reference to method/evidence/source. 
No integration of knower and known. 
 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
No integration with Knower, Way of Knowing 
Knower, Way of Knowing, absent from concept of what is known. 
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Categories Evidence in Responses  
Critical Objectivist  
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
History as story of 'the past' or ‘knowledge of past’.  
Reference to facts and truth, reality. 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
Historian as scribe, faithful conduit of past. 
Brief reference to knower in the sense of beginning reference to opinion or perspective. 
Beginning concerns about source.  
Evidence as missing, hard to get. 
Sources as direct testimony. 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
Accumulation of facts and evidence.  
Some use of words like ‘look for, analysis, research’. 
 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
Beginning integration of knower with known as seen in reference to some words such 
as eyewitness, opinion, bias. 
 
Naive Subjectivist 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
Doubts about history as possible. Transition to doubt objectivity as adequate to knowing 
and refers to/ask questions about the knower. 
History as personal opinion, story, narrative. 
Statements about true or false evidence. 
Correct or incorrect knowledge. 
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Categories  Evidence in Responses  
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
Refers to historian. 
Aware of historian as human, mediating knowledge of the past from standpoint or 
perspective. 
Refers to the subjectivity of the historian as making a credible account impossible. 
Doubts about bias and opinion. 
Refers to personal opinion, views, perspective, and interpretation. 
References to nationality, religious perspective, personal opinion, own viewpoint or way 
of thinking. 
 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
No reference to method as means to choose between different explanations. 
Aware of missing sources or sources hard to find. Refers to things unknown in history. 
Words like difficult, impossible to refer to decide between conflicting accounts or 
knowledge in history.  
No way of knowing the difference between accounts.  
History is seen as difficult. No way of knowing the difference between accounts. 
History is a matter of personal choice. 
None or little integration of knower, known, way of knowing. 
Link between evidence and source not understood as the action of the historian, the 
use of skill and knowledge of method to obtain evidence from the source in response to 
the question. 
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Categories Evidence in Responses 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
No integration of method with knowing to overcome subjectivity. 
Increased focus on knower. 
Choice between conflicting accounts is seen as difficult, or not possible. 
 
Critical Subjectivist 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
History still as difficult to know due to difference in views and perspective but some 
beginning reference to method.  
 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
Refers to historian/reader ‘recognizes constructed nature of knowledge but the historical 
method is not deemed an effective tool to deal with problems of conflicting or missing 
evidence’, Maggioni et al. (2004, p.188).  
Refers to subjectivity and difficulty in selecting between explanations. 
 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
Beginning awareness of method. 
Some general, vague reference to research, analysis, finding out. Beginning reference 
to some method to resolve the issue. 
 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
Beginning of integration. 
Weak reference to method but without the use of words such as by or through, 
displaying a belief in method providing a way to judge between different explanations. 
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Categories Evidence in Responses 
 
Naive Criterialist 
 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
History as possible despite difficulty and/or positionality. 
Confidence in account. May not refer to problems of account as constructed from 
perspective or position.  
History as product of research, investigation. 
 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
Refers to knower as historian, researcher, or scientist. 
Subjectivity may be overcome with use of evidence and argument. 
Standpoint or position of historian may not be questioned. Method alone may be seen 
as adequate to justify account.  
 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
Refers to method. 
Reverts to/Recognises the effective use of method to overcome the problem of 
subjective knowing. Refers to analysis of reliability and authenticity in reference to 
source. 
Includes some direct reference to heuristics used in judgment between explanations in 
history. 
Some reference to context. 
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Categories Evidence in Responses 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
No acknowledged integration of subjective and objective dimensions of knowing. 
More informed reference to research/evidence/source/heuristics that may help to 
evaluate an account. 
History account makes little or no reference to historian or to perspective or standpoint. 
No reference to knowledge as tentative or historians personal point of view. No 
discussion on opposing views. 
 
 
Critical Criterialist 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
What is known is a product of research and historical inquiry. A product of judgment 
based on evidence and argument. The subjective presence of the historian in the 
construction of the account may be referred to. 
 
 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
Reverts to some awareness of the historian as knower, conduit to the past. May 
recognise the constructed nature of the historical account and the historian as user of 
processes of history. 
May refer to interpretation and perspective again. 
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Categories  Evidence in Responses 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
Importance given to knowledge and skill in use of heuristics. Refers to heuristics but not 
necessarily with complete expertise. Several informed reference to heuristics in making 
an account reliable than as Naive Criterialist.  
Refers to the purpose for which the source was created. May refer to the questions asked 
by the historian of the evidence. 
More reference to reliability, authenticity*, (Authenticity is a commonly used term 
amongst teachers in Pakistan for some reason. I understand that authenticity may not 
imply reliability in the respondents language use and may refer more to truth and reality 
as in the ‘real’ artifact. 
Refers to use of source as evidence. Use of source to answer questions the source was 
not created to answer not directly seen in my data. 
‘Aware of disciplinary tools to transform primary sources into evidence’ Maggioni et al. 
(2009a, p.194)  
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
Integration of knower and known underpins the view of knowledge. 
What is known can be an integration of method with the subjective presence of the 
historian and the philosophy of the historian. Aware of presence of historical investigator 
who can ask questions that sources were not specifically designed to answer. Lee and 
Shemilt (2003) (Weak evidence in my data to this) 
Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.195) Ability of historical thinkers to use the disciplinary tools 
and criteria for historical inquiry and to focus on a multiplicity of particulars without losing 
the capacity to perceive a broader view. 
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Note:  
The Sophisticated Integrator stance is hypothetical, not counted in analysis. 
No participant amongst my respondents was seen as fitting at this level mainly due to a weak knowledge of heuristics 
although integration is evident in places. References to the acknowledged presence of the historian was brought up and 
debated quite often in the workshops by the participants but perhaps the questionnaire does not provide a slot to add 
that element. There is evidence of this in the video records and field notes. The key drawback is a lower level of 
knowledge and skill in the evaluation of accounts using the methods of history. 
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Table 3.7: ‘Sophisticated Integrator’ of the Subjective and Objective Dimensions of Knowing 
Category Evidence in Responses 
Sophisticated Integrator 
Evidence in responses 
to the Knower 
Recognises the historian as scientist and mediator, subjective, human, conduit of the 
past. 
Historian with cultural baggage, personal theories, and member of community of 
scholars. 
Possessing expert skill and knowledge of method. 
Questions the lack of an acknowledged presence of the historian in the text, 
VanSledright (2014). 
Evidence in responses 
to the Known 
Recognises history as an authored narrative, as tentative judgment, constructed from 
traces, discontinuous fragments, residua, relics, of the past.  
Recognises/refers to the interpretive, constructed, nature of historical knowledge. 
Recognises/refers to the tentative nature of historical knowledge. 
Recognises/refers to/questions, the acknowledged role and presence of the subject in 
constructing an account. 
Recognises the history account as best explanation under the circumstances of weak, 
conflicting evidence, and gaps in evidence. 
Recognises the history account as developing and open to challenge, change and 
evolution. 
 
 
 185 
 
Category Evidence in Responses 
Evidence in responses 
to Ways of Knowing 
Sophisticated integration of known, knower, way of knowing. 
History as constructed through careful, transparent, process and coherence with body 
of work, in acknowledgement of subjectivity of the historian. 
Use of method with knowledge and skill. Has knowledge, skill and belief in the historical 
method. 
Recognises the role of questions in evaluating a source. Can evaluate an account on 
the basis of question. 
Can identify/use key heuristics for evaluating a source to find evidence. 
Deep understanding of context. Use of empathy. 
‘the search for the best explanation through the patient weaving together of the best 
evidence and the best argument available.’ Maggioni et al. (2004, p.187)  
Pragmatic heuristics see VanSledright and Reddy (2014, p.187). 
Pragmatic or other transparent, open lens or epistemology. 
Evidence in responses 
of Integration 
Integration of subject and object with the way of knowing as medium of integration. 
Accounts are referenced and personal theories of historian are stated and open to 
argument. 
Makes transparent, or requires transparency of the role of the author in constructing an 
account. 
Is critical of missing authors and the referential illusion. 
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3.36.6 Selection of a Range of Responses for Each Question 
 The range of response excerpts is ordered here broadly according to Category levels. The integration of the objective 
and subjective dimensions is a criterion for differentiating between responses. From a stance of knowledge as objective truth to 
an awareness of the subjective presence of the historian to a greater integration of the use of evidence and method with 
reference to the mediation and positionality of the knower is the general order. Nuances of meaning in the responses make 
clear ordering difficult but interesting. The score is awarded in a holistic reading of responses to all 6 questions. A response to 
a single question is not adequate for judgment into a separate category. 
(The Exemplars are edited for grammar or sentence structure unless meaning was affected.) 
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Table 3.8: Exemplars from Responses to Boscolo and Mason Questions 
 
Question Evidence in Responses 
Question 1 
What is history? 
 
 
The past.  
Reflection of the past. 
History is what had happened in past. 
Events of the past, which can sometime effect our present and future. 
Story of past. 
An interesting story that connects a person’s present with past. 
Historian’s interpretation of past events. 
Study of Past. 
Insight of past. 
It is method of obtaining truth, opinion and find out the causes of the event and fact through effect. 
History is the interpretation of past events based on valid evidence. 
Question 2 
How do people who 
write history know 
about the past they 
write about? 
 
Books and Journals, newspapers, internet, films, study previous books, reading resources. These 
responses indicate a teacher-focus rather than one referring to sources of knowledge. 
References to sources as objects 
Collect facts,  
In light of facts and figures. 
By collecting information. 
By collecting data. 
Eyewitnesses, past experiences, listening to stories, detailed accounts, biographies. 
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Question Evidence in Responses 
 Historical buildings, official documents, theories and manuscripts, chronicles, poetry, painting, 
excavations. 
Archeological sites, primary, secondary sources. 
Different resources, pottery, ceramics, currency, word of mouth. 
Through evidences provided, through sources. 
References to process. 
By checking, doing research, investigating. 
Through different sources i.e. gathering data, interpreting information, collecting evidences. 
By feeling into the past. 
Evidence of integration. 
Collect evidence along with personal opinion. 
Constructing. 
By deciding which is best depending on the reliability of the source. 
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Question Evidence in Responses 
Question 3 
What problems can 
historians have when 
they try to understand 
what happened in the 
past? 
 
Fabrication. 
Lies. 
Bias. 
Definition of right or wrong is different. 
Sources are not authentic. 
Reference to problems of sources and methods. 
Sources can be biased. 
Misrepresentation of facts, distortion of facts. 
Unreliability of sources. Sources are false, true, or untrue. 
Problem is only of finding and collecting data. 
Has to totally depend on sources. 
Lack of right evidences. 
Evidence is missing, hard to get. 
Adopting methodologies which are not cost effective or time effective. 
Contradictions in data. Contradicting sources provided by different people. Contradictory accounts. 
Contradiction in research of the past, official reports. 
References to historian and perspective. 
All sources may be to present a certain view. 
Authenticity of sources, perception of author. 
Facts will remain facts but stories can be interpreted in different ways. 
Weak sources, incomplete knowledge, a historians cultural baggage, 
Interpreted wrong or a one side picture is shown. 
Each historian has different outlook. 
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Question Evidence in Responses 
 People look at the event from different views. They have their own interpretation and opinion about 
the events.  
To judge between accounts. 
To find a peculiar truth. 
 
Question 4 
Is it possible to explain 
what happened in 
different ways? 
 
In most responses the answer was a Yes. Some elaboration was provided. 
Question 5 
Why? 
Often not responded to. Some sheets say ‘already answered’. 
 
Question 6 
If there are two different 
explanations, how is it 
possible to understand 
which is better? 
Responses indicating helplessness in the face of conflict or difficulty in access to evidence. 
Can’t think of an answer. 
Difficult to answer. 
Beginning of integration. 
Difficult to prove but yes can be possible by gathering facts and the dates and the events. 
References to subjective judgment as basis of choice between accounts. 
The one you feel according to the situation is better. 
People have different perspectives. 
Explanation near to your way of thinking. 
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Question Evidence in Responses 
 The explanation which is authentic and closer to our personal opinion. 
That depends upon the person’s ability, mode of judgment. 
By studying all available interpretations and evaluating which is better. 
Search for disinterested sources. 
References to method, heuristics as ways to decide between explanations. 
Different way of analysing. 
Through using different sources, then analyzing to check its authenticity. 
Whichever justifies with evidence and proves it with some kind of source will be a better answer. 
Investigate reliable evidence. 
How good the source is for those explanations. 
Through various primary and secondary sources. 
Through finding a number of different resources that are reliable. 
Number of sources and evidence. 
Evidence is like fish on a fish mongers slab. Some are rejected, others are kept. 
Better one is followed by the primary resources, reliable evidence, or authenticity. 
Because the sources may be provided for different purposes e.g. official documents or to guide the 
people to the actual situation. 
The number of evidences must be considered for a certain view. It also matters who writes the view 
whether the explanation is written by the person who was a part of the event or had influence. So 
evidence alone can be helpful. 
Historian acts as lawyer to present interpretation and judge to check validity. 
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Question Evidence in Responses 
 Because history is my perspective in the light of certain reliable sources which still satisfy my set 
of ideas and requirements. 
How valid is it? 
Who wrote and why he wrote! 
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3.37 Validation of Assessment 
 
3.37.1 Assessment of Reliability of Marking of Responses to the Boscolo 
and Mason Questions 
 
The Boscolo and Mason questions are open ended and the narrative 
responses are open to interpretation. The large number of response sheets (166), 
required a rubric for consistent and reliable assessment. The CBKH was 
developed and is described in the Chapter on Research Methodology and argued 
on the basis of theory in the literature review. 
I marked sheets myself and checked corresponding scores in early marking 
and calculated the reliability of assessment. In order to make the process rigorous, 
I developed the rubric, the CBKH. This was a time consuming process taking newly 
two years and was supported by Dr Maggioni as described. With each assessment 
of responses to the developing rubric, I revised the categories and identified 
exemplars to improve the assessment. These revisions are provided in the 
document in Section 3.1 onwards. I had, for example, tried weighting the scale but 
realised this added to numbers of subjective decisions and therefore, changed the 
framework.  
A rigorous process of first, Inter Rater Assessment, followed by Internal 
Evaluation, was conducted. The process informed the development of the CBKH 
as well as assumptions of reliability of the assessment. It is concluded that rating 
of responses requires trained raters with the requisite knowledge and skills. A 
sound grounding in the principles and methods of history as well as sophisticated 
awareness of epistemic beliefs in history would be necessary for reliable 
assessment of epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history even when using the 
CBKH Categories. 
The Internal Evaluation was conducted used blind marking after obtaining 
numbers generated by a Random Number Generator from the complete set of 166 
response sheets. Internal evaluation was conducted three times with improved 
consistency. These results are reported in detail in Tables at Appendix A7 (A7-1, 
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A7-2, A7-3 and A7-4). Summarized results of Table A7-4 are also reproduced 
below. 
  
Table A7-4: Comparison of Three Internal Evaluations 
 
Internal Evaluation Percentage of Match Percentage of Mismatch 
1st Internal Evaluation 65% 35% 
2nd Internal Evaluation 53% 47% 
3rd Internal Evaluation 82% 17% 
 
The improved categories and the use of exemplars made assessment more 
reliable as Table A7-4 shows. 82% reliability was taken as adequate considering 
the nature of the construct of epistemic beliefs.
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3.37.2 Inter Rater Agreement for Validation of Category Table Inter Rater 
Exercise 
 
To test The Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History as a rubric to 
assess and order epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history: 
To test reliability of assessment of responses through an inter rater 
agreement exercise. 
 
3.37.3 The Raters 
 
In order to find raters for this rather specific and somewhat challenging 
rating, I visited the History Department in a University in Pakistan. The only people 
available were 3 students of M Phil History. One had completed his study, one was 
in a research phase and the third was still completing course work. 
Upon discussion and trial, I realized that their knowledge of the historical 
methods and principles of history did not match the requirement. Therefore, I 
undertook to train them over 4 sessions. This is described under Process. 
 
3.37.4 Selecting a Sample for Inter Rater Analysis 
 
A sample of responses was selected for Inter Rater Analysis. A simple 
random sample developed using a Google based programme, 'Random Number 
Generator', was employed to select a sample for Inter Rater Analysis. 60 % of the 
total was worked out and the programme was set to generate the sample. 
Duplicate numbers were allowed. Response sheets were copied for Raters, and 
pre-test and post-test sheets were mixed and not identifiable. The number 51 was 
selected, as 60% of the total was selected for Inter Rater Agreement. 60% of 84 
was 50.4. This was rounded off to a whole number 51. 
I decided to use duplicate numbers, as the total, being small, and the 
number of Raters could carry out the assessment separately; duplication would 
add strength to the rating given. Each number would have an equal chance of 
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being selected. This would also help me see if raters marked the same script the 
same or differently. An issue was that all response sheets were not marked by the 
Raters. This was limited to the time the raters could give. In all, 4 sessions of 
training and discussion including moderation of samples were all that were 
possible. 
 
3.37.5 Process 
 
The Raters were first assessed for the concepts and skills required for the 
task. Next, they were trained. The Inter Rater exercise was held after training. I 
used the same history material of my workshops, to help build concepts, in order 
to keep contexts comparable. After the training, they marked some responses 
each, and discussions were held to compare scores. Raters were allowed to 
discuss and question each other. I, the researcher, participated in the sessions. 
There was free dialogue and argument which was productive in developing 
understanding. After the training, they were given a post-test. The results are 
provided later in this Chapter. 
On the 4th day, a revision session discussing the categories with examples 
was held again. This was followed by the final marking exercise using the 
complete, randomly selected sample. Copies of the sheets were distributed and 
the Raters marked these. They were given the Category Table in its original form 
plus a simplified version for ease in analysis. Data of marking was recorded on 
Excel and a comparison was made. I sat in the session and discussed any sheet 
they wished to talk about. 
 
3.37.6 Tasks for Raters 
 
 Read responses to all 6 questions holistically. 
 Use the given CBKH rubric to assess responses. 
 Assign a single category to each respondent with a single mark.  
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3.37.7 Questions for the Inter Rater Moderation 
  
 Are responses marked consistently by individual raters? 
 How similar or different is the marking of different raters? 
 How similar or different is the marking of raters and researcher? 
 Do raters perceive a change in responses? 
 What is the direction of the change? 
 What is the degree of the change? 
 How does the marking of change by raters compare with that of the 
researcher? 
 
3.37.8 Criteria for Inter Rater Marking 
 
 A difference in a category awarded is seen as a failure. A difference 
between scores that reflects a miss between a subjective or objective 
position is seen as a critical failure.  
 A difference in degree within the same category awarded on the 
basis of a use of method is seen as a pass. 
 A match of scores is seen as a strong pass. 
 
3.37.9 Discussion on the Process of Inter Rater Agreement for Validation of 
the Category Table 
 
This validation required raters to have a sound understanding of knowledge 
in history. To be able to use the Categories to assess epistemic beliefs about 
knowledge in history ideally, the raters needed to themselves hold beliefs 
concurrent with the system, at the highest levels of sophistication. Secondly, 
Raters, to make a comparable assessment of responses, needed to be at similar 
levels of knowledge and skill amongst themselves. 
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3.37.10 Concepts and Skills Required of the Raters 
 
 Concepts about sources as relics of the past. Awareness that such 
relics become weak or reliable evidence depending upon the 
questions posed by the historian. 
 Concepts about the difference between sources and evidence. 
 Knowledge about types of sources. 
 Understanding of historical investigation. 
 Knowledge of heuristics such as asking questions of the purpose for 
which the source was created, the author of the source, and to ask 
questions for which the source was not created to answer. 
 Concepts about the constructed nature of knowledge in history. 
 
These are the concepts the categories are based upon, and raters needed 
to hold in order to consistently, dependably, rate responses to questions about 
knowledge in history. The raters often used terms such as perspective, opinion, 
heuristics, but did not themselves demonstrate sophisticated concepts of 
knowledge in history. Scores obtained by the students in a pre-test are given in 
Table 3.9 below. 
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Table 3.9: Pre-Test and Post-Test Assessment of Raters’ Concepts about 
Knowledge in History (Instrument: responses to the Boscolo & Mason 
questions) 
Code 
FM 
FM has a sensitive 
understanding of 
complexity of history but 
also says ‘History is a 
complete description 
that bridges over past 
and present’. She refers 
to perspective and to 
'personal biasness of 
author', 'nationalist 
perspective', and 
'different perspective'. 
She refers to method 
and ‘reliable, unreliable 
sources'. 
4 FM grows in sophistication. Refers to 
knowing through research, evaluating, 
synthesising primary, secondary 
sources, 'extracting truth through 
relying on reliable sources'. Refers to 
heuristics, by knowing about the 
writer, his/her purpose, and how that 
historian used that source. 
She also, however, attributes weak 
methods to the historian, ‘not 
bothering to know...’ 
Refers to a nationalist and liberal 
perspective. 
She refers to the questions posed by 
the historian and to resolving 
differences in explanations by using 
heuristics, questioning the agenda/ 
purpose of writer.  
 
5 
MM MM refers to history as 
'simply the past events' 
and examining 'facts 
and figures'. Conversely 
MM refers to primary 
and secondary sources 
‘problems with 
availability of sources', 
and 'biased 
3 In the post-test, MM is brief. He refers 
to history as the study of the past, 
through different primary, secondary 
sources. 
He again refers to 'biased approach'. 
He refers to analysing two different 
explanations through ‘further research 
i.e. background of authors, sources 
used, biased approaches’. I infer from 
5 
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approaches', ‘personal 
details of the author 
also helped to judge the 
better explanation’ 
the above that he is referring, albeit 
weakly, to heuristics as well as 
perspective.  
 
MT MT quotes Marx and 
Hagel, refers to 
philosophy of history. 
Refers to 'sources or 
evidences as reflecting 
the past'. Says quality of 
argument can help tell 
which explanation is 
more appropriate. 
Refers to multiple 
angles but not 
subjectivity. Says it is 
not easy to refute, face 
problems. Does not 
refer to heuristics.  
2 MT refers to method, analysing and 
evaluating the authenticity and 
reliability of sources via cross 
checking sources.  
Says event can be explained by 
reference to perspectives and 
opinions;  
Vaguely refers to heuristic, ‘by cross 
checking different opinions, for an 
integrated generation of a new 
approach/opinion’. The last refers to 
common research practice in 
Pakistan. 
4 
 
3.38 Comments on the Exercise 
 
The Rater Training Exercise was successful to a limited degree in 
developing the Raters’ epistemic beliefs in knowledge in history. The second rating 
was perhaps the experience that best helped develop ideas. The Inter Rater 
marking of the Questionnaires did not demonstrate a strong, sound and consistent 
growth in the Raters, but somewhat supported both the Categories as a workable 
instrument as well as the rating I had given to the responses. 
The data is qualitative as is the method of analysis. The target is epistemic 
beliefs about knowledge in history. Epistemic beliefs, in spite of the difficulty in 
accessing them, are being assessed in various ways around the world. This is due 
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to the importance of the beliefs for learning and development in various subject 
areas. 
The Raters had little prior knowledge of epistemic beliefs, this being a first 
time or second time that respondents had ever attempted such questions. An 
automated selection of words to assign responses to categories did not seem to 
be appropriate. A holistic judgment, an inference, is needed to be made, therefore, 
although I had my doubts about the success of an Inter Rater agreement exercise 
for this data, I have attempted it. I did not expect a reliability quotient to be 
significant but I just wanted to know how usable were the categories by others, 
and how far could the analysis be replicated. 
 
3.39 Issues 
 
 As described, the prior knowledge of the Raters was weak. Training made 
a difference in their familiarity with the responses and the category table. However, 
this was not adequate for a sound, consistent, reliable Inter Rater agreement 
according to the questions framed above. 
 There was, however, a reasonable degree of development in their use of 
the instrument, some consistency in the marking, and most importantly, a growth 
in sophistication towards a more consistent rating of category if not in degrees 
between it. 
 This was not adequate in rating the instrument as reliable. Judgments are 
a holistic inference. There was, however, reliable and consistent use of the 
instrument enough to suggest that with more sophisticated expert raters, the 
category table could provide a reliable judgment. An internal evaluation was next 
carried out to improve the reliability of the rubric and assess the consistency of my 
own marking. 
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Table 3.10: Inter Rater Assessment of Responses Comparison of Scores by 
Researcher and 3 Raters 
 
Ser Code M T Mo Researcher Code M T Mo Researcher 
1.  CR5aBM       2 CR5bBM       2 
2.  CR8aBM 2     3 CR8bBM 5     4 
3.  CR10aBM     3 3 CR10bBM 2     4 
4.  ER13aBM 4     4 ER13bBM 5     4 
5.  ER14aBM       3 ER14bBM       3 
6.  ER15aBM 4     2 ER15bBM 4     5 
7.  ET2aBM   4   4 ET2bBM   3   5 
8.  ET3aBM   4   2 ET3bBM   3   5 
9.  ET6aBM   4   3 ET6bBM   4   3 
10.  CT9aBM   3   1 CT9bBM   3   1 
11.  CT10aBM   4   3 CT10bBM   4   4 
12.  EJ1aBM 3     4 EJ1bBM 3     4 
13.  EJ2aBM 5 4   5 EJ2bBM 3 3   5 
14.  EJ4aBM 2     3 EJ4bBM 6     4 
15.  EJ5aBM 3     3 EJ5bBM 2     4 
16.  EJ6aBM 2     3 EJ6bBM 4     4 
17.  EJ8aBM 2     2 EJ8bBM 3   2 4 
18.  EJ14aBM 3     3 EJ14bBM 4     4 
19.  CJ16aBM 3     3 CJ16bBM 3     3 
20.  CJ18aBM 3     3 CJ18bBM       1 
21.  CJ21aBM   4   5 CJ21bBM   4   5 
22.  CJ22aBM   4   1 CJ22bBM   3   1 
23.  EB3aBM   3   2 EB3bBM   2   2 
24.  EB4aBM   3   4 EB4bBM   3   4 
25.  EB5aBM   3   3 EB5bBM   2   1 
26.  EB6aBM   3   1 EB6bBM   3   2 
27.  EB8aBM     3 2 EB8bBM     4 2 
 203 
 
Ser Code M T Mo Researcher Code M T Mo Researcher 
28.  CB13aBM     2 4 CB13bBM     2 4 
29.  CB15aBM     2 2 CB15bBM     3 2 
30.  CB17aBM     3 1 CB17bBM     3 2 
31.  CB21aBM      2 1 CB21bBM     2 2 
32.  CP2aBM       4 CP2bBM       4 
33.  CP6aBM     3 3 CP6bBM     3 3 
34.  CP7aBM     3 2 CP7bBM     3 2 
35.  CP8aBM     3 2 CP8bBM     3 4 
36.  EP9aBM     3 3 EP9bBM     3 4 
37.  EP10aBM     2 1 EP10bBM     2 1 
38.  EP11aBM     2 1 EP11bBM     2 1 
39.  EP12aBM     4 4 EP12bBM     3 4 
40.  EP13aBM     2 1 EP13bBM     3 2 
 
Response sheets assessed by Participants in Inter Rater Exercise: 73  
Response sheets assessed by Researcher in Inter Rater Exercise: 80 
Matched Scores: 32/73  
Category Difference: 41/73  
Percentage of Matched Scores: 44 % 
Percentage Difference of Mismatch: 56% 
 
 
3.40 Summary of Chapter 
 
The research methodology employed in this research has several crucial 
elements that are described and discussed in the Chapter on Research 
Methodology. Aim and objectives of the research, objectives of design, data 
collection and analysis, key features, are listed in an easy to read, ready reference. 
Importantly, the background of the study, procedures followed, and features such 
as constraints and opportunities are described in detail. Information about the two 
interventions is provided and a key section details how a perception of agency is 
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operationalised and provided in the experimental groups. Quasi experimental 
theory demands that threats to inference be identified in advance and then steps 
be taken to circumvent effects. This is reported in the Sections 3.30 to 3.34 in 
transparent detail. 
The development of a rubric to assess the 166 response sheets of the 
Boscolo and Mason questions became necessary. The development and key 
features of the rubric, the CBKH categories, is presented. Stages of the 
development are displayed in tables, and key features detailed that make the 
instrument available for use. Inter rater and internal evaluation carried out to 
assess reliability is reported in the end. 
Paradigms, mixed methods and truth claims are discussed at length in the 
Review of Literature. I have concluded that ‘what works’ is adequate as a 
pragmatic philosophy, if it is known how it is known, and to what parameters it can 
be held to apply. Detailed and transparent reporting of each aspect of research 
methodology is a step in this direction.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
‘But after your workshop, aa the information I gave that aa through authentic 
references, references should be authentic and you analyse... that aa how you 
analyse the themes, these two things aaaa will help you more to differentiate the 
two examples or two explanations ... the difference between (yes yes) the twooo... 
the difference between the two.. if there are two explanations it is possible to 
understand which is better.’ 
 
- Participant in focus group comparing differences in his responses to 
Boscolo & Mason questions at post-test. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Four presents analysis of the data. The data of each instrument is 
analysed separately and findings are discussed. References are made to compare 
findings of the three instruments where required. Results from tests are presented 
and discussed briefly under the Tables and in the Sections for ease in reference. 
Appendices contain the required tests. 
Briefly, the research is conducted in 5 quasi-experimental small studies. 
Each study has a Control and an Experimental Group. The sample is non-random 
with a total of 83 participants, unevenly divided, as found, into Control and 
Experimental Groups. Meta-analysis is conducted of the overall combined data of 
the 5 studies in order to raise the numbers and obtain an overview. Independent 
studies are analysed and the results reported where relevant and possible 
especially for BM data. Three measures are used, two Likert Scales, the BLTHQ 
and EBI. One questionnaire with 6 open ended questions provides qualitative data, 
which is assessed, and a single holistic score is awarded to each participant. 
Change in beliefs is examined from pre-test to post-test to answer study questions. 
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Data from a focus group, audio records of sessions, and field notes, add to 
qualitative descriptions where possible. Tests and numerical analysis of the data 
include, Chi Square, Cramer’s V, Effect Sizes, Odds Ratios, Wilcoxen Rank Sum 
Test, and the Mann Whitney for small studies. An estimate of the Difference of the 
Difference is carried out and reported. Factor Analysis of both the BLTHQ data 
and that from the EBI is conducted and reported. 
The research objective is to explore a relationship between a perception of 
agency in task based group discourse and change in concepts. This translates into 
the question, if there is a difference in change of epistemic concepts from pre-test 
to post-test between Control and Experimental Groups, and if there is evidence of 
more change in the Experimental Group. Causal relations are difficult to claim 
especially in low powered studies as discussed by Shadish et al. (2008). However, 
the Experimental Group, having received the special treatment, the results are 
expected to be different in this group as compared to the Control Group. 
Intervention one was a rich educational experience that was provided to both 
Control and Experimental Groups; therefore, some change in epistemic beliefs 
was expected to take place in both groups. The added impetus to change in the 
form of a perception of agency provided to the Experimental Group alone is 
expected to have made a difference to conceptual change if the theory is sound.  
To reiterate, concepts are found to be difficult to change even in task based 
discourse where contexts, actions, and words are present. An enhanced 
perception of agency relating to change is examined in this study. If the relationship 
holds, the experimental groups should display a better performance at post-test.  
I do not expect significant difference as the intervention of a perception of 
agency is a psychological construct studied in educational contexts. This 
relationship has not been researched before, in my knowledge, for me to take a 
reference for level of significance. Quasi-experiments differ from true experiments 
in the extent to which causal inference can be made. In the light of concerns about 
non-random selection and assignment, the role of the researcher in the conduct of 
the interventional workshops among other threats, an alternative hypothesis is 
proposed. 
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Reliability was tested for BLTHQ data using Cronbach’s alpha and was found 
to be 0.752 at post-test for the Control Group and 0.639 in the Experimental Group 
at post-test. I have some doubts about using the Cronbach alpha for the BLTHQ 
as there are 3 sets of items according to stance in the instrument, therefore internal 
consistency may be difficult to assume. Apart from this, Factor Analysis was 
conducted and the results are reported. Results appear to have some common 
features with the author’s findings. Reliability of each factor was tested and found 
to be good i.e. in the range of 0.679 to 0.778 in the Control Group and 0.602 and 
0.806 in the Experimental Group. 
Effect sizes in educational research are explored and a moderate effect of 
0.500 Cohen et al. (2007) is considered taking guidance from quoted Hattie 
rankings of effect size in educational research. The rankings given for motivation 
0.48, reducing anxiety 0.4, a disposition to learn 0.61, affective attributes, 0.24, are 
considered for a rough estimate as these relate to similar psychological constructs 
in evidence based research. Geoff Petty on Cambridge teacherstoolbox.co.uk 
suggests that an effect size of 0.4 is above average for education research. Instead 
of a null hypothesis, I frame an alternative hypothesis that there is a difference in 
change between Control and Experimental Groups and look for evidence to 
support this. 
The analysis focuses on identifying the stance of respondents and change 
in stance from pre-test to post-test in both Control and Experimental Groups. 
Results and discussion are concurrent and juxtaposed in order to facilitate 
understanding. 
The BM questions are more theoretical and general relating to epistemic 
concerns while the BLTHQ statements are set in the context of pedagogical 
practices of history teachers. The EBI explores general epistemic beliefs rather 
than beliefs in the domain of history. The nature and contexts of each instrument 
being different, I examine change as observed in each instrument separately 
expecting a different reading. My study compares the effects of the intervention, a 
perception of agency on change in concepts in task based group discourse in 
teacher education classrooms. The alternative hypothesis states that there is a 
 208 
 
difference in change of concepts in Control and Experimental Groups. The stance 
itself that respondents assume will be interesting but not crucial to the support of 
the hypothesis. I am, however, mindful of the limitations of the research, and these 
are described. 
The BM questions are more theoretical and general relating to epistemic 
concerns while the BLTHQ statements are set in the context of pedagogical 
practices of history teachers. The EBI explores general epistemic beliefs rather 
than beliefs in the domain of history. The nature and contexts of each instrument 
being different, I examine change as observed in each instrument separately 
expecting a different reading. My study compares the effects of the intervention, a 
perception of agency, on change in concepts in task based group discourse in 
teacher education classrooms. The alternative hypothesis states that there is a 
difference in change of concepts in Control and Experimental Groups. The stance 
itself that respondents assume will be interesting but not crucial to the support of 
the hypothesis. I am, however, mindful of the limitations of the research, and these 
are described. Results and discussion are concurrent and juxtaposed in order to 
facilitate understanding. 
 
4.2 Brief Outline of Objectives and Analysis Decisions in the Context of 
the Research 
 
The authors, Maggioni et al. (2009a), argue that the items of the BLTHQ 
are reasonable proxies of the epistemic beliefs named the Copier, Borrower, and 
Criterialist. Thus, agreement with the items for a stance can be taken to denote the 
epistemic stance of the respondent for the purpose of the analysis. 
I am conscious of the fact that the numbers of participants were limited, 
assignment and selection was non-random, control was limited, this being an 
experiment in the field. Many threats in the quasi experiment (as argued by Cook 
and Campbell, Shadish Cook and Campbell and discussed at length in this 
document), were controlled but there were limitations to this. I, as 
practitioner/researcher, conducted the intervention workshops and made 
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decisions. Groups were self-selected or selected by means of which I had no 
control as is the nature of educational workshops in schools. I have not offered a 
null hypothesis at outset and only look for enough evidence to support an 
alternative hypothesis. I also want to explore ways that this relationship can be 
researched by my colleagues in the field. The instruments provide rich and varied 
data although the sample has its limitations. 
Normal distribution is not the norm in the 5 study groups. Control and 
Experimental Groups are also not built on random assignment but are self- 
assigned according to location, preference, etcetera. Age, language capability, 
etcetera are other variables. Apart from demographic differences, there are many 
other variations within the sample. The study groups have a range of differences 
in numbers in the groups as well as in demographics, such as the number of 
women is far larger than men. Prior subject qualifications in terms of study towards 
a Masters in History, or Pakistan Studies with a history component, are key 
differences. All are teachers of history but it turned out that in one small group 
there were some teachers of history from a junior level where they taught World 
History and not Pakistan History. Attempts are made to use tests suited for the 
data. However, in places, tests that are required but that do not strictly meet 
statistical test criteria are used anyway, and the interpretation is left to readers. 
(For example, in the Factor Analysis, the KMO Bartlett test of Sphericity result is 
ignored and Factor Analysis is carried out. I have been creative in trying to observe 
a pattern in cross tables of the 21 items by arranging test results in Table 4.16 for 
analysis. Since this became useful I repeated the format for other analysis). 
In this sense, the context of the research would be familiar to other 
practitioners in the field of teacher education. The workshops, where the 
interventions were conducted, were like all other such teacher education 
experiences that the teachers were used to attending. The research conclusions 
may fall short of being highly reliable but may be valid in the sense that they are 
practitioner experiments in the field. 
I used the BLTHQ Likert Scale instrument as 1 of a set of 3 measures to 
explore the change in beliefs of the participants in my research. The scale was a 
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6 point measure. At the time of conducting the research workshops, I altered the 
instrument to a 5 point scale adding a neutral in place of a forced choice, keeping 
all items intact and adding a brief glossary to explain some words used. This is 
explained in the Section on Measures. The total data is of two groups, Control and 
Experimental, with 40 and 43 participants, a total of 83 teachers of O’ Level History. 
The research was conducted in small groups in 3 major cities of Pakistan. The 
numbers above are after data cleaning.  
A meta-analysis was conducted first of the overall combined data followed 
by analysis of the 5 small studies in the three cities. Each study had a Control and 
Experimental Group. The 5 groups are Rose-A, Tulip-B, Jasmine-C, Bougainvillea-
D and Pansy-E. A pre-test and post-test of both Control and Experimental Groups 
is assessed and the two groups are compared to explore the change in responses 
due to the two Interventions. To repeat, Intervention A was provided to all and 
therefore, some change is expected in all participants’ responses. Intervention B 
was provided to the Experimental Group alone, therefore a difference is examined 
in response to the research questions. An important relationship between 
Interventions 1 and 2 with change is discussed at the conclusion and within the 
discussions as required. The Research Map (Figure 3.4) is provided which helps 
to explain this.  
 
4.2.1 Missing Data 
 
Missing data is due initially to drop outs after the first day when the pre-test 
was held or late entries after the first day. In some cases, participants attended the 
day but did not wait to complete the test and submit it. In other cases all three 
instruments were not completed. All of these participants have been discounted. 
Those measures of respondents who had submitted all three instruments have 
been retained even if some items were not marked or were hard to read. The few 
missing responses after screening of the data in each item are replaced by nearby 
median points as my data is ordinal and the median point is seen as appropriate. 
Data was also deleted of those few participants who attended the workshop but 
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were not teachers of O’ Level History from Classes 9 onwards as they would have 
been teaching World History and not Pakistan History.  
 
4.3 Analysis of Data from Responses to the Boscolo & Mason 
Questionnaire 
 
4.3.1 Brief Introduction to the Analysis of Data from Responses to the 
Boscolo & Mason Questionnaire using the CBKH Category Scale 
 
The Boscolo & Mason questions, henceforth referred to as the BM 
questions, are the first of three instruments used in this research. The responses 
are in a free narrative form and require repeated reading and interpretation. After 
analysis of the response of each individual to the BM questions a qualitative 
descriptor is awarded on the CBKH Categories.  
The Categories range from 1 for Naive Objectivist, 2 for Critical Objectivist, 
3 for Naive Subjectivist, 4 for Critical Subjectivist, 5 for Naive Criterialist and 6 for 
Critical Criterialist. The scores transform the qualitative descriptors into numbers 
and these scores are then analyzed in quantitative terms. 
The main focus of my analysis in response to study questions is to examine 
the change in position of respondents’ stances in pre-test and post-test in both 
sets of data, Control and Experimental. This will be the basis to support a possible 
relationship between a perception of agency and change in epistemic beliefs, 
which is the focus of my research. A secondary focus is upon the effect of an 
experience of a range of suitable examples upon change. This was an 
interventional experience provided to both groups, therefore change should be 
evident in both sets of data. Finally, the question if this relationship of a perception 
of agency on change in concepts can be researched will be discussed. 
 
4.3.2 Questions for Analysis 
 Is a change in epistemic beliefs observed in responses of 
participants from entry pre-test to post-test after intervention in both 
Control and Experimental Groups? 
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 Is there a difference observed in change of epistemic beliefs between 
Control and Experimental Groups in terms of numbers, nature, or 
direction of change? 
 Is change from pre-test to post-test and between the Control and 
Experimental Groups supported in all three measures?. What are the 
differences in change observed in the three measures, the Boscolo 
& Mason questions, The Beliefs about Learning and Teaching 
History Questionnaire, and the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory? 
 How reliable and significant is this observation of change, and 
difference in change, between Control and Experimental Groups? 
An important reminder is needed here that some change is expected in both 
groups, Control, Experimental, due to Intervention 1 as described. The main 
experimental intervention, Intervention 2 is expected to effect change in the 
Experimental Group only. A difference in change between groups will thus be seen 
to relate to the difference in experience provided only to the Experimental Group.  
The analysis of data is conducted at various levels and categories. An 
intense search is conducted in a meta-analysis of combined data from all five 
studies followed by an analysis of each study. The data is combined primarily to 
increase the numbers for statistics and each group is also studied separately to 
find the difference in groups and related interesting information. The data, as 
mentioned above, is in a single score per respondent for each test, pre and post, 
on the scale CBKH. 
It is important to note here that for the purpose of analysis, Change and No 
Change is a key position I compare my data on, regardless of direction or degree 
of change. This is seen as necessary as the change varies in different epistemic 
beliefs in the three questionnaires.  
Importantly, I may not be able to see the difference in Category 
Change/Degree Change as something that has enough theoretical background to 
argue meaningfully in the context of my research. The study of epistemic beliefs is 
still developing with many grey areas still requiring work. At one stage, I do analyze 
the data into categories of No Change, Degree Change and Category Change for 
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fine grained analysis. Besides this, I further classify responses into Low Scores 
and High Scores to study change from naive to sophisticated positions. These 
analyses reveal important differences and are useful to draw conclusions, 
howsoever tentative.  
Data is examined as combined i.e. data from all 5 Studies is combined for 
meta-analysis as well as in separate study groups as the research was conducted. 
 
4.3.3 Statistical Tests Conducted in the Analysis of the BM Data 
 
To study the shift or change in respondents’ positions in the combined data, 
analysis begins with cross tables on the basis of observed scores of individual 
respondents. This simple analysis reveals a broad picture of change. A Chi Square 
test is used to see the reliability of change from pre-test to post-test. Furthermore, 
a non-parametric Wilcoxen rank sum test is used in each city to compare the 
difference in pre and post stance. 
For a more fine grained analysis, whole data is categorized into three 
categories i.e. No Change, Degree Change, and Category Change. The Mann 
Whitney test is used in each category of data to compare the changes in both 
Control and Experimental Groups. Further, another approach is used by 
comparing the pre and post responses with respect to a low and high stance. In 
this Section of the study, scores of 1, 2 and 3 are low score and 4, 5 and 6 are a 
high score. A Chi Square test is used to see the difference in pre and post 
responses with respect to low and high scores from pre-test to post-test. This is 
described in the following pages. 
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Table 4.1: Categories and Corresponding Holistic Scores of Epistemic 
Beliefs in the CBKH 
 
 
 
The Analysis is described in the following pages with Tables and 
commentary. This analysis includes the following: 
 
 A frequency distribution of overall combined data to compare change 
in Control and Experimental Groups. 
 Cross tabulation with Chi Square of Low and High scores in overall 
combined data. 
 Odds ratio for Change and No Change stance 
 Paired t test in overall combined data for Control and Experimental 
Groups.  
 Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test, to study responses in 5 City Groups.  
 Fine Grain analysis of No change, Degree Change, and Category 
Change. 
 Man Whitney Test of No Change, Degree Change and Category 
Change. 
 Table of comparison of difference as significant in each study of 5 
City Groups. 
 Analysis of Low and High scores in each City Group. 
Categories of Respondents                  Holistic Score 
Naive Objectivist     1 
Critical Objectivist     2 
Naive Subjectivist     3 
Critical Subjectivist     4 
Naive Criterialist     5 
Critical Criterialist     6 
Sophisticated Integrator    7 
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4.3.4 Test of Reliability 
 
Reliability assessment is informed by an Inter-Rater assessment exercise 
followed by a systematic Internal Evaluation with a concern for rigour. The 
development of the CBKH category scale was informed by a rigorous process of 
blind marking, repeated reading and assessment to improve the scale thus making 
the scores awarded as reliable as possible. The quality of the assessment using 
the CBKH category scale can be analysed through an examination of the data by 
interested readers (Appendix-A7). Inter Rater marking and Internal Evaluations are 
described in detail in separate Sections of this Chapter.  
 
4.3.5 Results of Final Internal Evaluation of Qualitative Assessment and 
Scoring of Responses to Boscolo & Mason Questions Using the CBKH 
Category Scale (Appendix-A7)  
 
Match: 10/17 = 58.82 
Difference of Degree within Category: 4/17 = 23.52 
Category Difference: 3/17 = 17.64 
First Internal Evaluation Score: 64.69% 
Second Internal Evaluation Score: 76.46% 
Third Internal Evaluation Score: 82.00% 
Inter Rater assessment and results are described in Chapter 3. 
 
4.4 Statistical Analysis of Response of Participants at Levels of Epistemic 
Beliefs in Control and Experimental Groups 
 
4.4.1 Comparison of Pre and Post Responses Using Chi Square Test of 
Independence 
 
Table 4.2 displays the frequency distribution of respondents at a stance. 
This Table helps observe change in stance at pre-test and post-test in Control and 
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Experimental Groups. A key difference in the move from a Naive Subjectivist 
stance to a Critical Subjectivist stance in both sets of data is highlighted. 
The Chi Square test for overall BM items of the Control and Experimental 
Groups reveals that there is a significant difference in stance of respondents in pre 
and post workshop. The value of Chi Square for the Control Group is 23.73 and 
for the Experimental Group it is 35.51, and their associated p-value is 0.000 which 
is less than 0.05. Therefore, it can be assumed from this analysis that Intervention 
2 played a role in shifting respondents’ stance in the Experimental Group as 
compared to the Control Group. The difference is seen to be significant in both 
sets of data. However, the larger Chi Square test statistic for the Experimental 
Group shows that there is more difference in the Experimental Group as compared 
to the Control Group. 
From Table 4.2, one can see that this difference occurs due to a major shift 
in the Naive Subjectivist stance in both Control and Experimental Groups. It is 
interesting to see that before the workshop, 21 respondents which constitute 
52.5% of the overall Control Group, appear to be at a Naive Subjectivist stance 
whereas after the intervention, that is at post workshop, 4 respondents, which 
constitute 8.9% of the overall Control Group, still remain in this category; while in 
the Experimental Group there is a 100 % shift in the respondents’ stance from the 
Naive Subjectivist position. 
Another difference to be noted is change in the Critical Objectivist stance. 
The Control Group has 12.5% respondents at pre-test, which nearly doubles to 
22.5% at post-test. In the Experimental Group, 16.3% at pre-test, which reduces 
to 14% at post-test. Respondents in the Control Group nearly double in the Critical 
Objectivist stance whereas in the Experimental Group numbers decrease in the 
Critical Objectivist stance. In terms of nature of change this is an important 
difference. 
The difference in change from the Naive Subjectivist to the Critical 
Subjectivist stance is interesting. In the Control Groups, there is an increase of 4 
respondents in the Critical Subjectivist stance whereas in the Experimental Group 
there is a large increase of almost double in the Critical Subjectivist stance. 
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In terms of nature of change it appears that most participants move towards 
sophistication in the Experimental Group. The change is significant in both groups 
with more significant change being seen in the Experimental Group.  
 
Table 4.2: Frequency Distributions of Participants at Levels of Epistemic 
Beliefs in Control and Experimental Groups, Pre-Test and Post-Test 
 
 CONTROL EXPERIMENTAL 
Pre Post Total Pre Post Total 
Naive Objectivist 3 1 4 3 2 5 
% 7.5 2.5 5.0 7.0 4.7 5.8 
Critical Objectivist 5 9 14 7 6 13 
%  12.5 22.5 17.5 16.3  14.0 15.1 
Naive Subjectivist 21 4 25 21 0 21 
% 52.5 10.0 31.3 48.8 0 24.4 
Critical Subjectivist 10 14 24 11 23 34 
% 25.0 35.0 30.0 25.6 53.5 39.5 
Naive Criterialist 1 10 11 0 9 9 
% 2.5 25.0 13.8 0 20.9 10.5 
Critical Criterialist 0 2 2 1 3 4 
% 0 5.0 2.5 2.3 7.0 4.7 
Total 40 40 80 43 43 86 
 
   Chi-Square = 23.733  Chi-Square = 35.51 
   P-Value = 0.000   P-Value = 0.000 
   N = 40    N = 40 
 The difference of Chi-Square value in Control - Experimental Groups is 
7.78% or 8%. Both Control – Experimental Groups show significant change. P 
value is 0.00 but the Chi Square is 36.51 in the Experimental Group, or 23.77 in 
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the Control Group. The difference in nature of change is interesting. More 
respondents moved up to a higher degree of sophistication in the Experimental 
Group. A 100% left the Naive Objectivist stance and 14% left the Critical 
Subjectivist stance. These respondents moved up to Critical Subjectivist stance 
where a 109% increase is seen. The increase in numbers in Naive Criterialist, 
Critical Criterialist stance is the same in both Groups. 
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of Pre and Post Responses in Control Group 
 
Figure 4.2: Comparison of Pre and Post Responses in Experimental Group 
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of Post Responses of Control and Experimental 
Group 
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4.4.2 Odds Ratio for Change and No Change in Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Next, I categorized the overall combined data into a Change and No 
Change category. I consider all respondents, who change their stance from pre-
test to post-test, fall in the change category. For example, if a respondent is a 
Naive Objectivist at pre-test and if he/she has any other stance except Naive 
Objectivist at post-test, he/she falls in the change category. In No Change 
category, I consider all those respondents, who did not change their stance at post-
test and remain at their original position, fall in the No Change category. Now, the 
whole data is converted into a binary category i.e. Change or No Change. Table 
4.3 shows the number of respondents who fall in Change and No Change category 
in Control and Experimental Groups. In the Experimental Group, 34 respondents 
out of 43, changed their stance while only 9 respondents did not change their 
stance. In order to see the likelihood of change than No Change in the 
Experimental Group, an Odds ratio is calculated for this binary data. The Odds 
ratio is found to be 1.259 which means there is 1.259, times Odds of change in the 
Experimental Group than No Change. In other words, I can say that each 
respondent in the Experimental Group is 1.259 times more likely to be changed 
than Not Changed. The value of Odds ratio is greater than 1, which indicates that 
a respondent in the Experimental Group is more likely to change than in the Control 
Group. The Odds ratio lie within 95% Confidence Interval i.e. 0.452 to 3.512, which 
shows that the value is not significant. If, however, a 90% or 80% Confidence 
Interval is considered in this educational context, then the change is significant or 
at least meaningful.  
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Table 4.3: Change and No Change Responses in Control and Experimental 
Group 
 Change No Change Total 
Experimental 34 9 43 
Control 30 10 40 
Total 64 19 83 
 Value 95% Confidence Interval  
Odds Ratio 1.259 0.452 3.512 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of Pre and Post Difference in Control and Experimental 
Group Using Paired t Test 
 
The difference from pre-test to post-tests in both Control & Experimental 
Groups is significant. In this Section of analysis, a paired t test is used to find the 
difference in pre and post stance in both sets of data. The mean for the pre-test 
score in Control Group is slightly different as compared to the post-test score 
(mean pre-test score= 3.03, mean post-test score= 3.73). The test statistics and 
significance value (t = - 4.149, degree of freedom = 39, p-value 0.000) show that 
the difference from pre-test to post-test is significant in the Control Group (see 
Table 1-B to Table 5-B in Appendix-B). In the Experimental Group, more change 
(difference) can be seen as compared to the Control Group. The mean of pre-test 
scores is 3.02 and the mean of post-test scores is 3.93. This difference in mean 
can be taken to suggest that more change has taken place in the Experimental 
Group rather than the Control Group. Also, the t statistics and significance value  
(t = - 5.263, degree of freedom = 42, p-value = 0.000) show that the difference is 
significant (see Table 1-B to Table 5-B in Appendix -B).  
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4.4.4 Analysis of Pre-Test and Post-Test Difference in Five Studies for the 
Control and Experimental Groups 
 
The research is conducted in 5 separate studies in 3 cities. These groups 
are code named Rose, Tulip, Jasmine, Bougainvillea and Pansy. Each group is 
analyzed separately to examine the change or difference in responses in individual 
city groups, then a statistical test of difference is carried out. The data in each 
group is small, therefore a test of normality is conducted to see the distribution of 
data. The Shapiro Wilk test of normality suggests that data does not follow normal 
distribution. Therefore, instead of using paired t-test, a non-parametric test, 
Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test, is used to see the significance of difference from pre-
test to post-test in both sets of data. The test statistics and their corresponding 
significance value in each city are given in Table 6-B in Appendix-B. The 
significance value of the test shows that only Rose Group in the Control Group has 
a significant difference from pre-test to post-test and the remaining four studies do 
not show significant difference in pre-test to post-test responses. On the other 
hand, Experimental Groups in four studies, Rose, Tulip, Jasmine and 
Bougainvillea, show significant difference in their respondents’ stance. The result 
obtained from this analysis is compatible to analysis of combined data that more 
difference or change is observed in the Experimental Group than in the Control 
Group. 
 
4.4.5 Estimating Intervention Effect in the Experimental Group in Meta-
Analysis of BM Data 
 
The analysis of treatment effect in the BM data is explained in Figure 4.4. 
The dependent variable ‘Y’ is response of the respondents in both the Control and 
Experimental Groups. In Control at pre-test, I observe the Control Group value 
Y=A, and at the post-test, the Control Group value is Y=E. Similarly, before the 
intervention in the Experimental Group, the value is Y=B and, after the intervention, 
Experimental Group value is Y=C. In order to estimate the treatment effect using 
four pieces of information contained in the points A, B, C and E, from Figure 4.4 
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the treatment effect is δ = 𝐶𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  which is the difference between Control and 
Experimental Groups at post-test. The estimation of treatment effect is calculated 
by taking the difference of average values of four points i.e. A, B, C and E as 
follows: 
Treatment effect = δ = (?̂?- ?̂? ) − (?̂?- ?̂? ) = (𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 - 𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) – 
(𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒  -  𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒) 
Where   
𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒 = ?̂?  = Sample mean of Y for Control Group at pre-test  
𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ?̂? = Sample mean of Y for Control Group at post-test 
𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒  = ?̂?  = Sample mean of Y for Experimental Group at pre-test 
𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ?̂?  = Sample mean of Y for Experimental Group at post-test 
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Figure 4.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of Control and 
Experimental Group 
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From the BM data, the sample mean of four points is found to be as 
follows: 
?̂? = 3.025, ?̂? = 3.725, ?̂? = 3.02 and ?̂? = 4.0; so the treatment effect or difference 
of the difference estimator of the Control and the Experimental Groups is:  
δ = (4.0 - 3.725) – (3.02-3.02) 
δ = 0.275 – 0 
δ = 0.275 
So, I quantify the intervention effect in the Experimental Group and it is 
estimated to be 0.275. This value indicates that the intervention in the 
Experimental Group does work. If the Experimental and the Control Groups have 
the same outcome, then the estimated value of difference in difference estimator 
should be 0 but in the BM data it has a positive value. This positive value somewhat 
supports the conclusion that the Intervention has a positive effect in the 
Experimental Group. 
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The Intervention effect in the Experimental Group in the BM data is also 
calculated by adding some indicator variables in a simple regression model. 
𝒀𝒊  = 𝜷𝟏  + 𝜷𝟐 Experimental + 𝜷𝟑PostTest + δ (Experimental × PostTest) +𝒆𝒊   
Where Experimental is the dummy variable, consider 1 when Respondents 
are in the Experimental Group, and consider 0 when respondents are in the Control 
Group. In post-test also, a dummy variable considers 1 when respondents are at 
post-test, and considers 0 when respondents are at pre- test. (Experimental × Post 
Test) is an intervention variable that measures the intervention effect when 
respondents are at post-test in the Experimental Group.  
Now the regression function is given as: 
   𝒀𝒊    =   𝟑. 𝟎𝟐  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟕𝟒𝟒 Experimental + 0.7 PostTest + 0.206(Experimental 
× PostTest) +𝒆𝒊      
S.E              [0.174]              [0.242]                               [0.246]                   [0.342] 
P-value       (0.000)              (0.9943)                             (0.0051)                 
(0.5463) 
So, if the respondents are in the Control Group at pre-test, then 
Experimental = 0 and Post-test = 0 and the model becomes: 
Y= 𝜷𝟏  =3.02 = A (from Figure 4.4); this value indicates that initially the 
respondents, on average, appear to be Subjectivists in the Control Group at pre- 
test.  
If the respondents are in the Experimental Group at pre-test, then 
Experimental= 1 and post-test = 0, and Experimental × post-test = 0; now the 
above model becomes Y= 𝛽1  +𝛽2  = 3.02  +0.001744 = 3.08 = B (from Figure 4.4). 
This value indicates that the respondents, on average, are at the same position in 
the Experimental Group as in the Control Group i.e. Naive Subjectivists. 
If the respondents in BM data are in the Control Group at post-test, then 
Experimental = 0, post-test = 1 and Experimental × post-test = 0 and the estimated 
value of the respondents at this level is:  
Y= 𝛽1  + 𝛽3= 3.02 + 0.7 = 3.72  4 = E (from Figure 4.4) 
This value indicates that respondents, on average, move from Naive 
Subjectivists to Critical Subjectivists in the Control Group at post-test. Similarly, 
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when respondents are at post-test in the Experimental Group then their estimated 
value is calculated as: 
Y= 𝛽1  + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + δ= 3.02  −0.001744  + 0.7 + 0.206 = 3.94  4 = C (from Figure 
4.4) 
This value is very close to 4 whereas in the Control Group the value is 3.72, 
which is smaller than 3.94. The difference is considered to be very small in a 
mathematical sense but theoretically, this is an observable value. This value also 
shows that, on average, respondents in the Experimental Group at post-test 
appear to be Critical Subjectivists while at pre-test they appear to be Naive 
Subjectivists.  
The suggestion of a difference leads to a requirement of analysis at the level 
of small studies. This is conducted below. To sum this up, however, a statement is 
made. The analysis of Low and High stance shows that there is a small positive 
effect of the intervention in the Experimental Group and the respondents, on 
average, move from being Naive Subjectivists to Critical Subjectivists.  
 
4.5  Fine Grain Analysis of Change in Respondents Stance 
 
4.5.1 Fine Grain Analysis of Classes, No Change, Degree and Category 
Change 
 
Change can be ordered as a transition within a category i.e. within a stance, 
say of an Objectivist, the respondent can be Naive or Critical on the basis of a 
beginning of doubt. The respondent can move forward or in reverse within the 
category. This is labeled Degree Change. Category change is awarded as a move 
from a category such as an Objectivist stance to a Subjectivist stance or a 
Criterialist stance, or in reverse in any order. Table 4.4 shows the changes in 
stance with respect to three classes No Change, Degree Change, Category 
Change. I categorized the BM score into the three classes, No Change, Degree 
Change, and Category Change. I considered those respondents, who did not 
change their position at post-test, to fall in the class of No Change. For example, 
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if a respondent appeared to be a Naive Objectivist at pre-test, and at post-test 
he/she again appears to be Naive Objectivist, I consider that he/she falls into the 
No Change class. 
 
Table 4.4: Analysis No Change, Degree Change, Category Change in 
Control and Experimental Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
Scale 
No Change Degree Change Category Change 
Control Experi-
mental 
Control Experi-
mental 
Control Experi-
mental 
 Naive 
Objectivist  
1 0 2 2 0 1 
 Critical 
Objectivist  
2 1 0 0 3 6 
Naive 
Subjectivist  
3 0 10 0 8 0 
 Critical 
Subjectivist  
3 0 0 13 7 8 
Naive 
Criterialist  
1 7 0 0 0 4 
Critical 
Criterialist  
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 10 9 12 15 18 19 
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of No Change, Degree Change and Category 
Change Stance of Control and Experimental Groups 
 
 
These respondents display no effect of the intervention at all. This can also 
be discussed as a possible resistance to change. 
In Degree Change, those who shift their stance within a position of 
Objectivist, Subjectivist, Criterialist from a firm position on the stance (I call this a 
naive position on the CBKH) to a beginning of doubt (I call this a critical position) 
are said to have changed a degree. These transition stages are described in detail 
in Chapter 3 on the CBKH Categories. Change from 1 to 2 i.e. from Naive 
Objectivist to Critical Objectivist or from 3 to 4 i.e. Naive Subjectivist to Critical 
Subjectivist falls in the Degree Change class.  
For the Category Change class, I considered those respondents who shift 
their position from Objectivist to Subjectivist or Criterialist in any order or direction. 
This can be a move towards greater sophistication or towards a more naive stance. 
For example, if a respondent appears a Naive Objectivist De Vaus (2001) in  
pre-test and at post-test he/she shifts to a Naive Subjectivist (Score 3), I consider 
that he/she has made a Category Change. Another example is, if a person is at a 
Naive Subjectivist category and goes back to a Naive Objectivist category that is 
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also a Category Change. This appears complicated but it is necessary as the 
change itself is complex and I have tried to observe it as systematically and as 
much in depth as possible. 
It is crucial to remember that for the purpose of my research, Change and 
No Change are the deciding difference between success and failure of the 
Intervention to effect the epistemic beliefs of respondents. This difference is used 
to answer the research question. Having said that, change is examined in some 
depth to add to my understanding of the nature of change and the process of 
change. The data is very interesting and leads to many avenues of study. 
Table 4.4 displays a comparison of No Change in stance, Degree Change, 
and Category Change, between Control and Experimental Groups. The slight 
difference in favor of the Experimental Group is consistent with other analysis. 
There is also a tiny difference in No Change in the Experimental Group with less 
people resisting change in the Experimental Group.  
 
4.5.2 Results of Mann Whitney Test of Classes of Change, No Change, 
Degree Change, and Category Change 
 
The results obtained from Fine Grain Analysis in No Change, Degree Change 
and Category Change in each category scale i.e. Naive Objectivist to Critical 
Criterialist are then compared in the Control and Experimental Groups.  
Again, the sample drawn from this analysis is very small, therefore instead of 
using independent t test a non-parametric Mann Whitney sum test is used to 
compare the changes in Control and Experimental Groups. 
The result or test statistics obtained from this test indicates that in No Change 
category, the change in both sets of data is reliable and significant. The mean rank 
of the Control Group is 6.65 while the mean rank of the Experimental Group is 
13.72, and shows more change in the Experimental Group (see Table 7-B in 
Appendix B). The significance value of this test is 0.004, which shows that there is 
significant difference in both groups in the category of No Change (see Table 8-B 
in Appendix B). 
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For the Degree Change category, the result is also similar to the No Change 
category. The significance value of the Mann Whitney test indicates that the 
difference in both groups is reliable. Also, the mean rank of the Control Group is 
8.33 and the mean rank of the Experimental Group is 18.53, which shows a large 
difference in the mean of Degree Change for both groups (see Tables 9-B and 10-
B in Appendix B). The larger mean rank of Experimental Group indicates that most 
respondents in Experimental Group fall in the Degree Change category.  
For Category Change the difference in Control and Experimental Groups is 
not reliable or significant. The mean rank for both groups is almost similar to each 
other. In the Control Group, the mean rank is 17.56 and for the Experimental Group 
the mean rank is 20.37. The significance value (p-value) for Category Change data 
is 0.407, which shows no significant difference in both groups for Category Change 
(see Table 11-B in Appendix B).  
 
4.5.3 Fine Grain Analysis of Low and High Stance for Control and 
Experimental Groups in Overall Combined Data 
 
In this Section of Fine Grain Analysis, the Epistemic scores on the CBKH 
ranging from 1-3 are classed as Low scores (from Naive Objectivist to Naive 
Subjectivist). Scores ranging from 4-6 are classed as High scores (Critical 
Subjectivist to Critical Criterialist). From Table 4.5, it is possible to recognize that 
most respondents fall in the Low category at entry pre-test in both sets of data. In 
the Control Group, 29 respondents constitute 72.5% of overall pre respondents 
that fall in the Low category while 11 respondents 27.5% fall in the High category. 
Similarly, in the Experimental Group, 31 respondents i.e. 72.09% of pre 
respondents appear to have a Low stance. Only 12 respondents in the pre-test 
Experimental Group show a High stance. This similarity in responses at entry pre-
test is important and encouraging as it suggests that both groups were similar at 
outset even if the selection was non-random or not matched. An examination of 
independent studies suggests finer differences between groups although the 
general level and pattern is similar (see Table 12-B in Appendix B). 
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It is very interesting to see the pattern of cange in post stance of both Control 
and Experimental Groups. In the post-test, the picture is opposite to the pre-test. 
In the Control Group, 13 respondents that compose 32.5% of overall post 
respondents, have a Low stance. 27 respondents, make 67.5% of overall post 
respondents and fall in the High category. The picture is clearer in the post-test 
scores of the Experimental Group; 8 respondents in the Experimental Group fall in 
the Low category whereas 35 respondents i.e. 81.4% of overall post experimental 
respondents, fall in the High category. This significant change in stance from Low 
to High stance in the post-test of both sets of data indicates that Interventions 1 
and 2 do work in their own ways and are compatible with my hypothesis; that more 
change could be observed in the Experimental Group than the Control Group. In 
order to support this statement, I used a Chi-square test to see the reliability of 
change in the Control and Experimental Group. In Table 4.5, the Chi square value 
for the Control Group is 12.832, and shows a difference in pre-test and post-test. 
The significance value for this set of data is 0.000, which is very small and shows 
difference or change is significant in pre-test and post-test responses. In the 
Experimental Group, the Chi square value is 24.819, which is almost double the 
Chi square value of the Control Group. This value indicates that there is a large 
difference in change in the Experimental Group as compared to the Control Group. 
Also, the significance value for this set of data is 0.000, which shows that Change 
is reliable and significant. 
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Table 4.5: Analysis No Change, Degree Change, Category Change in 
Control and Experimental Groups 
   Chi square = 12.832   Chi square = 24.819 
   DF =1     DF =1 
   P-value 0.000   P-value 0.000 
 
Figure 4.6: Comparison of Low and High Stance Control Group 
 
 
Category  Control 
Pre test 
Control 
Post test 
Experimental 
Pre test 
Experimental 
Post test 
Low 29 13 31 8 
% 72.5 32.5 72.1 18.6 
High 11 27 12 35 
% 27.5 67.5 27.9 81.4 
Total 40 40 43 43 
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Low and High Stance Experimental Group 
 
4.5.4 Fine Grain Analysis of Low and High Stance in the Five Study Groups  
 
An analysis of Low and High stance in the Control and Experimental Groups 
in the 5 study groups was conducted. At pre-test in the Control Group, most 
participants are at Low positions (1-2-3) on the Category Scale except in Rose, 
where Lows and Highs are more balanced. At post-test in the Control Group, A, B, 
and E present a matching picture with most participants moving to the High Group 
and lower stances being vacated. In the Experimental Group at pre-test, most 
groups present a picture of Low scores except Jasmine, where 53.8 % show High 
scores. In the post-test of the Experimental Group, the picture is reversed with all 
except one showing significantly High scores. Pansy differs in this respect. Pansy 
has no participant at High scores at pre-test, which could be the reason why in a 
comparison of Low and High scores, the group is at a disadvantage. It is interesting 
to note the similarity in the two groups at Total. The percentage of Low scores at 
pre-test is 72.5 in the Control Groups and 72 in Experimental Groups. There are 
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27.5 in the High scores at pre-test of the Control Group and 27.9 in the 
Experimental Group. The difference in total change to High scores is very different 
at post-test between Control and Experimental Groups. 81.4 % are at High scores 
in the Experimental Group as compared to 65% in the Control Group. A change 
can easily be seen in terms of observed counts of Low and High category in both 
sets of data. This result is studied further with an estimate of Effect. 
 
Table 4.6: Analysis of Low and High Stance in each City’s Study Group for 
Control and Experimental Groups 
 
Study Groups Control Experimental 
Pre Post Pre Post 
Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Rose 6 5 1 10 5 1 1 5 
%age 54.54 45.45 9.09 90.9 83.3 16.6 16.6 83.3 
Tulip 5 0 1 4 4 2 1 5 
%age 100 0 20 80 66.6 33.3 16.6 83.3 
Jasmine 9 2 7 4 6 7 1 12 
%age 81.8 18.1 63.6 36.3 46.1 53.8 7.7 92.3 
Bougainvillea 6 2 4 4 9 2 1 10 
%age 75.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 81.8 18.2 9.1 90.9 
Pansy 3 2 1 4 7 0 4 3 
%age 60.0 40.0 20 80 100 0 57.1 42.9 
Total 29 11 14 26 31 12 8 35 
%age 72.5 27.5 35 65 72.0 27.9 18.6 81.4 
 
The data of the five study groups was analyzed to identify more change 
towards High scores in each. There is a pattern of more Low scores at pre-test 
while there are some differences in proportion between groups. However, the 
proportion of difference at post-test is not always concurrent. Groups differ in 
effects. The analysis above compares a sum of moves towards High scores in 
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each group. Table 4.6 shows that there was more change in the Experimental 
Groups overall than in the Control Groups. This is consistent with the higher 
change in the Experimental Group in the combined data and the higher %age of 
High scores in the Experimental Group at post-test.  
 
4.5.5 Difference-In-Difference Estimator after Excluding Pansy 
 
Table 4.7: Difference-In-Difference (D.I.D) Estimator - City Wise 
 
City D.I.D 
Rose 0.590909 
 
Tulip 0.1 
 
Jasmine 0.454545 
 
Bougainvillea 0.443182 
 
Pansy -0.3619 
 
 
To measure the intervention effect in each group, a Difference-In-Difference 
Estimator is calculated by the following formula: 
Treatment effect = δ = (?̂?- ?̂? ) − (?̂?- ?̂? ) =   (𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  -  𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) – 
(𝑌𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒  -  𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑃𝑟𝑒) 
Treatment effects of all groups except Pansy show that there is a positive 
effect of the Intervention in Experimental Groups. 4 out of 5 Experimental Groups 
respond better as compared to the Control Groups. Only Pansy shows that the 
Intervention did not work and its Control Group performs better than the 
Experimental Group. 
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The Pansy group appeared to be an outlier compared to the other groups. 
Therefore, to explore this, I excluded Pansy in the analysis and calculated a 
Difference- In-Difference (D.I.D) for the remaining four groups. D.I.D Estimator for 
the four groups is found to be 0.35, which is greater than the D.I.D value of the 
overall five study groups. Also, I ran a Difference-In-Difference regression model 
for the four groups as I have carried out in the meta-analysis of all Cities. The 
significance value of intervention effect in this model is found to be 0.000, which is 
better than the previous model. This is an important comparison and provides 
support to the hypothesis that there is a relationship of a perception of agency and 
change in concepts. 
 
4.6 Summary of Analysis of Data from Responses to BM (Boscolo and 
Mason) Questions 
 
Notes: 
a)  Responses were analysed using the CBKH rubric. Qualitative descriptors 
were awarded numerical scores on a scale of 1-7. Scores ranged 
between1-6, no individual was found at 7. 
b)  Analysis is of overall combined data of 5 studies and separately of 5 
independent studies. 
 
4.6.1 Reliability of the Instrument 
 
 First internal Evaluation score = 64.69%, and percentage of 
mismatch is 35% 
 Second Internal Evaluation Score= 53% and percentage of 
mismatch is 47% 
 Third internal Evaluation score = 82% and percentage of mismatch 
is 17% 
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4.6.2 Frequency Distribution Table with Chi-Square Test 
 
The Control Group Chi-Square test statistic of change from pre-test to post-
test is 23.733 and p-value is 0.000. Experimental Group Chi-Square test statistics 
is 35.51 and p-Value is 0.000. Change is significant for both groups but the Chi-
Square statistic is larger for the Experimental Group. The difference of values 
between Control and Experimental Groups is, however, not significant. 
 
4.6.3 Odds Ratio for Change and No Change 
 
Odds ratio is 1.259. There is more likelihood of change in the Experimental 
Group than the Control Group. 
 
4.6.4 Pre-Test and Post-Test Difference in Both Groups Using a Paired t 
Test 
 
The difference is significant from pre-test to post-test in both groups. Control 
Group test statistic and significance value is (t = - 4.149, degree of freedom = 39, 
p-value 0.000). In the Experimental Group, change is also significant. (t = - 5.263, 
degree of freedom = 42, p-value = 0.000) However, more change has taken place 
in the Experimental Group. 
 
4.6.5 Pre-Test and Post-Test Difference in 5 Studies Using Wilcoxen Rank 
Sum Test 
 
Test results indicate that only 1 out of 5 groups in the Control Groups has 
significant difference in responses while in the Experimental Group, 4 groups out 
of 5 show significant difference from pre-test to post-test.  
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4.6.6 Estimating Intervention Effect Using Difference-In-Difference 
Estimator 
 
Effect of the treatment is 0.275. This positive value indicates that 
Intervention in the Experimental Group did work to make a difference in change. 
 
 
4.6.7 Fine Grain Analysis of Change in Stance (No Change, Degree Change 
and Category Change) with a Mann Whitney Test  
 
The difference is significant between Control and Experimental Groups in 
the No Change and Degree Change categories while not significant in the 
Category Change category. 
 
4.6.8 Analysis of Low and High Stance in Overall Control and Experimental 
Groups 
 
A Chi square test of independence was used to see the significance of 
change (difference) in Low and High stance. The Chi square test statistics in Table 
4.2.6 shows significant difference in Low and High stance in the Control Group. 
While more significant difference is found in terms of Low and High stance in the 
Experimental Group. 
 
4.6.9 Fine Grain Analysis of Low and High Stance in 5 Independent Studies 
Using a D.I.D Estimator 
 
D.I.D estimates are found to be positive in the first four groups while 
negative in the last group. Intervention 2 has a positive effect in 4 groups out of 5.  
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4.7 Analysis of Data from the Likert Scale, the Belief about Learning 
Teacher History Questionnaire (BLTHQ) 
 
4.7.1 Questions for Analysis of the BLTHQ Data 
 
 What is the stance of participants in terms of agreement or 
disagreement with items reflecting the Categories, Copier, Borrower, 
Criterialist, at pre-test? 
 What is the stance of participants after Intervention at post-test? 
 Do participants change their stance from pre-test to post-test in both 
groups, Control and Experimental? 
 What is the degree of change? 
 What is the nature of the change and the direction of the change? 
 Is there a difference in numbers at change from pre-test to post-test 
between Control and Experimental Groups? 
 Is there a difference in degree of change or nature of change 
between Control and Experimental Groups?  
4.7.2 Reliability of the Instrument 
 
Reliability (internal consistency) of the BLTHQ items in pre and post -test 
for both Control and Experimental Groups is measured by using Cronbach's alpha. 
The Cronbach alpha for the Control Group at pre-test is 0.562 indicating very weak 
consistency, and at post-test, the reliability is increased to 0.752 showing fairly 
good reliability of the items. In the Experimental Group, the reliability of the 
instrument at pre-test is found to be 0.612 and, at post-test, the reliability is found 
to be 0.639, which can be taken to mean that the reliability value is in an acceptable 
range in the Experimental Group. It must be kept in mind that there are only 21 
items in the Likert Scale and these can be grouped into three different levels of 
beliefs. Factor Analysis does show more items loading on Factors at pre- test than 
at post- test. 
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There is some doubt in my mind regarding the Cronbach alpha for the 
BLTHQ scale. The items are divided into three different sets according to the three 
categories of belief, the Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist. The Cronbach alpha is 
a measure of the internal consistency among the items. Cohen et al. (2007, p.506). 
Cohen et al. (2007) refer to Bryman and Cramer (1990:71) that the reliability value 
is acceptable at 0.8 although others suggest that it is acceptable at 0.67 or above. 
Keeping the latter as a reference the yield quoted above may be considered 
adequate. 
Apart from this test, the Factor Analysis is presented for discussion. 
Importantly, the other measure of change and epistemic stance, the Boscolo & 
Mason questions, display similar, consistent results. A number of tests conducted 
of data from the BLTHQ and presented here also show consistent if not significant 
results. 
 
4.7.3 Arrangement of Data 
 
4.7.3.1 Change as Observed in Responses to the BLTHQ Items is 
Expressed in the Following Arrangement: 
 
A binary model of Change and No Change, where all data is arranged 
according to the difference in scores obtained in pre-test and post-test. If the score 
on the Likert Scale at pre-test is the same as obtained at post-test, this is seen as 
No Change. If the score is different at post-test, regardless of where it is on the 
scale of 1 to 5, it is seen as change. In this arrangement, all change is change as 
opposed to No Change as resistance to change if a pattern appears to emerge. 
A move from agreement on the item to disagreement on the item at post-
test or vice versa is seen as a change in category on a single item. Change as 
change in category, Copier, Borrower, or Criterialist, as agreement or 
disagreement with a number of items in the same category, will be seen as a 
change in stance. Of the 21 items, 9 are said to be Copier items, 4 are said to be 
Criterialist items, and 8 are said to be Borrower items. If a respondent is seen to 
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be agreeing with most Copier items and disagreeing with Borrower or Criterialist 
items, that respondent may be said to be holding a Copier stance. This position 
could change. A change in category selected at pre-test by the respondent to 
another at post-test will be seen as a change in category. Change can be change 
in degree of stance e.g. from a score of 1 as strongly agree to a score of 2 as agree 
with the item that denotes the stance. 
 
4.7.3.2 Results and Discussion of Analysis on Cross Tables and Chi 
Square 
 
In order to observe and understand the pattern of change or difference in 
pre and post responses, Cross tables of all Items were made and studied in depth. 
The Chi Square test statistics in most items are found to be greater in the 
Experimental Group as compared to the Control Group. This indicates that more 
change (difference) took place in the Experimental Group. The significance value 
indicates that only 3 items out of 21 items in the Experimental Group are 
significantly different in pre-test to post-test responses. The change, however, 
appears to be visible on the cross table. All cells are not homogenous from pre-
test to post-test in both groups and movement can be observed in degree of stance 
if not easily from categories. This needed to be quantified in some way and, if there 
was a pattern to this change, it needed to be discovered. I, therefore, searched for 
options of analysis in order to observe and understand the pattern of change or 
difference in pre-test and post-test responses. Significance value of the Chi Square 
reveals that change is insignificant in most items of both groups except for 3 items. 
In these 2 Items of the Criterialist stance, and 1 Item of the Copier stance, more 
significant change has taken place in the Experimental Group only. As the 
Criterialist stance is seen to be the key, this difference between Control and 
Experimental Groups is considered meaningful. An instrument effect could be that 
as there are only 4 items out of the 21 of the Criterialist stance in the BLTHQ, and 
large change in both groups is seen in the Criterialist stance mainly, it can be 
suggested that with more items in this stance, change could be more significant 
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on the BLTHQ. The cross tables analysis of most items shows that the data does 
not appear random or confused for the most part. There is a clear pattern that is 
apparent in the consistency of responses falling in easily discernible bands for 
most items in both groups. It may be possible to assume that the questionnaire, 
the BLTHQ, has largely been able to identify the participants’ beliefs. The 
Exploratory Factor analysis has interesting results. 
 
4.7.3.3 Quantifying Difference of the Difference in Change as seen on 
Cross Tables 
 
It was seen as important to know the difference of the difference in change 
from pre-test to post-test between the Control and Experimental Groups in order 
to support an answer to the research questions. To quantify the amount of change 
in both sets of data, an absolute difference of percentages in each category from 
pre-test to post-test is taken in both sets of data, Control and Experimental. The 
reason for taking absolute difference is that I only need the magnitude of change, 
therefore I have ignored the sign and considered only the absolute value. Then, a 
difference of these differences is taken. 
In Table 4.16, ∆C% represents change from pre-test to post-test in the 
Control Group while ∆E% represents change from pre-test to post-test in the 
Experimental Group. The sum of difference is calculated separately in both Control 
and Experimental Groups and finally, a difference of this difference is taken. The 
overall change in the Control Group is 20% while in the Experimental Group the 
change is 32.50%, which shows that more change has taken place in the 
Experimental Group as compared to the Control Group. 
This process is repeated for each item and is stated in the column as in Item 
one. By studying the pattern of these differences for all items, it is possible to see 
that out of nine Copier items, six items show more change in the Experimental 
Group. All four Criterialist items show more change in the Experimental Group at 
post-test. Out of eight Borrower items, five show more change in the Control 
Group. 
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To summarize, Copier and Criterialist items show more change in the 
Experimental Group, and Borrower items show more change in the Control Group. 
Out of a total of 21 items, 13 items show more change in the Experimental Group 
and 8 items show more change in the Control Group. This analysis of the difference 
of the difference helps to quantify the difference in groups and may support the 
notion that change took place in both groups, Control and Experimental, while 
more change took place in the Experimental Group. Why there is a difference in 
change in Borrower items is hard to understand. Theoretically, the pattern of more 
change in the Criterialist items towards greater agreement or towards a more 
Criterialist stance stands to reason but the difference in the Control Group on the 
Borrower stance alone needs further analysis. It is certainly consistent with theory 
that a move from a Borrower stance, which is related to a Subjectivist position, is 
a move towards more sophistication. In that sense, it can be seen as consistent 
with a move towards a more Criterialist stance in both sets of data. 
There is a similar move in the Borrower stance in the Experimental Group but 
it is not significant. The move in the Experimental Group in the Criterialist stance 
is important as the Criterialist position is key in the scale of epistemic beliefs and 
the Intervention introduced activities and discussion related to this. The group 
changed significantly more on this stance and changed towards greater agreement 
with the Criterialist stance. 
Data indicates an emerging consistency in responses in both groups. There is 
evidence of change in belief as degree of agreement or disagreement rather than 
change of category of belief. On the whole, the pattern is of consistency in category 
from pre-test and post-test. There is more change in degree of agreement or 
disagreement within the category rather than change from category. There is 
evidence across the tables of change in degree from a strong to a simple 
agreement or disagree at a stance. This is different from what the BM results 
suggest where change from categories is evident across the board. The stance 
that is apparent is conceptually meaningful when seen in the light of data from the 
BM questions. 
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The cross tables display the percentages and frequencies that support this 
conclusion. An analysis of stance and consistency of stance is conducted. Most 
respondents disagree with most Copier items in both sets of data, Control and 
Experimental, and more so, at post-test. Respondents agree with Criterialist items, 
more so in the Experimental Group at post-test, and to some extent, disagree on 
Borrower items thus demonstrating a more Criterialist stance. This is common in 
the main in both groups with differences in change in degrees of agreement and 
disagreement. More change appears to have taken place in the Experimental 
Group and this is significant in the Criterialist items, which is also important. The 
analysis of stance as percentages of agreement and disagreement in the cross 
tables and of the consistency of stance support the findings. 
Where I had expected that change would be evident in both instruments 
making triangulation possible to support the findings, has been supported. Results 
also appear to strongly suggest that the history focused questions of the BM did 
work to unravel history related epistemic beliefs while the BLTHQ did access the 
learning and teaching beliefs held by teachers. If these results are reliable, and it 
appears so to some extent, interesting questions are raised in reference to the 
similarity in change as mapped by the two questionnaires. Are the teachers’ 
epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history and their understanding about 
pedagogical practices consistent? Was this the case because these were practice 
related belief embedded in school culture or did the Intervention make a 
difference?  
Interestingly, employing the data from each instrument separately to analyze 
what changed, and did not change, whether the intervention worked to target those 
particular beliefs or not, can be seen to be an effective strategy for analysis of the 
BLTHQ and BM data. The statements of the BLTHQ and BM questions are 
different as is the nature of the beliefs that each targets, yet each instrument 
displays change from pre-test to post-test in its own way. This can serve to inform 
research in the field. 
The BM questions target theoretical ideas and the BLTHQ statements are set 
in pedagogical practices of history teaching. The responses in both instruments 
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provide useful data regarding these practices and the beliefs that may underpin 
them. Epistemic beliefs are complex and relate to domains and contexts as well 
as other factors as research suggests. The stance of participants and change as 
seen in these two instruments can provide support to descriptions of teacher 
beliefs and implications for change. 
The change, as seen post interventions, has implications for the change in 
syllabus and assessment as planned by Cambridge International Examinations. 
Schools and teachers as well may see the emerging story as useful in informing 
both teacher education requirements as well as the possibilities for managing 
change. 
 
4.7.4 List of Statistical Analysis of the BLTHQ Items to Identify and Analyze 
Change  
 
In order to examine the change in pre-test and post-test and the difference in 
change in both sets of data, Control and Experimental, I have used various 
statistical techniques. The reason for conducting a range of analysis was to limit 
possibilities of error and look for finer grain in the analysis.  
The BLTHQ is constructed on a scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree. For this Instrument, I have used 1 as Strongly Disagree, to 5 as Strongly 
Agree. The data is at ordinal level with no specific assumptions, therefore  
non-parametric statistical tests are used to analyze the data. These are described 
below. 
 
4.7.4.1 Cross Table and Chi Square 
 
First, individual items are analyzed by means of cross tabulation and a Chi 
Square test to see the difference between observed and expected frequencies in 
each set of data. The Chi Square test statistic in each item is calculated to see the 
difference in pre-test and post-test responses with respect to each category 
(Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree).  
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One of the basic assumptions of Chi Square is that 20% of expected count in 
each is not less than 5. If the 20% of expected count is less than 5, then the Chi 
Square asymptotic significance value can be misleading. In this case, the Fisher 
Exact significance value is used instead of asymptotic significance value. In my 
study, several items have expected count less than 5 in over 20 % of cells. So, I 
report Fisher Exact significance value where it is needed and ignore asymptotic 
significance value. The Chi Square test is used to see the difference in two sets of 
questionnaires at different levels of agreement and disagreement. An effect size 
of this Chi Square value is calculated to report the measure of association in terms 
of weak, modest, moderate and strong association. Since the dependent variable 
is ordinal in nature (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree) and the independent 
variable is dichotomous (pre-test and post-test), Cramer's V measure of 
association is appropriate to calculate the effect size (Appendix-B).  
 
4.7.4.2 Analysis of Stance from Cross Tables with Percentages at 
Agreement and Disagreement 
 
The Cross Tables display the frequencies of agreement and disagreement 
on each item. In order to discuss the stance of participants, a preliminary analysis 
of percentages at agreement and disagreement is carried out. In places in some 
items, percentages of Agree and Strongly Agree are summed to discuss the stance 
of participants. By simple addition of the percentage of Agree and Strongly Agree, 
a sum of agreement is taken. This is repeated for Strongly Disagree and Disagree. 
Thus, a percentage sum is taken to point towards a stance of larger numbers of 
participants. A few items are displayed in this file. The remaining can be seen in 
the Appendix 14-B to 27-B. 
 
4.7.4.3 Analysis of the Difference of the Difference 
 
To carry out a closer analysis of change, I used another mathematical 
method based on observed responses (frequencies) in the Cross Table. The 
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process of this method is in two stages. First, I took the absolute difference of pre-
test to post-test responses in each category for each group, Control and 
Experimental. Next, a sum of these absolute differences was taken separately in 
both Control and Experimental Groups. The difference of this sum from 
Experimental to Control Groups represents total change in each item. 
To explain, the cross table displays the percentage of responses for each 
category, Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. Using Excel, the percentage at pre-
test was subtracted from the percentage at post-test for each category in the 
Control Group. This was repeated in the Experimental Group. Taking absolute 
numbers and disregarding the negative and positive signs, a sum of this absolute 
number is taken. This sum of the Control Group was then subtracted from that of 
the Experimental Group. The remainder was the difference of the difference 
between pre-test and post-test scores between Control and Experimental Groups. 
This is displayed in Table 4.16. 
This analysis will help me answer research questions on the basis of whole 
groups, pre-test and post-test and Control and Experimental, but it will not tell me 
much about how individuals changed. The analysis of Cross Tables also tends to 
focus on large numbers in cells even if they are technically not 'most'. A pattern 
horizontally across the Table 4.16 shows where a band of large numbers is formed, 
often from Control to Experimental Groups. This also misses the numbers 
scattered at other points of agreement and disagreement, which is a disadvantage 
of the method. However, it does help to answer the question of where broadly 
change took place. 
 
4.7.4.4 Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test 
 
A Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test, a non-parametric test, is used in each of the 
21 individual items for both sets of data, Control and Experimental, to see the 
difference in pre-test and post-test responses. The test is also used in the smaller 
sets of data of individual City groups to study the change in pre-test to post-test 
responses in Control and Experimental Groups in depth.  
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4.7.4.5 Odds Ratio  
 
In the next stage of study, the responses of overall respondents are 
categorized into Change and No Change categories in both Control and 
Experimental Groups. The data is converted into binary categories i.e. Change or 
No Change. The binary data is then analyzed by means of Odds Ratio to find out 
the Odds of change in the Experimental Group rather than No Change or Odds of 
change in the Experimental Group rather than the Control Group. 
 
4.7.4.6 Analysis of Stance 
 
It was considered important to identify the stance of participants in order to 
describe the change from pre-test to post-test and relate this to the Interventions 
provided. The focus of the study is conceptual change, and epistemic belief 
change is the particular conceptual change of interest in my study. By itself, 
exploring the epistemic stance of teachers of history is a useful endeavour in the 
light of the expected change in the Cambridge O' Level History Syllabus and its 
assessment in Pakistan. An Exploratory Factor Analysis is conducted followed by 
weighted averages and Consistency scores. 
 
4.7.4.7 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
An Exploratory Factor Analysis based on a principal components extraction 
method is carried out to identify the structure of data as well as to explore the 
factors that emerge from the data. A similar analysis was conducted by the authors 
in the US and it is reported by them e.g. Maggioni et al. (2004), I attempted the 
Factor Analysis in order to see how the instrument worked with my sample and if 
this could be seen to support my findings from the other analysis in any way. 
Factor Analysis was conducted of separate sets of data of pre/post, Control 
and Experimental Groups and followed by an analysis of the complete data set of 
166 response sheets. Factors that emerged remain 7 or 8 initially but those 3 that 
explained more variance were taken. The analysis of the overall data provided a 
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more coherent picture as 3 Factors of a single stance did emerge with an exception 
of 1 item in each. 
An unexpected outcome of carrying out the Factor Analysis turned to be an 
observation of the difference in the Factors that emerged at pre-test and post-test 
taken in the Control and Experimental Groups. Where Factors of a single stance 
did not emerge at pre-test, at post-test, data of the Experimental Group showed a 
change with a Factor of a single criterialist stance emerging. This is described in 
the Section 4.7.12 on Factor Analysis. 
 
4.7.4.8 Weighted Score and Consistency Score of Epistemic Beliefs 
 
A final analysis of responses to the BLTHQ is conducted to identify the 
epistemic stance of respondents and describe the change within this. Weighted 
scores and Consistency scores are calculated for each respondent. As there are 
a total of 83 participants, 40 in the Control Group and 43 in the Experimental 
Group, an overview is required; therefore, a Table of scores is presented in Table 
4.26. A discussion is provided below the Table 4.26. The Weighted score is 
calculated to assess the magnitude of change from pre-test to post-test. The 
Consistency score is calculated to assess the consistency of respondents on a 
stance. To explain, a respondent, to be a Criterialist, should in principle agree with 
criterialist items and disagree with Copier and Borrower items. The authors set a 
high bar, expecting 90% before a respondent can be assigned to the stance. This 
is seen in the data as over 90% in actual terms agree with the items of the 
criterialist stance; however, because they also either agree with the Copier stance 
or the Borrower stance, consistency is denied. That is an interpretation however, 
as it is hard to say why respondents did so. More qualitative data in a follow up 
study could help to explain this phenomenon. 
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4.7.5 Description of Analysis of Change 
 
4.7.5.1 Cross Table of BLTHQ Items  
 
The stances of respondents are categorized into the Copier, Borrower and 
Criterialist Stance as described by the authors, Maggioni et al. (2004) BLTHQ 
items reflect a Criterialist (4,11,12,13), Borrower (14,15,16,17,18,19, 20, 21) and 
Copier (1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9) stance. Cross tables of all 21 BLTHQ items are 
constructed individually. The percentage difference, Chi Square statistics value, 
its significance value, effect size and co-relation among pre-test and post-test 
responses of both Control and Experimental Groups are calculated for each item. 
In this Section, only items 1, 2, 7 of the Copier, items 4,11,12,13 of the Criterialist 
and item 16 of the Borrower stance are presented and discussed in detail. The 
remaining items are available in Appendix-B (see Tables 14-B to 27-B).  
These items are selected for discussion for the following reasons. The first 
item shows responses scattered in cells and is a good example of such items. Item 
2 is one of those that show significant change and that happens to be in the 
Experimental Group. The Criterialist items 4, 11, 12, 13, are selected because the 
Criterialist stance is important being the point of reference for a more sophisticated 
stance and where most change has taken place. Significant change has taken 
place in Items 11 and 13 amongst these and that is in the Experimental Group as 
well. Items 4 and12 also show large change, more so in the Experimental Group 
but the change is not significant.  
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Table 4.8: Students who are Good in Memorization Learn History Quickly 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post-
Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
2 2 0 4 4 0 
5.0 5.0 9.3 9.3 
Disagree 
% 
6 9 7.5 11 17 13.90 
15.0 22.5 25.6 39.5 
Neutral 
% 
7 8 2.5 8 6 4.60 
17.5 20.0 18.6 14.0 
Agree 
% 
21 17 10 13 14 2.4 
52.5 42.5 30.2 32.6 
Strongly Agree 
% 
4 4 0 7 2 11.60 
10.0 10.0 16.3 4.7 
Total 
% 
40 40 20 43 43 32.50 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
   Chi - Square = 1.088  Chi - Square = 4.386 
   D.F = 4    D.F = 4 
   P-value = 0.89   P-value = 0.356 
   Cramer's V = 0.117   Cramer's V = 0.226 
 
The stance of respondents is categorized into a Copier, Borrower and 
Criterialist Stance as described by the authors, Maggioni et al. (2004). Item 1 of 
BLTHQ i.e. ‘Students who are good in memorization learn history quickly,’ 
represents the Copier stance. The respondents overall response for this item in 
Control and Experimental Groups at pre-test and post-test is displayed in Table 
4.8. The majority of the respondents (52.5%) in the Control Group at post-test 
agree with this Copier statement whereas in the Experimental Group 37.3% 
respondents agree with this statement of Item 1 at post-test.  
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 The Chi Square test is used to see the difference in two sets of responses 
at different levels of agreement and disagreement. The Chi Square value for the 
Control Group is found to be 1.088, while in the Experimental Group, the value is 
4.386 and shows that more difference has taken place in the Experimental Group 
as compared to the Control Group. The significance value of Chi Square for both 
sets of data shows that the difference is insignificant for this item. The result of 
Cramer's V for the Control Group is 0.117 showing that there is strong association 
between stances and groups. In the Experimental Group, the Cramer's V estimate 
is 0.226 and shows that there is very strong association between disagreement 
and post-test. This result indicates that the respondents’ disagreement with this 
item in post-test is greater than pre-test. The Spearman rank co-relation also 
indicates that co-relation is stronger in the Experimental Group than the Control 
Group. 
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Table 4.9: Corroborating Evidence and Identifying Sources are Important 
Learning Strategies in History but Only After Mastering the Basic Facts 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Po
st-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
0 0  1 0 2.3 
  0 0 2.3 0 
Disagree 
% 
3 1   
5 
3 4 2.3 
  7.5 2.5 7.0 9.3 
Neutral 
% 
3 1   
5 
5 2 6.9 
  7.5 2.5 11.6 4.7 
Agree 
% 
24 26   
5 
25 22 6.9 
  60.0 65.0 58.1 51.2 
Strongly Agree 
% 
10 12   
5 
9 15 14 
25.0 30.0 20.9 34.9 
Total 
% 
40 40 20 43 43 32.40 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
    Chi- Square = 2.262 Chi - Square = 4.120 
    D.F = 4   D.F = 4 
    P-value = 0.520  P-value = 0.0390 
    Cramer's V = 0.168  Cramer's V = 0.219 
 
Table 4.9 shows the observed responses and Chi Square test for Item 2. 
The Chi Square test value for Control Group is 2.262 and for Experimental Group 
the value is 4.120. The greater value of Chi Square in Experimental Group shows 
the difference is greater in Experimental Group as compared to Control Group. 
Also, the significance value of Experimental Group is 0.0390 and shows change 
or difference is significant in the Experimental Group. 
It is possible to calculate from Table 4.9 that most respondents, 90% in the 
Control Group agree with this item (I refer to Strongly Agree and Agree as a single 
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Agree response for interpretation). In the Experimental Group, almost the same 
picture emerges from the Table 4.9 that most respondents agree with the item for 
the Copier stance.  
The total change in the Experimental Group is greater than the Control 
Group. In the Experimental Group, the change is 32.40% and in Control Group the 
change is 20%, which shows that more change has taken place in the 
Experimental Group as compared to the Control Group. The result in terms of total 
change is almost similar to Item 1 of the Copier stance. 
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Table 4.10: Teachers Need to Avoid Giving Students Conflicting Sources, 
since it Makes Historical Investigation Impossible 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Pos
t-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
6 7 
2.5 
 
10 11 
2.3 
 
15.0 17.5 23.3 25.6 
Disagree 
% 
18 22 10 
 
13 22 21 
 45.0 55.0 30.2 51.2 
Neutral 
% 
6 2 10 
 
2 2 0 
 15.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 
Agree 
% 
6 7 2.5 
 
12 5 16.3 
 15.0 17.5 27.9 11.6 
Strongly Agree 
% 
4 2 
5 
6 3 
7 10.0 5.0 14.0 7.0 
Total 
% 
40 40 30 43 43 39.60 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi- Square = 3.221  Chi - Square = 6.244 
D.F = 4    D.F=4 
P-value = 0.522    P-value = 0.182 
Cramer's V = 0.196   Cramer's V = 0.269 
 
A sum of 60% of respondents of the Control Group disagree with this item 
at pre-test, and at post-test the percentage of disagreement increases to 72.5%. 
In the Experimental Group, 53.5% of respondents disagree with this item at 
pre-test, and after Intervention, the percentage of disagreement increases to 
76.80%. 41.9% respondents agree with this item at pre-test and at post-test, the 
percentage of agreement decreases to 18.6%. These changes in responses of 
participants show that the Intervention in the Experimental Group as compared to 
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the Control Group did have some effect even if it was non-significant and that it 
was in the direction of a more sophisticated Criterialist stance (see Table 4.10). 
The Chi Square test for the Control Group at 0.05 level of significance 
shows that there is no difference in responses of pre-test and post-test as its   
p-value is 0.522. The Experimental Group p-value of Chi Square is 0.182, which 
is greater than 0.05 and shows no difference in the Experimental Group at post-
test as well. The Cramer's V estimate of the Experimental Group is found to be 
0.2569 and shows that there is a moderate association among disagreement and 
post responses. 
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Table 4.11: Knowledge of The Historical Method is Fundamental for 
Historians and Students Alike 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 0 2.5 
 
0 0 0 
 2.5 0 0 0 
Disagree 
% 
9 7 5 
 
9 5 9.3 
 22.5 17.5 20.9 11.6 
Neutral 
% 
8 7 2.5 
 
11 5 14 
 20.0 17.5 25.6 11.6 
Agree 
% 
17 13 10 
 
15 23 18.6 
 42.5 32.5 34.9 53.5 
Strongly Agree 
% 
5 13 
20 
8 10 
4.7 12.5 32.5 18.6 23.3 
Total 
% 
40 40 40 43 43 46.60 
100.0 100.0 100.
0 
100.0 
 
Chi- Square = 1.250  Chi - Square =5.299 
D.F = 4    D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.870   P-value = 0.151 
Cramer's V = 0.248   Cramer's V = 0.260 
 
Table 4.11 shows observed frequencies of respondents for this Criterialist 
item at pre-test and post-test for both Control and Experimental Groups. A Chi 
Square test for both Control and Experimental Groups shows difference between 
pre-test and post-test responses. However, the Chi Square value for the Control 
Group is 1.250, and for the Experimental Group it is 5.299, which shows that more 
difference occurs in the Experimental Group as compared to the Control Group.  
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From the Table 4.11 above, it is seen that most respondents agree with the 
Criterialist stance. Interestingly, the Criterialist stance sees most agreement in the 
research of Maggioni et al. (2004) and Maggioni et al. (2009a). Here in my study, 
64.0% of the respondents agree with the Criterialist stance in the Control Group 
while in the Experimental Group, 76.8% of the respondents agree with the 
Criterialist stance. In the Experimental Group, a notable change can be seen as 
34.9% of the respondents agree with the Criterialist stance at pre-test and at post-
test, this increases to 53.5% of the overall respondents. The Chi Square Test 
statistic shows that more change happened in the Experimental Group as 
compared to the Control Group. 
This is the first item of the Criterialist stance in the Likert Scale and most 
show agreement, which means a sophisticated stance on the categories. 55% 
agree at pre-test and 65% at post-test in the Control Group, which is a difference 
of 10%. In the Experimental Group, 54% agree at pre-test and 77% at post-test. 
The percentage of difference in pre-test and post-test in the Control Group is 10% 
as opposed to 24% in the Experimental Group, which is more than twice. 
The 1.5% difference in agreement at entry pre-test is not large between 
Control and Experimental Groups. The 24% difference in change between Control 
and Experimental Groups that is seen at post-test is very large in comparison. The 
p- value however, is not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.12: Comparing Sources and Looking for Author Subtext are 
Essential Components of The Process of Learning History 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Pos
t-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post-
Pre)% 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 
Disagree 
% 
0 1 2.5 
 
6 1 11.7 
 0 2.5 14.0 2.3 
Neutral 
% 
5 2 7.5 
 
7 3 9.3 
 12.5 5.0 16.3 7.0 
Agree 
% 
22 19 7.5 
 
24 20 9.3 
 55.0 47.5 55.8 46.5 
Strongly Agree 
% 
13 18 
12.5 
6 19 
30.2 32.5 45.0 14.0 44.2 
Total 
% 
40 40 30 43 43 60.50 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 3.312  Chi - Square = 12.295 
D.F = 4    D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.346   P-value = 0.006 
Cramer's V = 0.201   Cramer's V = 0.238 
 
This key statement of the Criterialist stance sees nearly all participants 
agreeing. There is a slight change in the post-test in both groups. In the Control 
Group 92.5% respondents agree with this item and in the Experimental Group 
90.7% respondents agree with this item. 
The Chi Square test and its associated p-value for the Control Group shows 
a difference that is insignificant between pre-test and post-test responses. In the 
Experimental Group, the Chi Square test statistic is 12.295, and its p-value is 0.006 
and shows that there is a highly significant difference in pre-test and post-test 
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responses in the Experimental Group. Also, the Chi Square value for the 
Experimental Group is larger than that of the Control Group. 
88% participants agree in the Control Group at pre-test and 92% at post-
test, which is a difference of 3%. In the Experimental Group, 69% agree at pre-test 
and 91% at post-test, a difference of 22%, making the change significant in the 
Experimental Group. The difference at pre-test between Control and Experimental 
Groups is 18%, which is a large difference. 
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Table 4.13: Students need to be taught to Deal with Conflicting Evidence 
 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post-
Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post-
Pre)% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
0 0 
0 
 
1 0 
2.3 
 
0 0 2.3 0 
Disagree 
% 
1 0 2.5 
 
2 1 2.4 
 2.5 0 4.7 2.3 
Neutral 
% 
3 0 7.5 
 
2 0 4.7 
 7.5 0 4.7 0 
Agree 
% 
23 21 5 
 
23 20 7 
 57.5 52.5 53.5 46.5 
Strongly Agree 
% 
13 19 
15 
15 22 
16.3 32.5 47.5 34.9 51.2 
Total 
% 
40 40 30 43 43 32.70 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 5.216  Chi - Square = 4.867 
D.F = 4    D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.157   -value = 0.301 
Cramer's V = 0.255   Cramer's V = 0.238 
 
Nearly all participants of both Control and Experimental Groups agree that 
students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence. 
The Chi Square test for Control and Experimental Group shows there is no 
large change in Control and Experimental Groups at pre-test and post-test. 
However, the Chi Square value of the Control Group is larger as compared to the 
Experimental Group indicating that change is greater in the Control Group than the 
Experimental Group. The large percentages of positive responses in both groups 
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could indicate that the desirability of the expected response was apparent to 
respondents. The Intervention provided experiences with conflicting evidence as 
well, thus reinforcing the concept. 
A 100% of participants in the Control Group agree with this Criterialist item 
at post-test making this change important. The Experimental Group is not far 
behind at 98%. The difference at pre-test is 2% between Control and Experimental 
Groups for this item. 
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Table 4.14: It is Fundamental that Students are Taught to Support their 
Reasoning with Evidence and Ask that History Textbook Authors do so Also 
 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post-
Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 0 2.5 
 
0 0 0 
 2.5 0 0 0 
Disagree 
% 
1 1 0 
 
8 1 16.3 
 2.5 2.5 18.6 2.3 
Neutral 
% 
5 0 12.5 
 
6 2 9.3 
 12.5 0 14.0 4.7 
Agree 
% 
17 21 10 
 
15 22 16.3 
 42.5 52.5 34.9 51.2 
Strongly Agree 
% 
16 18 
5 
14 18 
9.3 40.0 45.0 32.6 41.9 
Total 
% 
40 40 30 43 43 51.20 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi- Square = 6.539  Chi - Square = 9.269 
D.F=4     D.F=4 
P-value = 0.162   P-value = 0.026 
Cramer's V = 0.201   Cramer's V = 0.238 
  
The Chi Square test for this last question of the Criterialist stance shows 
different results for the Control and Experimental Groups. In the Control Group, 
the p-value is 0.162, which shows that there is no significant difference in the 
pre-test and post-test stances of respondents. In the Experimental Group, the  
p-value of the Chi Square test is 0.026, which reveals a significant difference in 
pre-test and post-test responses. Similarly, the Chi Square test statistics for 
Experimental Group is 9.269 and for Control Group the value is 6.539. The larger 
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value of Chi Square in the Experimental Group shows that the difference is larger 
in the Experimental Group than in the Control Group. In the Control Group, 97.5% 
respondents agree with this item and in the Experimental Group, 93.1% 
respondents agree with this item. 
It is worth noting that in some items of the Criterialist stance, at pre-test, 
participants appear to be more naive in the Experimental Group. In this item for 
example, 82% agree at pre-test in the Control Group, and 68% in the Experimental 
Group agree that it is fundamental that students are taught to support their 
reasoning with evidence and ask that history textbook authors do so also. Both 
groups move towards more agreement at post-test but the difference in percentage 
is higher in the Experimental Group, which makes it significant. There is a 15% 
change from pre-test to post-test in the Control Group and a 26% change in the 
Experimental Group. This is actually a problem as the non-random nature of the 
sample makes chance less likely as the reason for the difference in the sample at 
pre-test. Here, the comparison of small groups where the population is from single 
cities and schools becomes important.  
A reminder that the overall combined data is of 5 study groups in three cities 
and 3 different school systems. It can be said however, that the combined group 
is more representative of the larger population of history teachers in Pakistan. 
Another problem could be that the items have a social desirability factor at work. 
In the post-test especially, Intervention 1 being experienced by all, has made a 
difference in persuading the participants of the desirability of the pedagogical 
practice incorporating the historical method. That being the thrust of the 
workshops, it is understandable. The key question is, if it is Intervention 2 which 
makes for more change in the Experimental Group, or it is the effect of the 
difference in the sample at pre-test? Did the Experimental Group simply have more 
room to grow? This effect was spotted and countered in the responses to the BM 
questions as well. An analysis of data in the Criterialist items is additionally 
presented in Table 4.15 to answer the question raised above.  
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Table 4.15: Students need to be Aware that History is Essentially a Matter 
of Interpretation 
 
 Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 0 2.5 
 
0 0 0 
 2.5 0 0 0 
Disagree 
% 
1 1 0 
 
8 1 16.3 
 2.5 2.5 18.6 2.3 
Neutral 
% 
5 0 12.5 
 
6 2 9.3 
 12.5 0 14.0 4.7 
Agree 
% 
17 21 10 
 
15 22 16.3 
 42.5 52.5 34.9 51.2 
Strongly Agree 
% 
16 18 
5 
14 18 
9.3 40.0 45.0 32.6 41.9 
Total 
% 
40 40 30 43 43 51.20 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi- Square = 1.486 Chi - Square = 3.442 
D.F=4    D.F=4 
P-value = 0.829  P-value = 0.382 
Cramer's V = 0.136  Cramer's V = 0.200 
In Table 4.15 the observed frequency shows that 75% of the respondents 
in Control Group agree with this question at pre-test and 72.5% of the respondents 
agree at post-test. In the Experimental Group, 79.10% of the respondents disagree 
with this question with no change in pre-test and post-test response. The Chi 
Square test statistics for Control Group are smaller than the Experimental Group, 
which indicates that more difference occurs in Experimental Group than in the 
Control Group. Also, the Cramer's V estimate indicates that the association is 
moderate in the Experimental Group. 
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4.7.5.2 Comparison of Percentage Change and Chi Square Value for 
Control and Experimental Groups to Identify a Pattern in the Data 
 
Table 4.16: Comparison of Chi Square Value and Percentage Difference in 
Control and Experimental Groups 
Items ∆C% 
 
 χ²  
Control Group 
∆E%  χ²  
Experimental 
Group 
Comments 
Q1 20 1.088 32.5 4.386 Experimental group 
Q2 20 2.262 32.4 4.120 Experimental group 
Q3 45 7.462 27.9 3.711 Control group 
Q4 40 1.250 46.6 5.299 Experimental group 
Q5 10 1.250 51.3 6.083 Experimental group 
Q6 25 4.718 18.6 1.168 Control group 
Q7 30 3.221 39.6 6.244 Experimental group 
Q8 50 7.882 14 0.706 Control group 
Q9 30 3.900 37.3 5.983 Experimental group 
Q10 20 1.571 25.4 5.963 Experimental group 
Q11 30 3.312 60.5 12.295 Experimental group 
Q12 30 5.216 32.7 4.867 Experimental group 
Q13 30 6.539 51.2 9.269 Experimental group 
Q14 15 3.311 27.8 5.188 Experimental group 
Q15 15 2.540 23.2 2.126 Experimental group 
Q16 10 1.486 20.9 3.422 Experimental group 
Q17 30 2.99 9.3 0.368 Control group 
Q18 45 7.042 23.4 2.746 Control group 
Q19 20 2.278 18.5 1.654 Control group 
Q20 60 8.085 9.2 0.844 Control group 
Q21 30 2.064 13.9 3.132 Control group 
∆C%: Percentage difference from pre-test to post-test in Control Group 
∆E%: Percentage difference from pre-test to post-test in Experimental Group 
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Change in Control and Experimental Group 
 
 
The BLTHQ analysis of all 21 items was carried out and a great deal of 
information was obtained through it. However, I required an overview of the 
observations in the 21 items to find a pattern in the data if possible. The analysis 
from Sections 4.7.3 to 4.7.6 presented the change or difference in responses from 
pre-test to post-test in Control and Experimental Groups. The change or difference 
in overall 21 BLTHQ items is observed in two ways. First, there is a comparison of 
Chi Square value in Control and Experimental Groups. Second, the absolute 
difference of percentage from pre-test to post-test in each category (Strongly 
Disagree to Agree) is taken. The Chi Square Test statistics value and their 
corresponding significance value are mentioned in Tables 14-B to 27-B in 
Appendix-B. The absolute differences of percentages in Control and Experimental 
Groups are also given in Tables 14-B to 27-B in Appendix-B. A closer analysis of 
each item shows that the Chi Square value and absolute difference of percentage 
are related to each other. 
As the Chi Square value of a particular item in the Experimental Group is 
greater than the Chi Square value of the Control Group, the sum of absolute 
percentage difference is also greater in the Experimental Group. This larger value 
of Chi Square and absolute difference shows that difference or change is greater 
in the Experimental Group than the Control Group. On the other hand, if an item 
has larger Chi Square value as compared to the Experimental Group then its sum 
of absolute difference is also greater as compared to the Experimental Group. For 
example, in the analysis, Item 1 in the Control Group has a Chi Square value of 
1.088 and in the Experimental Group the value is 4.386. This larger value of Chi 
Square in the Experimental Group indicates that the difference is greater in the 
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Experimental Group. Also, the sum of percentage of absolute difference in the 
Control Group is 20% and in the Experimental Group the sum is 32.5%. This value 
also indicates that change in terms of percentage is greater in the Experimental 
Group than the Control Group. The Chi Square value and the sum of absolute 
percentage difference for all 21 BLTHQ items for both Control and Experimental 
Groups are given in Table 4.16. The result in the Table shows that 13 items out of 
21 items have a larger absolute percentage difference and Chi Square value in the 
Experimental Group (except Items 12 and 21, which have larger absolute 
difference value and smaller Chi Square value). This analysis shows that 
difference is consistent and greater in the Experimental Group as compared to the 
Control Group. 
 
4.7.6 Effect Size to Measure the Effectiveness of Intervention 
 
The difference in absolute percentage difference of the Control and 
Experimental Groups is analyzed by using independent t test. The mean of 
percentage difference of the Control Group is found to be 28.80 and the mean of 
the Experimental Group is 29.34. The significance value of test statistics, assuming 
equal variance; assumed as suggested by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances, 
is 0.901. This value reveals that there is no significant difference among 
percentage difference of the Control and the Experimental Group. However, as 
discussed earlier, as a researcher, I cannot rely only on the significance value. An 
effect size is calculated that measures the effectiveness of the treatment. For the 
calculation of effect size, I used Cohen's d effect size calculator available at 
http://www.uccs.edu/~lbecker/psy590/escalc3.htm. The Cohen's d effect size for 
the percentage difference of the Control and the Experimental Groups is found to 
be 0.511, in using Cohen's d: 0 - 0.20 weak effect, 0.21 - 0.50 modest effect,  
0.50 - 1.00 moderate effect. Thus, from my data I can say that Intervention in my 
case has moderate effect. 
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4.7.7 Analysis of Selection of the Neutral Option 
 
An analysis of the neutral stance taken by respondents on individual items 
of the BLTHQ was carried out. There are 9 Copier items, 8 Borrower items and 4 
Criterialist items in the BLTHQ. A completely neutral position on a stance would 
require the respondent to tick a neutral on all items of the stance. No one took a 
neutral stance on all items in both pre-test and post-test. Two respondents in the 
Control Group at pre-test took a neutral stance on all 4 Criterialist items, and one 
respondent in the Experimental Group took a completely neutral stance on all 8 
items of the Borrower stance at post-test, which is probably not a meaningful result. 
What is perhaps more interesting is the result of the neutral position in the 
Criterialist items. 16.3% of all 160 options on Criterialist items were ticked at 
neutral in the Experimental Group at pre-test and this reduced to 5.8% at post-test. 
This result was almost identical in the Control Group, which is probably due to the 
fact that at pre-test, the numbers in both Control and Experimental Groups were 
identical. There were 14.7% of all 360 neutral options taken at pre-test for Copier 
items, which reduced to 10.8% at post-test in the Control Group. There was a 
similar difference in the Experimental Group on this going from 12.7% to 8.5%. In 
Borrower items, 21.6% of all 320 options were selected at neutral and this changed 
to 14.7% in the Control Group. In the Experimental Group the change was from 
13.4% to 12.2 % which is negligible. As there were 43 respondents in the 
Experimental Group the number of options is slightly higher than in the Control 
Group with its 40 participants. 
Thus, only the Criterialist stance in both Control and Experimental Groups 
showed a large change of almost a third, less selections of the neutral option at 
post-test. The other bit of interesting information is that in the Borrower items, there 
were 21.6% options ticked at neutral at pre-test, which reduced to 14.7% at post-
test in the Control Group. The difference in the Experimental Group however, is 
only of 1% which is strange as the difference in the Control Group is of 7% at post-
test. 
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Generally, however, there is a clear pattern of fewer options of neutral being 
ticked at post-test as compared to the pre-test. This can be attributed to the 
experience of Intervention 1 while the effect of Intervention 2 is not seen as a 
difference in the Experimental Group as far as the neutral stance is concerned.  
 
Table 4.17: Neutral Option Analysis in the Control and Experimental Group 
 
  Control Experimental 
Pre % Post % Pre % Post % 
Copier 46 12.78 39.00 10.83 43 11.11 31 8.01 
Criterialist 21 13.13 9.00 5.63 21 12.21 10 5.81 
Borrower 64 20.00 47.00 14.69 44 12.79 34. 9.88 
 
4.7.8 Analysis of Individual Change from Pre-Test to Post-Test 
 
In the analysis of change in stance of the respondents as a comparison of 
pre-test to post-test responses, the frequencies show the number of respondents 
who chose a change from, say, an Agree towards a Disagree, or vice versa, in 
Copier, Borrower, or Criterialist stance. 
The neutral box indicates where respondents chose a neutral more times 
than at pre-test. The No Change box tells the number of respondents that did not 
change in terms of numbers at agreement or disagreement. 
The earlier analysis of all items of the BLTHQ by Contingency tables 
showed that respondents disagreed with most of the Copier items. However, the 
Contingency tables display the responses to overall items and is not a calculation 
of change of stance of individual respondents. For a closer analysis of individual 
change, the Agree and Strongly Agree positions were first collapsed as agreement. 
Similarly, Disagree and Strongly Disagree positions were merged into a single 
Disagree position. The position of agreement and disagreement of individual 
respondent is then analyzed. The method is described below. 
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For example, a respondent agrees with 3, disagrees with 4 items and takes 
a neutral on 2 items of the Copier stance at pre-test. In the post-test he/she agrees 
with 5 items, disagrees with 2 items and selects a neutral on 2 items of the Copier 
stance. In this case, he/she appears to agree more with Copier items and, on the 
other hand, he/she appears to disagree less with the Copier items at post-test. So 
his/her stance is calculated to be more agreement with Copier items than 
disagreement with Copier items at post-test. Table 4.18 of the Control Group and 
Table 4.19 of the Experimental Group display overall change of respondents 
obtained by summing all the respondents with change in stance obtained as 
described above. The Tables thus display frequencies and percentages of change. 
In the Control Group, with the Copier stance, 50% of the respondents change 
towards agreement while 22.5% change towards disagreement, 15% change 
towards neutral and 12.5% remain at their original position. In the Criterialist items, 
32.5% change towards agreement, 12.5% change towards disagreement, 5% 
change towards neutral position, and 50% remain at their entry level. 32.5% of the 
respondents change towards agreement in the Borrower items, 50% change 
towards disagreement, 15% change towards neutral position and only 2.5% show 
no change from pre-test to post-test data. 
In the Experimental Group, the picture which emerges from the data is quite 
different and interesting in terms of changes. In the Copier items, almost 50% of 
the respondents change towards disagreement, which is completely against and 
in the opposite direction as compared to the Control Group, 20.9% change towards 
agreement, 11.6% change towards neutral and 18.6% of the respondents remain 
at their entry level with no change in their stance from pre-test to post-test. In the 
Criterialist items, 35.7% change towards agreement and 33.3% change towards 
agreement. Here in the Experimental Group, change towards disagreement in the 
Criterialist items increased as compared to the Control Group where only 12.5% 
changed towards disagreement. 21.4% of the respondents show no change in their 
stance, which is very low as compared to the Control Group, where 50% do not 
change their position in the Criterialist items. In the Borrower items, 65.1% change 
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towards agreement, 9.3% change towards disagreement, and 25.6% have no 
change in their stance. 
  
Figure 4.9: Comparison of Pre-Test to Post-Test Change of Copier, 
Criterialist and Borrower Stance in Control Group 
 
 
  
Criterialist Borrower Copier 
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Table 4.18: Analysis of Change in the Control Group 
 
Control 
Stance Copier Criterialist Borrower 
 Agree 20 13 13 
50.0% 32.5% 32.5% 
Disagree 9 
22.5% 
5 20 
12.5% 50.0% 
Neutral 6 
15.0% 
2 6 
5.0% 15.0% 
No change 5 
12.5% 
20 1 
50.0% 2.5% 
 
Table 4.19: Analysis of Change in the Experimental Group 
 
Stance 
Experimental  
Copier Criterialist Borrower 
 Agree  9 15 28 
 20.9% 35.7% 65.1% 
Disagree  21 14 4 
 48.8% 33.3% 9.3% 
Neutral  5 5 0 
 11.6% 11.9% .0% 
No change  8 9 11 
 18.6% 21.4% 25.6% 
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of Pre-Test to Post-Test Change of Copier, 
Criterialist and Borrower Stance in Experimental Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Criterialist Borrower Copier 
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4.7.9 Analysis of Pre-Test to Post-Test Difference in Control and 
Experimental Groups 
 
4.7.9.1 Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test 
 
Table 4.20: Results of the Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test in Control and 
Experimental Groups 
 
Items 
Control Group Experimental Group 
Z Statistics Significance 
Value 
Z Statistics Significance 
Value 
Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
Q10 
Q11 
Q12 
Q13 
Q14 
Q15 
Q16 
Q17 
Q18 
Q19 
Q20 
Q21 
-0.971 
-1.396 
-1.413 
-2.253 
-0.275 
-1.194 
-1.413 
-0.280 
-0.864 
-0.857 
-1.126 
-2.524 
-1.451 
-1.110 
-0.936 
-0.034 
-1.153 
-0.165 
-0.646 
-0.996 
-1.330 
0.332 
0.163 
0.158 
0.024 
0.783 
0.233 
0.158 
0.779 
0.387 
0.392 
0.260 
0.012 
0.147 
0.267 
0.349 
0.973 
0.249 
0.869 
0.518 
0.319 
 0.183 
-1.852 
-1.325 
-1.409 
-2.182 
-1.079 
-0.821 
-2.375 
-0.436 
0.000 
-2.066 
-3.590 
-1.794 
-2.623 
-0.626 
-1.424 
-0.784 
-0.492 
-0.827 
-0.861 
-0.647 
-0.544 
0.064 
0.185 
0.159 
0.029 
0.280 
0.412 
0.018 
0.663 
1.000 
0.039 
0.000 
0.073 
0.009 
0.531 
0.154 
0.433 
0.623 
0.408 
0.390 
0.517 
0.586 
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The difference from pre-test to post-test responses in the Experimental 
Group is explored in the previous analysis. However, to find the consistency of 
change in the Experimental Group, another statistical research technique is used. 
The data of the BLTHQ is obtained on a Likert Scale and possesses an ordinal 
nature (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). Therefore, instead of using a paired 
t test to measure the significance of difference in both sets of data, a non-
parametric Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test is used to measure the difference in pre-test 
and post-test responses in both sets of data. Table 4.20 gives the result of the 
Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test statistics with their corresponding significance value in 
Control and Experimental Groups.  
In the Control Group, the difference from pre-test to post-test responses can 
be seen as significant in Item 4 and Item 12 (significance value is highlighted with 
red color in Table 4.20). This shows that the stance of respondents in pre-test is 
not significantly different to the post-test in all items except Item 4 and Item 12. In 
the Experimental Group, 5 items: Q4, Q7, Q10, Q11 and Q10 (significance value 
with green color in Table 4.20) show a significant difference in responses. Also, 
Q1 (0.064) and Q12 (0.073) have very small significance value and can be 
considered significant. Overall 7 items out of 21 items show significant difference 
in their responses and the significance value of the remaining questions are also 
smaller in the Experimental Group than the Control Group. This indicates that the 
Intervention in the Experimental Group may possibly have effected change in 
beliefs of respondents thus showing more change taking place in the Experimental 
Group. The Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test analysis above is compatible with the results 
of Chi Square and percentage change analysis, which shows that more change 
occurred in the Experimental Group than in the Control Group. 
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Table 4.21: Analysis of Pre-Test to Post-Test Responses in Control and 
Experimental Group in a Single Study (Rose Group) 
 Control Experimental 
Items Z-statistics Significance Value Z-statistics Significance Value 
Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
Q10 
Q11 
Q12 
Q13 
Q14 
Q15 
Q16 
Q17 
Q18 
Q19 
Q20 
Q21 
-0.707 
-0.431 
-0.142 
-0.707 
-0.520 
-0.736 
-1.633 
-0.647 
-0.816 
-2.232 
-1.265 
-1.342 
-0.577 
0.000 
-0.791 
-10.394 
-1.633 
-0.368 
-1.903 
-2.050 
0.000 
0.480 
0.666 
0.887 
0.480 
0.603 
0.461 
0.102 
0.518 
0.414 
0.026 
0.206 
0.180 
0.564 
1.000 
0.429 
0.163 
0.102 
0.713 
0.057 
0.040 
1.000 
-1.633 
-1.134 
-.033 
-1.342 
-0.378 
-0.378 
-0.730 
-1.890 
-0.378 
-1.000 
-1.841 
-0.277 
-1.838 
-1.134 
-1.414 
-0.577 
-1.089 
-.0447 
-.0447 
-0.272 
0.000 
0.102 
0.257 
0.041 
0.030 
0.705 
0.705 
0.465 
0.049 
0.705 
0.317 
0.036 
0.028 
0.021 
0.047 
0.157 
0.564 
0.016 
0.655 
0.655 
0.785 
1.000 
 
 
The effect of Intervention 2 in the Experimental Group is seen in the meta-
analysis of overall data of the BM. Differences in small groups support the 
hypothesis as more change in the Experimental Groups in 4 out of 5 studies. All 
groups except Pansy show change in responses as more significant in the 
Experimental Group compared to the Control Group. A similar trend can also be 
seen in the BLTHQ and EBI data where result of meta-analysis indicates that more 
items have significant change in the Experimental Group as compared to items of 
the Control Group. The number of items being 21 in the BLTHQ Likert Scale and 
32 in the EBI, a study wise analysis of difference was difficult. The numbers in cells 
were small in the single studies as well as unequal in numbers of participants. One 
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single study was analyzed by means of the same statistical test used for overall 
data of 5 studies. Though the sample size is smaller than overall data, the result 
is quite consistent and meaningful. The result indicates that only two items in the 
Control Group have significant difference in pre-test to post-test responses, while 
in the Experimental Group, 8 items including all 4 Criterialist items show significant 
difference of pre-test to post-test responses of respondents. See Table 4.21. 
 
4.7.10 Analysis of Change and No Change in Control and Experimental 
Groups 
 
All the above analysis consistently indicates that there is change in both 
groups and the change in respondents’ stance is greater in the Experimental 
Group than in the Control Group. To examine the pattern of this difference or 
change, another analysis is carried out. The overall data in both Control and 
Experimental Groups are categorized into Change and No Change categories.  
I assign a category of change for all of those respondents who shift from 
their original position from pre-test to post-test, and assign No Change for all of 
those respondents who remained at their original position from pre-test to post-
test. Thus, the whole data is classified into Change and No Change categories. 
Now the likelihood of change in the Experimental Group is compared to No Change 
for each item of the BLTHQ by means of Odds Ratio. Table 4.22 shows the Odds 
Ratio of all 21 items with their corresponding confidence intervals. Table 4.22 
shows that the Odds Ratio of 10 items is greater than 1, and 2 items have Odds 
Ratio close to 1. This indicates that in most BLTHQ items, the Experimental Group 
exhibits more change than the Control Group. I have interpreted Item 2 for the 
reader to understand the logic of Odds Ratio in my study. The Odds Ratio for Item 
2 is found to be 1.263, which is greater than 1. This means that for each respondent 
in the Experimental Group, change is 1.263 times more likely than No Change. 
The Odds Ratio of the remaining items can be interpreted in the same manner.  
More importantly, 3 out of 4 Criterialist items show a high Odds Ratio of 
more change taking place in the Experimental Group. The Criterialist stance is the 
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stance of higher sophistication on the scale. As the authors argue, consistency in 
epistemic beliefs is seen in reference to the Criterialist stance.  
 
Table 4.22: Odds Ratio (OR) with 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of BLTHQ 
Items 
 
Items Odds Ratio  95% CI If OR > 1 then Experimental 
Group is better than Control 
Group 
Q1 
0.580 0.243__1.386 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed  
Q2 
1.263 0.532 __2.997 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q3 
0.748 0.308__1.818 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q4 
0.774 0.326__1.841 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q5 
1.535 0.645__3.654 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q6 
1.544 0.649__3.671 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q7 
0.934 0.392__2.26 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
 281 
 
Q8 
0.514 0.213__1.243 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q9 
1.556 0.654__3.703 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q10 
0.787 0.332__1.864 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q11 
1.381 0.574__3.321 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q12 
1.895 0.791__4.537 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q13 
5.714 2.040__16.007 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q14 
0.926 0.386__2.223 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
 
Q15 
1.396 0.588__3.314 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q16 
1.143 0.481__2.713 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
Q17 
0.592 0.245__1.431 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
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Red indicates where the respondent is more likely to change in the Experimental 
Group. The green indicates a high score in favour of the Experimental Group, 
which is, however, less than 1. 
 
4.7.11 Exploratory Factor Analysis of the BLTHQ Items (Appendix-C) 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis, with the principal component Analysis 
Extraction Method, was performed separately on data from the BLTHQ items of 
both Control and Experimental Groups. One objective of Factor Analysis in my 
study was to see if the factors that emerge in my analysis represent a single 
Copier, Borrower or Criterialist stance or appear to be representing more than one 
stance. The authors of the BLTHQ have carried out the same study and describe 
Factor Analysis on both sets of data (i.e. pre-test and post-test). They also consider 
a two factor solution in their study, as suggested by the Scree Plot and name the 
two factors with the help of negative or positive loadings. Factors that emerge in 
the authors’ analysis consist of almost all items of Copier, Criterialist and Borrower 
stance with different positive and negative loadings. I carried out the Factor 
Q18 
0.800 0.318__2.012 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q19 
0.554 0.227__1.352 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
Q20 
0.541 0.219__1.339 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is less likely 
to be changed 
 
Q21 
1.150 0.486__2.723 Each respondent in 
Experimental Group is more 
likely to be changed 
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Analysis to identify the pattern in my data whether the factors that emerge consist 
of items of different stance or appear to be a single Copier, Criterialist or Borrower 
stance. 
In my study, using the same instrument, the BLTHQ, Q 1, Q 2, Q 3, Q 5 to 
Q 10 represent the Copier stance. Q 4, Q 11, Q 12, Q 13 represent the Criterialist 
stance. Q 14 to Q 21 represent the Borrower stance. 
The KMO Bartlett test of sphericity in pre-test responses of Control Group 
data is 0.396, which is very low, and below the standard requirement. However, in 
post-test data of the Control Group, the KMO test value is 0.507, which is fairly 
good compared to the post-test. Therefore, I ignored these smaller values and 
carried out Factor Analysis on both sets of data.  
The post-test data shows more certain and consistent behaviour and the 
reliability is fairly good (see Table 4.23). In the Control Group, the reliability scale 
ranges from 0.680 to 0.820 except the reliability of Factor 4, which is 0.436. In the 
Experimental Group, values range from 0.577 to 0.807 which show high 
consistency in the data. 
In the Control Group, eight factors emerged in the pre-test with Eigen values 
greater than one, which is not encouraging. However, I considered the first four 
components as important factors for all the sets of data because they explain most 
variation in all sets of data. The pre-test for both Groups, Control and Experimental, 
show random and uncertain behavior of respondents as seen in an earlier item 
analysis. The reliability of the factors at pre-test in both sets of data is low. In the 
Control Group, the reliability value ranges from 0.387 to 0.645 for all four factors. 
In the Experimental Group at pre-test, the reliability scale ranged from 0.154 to 
0.579 showing a poor consistency in the data. 
I next considered the test of the Control and Experimental Groups using the 
BLTHQ as 4 different sets of test in order to see a difference in the way Factors 
emerged in the samples. I carried out Factor Analysis on both sets of data, 
however, for explanation and discussion I considered only the post-test result of 
Control and Experimental Groups. For interpretation and naming of factors that 
emerged from the data, I calculated the threshold or cut off value of all four factors 
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and considered only those items in the factors whose loading is greater than their 
cut off value and ignored all of those whose loading is less than their cut off value 
regardless of their negative and positive sign. 
Overall, there is a change in Factor loading at post-test in both Control and 
Experimental Groups with a more definable pattern in the Experimental Group.  
The change in post-test in both Control and Experimental Groups may be 
taken as consistent with expectations as the research design incorporates two 
Interventions. Intervention one is provided to both Control and Experimental 
Groups, hence the change in both groups at post-test is understandable. 
Intervention two was provided to the Experimental Group only and the data 
suggests a difference in the degree and quality of change in stance between 
Control and Experimental Groups. The difference in the Control and Experimental 
Groups at post-test can be judged to reflect this difference in the experience 
provided to both. This, interestingly, is also consistent with the picture that 
emerged with the data from the other instrument, the Boscolo & Mason questions. 
The difference in change between the two groups is significant and cannot be 
ignored. 
It is important to note that Change and Degree of Change is important in 
both instruments at post-test as described above. The change is apparent and the 
direction of change or Degree of change in the beliefs targeted by the BLTHQ and 
the BM instruments appears similar. The nature of the change, from a Borrower 
stance to a more Criterialist stance, and from a Copier stance to a more Criterialist 
stance that is observed in data from the BM analysis can be compared to change 
as seen in the responses to the BLTHQ. This is interesting in the light of the 
difference of the questions or statements in both instruments. The BM asks 
theoretical epistemic questions whereas the BLTHQ nests questions related to 
epistemic beliefs in contexts of pedagogical practice. The BLTHQ questions are 
set in the context of teaching and learning history and relate to the teachers’ 
practice more directly. This is discussed in the overall analysis. (The items are 
argued by the authors to be reasonable proxies for the epistemic beliefs named 
Copier, Borrower or Criterialist). The change, as seen in the BM analysis, suggests 
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a move towards a more Criterialist stance whereas the change as observed in the 
BLTHQ also suggests a move towards a more Criterialist stance. The difference 
in the statements of the BLTHQ and BM are used to discuss the responses in more 
depth. 
 
Table 4.23: Reliability of All Factors in the Control and Experimental Groups 
 
Control post-test Experimental post-test 
Factors Cronbach α No of Item Cronbach α No of Item 
Factor 1 0.778 5 0.806 3 
Factor 2 0.720 7 0.695 7 
Factor 3 0.721 7 0.602 5 
Factor 4 0.337 4 0.695 4 
Factor 5 0.484 3 0.192 4 
Factor 6 0.679 2 0.303 7 
Factor 7 0.497 2 0.501 2 
Factor 8 - - 0.258 5 
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Table 4.24: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Post-test 
Questionnaires of Control Group 
 
Factors Linear Combination 
Cut off 
value 
% of 
Variation 
Reliability 
(Cronbach α) 
Factor 1 
0.87Q21 + 0.76(Q12 + Q13) + 
0.6Q4 + 0.4Q11 
0.4 21.72 0.778 
Factor 2 
0.8Q9 + 0.7(Q8+Q6) +  
0.6Q3 - 0.4(Q1 + Q5 - Q11) + 
0.3(Q4 - Q13) 
0.4 15.89 0.720 
Factor 3 
0.9Q19 + 0.6(Q5 + Q10 + Q18) 
+ 0.5Q3 + 0.4(Q1 + Q7+ Q14) 
0.5 9.719 0.721 
Factor 4 
0.8Q15 + 0.7Q17 + 0.5Q18 -
0.4(Q10 + Q1 + Q4) 
0.4 7.99 0.337 
 
 
Table 4.25: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Post-test 
Questionnaires of Experimental Group 
 
Factors Linear Combination 
Cut off 
value 
% of 
Variation 
Reliability 
(Cronbach α) 
Factor 1 0.9Q13 + 0.8Q12 + 0.711 0.7 17.590 0.806 
Factor 2 
0.8Q1 + 0.7Q6 + 0.5Q21 + 
0.4 (Q17 + Q7 + Q2 + Q3) 
0.4 13.57 0.733 
Factor 3 
0.8Q8 + 0.7Q19 + 0.6Q7 + 
0.5Q6 - 0.4(Q12+Q21) 
0.4 12.02 0.577 
Factor 4 
0.8Q15 + 0.7Q17 + 0.6Q16 
+ 0.4Q18 
0.4 7.05 0.610 
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4.7.12 Factor Analysis of the BLTHQ Combined Data (166 Respondents) 
 
In the earlier part of the study, I carried out Factor Analysis of data in 
separate sets of pre-test and post-test in both the Control and the Experimental 
Groups. The factors that emerged in each set of data were compatible with the 
other statistical analysis in the sense that at pre-test, factors did not appear 
coherent but the position improved at post-test. Data of the Experimental Group 
showed a clear Criterialist Factor with high reliability. The second factor that 
emerged was a Copier with a single item of the Borrower stance. 
I decided to run Factor Analysis of the combined data of the Control and the 
Experimental Groups, pre-test and post-test, to see if a different picture emerged. 
In this final Factor Analysis using the complete set of data, the Scree Plot 
(Appendix-C, Figure 1C) and Eigen value criteria suggest that seven factors again 
emerged from the data. I considered 0.3 as a cut off or threshold value for all the 
factors and considered only those items whose loading was greater than 0.3 
regardless of the negative and positive signs. Factor 1 explains 15.86% of variance 
and appears to be completely a Copier factor with a single Borrower item, Item 19. 
All Copier items appear with high to low loading with high loading on Item 5, Item 
6, Item 1, moderate loading on Item 7, Item 8, Item 9, and low loading on Item 3. 
Reliability of Factor 1 is measured by Cronbach alpha and it is found to be 0.735, 
which I can take as fairly good. Factor 2 explains 13.214% of the variance and it 
appears to be a completely Borrower Factor with a single Copier item with very 
low loading. Factor 2 contains Items 14, 15, 17 and 18 with moderate loading, and 
Item 19 with low loading. The reliability of Factor 2 was found to be 0.622. Factor 
3 explains 7.6% of the total variance and it appears with all Criterialist items with 
high loading on Items 12 and 13, moderate loading on Item 11, and low loading on 
Item 4. Factor 3 completely represents a Criterialist stance. Factor 3 might be 
considered important although Factor 3 explains only 7.6% of the total variance. I 
consider that the percentage of variance is less important. What is important is that 
Factor 3 exclusively represents the Criterialist stance. Reliability of Factor 3 was 
found to be 0.424 but after dropping Item 4 in the analysis, the reliability value 
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increased to 0.658. These first three Factors are considered important as they 
appear to be of a single stance in each case.  
The remaining four factors contain items loading together from various 
stances. These are also explained below. 
Factor 4 explains 6.5% of the total variance with negative moderate loading 
on Item 9 of the Copier stance, positive high loading on Item 16, and positive low 
loading on Item 15 of the Borrower stance. So this factor represents contradiction 
of the Copier and Borrower stance. Factor 5 explains 5.9% of the variance and 
appears with high positive loading on Item 4 of the Criterialist, and high positive 
loading on Item 20 of the Borrower stance. I name this factor as a combination of 
Criterialist and Borrower stance. Factor 6 explains 5.08% of the variance and 
appears with high positive loading on Item 21 of the Borrower stance, moderate 
positive loading on Item 10 and Item 3 of the Copier stance. Therefore, I name this 
factor a combination of Copier and Borrower items. Factor 7 explains 4.82% of the 
variance and it represents Item 1, Item 2 and Item 3 of the Criterialist stance. 
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4.7.13 Weighted Scores and Consistency Scores of Epistemic Stance for All 
Participants 
 
Table 4.26: Student Weighted Averages Scores on Epistemic Stances and 
Consistency Scores of Control Group 
Respondent 
Number 
Copier Criterialist Borrower 
Consistency 
Score 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 -0.78 -0.78 1.5 2 0.75 0 66.67 71.43 
2 -1.22 -0.56 2 2 0.75 -0.75 61.11 75.00 
3 -0.33 -0.22 0.75 1.5 0.5 0.75 57.89 55.00 
4 0.00 0.44 0.5 1.25 0 0.125 57.14 50.00 
5 -0.33 -0.22 1 0.5 0.75 0.75 50.00 50.00 
6 -0.22 -0.56 1.75 0.75 -0.375 -0.75 61.11 57.89 
7 -0.22 0.00 1.25 1.5 0.875 0.375 50.00 52.63 
8 0.00 0.56 1.5 1.25 1.5 1.125 40.00 40.00 
9 -0.44 -0.89 1.75 1.75 0.875 0.375 57.89 73.68 
10 -0.89 -0.56 0.5 0 -0.625 -0.75 77.78 78.95 
11 0.11 0.44 1.75 1.5 0.375 0.125 47.62 57.14 
12 -0.33 -0.67 1.25 0.5 -0.375 -0.25 78.57 77.78 
13 -0.89 -0.56 1.5 1.5 0.75 0.25 63.16 61.11 
14 -0.67 -1.11 1 1.5 0.375 -0.125 62.50 78.95 
15 0.11 -0.33 1 1.75 0.625 0.875 47.37 50.00 
16 0.00 0.11 0.5 0.75 0.625 1 46.15 35.00 
17 0.33 0.67 1 1.75 0.75 1.375 38.10 38.10 
18 -1.33 -1.56 1.75 2 0.875 1.25 71.43 61.90 
19 0.22 0.44 0.5 1 0.375 0.75 41.67 31.25 
20 -0.33 -0.78 0.5 1.25 0.125 0.5 53.33 60.00 
21 0.44 0.67 1.75 2 0.625 0.625 47.37 37.50 
22 -1.33 -0.44 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.375 63.16 60.00 
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The median value of the Copier stance at pre-test in the Control Group is 
-0.11, which shows that 50% of the respondents have weighted average less than 
-0.11. The remaining 50% of the respondents have weighted average greater than 
-0.11. At post-test, the median value shows more disagreement towards the Copier 
stance. The median value of the Consistency score at pre-test and post-test in the 
Control Group shows that most of the respondents have low consistency scores. 
On the other hand, the median consistency score of the Experimental Group at 
Respondent 
Number 
Copier Criterialist Borrower 
Consistency 
Score 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
23 0.11 0.22 0.75 1.5 0.625 0.375 44.44 50.00 
24 -0.22 -0.44 0.25 0.75 0.25 -0.375 50.00 73.68 
25 0.56 0.67 1 1.75 0.5 1.375 38.89 28.57 
26 0.11 -0.22 1.25 1 0.875 0.375 47.06 58.82 
27 0.00 0.11 0 1 0.875 0.625 38.89 43.75 
28 0.44 1.33 1.5 2 1.125 1.25 33.33 20.00 
29 0.11 -0.33 0.75 0.5 0.25 -0.125 46.67 66.67 
30 0.00 0.33 -0.75 1.75 0.5 1.25 33.33 46.15 
31 -0.78 -0.22 0.25 1.25 0.125 0.75 76.92 55.00 
32 0.22 0.11 -0.25 1 0.25 0.125 38.46 57.14 
33 -0.56 -0.89 1 1.25 0.75 1.125 62.50 56.25 
34 -0.11 1.56 1.25 0.75 0.25 0.125 57.14 42.86 
35 0.44 0.33 0 0.75 0 0.125 20.00 50.00 
36 0.11 -0.78 1.25 1 0.625 0 45.00 76.19 
37 -0.11 -0.22 0.75 0.75 0.125 0.25 61.54 61.54 
38 -1.44 -1.44 1 2 0.125 0.5 61.90 70.00 
39 -0.44 -1.33 1.75 2 0.5 0.625 61.90 71.43 
40 -0.22 0.22 1.5 0.5 0 0.5 62.50 55.56 
Median -0.11 -0.22 1.00 1.25 0.50 0.38 53.3 56.695 
S.D 0.5184 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.42 0.56 12.91 14.55 
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post-test is 61.9%, which shows that almost 50% of the respondents have less 
than 62% consistency score, and the remaining 50% have moderate and high 
scores. 
 
Table 4.27: Student Weighted Average Scores on Epistemic Stance and 
Consistency Scores of the Experimental Group 
Respondent 
Number 
Copier Criterialist Borrower 
Consistency 
Score 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 -0.78 -0.67 0.75 0.5 0.375 1 66.67 58.82 
2 -0.56 -0.22 0.25 1.75 0.75 0.25 46.15 68.75 
3 -0.67 0.22 0.5 1.25 0.5 0.5 57.14 50.00 
4 0.33 -0.56 1 1.75 0.125 0.25 50.00 68.42 
5 -1.44 -0.89 0.25 1 0.25 0.5 61.90 66.67 
6 -0.33 0.11 0.75 1.25 0.875 0.625 52.38 45.00 
7 -0.56 0.00 -0.5 1 -0.5 -0.5 65.00 71.43 
8 -1.44 -0.89 2 2 0.875 0.875 70.00 61.90 
9 -0.44 0.11 1 1.5 0.5 0.25 56.25 55.56 
10 0.00 -0.11 1 1 -0.125 -0.25 57.14 68.42 
11 -0.78 -1.11 0 1 -0.625 -0.125 63.16 76.19 
12 -1.00 -0.78 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.375 71.43 45.00 
13 -0.22 -0.56 0.75 1.25 0.375 1 45.00 52.38 
14 -0.11 -0.22 1.25 1.25 -0.375 0.75 71.43 55.00 
15 0.56 0.22 0.25 1.5 0.625 0.625 42.86 50.00 
16 0.56 -0.44 -0.5 1 -0.125 0.625 35.29 56.25 
17 0.78 -0.11 1 -0.25 0.5 1.5 31.25 35.29 
18 -0.67 -0.33 1 1.5 0.875 0.75 57.89 60.00 
19 -1.11 -1.22 1.25 1.5 0 0 71.43 76.19 
20 0.22 0.67 0.5 1 0.125 0.625 46.67 29.41 
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Respondent 
Number 
Copier Criterialist Borrower 
Consistency 
Score 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
21 -0.78 -0.89 1 1.25 0 0.625 71.43 66.67 
22 0.33 -0.22 0.75 1.25 -0.25 -0.125 52.94 63.16 
23 0.67 0.44 0.75 1.25 0.625 -0.125 42.86 52.38 
24 0.00 -0.33 0.5 1 0.125 0.125 60.00 65.00 
25 -0.22 -0.33 1.25 1.5 0.875 0.25 55.00 57.89 
26 -1.11 -0.89 0.75 0.5 0.125 -0.125 65.00 75.00 
27 -0.44 -0.22 1.25 1 0.25 0.375 68.75 60.00 
28 -0.22 -0.56 1.5 2 0.125 0.25 60.00 83.33 
29 0.11 -0.11 1 1.25 0.625 0.875 44.44 45.00 
30 -0.89 -1.11 1.5 2 0.625 0.125 66.67 75.00 
31 0.00 -0.22 1 1.25 1 0.875 47.37 57.14 
32 0.56 0.22 1 1 0.875 0.625 29.41 42.11 
33 -0.89 -1.00 1.25 1 0.25 -0.375 68.42 85.00 
34 -1.00 -1.11 0.75 1 0.5 0.125 68.75 75.00 
35 -0.11 -1.11 1 2 1.625 1.5 38.89 61.90 
36 -0.11 -1.11 1 1.5 0.625 1 60.00 68.42 
37 0.11 -1.33 0.5 1.75 -0.75 0.125 65.00 75.00 
38 -0.22 -0.89 1.25 2 -0.125 -0.75 65.00 78.95 
39 -0.78 -0.67 0 0.5 -0.25 -0.375 57.89 65.00 
40 0.67 1.00 0.75 1.5 0.625 1.125 59.09 33.33 
41 -0.44 -1.00 0 1 0 -0.375 63.16 90.48 
42 0.33 0.33 1.5 1.25 1.375 1 36.84 45.00 
43 0.11 0.00 0.5 2 0.25 0.5 50.00 61.11 
Median -0.22 -0.33 0.75 1.25 0.25 0.375 57.89 61.9 
S.D 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.53 11.70 14.02 
 
To obtain the weighted average, I did some complex calculation following 
those carried out by Maggioni et al. (2004). For the weighted average of each 
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respondent, I assigned a +2 to Strongly Agree, +1 to Agree, 0 to Neutral, -1 to 
Disagree,  
and -2 to Strongly Disagree. I then made a sum of the scores on all items and 
divided the sum by the number of items of that stance. For example, respondent 1 
at pre-test in the Control Group agreed with 1, disagreed with 6 and strongly 
disagreed with 1 Copier item. So the weighted score for the Copier stance is 
[(1x1+(-1x6) + (-2x1)]/9. The weighted average for the respondent in Copier items 
is -0.78. The weighted average for the Criterialist items is calculated in the same 
fashion and it is found to be 1.5. For the Borrower stance the weighted average is 
0.75. If the weighted score of a respondent in Copier items is a positive +1, it shows 
the agreement of the respondent towards Copier items. If a respondent obtained 
a weighted average of +1, +2, +3 in the Criterialist stance and -1, -2, -3 in the 
Copier and Borrower stance, then the respondent is considered to be more of a 
Criterialist.  
The weighted average is calculated to ascertain the magnitude of change 
from pre-test to post-test. Whereas, in order to assess how consistent is the 
stance, a consistency score of each respondent is calculated. The consistency 
score is calculated in relation to the Criterialist stance as the stance of higher 
sophistication and the direction towards which the teaching was directed. 
VanSledright and Reddy (2014) set the bar for consistency at 90%, which is high 
in their own estimation. Maggioni and VanSledright also report (2014, p.12)41 an 
average 68% for students and 74-75% for teachers. I take into account that this 
was the first time that participants had been introduced to epistemic ideas of beliefs 
in knowledge in history and that the length of the Intervention was no more than 3 
days spread over three weeks for most participants. This was also probably among 
the first few Likert Scale questionnaires that respondents had ever filled, and 
certainly the first time they had encountered questions such as these relating to 
epistemic beliefs, whereas the respondents in the authors’ study would be more 
familiar with the territory. Therefore, I have set a lower bar at 60%, moderate at 
70% and high at 80%. 
                                            
41 This is a Paper presented at AERA 2014 awaiting publication. 
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Maggioni et al. (2004) found that respondents appeared to agree with the 
Criterialist stance as well as the Borrower or other stance to some extent. The data 
in my study is most discomfiting in this regard. Generally, over 90% agree with the 
Criterialist stance in both groups at post-test but nearly 60% agree with the 
Borrower stance and 40% agree with the Copier stance at the same time. There 
are various ways in which this result can be reasoned. 
There is a common pattern in the four tests, pre-test and post-test and 
Control and Experimental Groups as well as within the 5 small groups, of more 
agreement with the Criterialist stance, some agreement and larger disagreement 
with the Copier stance and some concurrent agreement with the Borrower stance. 
There is consistence as well in the assessment of more change in the 
Experimental Group. The direction of change from pre-test to post-test is also 
generally towards greater sophistication as was the thrust of the teaching in the 
workshops. This common pattern points towards what could possibly be a 
successful assessment of stance and change in stance by the BLTHQ. 
It may be argued that the participants are just generally confused in 
epistemic understanding more so in the pre-test. There is low to moderate 
development in sophistication at post-test but not to a satisfactory level if seen as 
groups rather than individually. There is, however, a difference in Control and 
Experimental Groups and within small groups. 
Finally, a consideration of whether the criteria that underpins an assumption 
that practice choices are associated by the teachers as reflecting epistemic beliefs 
and therefore, needing to be coherent can be questioned. The teachers did select 
the Criterialist option as desirable but also other options, therefore they did not 
make the link that agreement with one should mean a disagreement with the other. 
If it is necessary to identify a stance for respondents, then some decisions need to 
be taken. The choice is to ignore agreement with the Criterialist stance as it 
appears to be a common decision that is desirable and focus on the responses, 
indicating the Copier and Borrower stance and the difference within these from 
pre-test to post-test. 
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If this is done, the results make sense. An examination of the median 
suggests that there is disagreement with a Copier stance in both groups, pre-test 
and post-test, and more so in the Experimental Group at post-test. The pre-test 
indicates more difference in the Control and Experimental Groups in the Borrower 
stance. The median in the Control Group is 0.50 at pre-test and reduces by half to 
0.25 in the Experimental Group. At post-test the Control Group median reduces to 
0.38 and increases to 0.38 in the Experimental Group. A closer examination of 
change in small groups is seen as necessary to understand this. 
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Table 4.28: Student Consistency Scores on Epistemic Stances of Control 
Group and Experimental Group 
 
Student 
Number 
Control Group Experimental Group 
Pre Test Post Test Pre Test Post Test 
1 66.67 71.43 66.67 58.82 
2 61.11 75.00 46.15 68.75 
3 57.89 55.00 57.14 50.00 
4 57.14 50.00 50.00 68.42 
5 50.00 50.00 61.90 66.67 
6 61.11 57.89 52.38 45.00 
7 50.00 52.63 65.00 71.43 
8 40.00 40.00 70.00 61.90 
9 57.89 73.68 56.25 55.56 
10 77.78 78.95 57.14 68.42 
11 47.62 57.14 63.16 76.19 
12 78.57 77.78 71.43 45.00 
13 63.16 61.11 45.00 52.38 
14 62.50 78.95 71.43 55.00 
15 47.37 50.00 42.86 50.00 
16 46.15 35.00 35.29 56.25 
17 38.10 38.10 31.25 35.29 
18 71.43 61.90 57.89 60.00 
19 41.67 31.25 71.43 76.19 
20 53.33 60.00 46.67 29.41 
21 47.37 37.50 71.43 66.67 
22 63.16 60.00 52.94 63.16 
23 44.44 50.00 42.86 52.38 
24 50.00 73.68 60.00 65.00 
25 38.89 28.57 55.00 57.89 
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Student 
Number 
Control Group Experimental Group 
Pre Test Post Test Pre Test Post Test 
26 47.06 58.82 65.00 75.00 
27 38.89 43.75 68.75 60.00 
28 33.33 20.00 60.00 83.33 
29 46.67 66.67 44.44 45.00 
30 33.33 46.15 66.67 75.00 
31 76.92 55.00 47.37 57.14 
32 38.46 57.14 29.41 42.11 
33 62.50 56.25 68.42 85.00 
34 57.14 42.86 68.75 75.00 
35 20.00 50.00 38.89 61.90 
36 45.00 76.19 60.00 68.42 
37 61.54 61.54 65.00 75.00 
38 61.90 70.00 65.00 78.95 
39 61.90 71.43 57.89 65.00 
40 62.50 55.56 59.09 33.33 
41 - - 63.16 90.48 
42 - - 36.84 45.00 
43 - - 50.00 61.11 
Mean 53.01225 55.923 56.18488 61.22209 
Median 51.665 56.695 57.89 61.9 
Minimum 20 20 29.41 29.41 
Maximum 78.57 78.95 71.43 90.48 
Range 58.57 58.95 42.02 61.07 
 
Following the method used by Maggioni et al. (2004), the consistency score 
of each respondent in the Control and Experimental Groups is calculated by 
comparing agreement of the respondent to the Criterialist stance. I assigned 0 to 
all respondents who agree to Copier and Borrower items and thus disagree with 
 298 
 
Criterialist items. I assigned 1 to all of those respondents who disagree with Copier 
and Borrower items and agree with Criterialist items. I then sum all the respondents 
at 1 and divide by the total numbers of items that have been responded to by each 
individual. For example, if a respondent agrees with Items 1, 2, 3, 5 and disagrees 
with 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, he/she has 4 zeros and 5 ones. Similarly, if he/she agrees with 
all Criterialist items he/she has 4 ones. If he/she agrees with 16, 18, 21, and 
disagrees with 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, he/she has 3 zeros and 5 ones. So, the 
consistency score of this respondent is 
(5+4+5)
21
 = 0.666 or 66.6%. I consider those 
respondents who have a consistency score greater than 80% at post-test to be 
consistent with the Criterialist stance.  
The Criterialist stance is the stance of greater sophistication in the scale of 
Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist. It is also the stance towards which the 
Intervention targeted change in epistemic concepts therefore it is reasonable to 
assess consistency against the Criterialist stance as suggested by Maggioni et al. 
(2004). The consistency scores are next ordered as Low, Moderate, and High 
Scores according to Table 4.29. 
 
4.7.14 Weighted Averages and Consistency Score for the Control and 
Experimental Group 
 
Weighted averages and consistency scores of individual respondents in the 
5 individual studies were also calculated in the above mentioned procedure. The 
results indicate that there is no clear pattern of significant change observed in small 
groups as seen in the overall combined data. This is therefore not included in the 
analysis. All tests are included in the Appendices. 
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Table 4.29: Categories of Low, Moderate and High Consistency Score of 
Epistemic Beliefs 
Consistency 
Score 
Range 
Control Group Experimental Group 
Pre Post Pre Post 
Low Below 60% 25 24 23 18 
% 62.5 60 53.48 41.86 
Moderate 60% to 
79% 
15 16 20 22 
% 37.5 40 46.5 51.16 
High 80% to 
100% 
0 0 0 3 
% 0  0 0 6.9 
 
Figure 4.11: Comparison of Consistency Score of Control and Experimental 
Group 
 
I consider those respondents, who have a score at 80 or above, to have 
high consistency with the Criterialist stance; those with a score ranging between, 
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60-79 to have moderate consistency, and those below 60 to have low consistency 
with the Criterialist stance. Taking a percentage according to the numbers in each 
test i.e. 40 respondents in the Control Group and 43 in the Experimental Group, I 
can develop an overview. According to this classification of my data, I can say that 
there were 40% at moderate consistency with the Criterialist stance in the Control 
Group at post-test, and 60% at low consistency with the Criterialist stance at post-
test. 
In the Experimental Group, there were 53% at low consistency with the 
Criterialist stance at pre-test and this changed to 42% at post-test. There were 
47% at moderate consistency and this changed to 51% at moderate consistency 
in the post-test in the Experimental Group. There were 7% at high consistency in 
the Experimental Group alone at post-test. 
The difference in the weighted averages of Copier, Criterialist and Borrower 
stance is estimated by using a paired t test. In the Control Group only, the weighted 
average of the Criterialist stance shows significant difference from pre-test to post-
test significance value 0.009 (p-value). The mean of the pre-Criterialist stance is 
0.97 and the mean of the post-Criterialist stance is 1.26, which shows that the 
difference is towards the post-test.  
The Criterialist stance shows a highly significant difference from pre-test to 
post-test in the Experimental Group. The mean of the pre-test Criterialist stance is 
0.79 and the post-test Criterialist stance mean is 1.25, which is a high weighted 
score in post-test. 
 
4.7.15 Paired t Test of Pre-Test and Post-Test Consistency Scores in Control 
and Experimental Groups 
 
The paired t test is also used among pre-test and post-test consistency scores 
of Control and Experimental Groups. The result indicates that only in the 
Experimental Group, the consistency score of the pre-test is significantly different 
from the post-test significance value 0.0029 (p-value), while in the Control Group, 
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no significant difference occurred in pre-test to post-test consistency scores (p-
value 0.548). 
 
4.8 Epistemic Beliefs Inventory  
 
4.8.1 Summary and Discussion of Analysis of Data of the Third Measure, 
the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
 
The EBI, Epistemic Belief Inventory, is a measure of general Epistemic 
Beliefs. For the Analysis of the EBI, the purpose of analysis is mainly to identify 
change from pre-test to post-test in both sets of data, Control and Experimental. I 
need to study if the pattern of consistently more change in the Experimental Group 
seen in the BLTHQ and BM analysis, is found in the data of domain general 
epistemic beliefs as measured by the EBI. Results are not significant but 
interesting. The pattern is supported as more difference of the difference in the 
Experimental Group in 20 out of 32 items in the EBI. This pattern is more 
pronounced in the EBI than in the BLTHQ data and is consistent with the findings 
of the two instruments. 
A Chi Square test of independence was taken for each item. However, Chi 
Square values were not significant in most items. A pattern could be seen on the 
Contingency Tables with respondents moving in some degree and direction. This 
needed to be examined in some detail. Therefore, the Chi Square analysis was 
followed by an analysis of a difference of the difference in observed responses 
from pre-test to post-test in the Control and Experimental Groups separately. The 
analysis shows that there is somewhat more difference in responses from pre-test 
to post-test in terms of percentages in the Experimental Group as compared to the 
Control Group.  
An independent t test was carried out to find if the difference in percentage 
difference of the Control and Experimental Groups is significant. The test failed to 
reveal any significant difference amongst the two groups. An effect size was also 
calculated to measure the effectiveness of the intervention in the Experimental 
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Group. The Cohen d effect size for percentage difference shows moderate effect 
of the Intervention in the Experimental Group. More importantly, an overview of 
difference in all 32 items shows consistent more difference in the Experimental 
Group as compared to the Control Group. This consistent difference supports the 
results as seen in the data in the other two instruments, the BLTHQ and BM. I take 
this as most encouraging and have presented the Tables 4.30 and 4.31 for 
examination. 
A weighted averages analysis of the EBI was carried out. The result of the 
weighted averages appears different to the analysis of the difference of the 
difference. It must be noted that the absolute difference of each item deals with 
overall absolute change in stance of all respondents for a particular item (e.g. Item 
1) from pre-test to post-test. Weighted averages deal with change in individual 
respondents within different categories of items e.g. Simple Knowledge (SK), 
Certain Knowledge (CK), Omniscient Authority (OA), and median stance is taken 
for comparison. De Vaus (2001, p.153) argues that distinguishing between 
aggregate level and individual change is important both at the theoretical level and 
at the level of research design. The aggregate change will not tell us about the 
level of individual change. 
The change from pre-test to post-test is seen in a sum of all subscales, 
Quick Learning, Fixed Ability, Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge and 
Omniscient Authority. This analysis further examined the magnitude of change 
from pre-test to post-test in three subscales, Simple Knowledge, Certain 
Knowledge and Omniscient Authority only, as these are of interest to me with 
reference to epistemic beliefs. Median points show no pre-test and post-test 
change was observed in SK and OA stance in both groups, Control and 
Experimental. There is a small difference of degree of disagreement on knowledge 
as certain between Control (-0.57) and Experimental Groups (-0.13) at post-test. 
In case of CK, Certain Knowledge, respondents tend to disagree with CK in both 
groups at pre-test and post-test with slightly more disagreement at post workshop 
in the Control Group. It appears that whatever difference is seen in the overall 
analysis has more to do with subscales, Quick Learning and Fixed Ability.   
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Table 4.30: If Two People are arguing about something, at least one of them 
must be wrong 
 
 
Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Post
-Pre)% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
10 7 
7.5 
9 10 
2.4 
25.0% 17.5% 20.9% 
23.3
% 
Disagree 
% 
7 10 
7.5 
14 16 
4.6 
17.5% 25.0% 32.6% 
37.2
% 
Neutral 
% 
13 9 
10 
10 4 
14 
32.5% 22.5% 23.3% 9.3% 
Agree 
% 
6 7 
2.5 
6 7 
2.3 
15.0% 17.5% 14.0% 
16.3
% 
Strongly Agree 
% 
4 7 
7.5 
4 6 
4.7 
10.0% 17.5% 9.3% 
14.0
% 
Total 
% 
40 40 35 43 43 28 
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Table 4.31: Some People Just Have a Knack for Learning and Others Don't 
 
 
Control Experimental 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆C%=(Po
st-Pre)% 
Pre 
Test 
Post 
Test 
∆E%=(Pos
t-Pre)% 
Strongly  
Disagree 
% 
6 4 
5 
5 8 
7 
15.0% 10.0% 11.6% 18.6% 
Disagree 
% 
9 3 
15 
8 13 
11.6 
22.5% 7.5% 18.6% 30.2% 
Neutral 
% 
12 13 
2.5 
12 7 
9.3 
30.0% 32.5% 25.6% 16.3% 
Agree 
% 
9 15 
15 
10 10 
0 
22.5% 37.5% 23.3% 23.3% 
Strongly Agree 
% 
4 4 
0 
8 5 
7 
10.0% 10.0% 18.6% 11.6% 
Total 
% 
40 40 37.5 43 43 34.9 
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Table 4.32: Percentage Difference of Items in the Control and Experimental 
Group 
 
Items 
Control 
∆C% 
Experimental 
∆E% 
1 25 23.1 
2 36.4 27.9 
3 36.4 51.1 
4 20 32.6 
5 5 18.4 
6 15 37.1 
7 20 32.6 
8 15 37.2 
9 30 32.5 
10 30 46.6 
11 20 46.4 
12 10 27.8 
13 35 41.9 
14 30 32.5 
15 45 27.8 
16 50 41.8 
17 37.5 34.9 
18 27.5 21 
19 35 28 
20 30 18.6 
21 30 69.9 
22 40 14 
23 45 23.3 
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Items 
Control 
∆C% 
Experimental 
∆E% 
24 25 55.7 
25 20 27.8 
26 25 18.6 
27 40 14 
28 35 23.1 
29 25 41.7 
30 25 37.2 
31 25 37.3 
32 30 37.1 
 
∆C%: Absolute percentage difference from pre-test to post-test in the Control 
Group 
∆E%: Absolute percentage difference from pre-test to post-test in the Experimental 
Group  
Bold highlights a pattern of consistent more difference in the Experimental 
Group as compared to the Control Group. A moderate effect is seen with a 
calculation of effect size although the difference is not significant. 
 
4.8.2 Factor Analysis of the Overall EBI Data 
 
The authors of the EBI describe the emergence of four factors in their study. 
Initially, the reliability scale of EBI items was very poor and it was impossible to 
carry out Factor Analysis in the data. 12 items were then dropped one by one by 
checking their reliability value. The reliability of the remaining items was found to 
be 0.742, which could be seen as fairly good in the context. Factor Analysis was 
carried out with Varimax Rotation and seven factors emerged from the data that 
have Eigen values greater than 1. A Scree Plot suggested that the first three 
factors were important with a large gap between Factors 1 and 3. The first and 
second Factors represent a combination of Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge 
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and Fixed Ability, of which two are epistemic beliefs and one is a belief about 
learning. Factor 3 explains 7.3% of the variance and contains items of Quick 
Learning, Simple Knowledge and one item of Omniscient Authority. This loading 
together of factors to do with epistemic beliefs and those related to learning is not 
coherent in my understanding.  
Tables 4.30 and 4.31 are attached to show samples of 2 items. Table 4.32, 
exploring the difference of the difference in change in the Control and Experimental 
Groups, is also shown above. 
 
4.9 Summary of Results of All Three Measures 
 
Results of tests using the three instruments, the EBI, BLTHQ and the 
Boscolo & Mason questions are reported and discussed in this Chapter.  
Qualitative assessment of the 166 responses to open ended Boscolo and 
Mason questions was carried out to the CBKH rubric developed for this purpose. 
Qualitative descriptors and quantitative scores were awarded to each respondent 
at pre-test and post-test. Inter-Rater and Internal Evaluation was conducted and is 
reported. 
An overall assessment of data finds significant change in participants’ 
stance from pre-test to post-test in both Control and Experimental Groups. The Chi 
square statistic, however, is different at 23.73 for the Control Group and 35.51 for 
the Experimental Group. Odds of change is 1.259.  
The difference in the change from pre-test to post-test between Control and 
Experimental Groups is more evident in fine grain analysis. In an analysis of 
Change and No Change, the mean rank for the No Change category in the Control 
Group is 6.65. For the Experimental Group, the mean rank is 13.72. Significance 
value is 0.004. A comparison of change from low to high stance between Control 
and Experimental Groups is also interesting. Most participants (72.5% in the C and 
72.09% in E) are at a low stance at pre-test in both groups. At post-test, 67.5% in 
the Control Group and 81.4% in the Experimental Group are at a high stance. Chi 
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Square value is 12.83 for Control and 24.81 for Experimental and the significance 
value is 0.000. 
A comparison of data of the 5 studies finds positive effects of Intervention 2 
in 4 of 5 studies. The results of this analysis of data from the BM measure are seen 
to support the hypothesis. The BLTHQ Likert Scale has 21 items and data is 
examined as an overall meta-analysis of all 5 studies as numbers in cells in 
individual studies is small. A coherent pattern is seen in cross tables of individual 
items. A Table (4.16) is produced for an overview of Chi Square values and 
absolute percentage difference in Control and Experimental Groups for all 21 
items. Chi square values and percentage difference are seen to relate to each 
other. In 13 of 21 items, a larger percentage difference and smaller Chi square 
value in the Experimental Group is seen. Change is significant from pre-test to 
post-test in two items of the Control Group and 7 items of the Experimental Group. 
The significance value of the remaining items is also noted as being smaller in the 
Experimental Groups. The result of a Wilcoxen Rank Sum Test is compatible with 
the Chi square statistic. A comparison of change and No Change is conducted on 
each item. Odds ratio of 10 items is greater than 1, and 2 items have Odds ratio 
close to 1. For each respondent, change is more likely in the Experimental Group 
in 10 plus 2 items.  
An analysis of percentage difference does not find significant difference 
between Control and Experimental Groups but effect size is 0.511, which is a 
modest effect according to Cohen d. Due to the number of items and the smallness 
of size of groups in individual studies, separate analysis of all 5 studies is not 
conducted. The BLTHQ data of one single study is analysed for comparison and 
a similar result is seen. 2 items of the Control Group and 8 items of the 
Experimental Group show significant change. Thus, the results are seen to support 
the findings of the BM data analysis. 
The pattern of the data of the EBI Likert Scale shows that the result is 
consistent with that of the BM and BLTHQ and more change is seen in the 
Experimental Group. Results are not significant but the pattern of the data and 
results consistently favor the Experimental Group in terms of change. A Chi square 
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test of independence followed by percentage analysis of difference in difference in 
all 32 items shows that more difference has taken place in responses of 
respondents in the Experimental Group. Cohen d effect size was also calculated 
to measure the effectiveness of the Intervention in the Experimental Group. The 
result indicates that the Intervention has had a moderate effect in the Experimental 
Group. 
Independent studies were not analysed separately due to the number of 
items, 32, and the size of the sample. Instead, data was combined in meta-
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
‘The teacher’s role is more, you can say, it depends upon the teacher’s role, 
and his personality. Is it, is authoritarian, hmm or, or….. it is a more collaborative 
approach soo………..it depends how much liberty teacher is giving, yes’. 
‘When liberty was given, when liberty was given when different opinions 
came out it..........’ 
 
- Participants of Experimental Group giving reasons for change. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this last Chapter, I conclude from the theoretical arguments that are 
explored in the research, and from the empirical evidence, to draw conclusions on 
the alternative hypothesis proposed. The question, if a perception of agency 
relates to change in concepts in the context of task based discourse in classrooms, 
is answered in the light of the strengths and limitations of the process. The strength 
of the research lies in the design to observe a relationship between two cognitive 
constructs, a perception of agency and epistemic belief change, in valid contexts 
of classroom learning and practitioner research, in the effort made to counter 
threats to inference with better design, open, detailed, and transparent reporting, 
and most importantly, the observation of more and better change in 4 of 5 studies. 
What is known is thus, as argued in the review of literature, what is known 
to work in 4 of 5 studies, and how it is known is made available for review and 
interpretation. Truth claims are necessarily tentative, open to interpretation by 
readers. It would, however, be hard to offer a single alternative explanation for the 
consistency of change seen in all tests, in all three measures, and importantly, in 
4 of 5 studies other than the limitations of quasi experimental design or data and 
statistical analysis. 
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This is an interesting puzzle. To explain, I, as the researcher and tutor in all 
10 Control and Experimental Group workshops, would need to identify a single 
alternative cause that could explain the difference of more and better change in 
the 5 Experimental Groups. Features such as better examples or materials, more 
time, better feedback, etcetera could explain a difference in learning but these 
would have to be consistent in all Experimental Groups and missing in Control 
Groups. The consistency required, precludes accidental differences having an 
effect in 4 of 5 groups. The probability of 4 of 5 studies producing positive results 
by chance without a common effective cause, is perhaps not high. This is 
consistent in all tests and in all three measures. The difference is observed in larger 
numbers in change as opposed to No Change, degree change, and in assessment 
of change from low to high stance. There is also somewhat more coherence in the 
performance as seen in Factor Analysis at post-test. In the examination of change 
and No change and difference in low and high stance at the level of independent 
studies, more significant change is seen in the Experimental Groups. A D.I.D 
estimate finds positive results in favour of the Experimental Groups in 4 of 5 
studies. Meehl (1990, p.204) argues of course, that in research in the social 
sciences and arguably in the biological sciences, ‘everything co-relates to some 
extent with everything else’. I do not argue with Meehl but present this practitioner 
research to be examined in its parameters of design, constraints and opportunities 
in educational contexts. 
This finding in analysis of the BM data in 5 studies is supported in the meta-
analysis of overall BLTHQ data. The analysis was difficult to carry out in each of 
the 5 independent studies. As there are 21 items in the BLTHQ and 32 in the EBI, 
and small, uneven numbers in cells, it was not attempted. BLTHQ data of one 
study (Rose) that has positive results in the BM data was analysed. 2 items in the 
Control Group and 8 items in the Experimental Group showed significant change 
supporting the result seen in the BM data. See Table 4.21. 
The alternative hypothesis of a relationship of a perception of agency and 
change in concepts is thus seen as supported. This is discussed in the following 
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pages. Theoretical aspects are recalled briefly, questions are restated followed by 
a summary of results. Finally, conclusions are drawn and argued. 
The perception of agency as well as epistemic beliefs, being psychological 
constructs, limit the possibilities of definition and the reliability of the measurement. 
The communication of the research is, therefore, detailed, transparent, and 
conclusions are tentative and open to interpretation. Having said that, it is 
important to recognise that such limitations and constraints will always be part of 
the equation when researching these constructs in the field. As discussed in the 
review of literature, practitioner research, quasi experiments with non-random 
assignment, do not permit the same kind of inference as true experiments. This 
relationship could not be observed in a laboratory setting due to the manipulations 
that would be required in sample selection and assignment making a perception 
of agency hard to argue. 
 
5.2 The Argument 
 
The research focus, a relationship between a perception of agency and 
change in concepts in task based discourse, is drawn from a theoretical argument. 
The processes of paradigm change in scientific communities as described by Kuhn 
are argued as different from the orchestrated learning situations of teacher 
education classrooms. To restate, change processes, as argued by Kuhn, are 
autonomous, meaningful to participants, highly charged, whilst classroom learning 
situations are planned, structured, may be teacher or group led, and constrain the 
learner’s agency to reflect upon own prior knowledge and develop own concepts.42 
From this theoretical argument, I draw a hypothesis of a relationship of a 
perception of agency with conceptual change in task based discourse in teacher 
education classrooms. The relationship is logical and arguable, and the research 
finds between good to moderate empirical support for the alternative hypothesis. 
The constructs of agency and a perception of agency are employed in this 
study but not interchangeably. I argue agency as a variable affordance in social 
                                            
42    1. Thomas Kuhn.  2. See Review of Literature: An Argument for Agency  
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contexts on the basis of the difference I perceive in the planned and imposed 
process of change as produced in classrooms and Kuhn’s descriptions of naturally 
evolving paradigm change in scientific communities. For the purpose of this 
research, I hypothesize an enhanced perception of agency in task based group 
discourse, which may extend possibilities for participants to reflect upon their own 
prior ideas, to question, agree or disagree with group views in order to develop 
their own concepts. Questions can be raised if the perception in itself was 
adequate for an individual to change or would a perception created in the whole 
group work to enhance the agency of individuals in real terms and thus make a 
difference? More qualitative research could help to further understand the cause 
of the change in stance seen in the data. 
Task based, group learning situations provide the necessary contexts, 
actions, and opportunities for focused, purposeful talk for the development of 
meaning.43 For the individual to learn, to change a concept such as epistemic 
beliefs, within this social context, the individual is the agent. In my understanding, 
educators need to examine the approach to task based group discourse to include 
an awareness of the agency of the individual learner within the social context. 
Contexts, actions, and words provide vital opportunities for talk as well as active 
learning and as Schön (1963) argues, and Newman (1999) agrees, convergence 
of meaning is made possible. Newman, however, disagrees with Schön's thesis of 
reflection in action, arguing instead, for language games with reference to 
Wittgenstein. In this research, I examine if making discourse productive for more 
learners requires building a perception of agency within the group discourse to 
question, to agree or disagree and reflect upon own prior concepts as well as the 
new ideas on offer. There is logic in this as it would be hard indeed to argue that 
concepts are changed in an environment that imposes ideas by force. 
  
                                            
43 See Schön (1987a, pp.100-101) in Newman (1999, p.39) as discussed in The Review of Literature. 
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5.3 Reflection and Language Games 
 
A review of literature for this research finds general understanding that 
conceptual change is a rational, psychological process as well as a social process. 
Intention and motivation are also seen as important by theorists. Thus, both 
internal and external factors are said to play a role in conceptual change. This is 
also the underpinning position for my empirical research that examines change in 
concepts as supported by a perception of agency within task based discourse. A 
perception of agency, it is argued, supports participants to reflect upon own prior 
concepts within active, social situations to change and develop new concepts. In 
this study, evidence of change is seen to support this relationship albeit tentatively. 
An analysis of a post session focus group with participants also sheds light on 
thoughtful deliberation as participants talk about the change or difference in their 
stance after the learning experience. 
On the basis of my observations, I consider that reflection is necessary and 
did take place in the experimental workshops. The context of task based discourse 
involving the use of actions and words was a necessary part of the process of 
learning. Practically, the participants took part in specific tasks of examining 
relevant and suitable evidence, making of knowledge claims, learning meaning 
and words such as sources, evidence, significance, as well as the process of using 
heuristics to assess knowledge claims. They came to recognize and learn norms 
of knowledge construction in the community of historians and, as the excerpt 
illustrates, they could later reflect upon their own naiveté with some amusement. 
Newman argues for convergence of meaning taking place in participation in the 
language games of historians and a reinterpreted reflection may, according to him, 
be part of the process but only ‘after at least some convergence of meaning has 
been achieved’ Newman (1999, p.157).  
In my study, while the social aspect is seen as necessary, it is 
problematised with a changing and changeable perception of agency within 
discourse examined as a meaningful factor in change. Change is posited as a 
mindful, individual process of reflection within task based discourse to develop 
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concepts. I find tentative support for the hypothesis that a perception of agency 
within task based discourse facilitated reflection upon own prior concepts and 
those of others in developing conceptual understanding.  
Skemp’s theory of experience of a collection of suitable examples 
supporting change of concepts is also tested and found to be effective. The 
experience of a range of suitable examples as an effective pedagogical strategy 
finds significant support in my research. Thus, words, actions, experience in social 
contexts, participating in what can be called the language games of historians, and 
reflection in action were all essential parts of the process. 
With an enhanced perception of agency in task based discourse, 
participants were able to reflect upon their prior ideas about knowledge in history, 
be critical, compare these with the new ideas of knowledge in history as co-
constructed, and change. It is possible that participants were able to concurrently 
reflect upon their own prior concepts and find new ideas plausible to change to a 
different epistemic perspective.  Change does take place all the time and perhaps 
this is how it happens. More research is needed to answer the question of how 
and why change took place. 
 
5.4 Effects of Intervention One, Experience of a Range of Suitable 
Examples on Change in Concepts 
 
Effects of Intervention One, experience of a range of suitable examples 
provided in matched content and method to all 10 groups of both Control and 
Experimental is examined. This was the method of teaching and it had to be 
necessarily, a carefully crafted and matched experience in order to support valid 
conclusions for Intervention 2, a perception of agency relating to change in 
concepts. Unfortunately, a Control Group that did not experience a range of 
suitable examples, could not be provided without adding to confusion. 
Interestingly, this Intervention has had excellent effects. Change is significant in 
both Control and Experimental Groups at post-test. I conclude from this statistic 
that ‘experience of a range of suitable examples’ does support change in concepts. 
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5.5 Support in the Data for the Hypothesis of a Relationship of a 
Perception of Agency in Task Based Discourse with Change in Concepts 
 
Empirical evidence provides reasonable support to the hypothesis as I draw 
conclusions from the rather copious amounts of qualitative and numerical data. 
The results are tantalizing and interesting but not conclusive in the sense of 
statistical significance in most tests of the relationship. Effectiveness of the 
intervention of a perception of agency is examined with data from the three 
measures, the BM questions and BLTHQ and EBI Likert Scales. 
More and better change in Experimental Groups is observed with moderate 
effect in the data of all three measures, the BLTHQ as well as the BM and the EBI 
while being qualitatively and quantitatively different in each. Some tests show 
significance. The change is consistent and more apparent in fine grain analysis 
and with more support in the nature and quality of change. The participants 
generally moved from either a more objectivist or relativist conception of 
knowledge towards a range of awareness of the use of evidence and argument in 
the choice between explanations in history. Conclusions are drawn from an 
analysis of overall change as Change and No Change, a difference in low and high 
stance at post-test, and differences in degree of change. Analysis is conducted as 
a meta-analysis of data of all 5 studies as well as of independent studies in varying 
ways appropriate to the data. 
Cohen d effect size44 ranges between 0.511 - 0.60 in BLTHQ data tests, 
which is moderate by Cohen's standards. Cohen et al. (2007, p.521) Cohen 
considers a differential measure of effect size as more important than significance 
Cohen et al. (2007, p.521). A Difference of Difference estimate with BM data is 
0.275. This is the positive effect of the treatment. 
Effect size rankings in teacher education research are not available. There 
is no effect size quoted in Hattie Rankings (September 2014, May 2015) on a 
perception of agency as this may be the first time that this relationship has been 
suggested, researched, or reported, to my knowledge. The sizes quoted for related 
                                            
44 Cohen (1988) argues an effect size of 1.0 as ‘ large, blatantly obvious’ Hattie (2009:7-8) 
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psychological constructs such as 0.48 for motivation, 0.24 affective attributes, can 
be taken as rough reference. Some tests show significant difference. Without an 
appropriate reference for research in adult or teacher education, I consider the 
effect sizes seen as adequate as both a perception of agency and epistemic beliefs 
are psychological constructs. 
There is consistently more and better change seen in the Experimental 
Groups in nearly all tests and all three measures. This consistency in all tests of 
various relationships, I consider important even if statistical significance is seen in 
only a few tests. Effect sizes, Odds Ratio and the Difference of the Difference are 
positive.  
In overall analysis of BM data, respondents from both Control and 
Experimental Groups change significantly from pre-test to post-test but Chi Square 
values for the Experimental Groups (35.51) are higher compared to the Control 
Groups (23.73). The Odds Ratio is 1.259; likelihood of more change in the 
Experimental Groups. A paired t test has similar significant change in both groups 
with higher values in the Experimental Group. 
A Wilcoxen rank sum test to see the significance of the difference in change 
between groups was conducted. The difference in the Control Groups is significant 
in only 1 study of 5 while it is significant in 4 studies of 5 in the Experimental 
Groups. 
A Mann Whitney Test of Change, No Change and Degree Change of the 
difference between Control and Experimental Groups is significant and reliable. 
The mean rank in Degree Change is 8.33 in the Control Group and 18.53 in the 
Experimental Group, which is a large difference between groups.  
The difference in change between the Control and Experimental Groups is 
most apparent in the comparison of change from low to high stance. While both 
Control and Experimental Groups have a very similar stance at pre-test, at post-
test the difference is large. 67.5% in the Control Group are at a high stance and 
81.4% are at a high stance in the Experimental Group. The significance value is 
0.00, which is a good result to have! 
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A D-I-D estimate of treatment effect is 0.275 which is positive. Odds 
calculated are 1.259 in favour of change in the Experimental Group with a 95% 
confidence interval. If the confidence interval is lowered in the context of this 
educational research, is seen to have more value. The notion that the alternative 
hypothesis is moderately supported gains ground with these results from the data 
of the Boscolo and Mason questions.  
Fine grain analysis of Low and High stance between the 5 study groups 
using a D.I.D. estimate was conducted. This was positive in 4 groups and negative 
in 1 group. Thus, 4 Experimental Groups out of 5 show positive effect of the 
Intervention of a perception of agency in task based discourse.  
It is interesting to note the similarity in the two groups, at pre-test. The 
percentage of low scores at pre-test is 72.5 in the Control Groups, and 72 in 
Experimental Groups. There were 27.5 in the high scores at pre-test of the Control 
Group and 27.9 in the Experimental Group. The total change to high scores was 
very different at post-test between Control and Experimental Groups. 81.4 % were 
at high scores in the Experimental Group as compared to 67% in the Control 
Group. A change can easily be seen in terms of observed counts of Low and High 
category in both sets of data.  
In the data of the BLTHQ, 21 items were categorized into the 3 stances, the 
Copier, Borrower and Criterialist stance. Cross tables analysis does not show the 
data as random or confused with clear patterns emerging in the consistency of 
responses falling in easily discernible bands for most items in both groups. A Chi 
square test of independence (see para 4.7.5.1) supports more positive change in 
the Experimental Group. The BLTHQ, being a Likert Scale, each item is analysed. 
In order to observe a pattern a table was made. Chi Square values, percentage 
difference and Odds Ratio were displayed and compared for each item. Thus, it is 
possible to see that 13 out of 21 items show more positive change in the 
Experimental Groups compared to the Control Groups. Cohen's d effect size 0.511 
of the percentage difference in Control and Experimental Groups is a moderate 
effect seen. Cramer V Effect size is greater than 0.2 in 13 of 21 items. The effect 
size value of 0.29 indicates a good effect of the intervention in the Experimental 
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Group. In the remaining items the effect size is 0.17. Odds Ratio is also taken to 
indicate more likelihood of change in the Experimental Group with some degrees 
of difference. See Table 4.22. 
The neutral option on all items of a single stance was taken by only 3 
respondents. Generally, neutral is a random option on items and not a preferred 
choice which is further reduced at post-test. The neutral is interesting where it is 
seen that fewer respondents opted for a neutral in the Experimental Group at post-
test than the Control Group.  
Weighted averages improved at post-test in the Experimental Groups’ 
consistency with the Criterialist stance as assessed with BLTHQ data. Median 
values show low consistency in the Control Group at post-test while the 
Experimental Groups show more consistency. A paired t test has a consistency 
score showing significant difference at post-test in the Experimental Group. 
(0.002). Factor Analysis improved at post-test in the Experimental Group where a 
clear Criterialist factor emerges. Generally, it can be said from an examination of 
the data from the BM and BLTHQ instruments, that there is consistence in a better 
performance in change in concepts about knowledge in history in the Experimental 
Group as compared to the Control Group. 
The EBI focuses on general epistemic beliefs, therefore a comparison of 
change in stance from pre-test to post-test was seen independently in the 
instrument. The data of the EBI supports the findings of more change in the 
Experimental Group. Of 32 items, 20 showed more change in the Experimental 
Groups. The Cohen d effect size for percentage difference shows moderate effect 
of the intervention in the Experimental Group. The Experimental Group showed a 
disagreement with knowledge as certain at post-test which is interpreted as 
coherent with findings of the BM and BLTHQ. This result is thus seen as consistent 
with the result of the BM and BLTHQ analysis. 
In an analysis of the 5 independent studies, more and better change in 
terms of change to a higher stance is seen in 4 of 5 Experimental Groups. This is 
an important result raising questions of cause. Intervention 1, an experience of a 
range of suitable examples, was provided to all 10 Groups Control and 
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Experimental. This was the pedagogical method and it is presented and discussed. 
Participants in both Control and Experimental Groups changed significantly from 
pre-test to post-test. Thus, the pedagogical method has been successful in 
changing epistemic concepts about knowledge in history. Intervention 2, an 
enhanced perception of agency, was provided to Experimental Groups only in all 
5 studies. More and better change is seen with moderate effect sizes in 4 of 5 
Experimental Groups and in one Control Group.  
The effect of Intervention 2 in the Experimental Group is first seen in the 
meta-analysis of overall data of the BM. A similar trend is seen in the BLTHQ and 
EBI data where result of meta-analysis indicates that more items have significant 
change in the Experimental Group as compared to items of the Control Group.  
The number of items being 21 in the BLTHQ Likert Scale and 32 in the EBI, 
a study wise analysis of difference was difficult. The numbers in cells were small 
in the single studies as well as unequal in numbers of participants. One single 
study (Rose - Table 4.21) was analyzed by means of the same statistical test used 
for meta- analysis of overall data of 5 studies. Though the sample size is smaller, 
the result is quite consistent and meaningful. Only two items in the Control Group 
have significant difference in pre-test to post-test responses while in the 
Experimental Group, 8 items including all 4 Criterialist items show significant 
difference from pre-test to post-test. This I consider meaningful support to the 
finding of the BM that 4 out of 5 studies show more positive change in the 
Experimental Groups. Meta-analysis of overall combined data of the BLTHQ and 
EBI also supports a conclusion of more and better change in the Experimental 
Groups. 
I, as the tutor, practitioner researcher in all groups, cannot account for any 
other possible common factor in the 4 Experimental Groups that could be said to 
be a reason for the difference in epistemic belief change between groups. The 
tutor, materials, activities, general focus of discussion, school contexts, plan, were 
the same in all groups. What was consistently maintained as different in the 
Experimental Groups was the enhanced perception of agency. There were random 
differences certainly in groups. Size, composition, city, school, qualifications, 
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experience, etcetera are all discussed as the many varying natural features of the 
sample in practice contexts. What is known to be common is the enhanced 
perception of agency in the Experimental Groups alone. This is discussed in the 
following pages. 
 
5.6 Limitations and Strengths 
 
There are limitations to inference as described in the nature of the 
constructs of epistemic beliefs and perceptions of agency. The limits of reliability 
of qualitative assessment of epistemic beliefs with the CBKH category scale and 
the 3 measures, threats to validity in the quasi experimental design, non-random 
sample, multiple differences within the sample, field contexts, practitioner 
research, size of the samples, the limitations of statistical tests conducted are 
taken into account but cannot be measured and calculated for statistical analysis.  
This is a self-funded practitioner research for a degree and there are 
limitations of access to high powered statistical analysis. 
Research in the social sciences is fraught with difficulties and what is 
claimed as known, takes all such factors into account. As Shadish et al. (2002) 
warn, and I have found, it is frustrating if after all this effort, non-random selection 
and weak control in a weak quasi experiment make a more strongly supported 
conclusion difficult. The practitioner researcher’s role, assignment process and 
unknown basis of the samples present in the 10 workshops are reasons to avoid 
strong claims. It is reiterated that such limitations are not peculiar to this research 
but would always be present in field research and research into epistemic beliefs.  
To improve the reliability of the qualitative assessment of responses to BM 
questions, I conducted reasonably rigorous Inter Rater and Internal Evaluation. In 
so doing, apparently, I limit the subjectivity of the Rater, yet say little about the 
subjectivity of the rubric (i.e. the categories I create) or the extent to which results 
can be generalised.  
The rubric and the validity of the measures can be defended best by 
theoretical arguments as I do for the CBKH. To begin, I have used the models of 
Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) and Maggioni et al. (2004), Maggioni et al. (2009a) 
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then developed these further. While I argue with and alter the model they employed 
in the research they conducted, my position is actually consistent with much of 
what is their position regarding epistemic beliefs in the other writings they have 
produced as well as others such as Lee and Shemilt (2003). There is, however, 
difference in emphasis. I set higher standards for a criterialist stance by insisting 
upon the continued awareness of the constructed nature of knowledge in history 
and acknowledgement of the historian in the text at the highest level of beliefs. I 
also increase the spread within the stance to include those who are now aware 
that there is a way out of the relativist impasse but do not yet know the use of the 
heuristics well enough. At the highest level of the Sophisticated Integrator, 
expertise in the use of the historical method is expected as described by these 
authors at the Criterialist Level. I have separated ways of knowing from the knower 
and known in the rubric and, this again, I defend as a useful and necessary step. 
In so doing I separate the essential epistemic aspect of belief from the possibly 
weak knowledge and skill in evaluating an account with the use of heuristics.  
The rubric is also defended as it enables categorising a vast majority of the 
data. The CBKH was extremely useful in analysing the 166 response sheets with 
open ended, qualitative responses to the BM questions. It is an important tool to 
examine large numbers of responses with reasonable reliability. My argument 
takes into account the responses of my sample and the need to differentiate 
between these individuals and expert historians. The CBKH rubric is a useful 
instrument to unravel epistemic beliefs, order these and differentiate between a 
range of stance at finer grain. More research with trained and tested raters will help 
to improve reliability. A set of exemplars is provided. There are, at present, 
nuances of difference but a lot of consensus available in the literature as to what 
constitutes a naive or sophisticated stance. This is, in the end, a subjective yet 
necessary decision. 
There are limitations to consistency of stance. Weighted averages do not 
show consistency if consistency with the Criterialist stance is set at 90%. According 
to the data of the BLTHQ, participants take a dual stance agreeing with both the 
Criterialist as well as one more, either Borrower or Copier stance. This dual stance 
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I see as an instrument effect and not coherent with the findings of the BM. 
VanSledright et al. (2006) describe similar findings in their data as do Maggioni et 
al. (2009a). The 4 items of the Criterialist stance are seen as hard to disagree with 
and it is also seen as difficult to disagree, at the same time, with all the remaining 
17 in the scale. Therefore, agreement or disagreement with the Borrower and 
Copier items is taken as adequate in describing the participants’ stance. This is 
consistent with the stance seen in the data of the BM questions and with 
expectations of change from pre-test to post-test. Factor Analysis does not tell us 
much about the validity of the BLTHQ measure although more coherence and a 
clear criterialist stance emerging at post-test is important, in my view. This, I 
consider a reliable, consistent and arguable result and it provides support to the 
findings of Maggioni et al. (2004) in their assessment of epistemic beliefs. 
There are real strengths in this research. The logical nature of the 
relationship proposed and its basis in theory of change in paradigms that 
encourages faith in its effectiveness; validity for inference of research in field 
contexts; the meaningful nature of the content employed for change in epistemic 
beliefs, the effectiveness of a sound pedagogical method; conduct of 5 studies in 
reasonably comparable conditions and the data gathered; the appealing quality of 
responses to BM questions and the good possibility of assessment that the CBKH 
provided; the rigorous internal evaluation; the transparent and open reporting; and 
finally, my, the practitioner researcher's, long years of experience in teaching both 
children and adults are strong points. The findings, though not as significant as 
experimental science may require, are certainly persuasive. 
Theoretically, the relationship is well worth exploring. Logically too, the 
relationship makes sense. It would be hard to argue that epistemic concepts can 
change where there is a perceived lack of agency in the learning context. 
Behaviour may change at least overtly, concepts probably do not. 
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5.7 Is the Relationship of a Perception of Agency and Change in Concepts 
Possible to Research? 
 
I do, in practical terms, conclude that the relationship of a perception of 
agency with change in concepts can be systematically researched with some 
rigour as is possible in research into epistemic beliefs. In experimental research, 
the design becomes a little complicated. All things need to be the same, therefore 
the pedagogical method such as that of a range of suitable examples has to be 
specified carefully.  
Practically, identifying a concept that needed change, obtaining a suitable 
sample and relevant measures was possible including finding schools interested 
in the change. Contextual issues, although challenging and often unplanned and 
hard to measure, kept occurring but it was still possible to continue with the 5 
studies with reasonable success. Data analysis was a large challenge but that, in 
a properly funded and resourced research, would not be an issue. 
A perception of agency is claimed only in the sense that the planned 
procedures were followed as operationalized and described. Classroom 
arrangements were maintained. I, as teacher, kept a careful focus on groups to 
encourage participants to question, agree and disagree with group views, and to 
reflect upon their own prior ideas as well as the new concepts discussed in the 
task based discourse. I kept teacher talk to a minimum, and encouraged people to 
find groups they were comfortable with. It is important not to think of the process 
as mechanical but in terms of valuing agency, understanding that individuals need 
opportunities, room to raise their prior ideas, discuss them and make connections 
with the new. Going back to Kuhn, this research points out, is a need to explore 
social conditions that have nurtured change in paradigms and relate these to 
conditions in classrooms.  
A focus group session was held with participants of an Experimental Group 
after the workshops were over. I asked participants to examine the change in their 
responses to the questionnaires and consider what was it in the way that the 
workshops were conducted that helped them to change. Interestingly, although 
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they did not know the intervention or the words ‘a perception of agency’, several 
identified in various ways, a sense of liberty, and encouragement to think for 
themselves. Excerpts are added in places to illustrate what participants perceived.  
An important point to be made is the need for more qualitative research to 
give substance to the idea of a perception of agency relating to change in social 
contexts. I would better employ my qualitative data, adding more excerpts from 
audio records and field notes in order to improve descriptions in a revision. I had 
a plan originally to hold focus groups for all workshops to discuss perceptions and 
change; however, that became practically difficult and only one such session was 
held.  
I used mixed methods and this, I found useful in the research. The 
responses to open ended questions as qualitative data when interpreted with a 
rubric made assessment of the large sample possible. Tashakkori and Creswell 
(2007, p.207-210) propose interconnected qualitative and quantitative 
components in mixed methods research including starting with a strong mixed 
methods research question or objective. The focus of my research, a perception 
of agency as making a difference in epistemic concepts, drove all aspects of the 
design. The data is mixed as is the analysis, and conclusions are drawn from both 
qualitative data transformed to quantitative as well as Likert Scale data. As the 
nature of my qualitative data, type of method, and its analysis are easier to 
integrate, I faced fewer problems. 
The problem with responding to the question if this relationship can be 
researched on the basis of my data is that I must put forward a strong claim that 
the cause of the change in my studies was indeed a perception of agency and not 
some other underlying common factor and this is what is possible to research. I 
provide the outcome of data analysis as supporting the hypothesis as well as 
transparent description. I also realise that I do not know what could be the 
alternative reasons for the consistency seen in most tests, 3 measures and in the 
results in 4 out of 5 studies. More research is required to respond. 
Having said all this, theoretically, there may be limitations to how far the 
research may be judged as interpretable. An evaluation would be required, as 
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Meehl (1990) suggests, to make a judgment. The constructs are psychological ‘soft 
areas’, the quasi experiments conducted in teacher education classrooms with 
non-equivalent, non-random groups by a practitioner are quite different from true 
experiments. This is, however, a good example of practitioner research, and in that 
sense, the question, is the relationship possible to research, is answered positively 
in terms of the practical model.  
 
5.8 Quality of Change as seen in the Three Measures and the Use of the 
CBKH Categories 
 
Change is significant in both groups, Control and Experimental from pre-
test to post-test. When the quality of change is analysed, I see that the change is 
more, one of degree within a stance from a naive to a critical position or to the next 
stance from Critical Objectivist to a Naive Subjectivist or Critical Subjectivist to a 
Naive Criterialist. A move from low to high stance is seen but it is not radical but 
gradual in most cases.  
There are similarities and differences between what the data from the three 
instruments tell us. This is expected due to the indirect approach to epistemic 
beliefs and contexts of pedagogical practice, in the BLTHQ as well as some 
instrument effects. The EBI measures general epistemic beliefs from pre-test to 
post-test and change is seen within these tests. The BM questions are open ended 
and responses are similarly open and varying.  
Importantly, all change is judged as evidence of a perturbation in the 
individual’s beliefs and an attempt to make new meaning, therefore, positive, while 
‘No Change’ is seen as no effect of the Intervention. There are differences and 
similarities in the quality of data, small differences in degree of change and nature 
of change in the three sets of data emerging from the 3 measures. The direction 
of change seen in all three instruments is observed and interpreted towards more 
sophistication and, again more so, in the Experimental Group. A backward 
movement towards naive beliefs is seen less often.  
The assessment of responses to the BM data shows a coherent pattern. 
Most participants moved away from an objectivist belief in knowledge of the past, 
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believing in history as isomorphic with the past or directly obtained from evidence, 
but did not yet develop the level of knowledge or understanding of heuristics to be 
categorized as full Criterialists. No one in either group reached Level 7 of the 
Sophisticated Integrator and, a total of 2 in the Control and 4 of the Experimental 
out of the total 83, fell in the Critical Criterialist stance at post-test. At pre-test, there 
was only 1 participant in the entire sample at this stance. 19 moved to, what I term, 
a Naive Criterialist stance, which is good evidence of development. At the Naive 
Criterialist stance, the respondent can be said to be aware that there is a way out 
of subjective helplessness but does not yet know the use of the historical method 
well enough to be at the Critical level. This stage I argue as the beginning of the 
Criterialist stance as there is now a coming to light in a sense, an awareness that 
was not there earlier, that there is a way out of the subjectivist impasse. Both the 
Naive Criterialist and Critical Criterialist in the CBKH categories fall in, 
approximately, what Maggioni et al. (2009a) term ‘Transition 2’ in their model. What 
they describe as the Criterialist stance in their model is more in keeping with the 
Sophisticated Integrator in the CBKH categories with additional expectations in the 
CBKH of epistemic beliefs, expertise, as well as a requirement for the transparent 
and acknowledged presence of the historian in the text.  
Maggioni et al. (2004), Maggioni et al. (2009a) do not report many people 
in their sample at the Criterialist level in their studies. I considered a wider spread 
in this category as the research analysis required a differentiation in the sample 
and a fine measure of change. The CBKH rubric was developed to assess 
responses in the sample and not a hypothetical sample. The CBKH thus provides 
a clear reference for epistemic beliefs as assessed. This is described in detail in 
the Chapter on Research Methodology. 
The EBI shows good change but it is more interesting in the small increase 
with disagreement with knowledge as certain in the Experimental Group. On 
average, change is observable and more so, significantly, in the Experimental 
Group and in this sense, the instrument has provided good support. Analysis of 
the data from the EBI supports the pattern of more change in the Experimental 
Group in 21 out of 32 items with higher Chi Square values. A moderate effect size 
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of 0.6 in favour of the Experimental Group is seen, which is somewhat more than 
the 0.51 effect size seen in BLTHQ data. 
The participants' awareness of the historical method was enhanced by the 
experience of the Intervention and interestingly, they were persuaded towards its 
effectiveness in selecting between knowledge claims yet they could not securely 
describe the way in which this could be done. Longer periods of teaching, and 
more experience in the use of heuristics is recommended. Subjectivist concerns 
reflected in statements such as ‘all are good’ were happily less likely to be seen in 
post-test narrative responses to BM questions. 
As expected, there is more clarity about change in the narrative responses 
to the Boscolo and Mason open ended questions. Between the two sets of data, 
the qualitative analysis of the responses to the BM questions suggests a more 
coherent move towards sophistication whilst in BLTHQ data the same participants 
appear to take a dual stance. This can be attributed to the instrument but I also 
think that as the items target pedagogical practice albeit underpinned by epistemic 
beliefs, the Intervention would need to overcome both habits of thinking as well as 
practice, which is again not easy to do. 
The data of the BLTHQ is interesting. There is a pattern in change from pre-
test to post-test and between groups. Analysing cross tables of each item e.g. 
Table 4.8 illustrates this. Broadly, the participants in the Control Groups increased 
in support of the use of the historical method as well as objective knowledge whilst 
in the Experimental Group, more participants increased in their awareness of the 
need for method as well as in the constructed nature of knowledge. It is hard to 
decipher in epistemic terms which group grew in sophistication unless one 
recognizes the order of the scale of epistemic beliefs. In these frameworks, the 
Subjectivist stance is in a higher order than the Objectivist stance and the 
Criterialist is on the top of the scale. Therefore, it can be said that the members of 
the Experimental Groups grew towards more sophistication in comparison with the 
Control Groups.  
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The dual stance seen here was also observed in the data of the authors’ 
studies as well except in the case of experts.45 This could be an instrument effect 
in terms of the construction and balance of the items or the pedagogical beliefs 
that the questions are framed in. VanSledright et al. (2006, p.218) say they are 
unclear about the answer as to why participants appear to take a dual stance.  
As stated above, participants agreed with the Criterialist stance but also 
agreed with either the Objectivist or Subjectivist stance. No participant, not even 
the few at a more advanced position as seen in BM data, agreed only with the 4 
Criterialist items and disagreed with all 17 other items as experts may be expected 
to generally do. This is clearly something a revised version of the BLTHQ should 
address. I have taken this into account and worked around it. 
Interestingly, participants do not appear to hold a dual stance in the 
responses to the more theoretical Boscolo & Mason questions even though there 
is some evidence of occasional contradiction within responses to the 6 questions. 
It is perhaps in the nature of epistemic ideas that positions may be exploratory and 
tentative at times as discussed in the review of literature. More research is needed. 
Keeping the seeming desirability of the Criterialist stance in mind, I interpret 
the dual stance differently. The generally across the board agreement with 
Criterialist items in the post-test is seen as positive and in keeping with 
sophistication and then ignored. Agreement with Borrower items is seen as more 
coherent with instruction, a more sophisticated move towards an awareness of 
knowledge in history as constructed, as seen in the Experimental Groups. 
Agreement with Objectivist items is logically seen as a move towards a more Naive 
Objectivist stance as in the Control Groups. 
Considering the framing of epistemic beliefs, Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.208) 
wonder if the journey towards expertise implies, at a certain point, the adoption of 
the Borrower stance. I, too, tentatively consider that the Subjectivist stance may 
be a necessary interim position between the Objectivist and Criterialist stance 
without which the importance of the use of the historical method to judge between 
two explanations in history may not seem meaningful. This is the argument I 
                                            
45 See Maggioni et al. (2009) 
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employ in the order of epistemic beliefs in the CBKH scale and, in this sense, there 
is coherence between the findings of the two instruments. The move towards 
agreement with a Borrower stance in the Experimental Group is understood in this 
light. 
It could be said that the Criterialist items are hard to disagree with. There is 
a saying in Urdu that an elephant has different teeth to show off and different to 
eat with. The straightforward conclusion would be that the Criterialist items had a 
socially desirable value, therefore most everyone agreed with them. In the post-
test, however, whilst the participants of the Experimental Group showed overall, 
as well as more coherent, change towards the higher stance, also displayed a 
more independent and thoughtful stance. They registered a balance of change to 
agreement, disagreement, and No Change in the Criterialist items. The Control 
Group showed less change overall, more agreement with the Objectivist stance, 
and a somewhat larger move to the socially desirable Criterialist stance. The 
awareness of the role of the knower in knowledge construction grows more in the 
Experimental Groups. Data of the BM responses shows that most people moved 
from an Objectivist or a Naive Subjectivist stance to a Critical Subjectivist or higher 
stance in the Experimental Groups.  
A key objective of instruction in the workshops was to develop epistemic 
thinking towards greater sophistication. Direct instruction did not take place. At no 
point were the words epistemology, epistemological thinking or beliefs mentioned 
or discussed in direct terms. Historical events and conflicting accounts as well as 
sources were examined and evidence was studied with the use of heuristics. 
Those were the tasks carried out and opportunities for epistemic thinking and talk 
were provided. Therefore, the change towards a more Borrower stance in the 
Experimental Groups is seen as more coherent with instruction. Participants could 
only advance in limited ways as there was not enough time for a more concerted 
experience of historiography. Such are the constraints of research in the field! 
A key point is that most people did not fall in the Criterialist stance in the 
pre-test in BM data and only some moved towards a Criterialist stance at post-test. 
Now that may be taken as contradicting the BLTHQ data of large numbers 
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agreeing with the Criterialist stance. If, however, an account is taken of the nature 
of the question in the BM being dependent on demonstrating knowledge and 
understanding of the use of heuristics, it is possible to understand the difference. 
In the BM questions, respondents cannot just take a socially desirable stance. 
They have to demonstrate they know how to judge between accounts, which is 
more challenging than selecting what sounds like the right thing to say. Therefore, 
I trust the BM data and count agreement with Criterialist items in the BLTHQ as 
positive and necessary. If respondents had not agreed with Criterialist items or 
agreed both with the Copier and Borrower items that would have been a cause for 
concern. Happily they did not. The findings in this research are arguably sound. I 
consider that responses by participants are thoughtful, display coherent patterns, 
and there is consistency in results of all three instruments. Findings of my research 
deepen, and are in line with prior findings. 
In moving from a Copier or Objectivist stance, the next stage is a Borrower 
or Subjectivist stance. The Experimental Groups took that direction while the 
Control Groups moved back to agree with an Objectivist stance. The Experimental 
Group in this light grew in sophistication whereas the Control Groups moved to a 
more naive stance. I have ethical concerns about this and want to go back and 
complete what I began as well as provide equal opportunity to Control Groups to 
change with an enhanced perception of agency. 
Results largely show that the history focused questions of the BM did work 
to unravel history related epistemic beliefs while the BLTHQ did access the 
learning and teaching history beliefs held by teachers. Taken together, the two 
instruments provide a good description of participants' epistemic beliefs about 
knowledge in history. Maggioni et al. (2009a, p.207) report that most teachers fully 
completed the questionnaire, which is what I found as well. The neutral option was 
not taken as a choice and the change in stance found is coherent with 
expectations. Broadly, the stance seen and change within it is logical and coherent 
in all groups in the pre-test with a change that is towards more and better 
development at post-test in the Experimental Groups. This result-as-coherent is 
also interpreted as support for measurement and analysis. 
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Combining quantitative Likert Scales with the qualitative Boscolo & Mason 
Questionnaire was useful in the range of information that could be obtained. 
Analysis was time consuming as a set of categories to analyze the responses to 
the open ended questions became necessary and had to be developed. 
Developing the categories, the CBKH was a challenging enterprise but well worth 
the time. In the end, the rubric made the analysis with repeated and persistent 
effort, more reliable. The Inter Rater agreement and Internal Evaluation does 
suggest that assessment became more consistent with efforts at rigour and 
repeated trials. I had nagging concerns that reading the responses so many times 
and coming up with varying results might make the scores I awarded doubtful but 
the analysis of data has brought up patterns that validate the assessment to a large 
extent. Pre-test data appears to be similar in many ways in both groups as indeed 
it does in the BLTHQ and EBI responses. Post-tests show consistent patterns in 
change and more and better change in the Experimental Groups. The instruments 
I selected were suitable as described as they assess epistemic beliefs, can be 
used for a pre-test and post-test measurement of change, and in combination, 
there is some variance in the construct measured to provide a rich description of 
stance. 
While truth claims about epistemic beliefs need to be tentative, there is 
enough data in 3 measures over 166 response sheets to give some substance to 
the argument that beliefs were measured and change was assessed. 
 
5.9 Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis and Interpretations 
 
Mixing methods was liberating and empowering. I was able to select 
instruments and methods of analysis from both camps and obtain good evidence. 
The open ended Boscolo & Mason questions provided very useful and illuminating 
qualitative responses as data in the sample of 83 participants. Obtaining scores 
for each respondent made a systematic analysis possible of the 166 response 
sheets. The CBKH categories developed for this research are a useful tool to order 
and categorise large numbers of responses for an epistemic stance. The process 
of Inter Rater assessment and Internal Evaluation was necessary to improve 
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reliability. The Inter Rater exercise was not fruitful in producing trained Raters of a 
good level as is explained, but the Internal Evaluation did help to improve the 
quality of assessment to overall 82%. Doing 5 separate studies helped in raising 
numbers and more than that, a comparison of studies did support drawing 
conclusions.  
I can agree with Limon (2002, p.277-285) that epistemic concepts can be 
implicit in narrative and can be inferred. At the same time, the other instrument, 
the BLTHQ Likert Scale Maggioni et al. (2009a)was employed. As described, this 
has statements about pedagogical practices underpinned by epistemic beliefs and 
conclusions about beliefs were drawn through a quantitative analysis. A broad 
degree of concurrence in findings of change in both instruments albeit with 
differences is argued. The availability of the BLTHQ was timely and useful. Data 
from this study may help in developing the instrument further.  
This is a mixed method research in somewhat hidden ways. The long and 
arduous analysis, repeated reading and agonizing over meanings and themes in 
the 166 qualitative response sheets with reflections on epistemic issues was not 
an easy task. This effort is lost to view as the descriptors awarded are converted 
into single scores for analysis. The process took over two years, and the 
development of the CBKH scale, before a satisfactory analysis was completed but 
it was well worth the effort as the level of reliability of assessment improved with 
each trial. Patterns in the BM data are logical and consistent as well as theoretically 
sound, which is the most important evidence in the consideration of reliability. Had 
the assessment not been sound, there would have been much inconsistency and 
random differences. All in all, the pattern of findings is persuasive. 
Assessment of responses to the CBKH scale needed to be as reliable as 
possible as indeed all assessment should be. In this research, there was a larger 
emphasis on reliable judgment as a relationship between two psychological 
constructs was being explored in experimental ways. Scales of epistemic beliefs 
are a developing science and, while reliability was improved, it remains a 
subjective judgment. The Likert Scales, on the other hand, appear a matter of 
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counting numbers if it were not for the insight that even the Likert Scale score is 
an effort to quantify an epistemic belief, which is complex. 
Data from the Likert Scales was analyzed through quantitative analysis, 
which, though challenging, seemed fairly straightforward. However, it turns out 
there is much interpretation involved as the data reveals some aspects clearly and, 
in others, provides only hints and suggestions. Pulling all the various results of all 
three instruments together and finding support for arguments and discounting 
others requires interpretation and meaning making. An example is an analysis of 
change in the BLTHQ data that finds that respondents from Control and 
Experimental Groups have gone different ways in the move to the Copier and 
Borrower stance. This has to be understood in the light of the change of stance 
seen in the BM data as well as an understanding of how perhaps a perception of 
agency may have encouraged participants in the Experimental Group to be more 
independent in selecting stance. The members of the Control Group moved more 
towards the socially desirable Criterialist stance while those in the Experimental 
Group changed to a somewhat more balanced Agree and Disagree with the 
Criterialist stance.  
This is very interesting. The participants in the Control Group also moved 
lower to agreement in the Naive Copier stance, whereas participants in the 
Experimental Group moved upwards to recognition of the constructed nature of 
knowledge in history. The numbers can be interpreted and explained in interesting 
ways. 
The open ended questions of the BM related well to the tasks of source 
evaluation and discussion experienced during the workshops and gave the 
participants opportunity to show development in their concepts. Their growth in 
epistemic stance as seen in the measure is coherent with the experience provided 
to some extent. This is another aspect of interpretation of the scores awarded. 
Interestingly, employing the data from each instrument separately to 
analyze what changed, and did not change, whether the intervention worked to 
target those particular beliefs or not, can be seen to be an effective strategy for 
analysis of the BLTHQ and BM, EBI data. The statements of the BLTHQ and BM 
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questions are different as is the nature of the beliefs that each targets, yet each 
instrument displays change from pre-test to post-test in its own way and with 
degrees of difference. This can serve to inform research in the field.  
Concluding from all this evidence is a fascinating experience very much like 
fitting together pieces of a puzzle. To be honest, questions about the status of 
qualitative or quantitative data or paradigmatic assumptions in analysis were not 
in the foreground in drawing conclusions. Pragmatic, practical reasoning using 
numbers, patterns, knowledge such as what could be a socially desirable choice, 
or what was closer to the content taught, as well as theoretical arguments, helped 
to draw conclusions.  
 
5.10 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This research has fortunately proved useful in several ways. A hypothesis 
of a relationship of a perception of agency in task based group discourse and 
change in concepts is argued, proposed, and found to be supported in four of five 
quasi experimental studies. The study also demonstrates how the relationship can 
be systematically researched. Identifying the relationship opens a small new idea 
to explore in Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change and generally, the area of 
conceptual change in education. A perception of agency and change in concepts 
are discussed in the blurred space of philosophical and psychological arguments 
about learning where Kuhn's arguments about revolutions in science, Schön's 
epistemology for reflective practice, counter arguments on convergence of 
meaning such as those of Newman, and a review of Russell's work on agency and 
mental development are found. The relationship is briefly introduced and found 
supported empirically but requires more academic argument for elaboration as well 
as research. 
Testing the relationship in change of other concepts that are problematic in 
teacher education such as responsibility of pupil behaviour will be interesting. 
Qualitative research is recommended to better understand the phenomenon of a 
perception of agency and its effects on learning in social contexts.  
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Research in epistemic beliefs about knowledge in history is useful in the 
contexts of curriculum change in history and informs preparations for examination 
for Cambridge International Examinations in Pakistan. The importance of 
development of epistemic beliefs to negotiate knowledge claims in a world of 
multiple media needs increasing focus. The research finds significant support to 
the question if it is possible to develop epistemic beliefs with adult education in the 
findings of all 10 groups. 
Skemp’s principles of experience of a range of suitable examples to change 
concepts are tried and found most useful in changing concepts, Skemp (1971). I 
emphasise each aspect, experience, range, suitability, and examples as important 
in my studies. Significant change in both groups is good evidence for the 
effectiveness of the strategy.  
I developed the Categories of Beliefs about Knowledge in History by 
modifying Maggioni et al. (2004) Maggioni et al. (2009a) model of the Copier, 
Borrower, Criterialist Categories. This was necessary as I found that clear 
descriptions were needed in order to make reliable judgments over large numbers 
of responses. The new rubric is tested in assessment of 166 response sheets and 
found useful and reliable. The arguments I have raised and discussed over time 
with Professor Maggioni have made this possible and I owe her my heartfelt 
thanks. Maggioni's patient and knowledgeable questions and painstaking reading 
of my ideas helped to build a better set of categories. Kuhn and Weinstock (2002, 
p.124), Levels of Epistemological Understanding, were initially studied to develop 
my own understanding and inform the development. After that, when I saw that my 
data needed for me to expand and elaborate the categories for more reliable 
assessment, it was Dr. Liliana Maggioni from the University of Maryland, with her 
rich experience in the field, who gave of her time and expertise to argue this 
development. The epistemic arguments for the development of the categories are 
interesting and the rubric is open for interpretation and practical trial over large 
data sets. Epistemic belief research would benefit from the description of the 
combined use of the Boscolo & Mason questions and the assessment of 
responses with the CBKH categories over large samples. 
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Carrying out 5 quasi experimental studies in practitioner research in 
education was instructive. Careful design, countering threats and interpreting the 
theory in practical contexts was a great learning experience. This should serve as 
an example of a different way to carry out practitioner research other than case 
studies. Conducting 5 studies sounds more grand than it is. In schools, teachers 
often have opportunities to try out a method over time and in varying classrooms. 
How this can be made more systematic and reliable is useful knowledge. 
This is a useful example of practitioner research in teacher education and 
should be useful and interesting in my field. I have used mixed methods at various 
levels in measures, analysis and provided transparent and useful descriptions 
along with the statistics possible. To me personally, mixed methods helped to 
reflect upon the complexities of paradigms and the implications of stance. I reason 
that ‘personal choice’, as a basis of truth claims in educational research, is difficult 
and lacking coherence with the everyday nature of educational assessment and 
evaluation. I emphasise the consequences to life chances that truth claims can 
have in education and try to articulate a stance that is more in keeping with the 
responsibility of the educational practitioner. I consider ‘what works’ as a theory to 
argue that what is known is of value only if it is known how it is known, and to what 
parameters it can be held to apply. I also give importance to ‘what is known to 
work’ in the community of scholars.  
In this research the concepts are epistemic beliefs about knowledge in 
history, which is useful in the contexts of curriculum change in history and informs 
preparations for examination for Cambridge International Examinations in 
Pakistan. Teachers’ concepts about history knowledge develop with such learning 
experiences as this excerpt from the focus group illustrates: 
‘Even Cambridge also gives us that little phrase ‘do you agree’ that gives 
you the answer that....Cambridge...that board is also giving them the liberty....there 
is no question in restricting them to your own opinion, they have the liberty. You 
should give them the liberty but you should give this aaa idea that they.....it should 
be proven, they should have valid reason for giving their opinions’ 
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One last point; I share whole heartedly, VanSledright’s concern for the 
teaching of critical reading. He states poignantly that the warrant to teach history 
in school lies in its opportunity to teach critical reading and that this was for him, 
‘the only warrant that mattered in the end’, VanSledright (2002, p.153). My 
experience with teachers exploring history accounts and their own epistemic 
beliefs in the 10 workshops across Pakistan has been that teachers would endorse 
this point of view as well.  
Research in the development of critical thinking is useful in the educational 
context of Pakistan. 
 
5.11 Alternative Explanations of Cause 
 
Shadish et al. (2002) raise concerns of critics such as Cronbach and Snow 
(1977) that ‘most causal relationships vary across units, settings and times, and 
so doubt whether there are any constant bivariate causal relationships’. In order to 
learn if a threat to both was possible and plausible, as argued by Shadish et al. 
(2002, p.40), I would need to know that the same threat was possible and plausible 
over the 4 studies out of 5 where the hypothesis is supported in this research. 
There are a range of broad similarities and fine differences within the persons and 
settings in the studies, but a common factor would need to be identified. Of the 5 
quasi experimental studies conducted in this research, 4 show more change in the 
Experimental Groups. The workshops were held over five months in three cities 
and three large school systems of Pakistan. Apart from the Intervention, the 
common factor could only be myself, the tutor, and my pedagogical method and 
materials that was working to change concepts. This, to the best of my knowledge, 
is the enhanced perception of agency as described in the Chapter on Research 
Methodology. It was the only, conscious, concerted, and organized, difference 
provided to all 5 Experimental Groups and not the Control Groups. There was, in 
this 5 month period of the workshops, no other training conducted, which only 
members of Experimental Groups could have attended. 
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The other possible and plausible explanation could be, to play the devil’s 
advocate, I read more into the responses and awarded a change category in the 
Experimental Group that I did not do for the Control Group as many times. That 
could easily happen in qualitative interpretation if the marking is not blind, 
systematic, or rigorous. A judgment on epistemic beliefs is difficult and slippery, 
therefore I used blind marking, developed the category scale and did Inter Rater 
and Internal Evaluation to improve reliability. However, there is room for 
improvement. 
Another explanation could lie in the statistical analysis. Data from all three 
measures, all tests in varying degrees and levels of testing, support the alternative 
hypothesis. Results are consistent in all tests but the reliability and validity of 
measures and quality of data differ as well as the statistics. Statistical significance 
in all tests is not to be expected considering the nature of the constructs and the 
size of the sample. Cronbach (1988) explains that validation tells a party what is 
strong or weak in their claim. I have tried to do that but conducting an evaluation 
of validity is difficult for practical reasons described in the document. 
Cook et al. (2010, p.114-115) argue that the only defensible warrant for 
causal assertions is that no alternative explanations are forthcoming from the 
relevant community of scholars and practitioners concerned with a given subject 
matter. They suggest that the ultimate warrant for causal inference is not tool 
based or even truth or logic-based; it is social. It has to do with intense scrutiny by 
a wide range of knowledgeable others. This is good insight and I would leave it at 
that. 
This is practitioner research using quasi experimental methods and the 
constraints and possibilities are made transparent. For an alternative explanation 
other than a perception of agency making a difference, a common cause needs to 
be identified in the Experimental Groups. That is a complex question to answer. 
There is coherence and a consistence to the result in many ways which is 
persuasive. 
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5.12 Participants Giving Reasons for Change 
 
A most useful, impromptu feedback session was conducted with an 
Experimental Group 10 days after the last session. I asked the participants to read 
their responses on both sets of pre-test and post-test to compare the difference. 
We discussed the change in responses. I then asked them what was it in the 
sessions, in the way in which they were conducted, that they could recall as having 
helped them to change. This transcript is most useful in providing some support to 
the argument that something like a perception of agency was perceived by 
participants and it was remembered even after the workshops were over. This 
focus group was in the afternoon at the end of the school day and teachers were 
busy marking papers and eating a hurried lunch but came good naturedly and sat 
through the session in a good spirit. They shared the microphone, and the 
recording fortunately is quite audible, although it is hard to recognize voices partly 
due to the whirring noise of the fan. The word ‘liberty’ interestingly, was mentioned 
in various ways at least five times. The participants of the focus group did not 
answer straight out but were reflective, thoughtful. Some key themes were, ‘you 
made us think’, ‘we stirred our minds’, ‘it depends on the teacher’s role’, ‘not 
authoritarian, more collaborative’, ‘depends on how much liberty teacher is giving’ 
‘you gave a chance to students to discuss..... whatever came in their minds’. This 
recording is valuable as possible evidence of a perception of agency standing out 
for the participants of the Experimental Group as something that made a difference 
in changing concepts. 
 
5.13 Final Thoughts 
 
In the end I conclude tentatively that a perception of agency does relate to 
change in concepts in task based discourse as my hypothesis states. The 
experience of a perception of agency in my workshops persuaded more people in 
the Experimental Groups to change their concepts and towards development in 
epistemic beliefs. Tentatively, this is what the data suggests. As for myself, the 
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practitioner researcher, I am intrigued by the results and shall try to maintain a 
perception of agency in task based discourse when working to change concepts 
in the future. 
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APPENDIX A1 
Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 
 
A Case Study 1 
 
In the video I mention, there is a group of 4 children in an early years 
classroom (Key Stage 1) working on a map drawing that has to be in keeping with 
the principles just defined by the teacher of plan views versus side views. The 
concept of plan view is contra intuitive and learners often draw maps incorporating 
both plan and side views in the same image. The children appear to have different 
concepts about this and are unable to find coherence or a meeting ground. One 
little girl, with strong views, is dominating the exercise and keeps using the eraser 
to rub off or change what she disapproves of to the frustration of the others. This 
edgy learning situation is a common feature in schools and one of the reasons 
perhaps why teachers resist so called group work. Watching the video, I realized 
that one aspect of the situation could be a perceived lack of agency in the task 
based discourse which might cause resistance to change. See 
http://tinyurl.com/mdrpjvd. 
 
A Case Study 2 
 
This is a case of another situation with reference to adult learners where 
concepts were found to be incongruent amongst a group of teacher educators and 
a perception of a lack of agency brought about resistance to change. Teacher 
educators in Pakistan had experience of teaching a course based on a technical 
rational view of knowledge. Learners were expected to read academic theory and 
reflect on own practice in its light, generally being critical of own practice. After 
some years and a change in university, the course was changed radically to one 
that was premised on practitioner research with its attendant philosophy of 
knowledge as constructed. Teacher trainers, who were not course developers, 
were now required to teach the gamut of research process from focusing circles, 
to selection of criteria and methods to evaluating teaching and learning using 
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evidence from practice. The trainers, however, whilst teaching its content of 
teacher research methods, kept up the old approach of technical rationality, one 
of knowledge as emanating from expert authority. Importantly, when a colleague 
argued the difference in the two approaches they banded together to resist the 
idea. Students were instructed that focusing circles were only meant to teach you 
how to organize your ideas and the requirement of the assignment was to review 
the literature and reflect upon it. With time however, the change in thinking came 
about. 
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APPENDIX-A2 
An Information Sheet 
 
 
Title of Research Project  : Classroom factors that support teacher  
      learning and conceptual change46  
 
Principal Researcher  : Lubna Kidwai 
 
Institution    : University of Bradford  
 
Supervisors    : Dr Ivan Reid, Dr George Sheeran 
 
Research Aim   : To investigate a link between classroom  
      process and conceptual change 
 
Charges    : There are no charges for the course. 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project. This is an independent 
research being conducted by a researcher, Lubna Kidwai, for the purpose of 
obtaining an award of a PhD from the University of Bradford, UK. 
 
Voluntary Participation 
 
This workshop and participation in research is purely voluntary. You may 
stop and leave at any time or refuse to answer any question. If you withdraw/leave 
from the workshop, you will not suffer any personal or professional harm or 
disadvantage. 
In order to help you decide, costs and benefits are described below. 
 
                                            
46 This was the Title at the time of the conduct of research. 
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Benefits 
 A Certificate of completion will be offered to those who complete with 
full attendance on all three days of the Course. 
 You will benefit by working together to understand how key concepts 
such as cause and significance, and skills such as analysis and 
reasoning can be taught. 
 You will benefit by understanding an ongoing change in the 
Cambridge History and Culture Syllabus as well as Syllabi around 
the world. 
 You will also benefit by learning good teaching practice in history and 
being part of a collaborative exercise. 
 An opportunity to carry out a project will be offered which you may 
choose to accept or decline. 
 
Risks/Discomfort 
 
 The training is free of charge, however you will need to pay Rupees 
200 for the Certificate. The Certificate is one of attendance and does 
not require any assessment. Your presence on all days will be 
enough. 
 The training is once a week for 3 weeks which will take your time and 
effort. 
 You will need to fill in several questionnaires which may be time 
consuming and tiring. 
 You will experience some conflict with your existing ideas and the 
new concepts you will come across. 
 You may be requested to permit an audio-record of the proceedings 
in some sessions which you may accept or refuse as you please. 
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Procedures to be Followed 
 
 You will be asked to fill out a series of questionnaires and task sheets 
in the beginning. We will ask for data about yourself such as the class 
you teach and the numbers of years you have been teaching. This 
will be recorded with number codes so that you remain anonymous. 
This data will be stored carefully to maintain confidentiality. 
 If you choose to attend the workshop offered, we will record how well 
you learn, and things that helped you learn.  
 At the end of the workshop we may ask you to take part in an 
interesting feedback session, which we would like to audio record 
with your permission. If you feel that is not acceptable we will not 
record the session. 
Duration 
 The workshops will take place over three days of 3 and a 1/2 hours 
each. 
 The questionnaires/tasks will be filled/carried out during the 
workshop. 
 
Consent Form 
 
I have read and understood the information given above.  
I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained.  
I understand that I will be free to withdraw and leave at any time.  
I agree to take part in the research. 
 
Signed : __________________ 
Date  : __________________ 
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PERSONAL DATA 
 
 
Name: ______________________________________________________ 
Gender:  Male      Female         
Age:  25 – 35 Yrs       35 – 45 Yrs    45 – 55 Yrs    55 & Above   
You Teach: Matric     O’ Levels          A’ Levels       
Subjects You Teach: __________________________________________ 
Years You Teach: 
Early Years   Primary   Middle School   Senior School         
A’ Levels       
You Teach: Boys   Girls   
Qualifications: BA / B Sc   Masters  
Any Courses Attended: _________________________________________ 
Years in Teaching:  _________________________________________ 
IELTS Score: (if available) _________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX-A2a 
The History Workshop Certificate 
 
Figure A2a: The History Workshop Certificate 
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APPENDIX-A2b 
History Workshops: Samples in All 5 Studies and in Total for Meta-Analysis 
 
List of Students and Missing Data 
 
 
(Missing includes those who did not attend on second or third day, did not submit 
the measure. Those 5 who were teaching Class 8 or Matric are also not included 
in Missing Data. They were counted out of the analysis even if they attended or 
submitted the assessment measure.) 
 
 
  
S/No Date Station Control Attended Missing 
Con Exp 
1.  6 & 20 January 2011 Rose 14 0 11 3 
7 January & 4 February 
2011 
‘ 0 12 6 6 
2.  31 January 2011  Tulip 0 6 6 0 
17 & 31 January 2011 ‘ 5 0 5 0 
3.  27 January &  
8 February 2011 
 
Jasmine 0 14 13 1 
26 January & 
7 February 2011 
 
‘ 15 0 11 4 
4.  10-12 May 2011 Bougainvillea 10 0 8 2 
19-21 May 2011 ‘ 0 12 11 1 
5.  16-18 May 2011 Pansy 6 0 5 1 
19-21 May 2011 ‘ 0 7 7 0 
     Total : 50 51 83 18 
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SUMMARY 
 
 Cities C E Total Missing 
a. Rose 11 6 17 9 
b. Tulip 5 6 11 - 
c. Jasmine 11 13 24 5 
d. Bougainvillea 8 11 19 3 
e. Pansy 5 7 12 1 
 G/Total 40 43 83 18 
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APPENDIX-A3 
Questions Adapted from those used by Boscolo and Mason 
 
First Name  Last Name  
 
1. What is History? 
 
2. How do people who write History know about the past they write about? 
 
3. What problems can historians have when they try to understand what 
happened in the past? 
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4. Is it possible to explain what happened in different ways? 
 
5. Why? 
 
6. If there are two different explanations, how is it possible to understand 
which is better? 
 
(Questions adapted from those used by Boscolo and Mason (2001); Bozo, Morra 
and Pierimarchi, 1989, described in Limon & Mason, 2002: 328) 
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APPENDIX-A4 
 
Beliefs About Learning and Teaching History 
 
First Name     Last Name    
 
BELIEFS ABOUT LEARNING AND TEACHING HISTORY 
 
1. Students who are good at memorization learn History quickly.  
Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
2. Corroborating evidence and identifying sources are important learning 
strategies in History, but only after mastering the basic facts. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
3. In History there is really nothing to understand; the facts speak for 
themselves. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
4. Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and 
students alike. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
5. Students who know their textbook well will be good at History. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
6. To learn History means mainly to study many facts about the past and 
commit them to memory. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
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7. Teachers need to avoid giving students conflicting sources, since it makes 
historical investigation impossible. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
8. In learning History, summarizing is more important than comparing. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
9. Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, only check that 
they know the facts. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
10. Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn History 
well. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
11. Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential 
components of the process of learning History. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
12. Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
13. It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with 
evidence and ask that History textbook authors do so also. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
14. Students who read many History books learn that the past is what the 
historian makes it to be. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
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15. Good students know that History is basically a matter of opinion. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
16. Students need to be aware that History is essentially a matter of 
interpretation. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
17. History should be taught like a story: Some things are true, but some others 
are just a matter of personal opinion. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
18. In reading a History book, it is more important to pay attention to the 
perspective of the historian than to his or her reasoning on the evidence 
discussed. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
19. Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students 
can believe whatever story they choose. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
20. Teaching that one historical interpretation is better than another is usually 
inappropriate. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
 
21. Teachers need to make all historical interpretations available and let the 
students construct their own understanding of them. 
 Strongly Agree…. Agree…. Neutral…. Disagree.... Strongly Disagree 
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Explanation of words in italics 
 
Corroborating: Confirming and checking. 
Historical method: Methods such as investigating, using sources to 
develop and evaluate historical accounts. 
Conflicting sources: Sources that seem to contradict each other. 
Comparing: Comparing sources of evidence. 
Author subtext: Underlying, or hidden meaning of the author. 
 
Note: 
Scale obtained after written advice from VanSledright, from  
Maggioni et al. (2009a). The adaptation is only a note with terms in 4 items 
elaborated. 
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APPENDIX-A5 
 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
 
First Name     Last Name    
 
Note: In this part, we want you to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with 
each of the statements listed below. Please circle the number that best corresponds 
to the strength of your belief. 
 
1. It bothers me when instructors don't tell students the answers to 
complicated problems. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
2. Truth means different things to different people.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
4. People should always obey the law.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
5. Some people will never be smart no matter how hard they work. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
6. Absolute moral truth does not exist.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
8. Really smart students don't have to work as hard to do well in 
school.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
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9. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most 
likely end up being confused.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
10. Too many theories just complicate things.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
11. The best ideas are often the most simple.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
12. People can't do too much about how smart they are.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
13. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
14. I like teachers who present several competing theories and let 
their students decide which is best.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
15. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
16. If you don't learn something quickly, you won't ever learn it.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
17. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don't.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
18. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
19. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them 
must be wrong.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
20. Children should be allowed to question their parents' authority.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
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21. If you haven't understood a chapter the first time through, going 
back over it won't help.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
22. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
23. The moral rules I live by apply to everyone.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
24. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.  
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
25. What is true today will be true tomorrow. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
26. Smart people are born that way. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
27. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
28. People who question authority are trouble makers. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
29. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
30. You can study something for years and still not really understand 
it. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
31. Sometimes there are no right answers to life's big problems. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
32. Some people are born with special gifts and talents. 
 Strongly Disagree     1      2      3      4      5      Strongly Agree 
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SK: Simple Knowledge 
Strongly Agree:   1, 10, 11, 13, 18 
Strongly Disagree:  24, 30 
CK: Certain Knowledge 
Strongly Agree:  19, 22, 23, 25  
Strongly Disagree: 2, 6, 14, 31 
OA: Omniscient Authority 
Strongly Disagree: 20 
Strongly agree:  4, 7, 27, 28 
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APPENDIX-A6 
EXPLAINING THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND INTERVENTION 
 
  (The design is presented here as employed in two studies in order to explain how it is replicated) 
 
Studies Control Group Experimental Group Tests Data 
Study A 
Context 
 
History workshop for O’ 
Level History teachers 
related to change in 
History Syllabus for CIE O’ 
Level Examination 
towards an assessment of 
concept of knowledge, 
evidence and ability to 
evaluate accounts. 
Workshop over 3 weeks, 1 
day a week 
 
History workshop for O’ 
Level History teachers 
related to change in 
History Syllabus for CIE 
O’ Level examination 
towards an assessment 
of concept of knowledge, 
evidence and ability to 
evaluate accounts.  
Workshop over 3 weeks, 
1 day a week 
Pre-Test and Post-
Test 
 
Matched 3 
Instruments to collect 
data at Pre-Test and 
Post-Test. 
a)  BM open 
ended questions with 
analysis to CBKH.  
b) BLTHQ Likert 
Scale 
c) EBI Likert 
Scale 
 
Intervention 1 
Necessary for 
control. 
Consistent method 
necessary to avoid 
threat. 
Workshop method 
Using a range of suitable 
examples Skemp (1971) 
of conflicting evidence and 
accounts  
Workshop method 
Using a range of suitable 
examples Skemp (1971) 
of conflicting evidence 
and accounts 
Pre-Test and Post-
Test 
Comparison of Pre-
Test and Post-Test 
performance of all 
groups. 
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Studies Control Group Experimental Group Tests Data 
Intervention 2 
(Experimental) 
 Intervention: 
 Introduction of an 
enhanced Perception of 
Agency. 
Comparison of 
Change in stance  
Control and 
Experimental 
Groups 
 
 
Study B 
 (Tulip) 
Context 
History workshop for O’ 
Level History teachers 
related to change in 
History Syllabus for CIE O’ 
Level Examination 
towards an assessment of 
concept of knowledge, 
evidence and ability to 
evaluate accounts.  
Workshop over 3 weeks, 1 
day a week 
History workshop for O’ 
Level History teachers 
related to change in 
History Syllabus for CIE 
O’ Level Examination 
towards an assessment 
of concept of knowledge, 
evidence and ability to 
evaluate accounts. 
Workshop over 3 weeks, 
1 day a week 
 
Pre-Test and Post-
Tests. 
Matched 3 
Instruments to collect 
data at Pre-Test and 
Post-Test. 
a)  BM open 
ended questions with 
analysis to CBKH.  
b) BLTHQ Likert 
Scale 
c) EBI Likert 
Scale 
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Studies Control Group Experimental Group Tests Data 
Intervention 1 
Necessary for 
control. 
Consistent method 
necessary to avoid 
threat. 
Workshop method 
Using a range of suitable 
examples Skemp (1971) 
of conflicting evidence and 
accounts 
Workshop method 
Using a range of suitable 
examples Skemp (1971) 
of conflicting evidence 
and accounts  
Pre-Test and 
Post-Test 
Comparison of 
pre-test and 
post-test 
performance of 
all groups. 
 
Intervention 2  Intervention: 
Introduction of an 
enhanced Perception 
of Agency. 
Comparison of 
change in 
stance  
Control and 
Experimental 
Groups 
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APPENDIX-A7 
Evaluation of Qualitative Analysis of Boscolo and Mason’s Open Ended 
Questions to the Rubric, Categories of Beliefs About Knowledge in History 
(CBKH) 
 
Table A7-1: 1st Internal Evaluation Score Comparison - 5 May 2014 
(Random numbers generated by using online Random Number Generator) 
 
Ser Random No of (1-168) Group 1st Int Eval 
Score 
Original Score 
1.  2 B 6 5 
2.  25 A 3 3 
3.  27 B 3 4 
4.  40 B 4 4 
5.  43 B 4 3 
6.  44 B 5 4 
7.  46 B 4 4 
8.  62 B 5 4 
9.  63 A 1 1 
10.  68 A 4 2 
11.  89 B 4 4 
12.  90 B 6 6 
13.  103 A 4 4 
14.  109 B 5 5 
15.  114 B 4 2 
16.  138 B 3 5 
17.  165 B 2 4 
  
Matched Scores: 11    Category Difference: 6 
Percentage of Matched Scores: 65% Percentage of mismatch: 35% 
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Table A7-2: 2nd Internal Evaluation Score Comparison - 11 May 2014 
 
Ser Random No of (1-168) Group 2nd Int Eval 
Score 
Original Score 
1.  4 B 5 4 
2.  18 A 6 3 
3.  30 A 4 1 
4.  44 A 4 3 
5.  49 B 4 1 
6.  61 A 3 4 
7.  64 A 5 5 
8.  71 A 3 2 
9.  72 B 2 4 
10.  73 B 1 4 
11.  79 A 3 1 
12.  81 B 3 4 
13.  94 B 4 3 
14.  110 A 4 4 
15.  128 A 4 2 
16.  145 A 3 3 
17.  153 A 2 4 
   
Matched Scores: 9     Category Difference: 8 
Percentage of Matched scores: 53%  Percentage of Mismatch: 47% 
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Table A7-3: 3rd Internal Evaluation Score Comparison - 24th May 2014 
Ser  Random No of 
(1-168) 
Group 3rd Int Eval 
Score 
Original 
Score 
Comparison 
1.  5 RC 2 2 Match 
2.  9 RC 4 4 M 
3.  23 TE 4 4 M 
4.  24 TC 4 4 M 
5.  31 JE 4 5 CD 
6.  41 JE 2 2 M 
7.  46 JC 2 2 M 
8.  59 RC 3 3 M 
9.  64 RE 2 2 M 
10.  72 TE 6 6 M 
11.  79 TC 2 2 M 
12.  85 JE 2 2 M 
13.  98 JC 2 2 M 
14.  114 BE 4 4 M 
15.  116 BC 4 3 CD 
16.  123 PC 4 4 M 
17.  166 PE 3 2 CD 
  
Matched Scores: 14     Category Difference: 3 
Percentage of Matched Scores: 82%  Percentage of Mismatch: 17% 
 
Table A7-4: Comparison of Three Internal Evaluations 
Internal Eval Percentage of Match Percentage of Mismatch 
Ist Internal Eval 65% 35% 
2nd Internal Eval 53% 47% 
3rd Internal Eval 82% 17% 
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APPENDIX-B  
Tables 1B to 27B 
 
Table 1-B: Paired Samples Statistics for Control Group 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pre-test score 3.03 40   0.891   0.141 
Post-test score 3.73 40 1.281 0.203 
 
Table 2-B: Paired Samples test for Control Group 
 
Paired Differences 
T DF Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pre-test score – 
Post-test score 
-0.700 1.067 0.169 -1.041 -0.359 -4.149 39   0.000 
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Table 3-B: Paired Samples Statistics for Experimental Group 
 
Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pretest score 3.02 43 0.963 0.147 
Post-test score 3.93 43 1.223 0.186 
 
Table 4-B: Paired Samples test for Experimental Group 
 
Paired Differences 
T DF Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pre-test score – 
Post-test score 
-0.907 1.130 0.172 -1.255 -.559 -5.263 42 .000 
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Table 5-B: Mean Ranks of No Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
No Change Control 10 6.65 66.50 
Experimental 9 13.72 123.50 
Total 19   
 
Table 6-B: Comparison of pre and post responses for each city in both Control and Experimental Groups 
Cities Control Group Experimental Group 
Z / P-value Decision Z / P-value Decision 
Rose -2.486/0.013 Significant Difference -2.041/0.041 Significant Difference 
Tulip -1.841/0.066 No Significant Difference -2.060/0.039 Significant Difference 
Jasmine -1.66/0.096 No Significant Difference -2.209/0.027 Significant Difference 
Bougainvillea -6.04/0.546 No Significant Difference -2.310/0.021 Significant Difference 
Pansy -1.732/0.083 No Significant Difference -3.8/0.705 No Significant Difference 
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Table 7-B: Mean Ranks of No Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
No Change Control 10 6.65 66.50 
Experimental 9 13.72 123.50 
Total 19   
 
Table 8-B: Mann Whitney Test Statistics of No Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 No Change 
Mann-Whitney U 11.500 
Wilcoxon W 66.500 
Z -2.858 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 
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Table 9-B: Mean Ranks of Degree Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Degree Change Control 12 8.33 100.00 
Experimental 15 18.53 278.00 
Total 27   
 
 
Table 10-B: Mann Whitney Test Statistics of Degree Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 Degree Change 
Mann-Whitney U 22.000 
Wilcoxon W 100.000 
Z -3.630 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
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Table 11-B: Mean Ranks of Category Change Category in Control and Experimental Group 
 Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Category Change Control 18 17.56 316.00 
Experimental 19 20.37 387.00 
Total 37   
 
Table 12-B: Mann Whitney Test Statistics of Degree Change Category in Control and Experimental 
Group 
 Category Change 
Mann-Whitney U 145.000 
Wilcoxon W 316.000 
Z -0.829 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.407 
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Table 13-B: Comparison of percentage of pre and post, Low and High stance, in Control and Experimental Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi - Square = 12.832   Chi - Square = 24.819 
DF = 1     DF = 1 
P-value = 0.000    P-value = 0.000 
 
  
Category  Control-Pre test Control –Post test Experimental –Pre test Experimental –Post test 
Low 29 13 31 8 
% 72.5 32.5 72.1 18.6 
High 11 27 12 35 
% 27.5 67.5 27.9 81.4 
Total 40 40 43 43 
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Table 14-B: In History there is really nothing to understand; the facts speak for themselves 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
5 6 11 11 7 18 
12.5 15.0 13.8 25.6 16.3 20.9 
Agree 
% 
22 17 39 22 23 45 
55.0 42.5 48.8 51.2 53.5 52.3 
Neutral 
% 
3 4 7 2 4 6 
7.5 10.0 8.8 4.7 9.3 7.0 
Disagree 
% 
9 5 14 7 5 12 
22.5 12.5 17.5 16.3 11.6 14.0 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 8 9 1 4 5 
2.5 20.0 11.3 2.3 9.3 5.8 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 7.462     Chi - Square = 3.711 
D.F = 4       D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.113      P-value = 0.447 
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Table 15-B: Students who know their textbook well will be good at History 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
5 5 10 3 1 4 
12.5 12.5 12.5 7.0 2.3 4.7 
Agree 
% 
17 17 34 19 29 48 
42.5 42.5 42.5 44.2 67.4 55.8 
Neutral 
% 
8 8 16 10 5 15 
20.0 20.0 20.0 23.3 11.6 17.4 
Disagree 
% 
9 7 16 10 6 16 
22.5 17.5 20.0 23.3 14.0 18.6 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 3 4 1 2 3 
2.5 7.5 5.0 2.3 4.7 3.5 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 1.250    Chi - Square = 6.083 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.870     P-value = 0.193 
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Table 16-B: To learn History means mainly to study many facts about the past and commit them to memory 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
9 8 17 9 11 20 
22.5 20.0 21.3 20.9 25.6 23.3 
Agree 
% 
11 12 23 14 16 30 
27.5 30.0 28.8 32.6 37.2 34.9 
Neutral 
% 
5 5 10 8 5 13 
12.5 12.5 12.5 18.6 11.6 15.1 
Disagree 
% 
15 11 26 8 8 16 
37.5 27.5 32.5 18.6 18.6 18.6 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
0 4 4 4 3 7 
0 10.0 5.0 9.3 7.0 8.1 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 4.718    Chi - Square = 1.168 
D.F = 4       D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.318     P-value = 0.883 
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 Table 17-B: In learning History, summarizing is more important than comparing. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
5 12 17 7 10 17 
12.5 30.0 21.3 16.3 23.3 19.8 
Agree 
% 
24 16 40 27 24 51 
60.0 40.0 50.0 62.8 55.8 59.3 
Neutral 
% 
6 4 10 3 3 6 
15.0 10.0 12.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Disagree 
% 
5 5 10 5 5 10 
12.5 12.5 12.5 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
0 3 3 1 1 2 
0 7.5 3.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 7.882    Chi - Square = 0.706 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.096     P-value = 0.951 
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Table 18-B: Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions only check that they know the facts. 
 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
11 9 20 16 13 29 
27.5 22.5 25.0 37.2 30.2 33.7 
Agree 
% 
19 21 40 18 22 40 
47.5 52.5 50.0 41.9 51.2 46.5 
Neutral 
% 
7 3 10 0 2 2 
17.5 7.5 12.5 0 4.7 2.3 
Disagree 
% 
3 6 9 8 3 11 
7.5 15.0 11.3 18.6 7.0 12.8 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
0 1 1 1 3 4 
0 2.5 1.3 2.3 7.0 4.7 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 3.900    Chi - Square = 5.983 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.420     P-value = 0.20 
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Table 19-B: Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn History well 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
4 4 8 2 5 7 
10.0 10.0 10.0 4.7 11.6 8.1 
Agree 
% 
18 17 35 21 25 46 
45.0 42.5 43.8 48.8 58.1 53.5 
Neutral 
% 
7 4 11 5 2 7 
17.5 10.0 13.8 11.6 4.7 8.1 
Disagree 
% 
10 13 23 12 11 23 
25.0 32.5 28.8 27.9 25.6 26.7 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 2 3 3 0 3 
2.5 5.0 3.8 7.0% 0 3.5 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 1.571    Chi - Square = 5.963 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.814     P-value = 0.202 
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Borrower Items 
 
Table 20-B: Students who read many History books learn that the past is what the historian makes it to be. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
0 3 3 4 0 4 
0 7.5 3.8 9.3 0 4.7 
Agree 
% 
5 5 10 7 10 17 
12.5 12.5 12.5 16.3 23.3 19.8 
Neutral 
% 
8 6 14 5 3 8 
20.0 15.0 17.5 11.6 7.0 9.3 
Disagree 
% 
20 19 39 19 21 40 
50.0 47.5 48.8 44.2 48.8 46.5 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
7 7 14 8 9 17 
17.5 17.5 17.5 18.6 20.9 19.8 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 3.311    Chi - Square = 5.188 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.507     P-value = 0.269 
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Table 21-B: Good students know that History is basically a matter of opinion. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
2 0 2 1 0 1 
5.0 0 2.5 2.3 0 1.2 
Agree 
% 
7 7 14 13 9 22 
17.5 17.5 17.5 30.2 20.9 25.6 
Neutral 
% 
12 11 23 5 6 11 
30.0 27.5 28.8 11.6 14.0 12.8 
Disagree 
% 
15 16 31 18 21 39 
37.5 40.0 38.8 41.9 48.8 45.3 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
4 6 10 6 7 13 
10.0 15.0 12.5 14.0 16.3 15.1 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 2.540    Chi - Square = 2.126 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.637     P-value = 0.713 
(Table 14-B also represents the Borrower stance. Most of the respondents Disagree with this Borrower stance at Control 
and Experimental Group. The Chi square test for both Control and Experimental Group shows no significant difference 
among pre-test and post-test stance). 
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Table 22-B: Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of interpretation. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
0 1 1    
0 2.5 1.3    
Agree 
% 
5 5 10 4 5 9 
12.5 12.5 12.5 9.3 11.6 10.5 
Neutral 
% 
5 5 10 5 4 9 
12.5 12.5 12.5 11.6 9.3 10.5 
Disagree 
% 
24 21 45 26 19 45 
60.0 52.5 56.3 60.5 44.2 52.3 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
6 8 14 8 15 23 
15.0 20.0 17.5 18.6 34.9 26.7 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 1.486    Chi - Square = 3.442 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.829     P-value = 0.382 
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Table 23-B: History should be taught like a story: Some things are true, but some others are just a matter of personal 
opinion. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
0 1 1 2 2 4 
0 2.5 1.3 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Agree 
% 
2 4 6 11 9 20 
5.0 10.0 7.5 25.6 20.9 23.3 
Neutral 
% 
5 8 13 3 4 7 
12.5 20.0 16.3 7.0 9.3 8.1 
Disagree 
% 
24 19 43 19 20 39 
60.0 47.5 53.8 44.2 46.5 45.3 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
9 8 17 8 8 16 
22.5 20.0 21.3 18.6 18.6 18.6 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 2.99     Chi - Square = 0.368 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.558     P-value = 0.985 
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Table 24-B: In reading a history book, it is more important to pay attention to the perspective of the historian than to his 
or her reasoning on the evidence discussed. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
2 4 6 4 3 7 
5.0 10.0 7.5 9.3 7.0 8.1 
Agree 
% 
8 11 19 13 14 27 
20.0 27.5 23.8 30.2 32.6 31.4 
Neutral 
% 
14 6 20 10 7 17 
35.0 15.0 25.0 23.3 16.3 19.8 
Disagree 
% 
15 14 29 14 13 27 
37.5 35.0 36.3 32.6 30.2 31.4 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 5 6 2 6 8 
2.5 12.5 7.5 4.7 14.0 9.3 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 7.042    Chi - Square = 2.746 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.134     P-value = 0.601 
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Table 25-B: Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students can believe whatever story they 
choose. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
6 9 15 7 11 18 
15.0 22.5 18.8 16.3 25.6 20.9 
Agree 
% 
19 19 38 24 23 47 
47.5 47.5 47.5 55.8 53.5 54.7 
Neutral 
% 
5 2 7 4 2 6 
12.5 5.0 8.8 9.3 4.7 7.0 
Disagree 
% 
9 8 17 7 6 13 
22.5 20.0 21.3 16.3 14.0 15.1 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
1 2 3 1 1 2 
2.5 5.0 3.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 2.278    Chi - Square = 1.654 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.685     P-value = 0.799 
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Table 26-B: Teaching that one historical interpretation is better than another is usually inappropriate. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Strongly Agree 
% 
1 1 2 3 4 7 
2.5 2.5 2.5 7.0 9.3 8.1 
Agree 
% 
9 18 27 14 15 29 
22.5 45.0 33.8 32.6 34.9 33.7 
Neutral 
% 
11 4 15 9 9 18 
27.5 10.0 18.8 20.9 20.9 20.9 
Disagree 
% 
15 10 25 13 13 26 
37.5 25.0 31.3 30.2 30.2 30.2 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
4 7 11 4 2 6 
10.0 17.5 13.8 9.3 4.7 7.0 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 8.085    Chi - Square = 0.844 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.089     P-value = 0.932 
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Table 27-B: Teachers need to make all historical interpretations available and let the students construct their own 
understanding of them. 
 Control Experimental 
Pre Test Post Test Total Pre Test Post Test Total 
Agree 
% 
4 3 7 4 4 8 
10.0 7.5 8.8 9.3 9.3 9.3 
Neutral 
% 
5 5 10 3 0 3 
12.5 12.5 12.5 7.0 0 3.5 
Disagree 
% 
17 12 29 18 20 38 
42.5 30.0 36.3 41.9 46.5 44.2 
Strongly Disagree 
% 
14 20 34 18 19 37 
35.0 50.0 42.5 41.9 44.2 43.0 
Total 
% 
40 40 80 43 43 86 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Chi - Square = 2.064    Chi - Square = 3.132 
D.F = 4      D.F = 4 
P-value = 0.559     P-value = 0.372 
A range is given for the interpretation of estimates of Cramer's V. A value higher than 0.25 indicates very strong 
relationship, value between 0.15 and 0.25 indicates strong relationship. Any estimates between 0.11 and 0.15 indicate 
moderate relationship. The estimates between 0.06 and 0.10 show weak relationship and the value between 0.01 and 0.05 
shows that the relationship between dependent and independent variable is negligible. 
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APPENDIX-C 
Discussion of Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
In the Control Group at post-test, Factor 1 explains 21.725% and the cut off 
value is 0.4, Factor 2 explains 15.89% with the same cut off value as Factor 1. 
Factor 3 explains 9.719% of variance with a cut off value of 0.5. Factor 4 explains 
7.99% of variance with a cut off value of 0.4. The reliability of Factor 1 to Factor 4 
is found to be 0.788, 0.720, 0.721 and 0.337 respectively. The percentage of 
variance and reliability value of Factor 4 and Factors 5, 6, 7 and 8 are very low 
(see Table 1), that is why I ignored Factors 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
Factor 1 appears with all Criterialist items i.e. Item 4: Knowledge of the 
historical method is fundamental for historians and students alike, Item11: 
Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential components of the 
process of learning History, and Item 13: Students need to be taught to deal with 
conflicting evidence, with high positive loading in combination with single Borrower 
Item i.e. Item 21: Teachers need to make all historical interpretations available and 
let the students construct their own understanding of them. This factor can be 
taken to reflect a Criterialist stance with a combination of Borrower Item i.e. Item 
21. The reliability of Factor 1 is found to be 0.778. Factor 2 represents an overall 
Copier stance and it appears with high positive loading on Item 9 i.e. Teachers 
should not question students’ historical opinions, only check that they know the 
facts, moderate loading on Item 8 i.e. In learning History, summarizing is more 
important than comparing, Item 6 i.e. To learn History means mainly to study many 
facts about the past and commit them to memory, Item 3 i.e. In History there is 
really nothing to understand; the facts speak for themselves, and low positive and 
negative loading on Item 1 i.e. Students who are good at memorization learn 
History quickly, Item 5 i.e. Students who know their textbook well will be good at 
History, with three Criterialist items i.e. Item 4 i.e. Knowledge of the historical 
method is fundamental for historians and students alike, Item 11 i.e. Comparing 
sources and looking for author subtext are essential components of the process of 
learning History, Item 13 i.e. It is fundamental that students are taught to support 
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their reasoning with evidence and ask that History textbook authors do so also. So 
this factor appears to represent a combination of Copier and Criterialist stance. Its 
cut off value is 0.4 and reliability is 0.720. The cut off value of Factor 3 is 0.5. Factor 
3 indicates a combination of a Borrower and Copier stance with high loading on 
Borrower items i.e. Item 19 i.e. Since there is no way to know what really happened 
in the past, students can believe whatever story they choose, Item 18 i.e. In reading 
a History book, it is more important to pay attention to the perspective of the 
historian than to his or her reasoning on the evidence discussed, and moderate 
and low loading on Copier items i.e. Item 5 i.e. Students who know their textbook 
well will be good at History, Item 10 i.e. Good general reading and comprehension 
skills are enough to learn History well, Item 3 i.e. In History there is really nothing 
to understand; the facts speak for themselves, Item 1 i.e. Students who are good 
at memorization learn History quickly, Item 7 i.e. Teachers need to avoid giving 
students conflicting sources, since it makes historical investigation impossible, and 
a single criterialist item, Item 14 i.e. Students who read many History books learn 
that the past is what the historian makes it to be. Factor 4 also reflects almost the 
same picture with no certain stance. 
In the Experimental Group at post-test, I again considered the first four 
factors as significant for understanding and interpretation. As stated above, I again 
opted different cut off values for different factors and considered only those items 
whose loadings are greater than or equal to these cut off values and ignored all 
those items whose loadings are less than these cut off values. The percentage of 
variance and cut off values of all four factors, with their respective reliability values.  
Based on loading, Factor 1 emerges completely and wholly a Criterialist 
stance with very high positive loading on all Criterialist items i.e. Item 4 i.e. 
Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and students 
alike, Item 11 i.e. Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential 
components of the process of learning History, Item 12 i.e. Students need to be 
taught to deal with conflicting evidence, Item 13 i.e. It is fundamental that students 
are taught to support their reasoning with evidence and ask that History textbook 
authors do so also. This high loading on Criterialist stance items at post-test differs 
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from the Control Groups in terms of loading, showing that the respondents’ attitude 
has changed considerably after intervention. Factor 1 of the post-test explains 
almost 18% of the overall variation in this set of data. I consider this factor can be 
taken to be a significant factor in my analysis as it clearly points to one single 
stance that of the Criterialist. The reliability scale for items of Factor 1 is 0.806, 
which indicates a high consistency in the data. The remaining variation left by 
Factor 1 is explained in Factor 2. Factor 2 explains 13.57% of variation and its 
reliability scale value is 0.733, which shows that this factor also contributes a 
significant role in post-test data. All items in Factors 2 except Item 21 represent 
the Copier items with very high loading on Item 1 i.e. Students who are good at 
memorization learn History quickly, high loading on Item 6 i.e. To learn History 
means mainly to study many facts about the past and commit them to memory, 
low loading on Item 17 i.e. History should be taught like a story: Some things are 
true, but some others are just a matter of personal opinion, Item 7 i.e. Teachers 
need to avoid giving students conflicting sources, since it makes historical 
investigation impossible, Item 2 i.e. Corroborating evidence and identifying 
sources are important learning strategies in History, but only after mastering the 
basic facts, and Item 3 i.e. In History there is really nothing to understand; the facts 
speak for themselves. Item 21of Borrower stance i.e. Teachers need to make all 
historical interpretations available and let the students construct their own 
understanding of them, appears with moderate loading. Thus, Factor 2 in the 
Experimental Group indicates a Copier stance of respondents. Factor 3 appears 
with high, moderate and low loadings on Borrower, Copier and Criterialist items. 
This shows the complex behavior of respondents. Factor 4 appears with the same 
picture as of Factor 3 with no single stance and shows uncertain behaviour of 
respondents. 
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Figure 1C: Scree Plot for Combined Data 
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